Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State

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The Global Campaign to Counter the Islamic State

On September 10, 2014, President Obama announced the formation of a global coalition to “degrade and ultimately defeat” the Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL/ISIS or the Arabic acronym Da’esh). Subsequently, over 60 nations and partner organizations agreed to participate, contributing either military forces or resources (or both) to the campaign. In Brussels in December 2014, 60 of these partners agreed to organize themselves along five “lines of effort,” (by contrast, the United States strategy involves nine lines of effort), with at least two countries in the lead for each:

- supporting military operations, capacity building, and training (led by the United States and Iraq);
- stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters (led by The Netherlands and Turkey);
- cutting off IS access to financing and funding (led by Italy, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States);
- addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises (led by Germany and the United Arab Emirates); and
- exposing IS’ true nature (led by the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

According to the U.S. State Department, there are currently 66 participants in the coalition, including Afghanistan, Albania, the Arab League, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, the European Union, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Each country is contributing to the coalition in a manner commensurate with its national interests and comparative advantage. Contributions include both military and non-military assistance, although reporting on non-military contributions tends to be sporadic, as many countries donate humanitarian assistance directly to local governments or non-governmental organizations operating on the ground. Still, some illustrative examples of the kinds of bilateral counter-IS assistance countries provided as the coalition was being formed in September 2014 include: Switzerland’s donation of $9 million in aid to Iraq, Belgium’s contribution of 13 tons of aid to

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1 For more information on the status of efforts to defeat the Islamic State, see CRS Report R43612, The Islamic State and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard and Carla E. Humud.
2 Testimony from Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, House Armed Services Committee, June 17, 2015.
5 U.S. Department of State, then Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL webpage, http://www.state.gov/s/seci/.
Iraq generally, Italy’s contribution of $2.5 million worth of weaponry (including machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and 1 million rounds of ammunition), and Japan’s granting of $6 million in emergency aid to specifically help displaced people in Northern Iraq.6

Counter-IS Coalition Mandate

In terms of the legal basis for the coalition, several United Nations Security Council Resolutions—in particular, 2170, 2178 and 2199—call on UN member states to take a variety of steps (to include coalition activities such as countering terrorist financing, assisting with humanitarian relief, countering IS messaging and assisting with stabilization support), although these fall short of explicitly authorizing the use of military force against the Islamic State. Some coalition participants have cited the Iraqi Government’s letter to the United Nations Security Council requesting defense assistance and stating that Iraq faces threats from IS safe havens in Syria as a further legal basis for participating in the military coalition. With respect to the U.S. contribution to the military campaign, some observers have argued that a new authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) is required;7 the Obama Administration maintains that it already has the necessary legal basis to prosecute the campaign through the 2001 AUMF (P.L. 107-40), and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (2002 AUMF; P.L. 107-243).8 Even so, U.S. Administration officials underscore that the military campaign is only one part of the overall effort to counter the Islamic State, asserting that success depends upon the ability to make progress in non-military areas.9

Military Aspects of the Coalition

Operation Inherent Resolve, the military component of the global coalition to defeat the Islamic State, began on August 8, 2014. Subsequently, according to United States Central Command and open source reporting, some 22 nations have joined the military component of the coalition. The current objectives of the coalition campaign are “destroying ISIL’s parent tumor in Iraq and Syria, combating its worldwide spread, and protecting all homelands.”10 Accordingly, the campaign currently has three primary military components: coordinated air strikes, training and equipping local security forces, and targeted special operations, some based out of Northern Iraq while others apparently dedicated to operations in Syria.11 The philosophy underpinning the campaign appears to be that fighting the Islamic State requires a long-term campaign for which Iraqis and their neighbors should take the lead; thus, in its view, U.S. and coalition forces should therefore

7See, for example, Richard Fontaine & Vance Serchuk, “Can We Finally Get An AUMF Right? As Congress debates the war authorization against Islamic State, it should learn from past mistakes” Politico, February 15, 2015; Paul Kane, “Congress Split Over Ways to Face the Islamic State,” The Washington Post, February 22, 2015.
focus on supporting Iraqis, Syrians, and others rather than taking on significant ground combat roles themselves.

According to the Department of Defense (DOD), as of March 15, 2016, the coalition conducted 10,962 airstrikes; 7,336 of those in Iraq and the balance (3,626) in Syria. By March 17, 2016, 22,779 targets were destroyed. The United States has spent $6.4 billion on counter-IS military operations since August 8, 2014, with an average daily cost of $11.5 million. Figure 1 illustrates the average daily cost of operations, by month, since August 2015:

Towards the end of 2015, the campaign to counter the Islamic State experienced several notable setbacks. First, despite the expenditure of upwards of $500 million, the Department of Defense proved unable to field more than a “handful” of anti-IS troops in the Syrian battle space. Second, the Islamic State demonstrated a degree of strategic-level reach by inspiring (and in some cases coordinating) attacks in Western cities, notably Paris, Brussels, and San Bernardino, and expanding to other countries, including Libya. As a result of these and other developments, the Obama Administration determined it should alter its military campaign plan, shifting away from its “Iraq First” approach to sequencing the campaign and targeting the Islamic State more directly while “accelerating” its overall anti-IS operations.

Reflecting this decision, Secretary Carter announced that the U.S. would send an Expeditionary Targeting Force (ETF) of around 200 soldiers to the Iraqi theater. While the precise tasks of the ETF are classified, it is generally believed that it conducts raids and other operations, and collects intelligence. Carter also announced a 50% increase in DOD’s budget request for operations and capabilities associated with countering the Islamic State, for a total of $7.5 billion. The request includes $1.8 billion to purchase 45,000 GPS-guided smart bombs and laser-guided rockets, as well as an investment in maintaining 4th generation fighter and attack jets, including the A-10.
In February of 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter expressed his frustration that military coalition partners were not doing enough to shoulder the military burden of countering the Islamic State.\footnote{19} Shortly thereafter, Secretary Carter met with his counterparts from a number of the coalition contributing nations at NATO Headquarters in Brussels to generate additional contributions to the campaign and brief other nations on the United States’ updated concept of operations for OIR. The latter was unanimously agreed upon. In terms of force generation, Secretary Carter noted, “[i]n sum, nearly 90 percent of the countries participating in the coalition’s military campaign have stepped up to do more in the last months and days.”\footnote{20} According to public sources, contributions from coalition participants included extending air operations to Syria, training police, stabilizing, assisting in recovery, and providing more trainers, critical logistic support and materiel to local partners on the ground.\footnote{21}

On April 6, 2016, Pentagon officials stated that the coalition has “degraded the enemy’s ability to move freely on the battlefield while regaining significant amounts of territory and degrading [IS] leadership and resources.”\footnote{22}

\section*{Russia}\footnote{23}

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on March 14, 2016, that Russia would begin withdrawing the “main part” of its forces in Syria.\footnote{24} Observers subsequently noted that this did not indicate a full withdrawal from Syria. As some observers note, “what is happening on the ground is a drawdown of forces that were surged to Syria in the aftermath of the shootdown of a Russian Su-24 by Turkey in November 2015 and the intensified fighting over the winter.”\footnote{25} Russia has retained a number of its aircraft in Syria, its naval basing at Tartous, as well as its S-400 air defense system in Latakia. Russia initially built up its military presence at Latakia in September 2015 and launched an air campaign on September 30.

In part because of Moscow’s long history and relationship with the Asad regime, Russia’s strategic priorities in Syria appear to fundamentally differ from those of the U.S.-led counter-IS coalition, which has generally argued that Asad could not remain in power as a result of any settlement arrangements. These strategic differences manifested in Russia’s military targeting priorities. Through mid-November, Russia had largely struck what it referred to as “terrorist” elements opposed to the Asad regime, including – but not limited to – the Islamic State.\footnote{26} A cessation of hostilities agreement had largely frozen fighting between pro-Asad forces and select

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{21} Ibid.
\footnote{23} For more information, see CRS Insight IN10360, \textit{Russian Deployments in Syria Complicate U.S. Policy}, by Carla E. Humud et al.
\footnote{24} Denis Dyomkin and Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Putin Says Russians To Start Withdrawing From Syria, As Peace Talks Resume,” \textit{Reuters}, March 15, 2016.
\footnote{25} Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
opposition forces as of early April, but reports suggested that Russian-supported Syrian military operations against Islamic State targets were ongoing.

**Turkey**

Before the initial publication of this report, in July 2015, Turkey expanded its participation in the coalition by taking direct military action in Syria and allowing other coalition planes to utilize Turkish airspace and bases to conduct strikes on the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Shortly after Turkey commenced military strikes against the Islamic State in Syria in late July, Turkey resumed hostilities with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), ending a cease fire that had been in place since March 2013. As Prime Minister Davutoglu said in September 2015, “by mounting operations against [the Islamic State] and the PKK at the same time, we also prevented the PKK from legitimizing itself.” Turkey is reportedly worried about recent gains by the Syria-Based People's Protection Units (Kurdish acronym YPG), and about increased YPG closeness with the United States because of the YPG’s emergence as arguably the most capable anti-IS ground force in Syria. Some observers speculate that Turkey is more concerned about containing Kurdish political aspirations (with their potential cross-border implications) than countering Islamist extremism at and within its borders.28

**Challenges to Coalition Coherence**

Organizing and prosecuting a coalition campaign presents a variety of challenges in addition to the military task of defeating an opponent. In the first instance, without a single authority responsible for prioritizing and adjudicating between different multinational civilian and military lines of effort, various actors often work at cross-purposes without intending to do so. These coalition coordination challenges were demonstrated in recent military campaigns (particularly in Afghanistan). Exacerbating matters, other actors in the region—some of whom are coalition partners—have different, and often conflicting, longer-term regional geopolitical interests from those of the United States or other coalition members. This, in turn, may lead nations participating in the coalition to advance their goals and objectives in ways that might contradict each other. Finally, participants in the coalition have different tolerances for risk, and therefore will determine “rules of engagement” (ROE), or “caveats” that can constrain the ability of military commanders from employing military force as they see fit. While navigable, all these factors can make it considerably more difficult to consolidate gains and achieve campaign success.

This brief report offers several figures. The first is a map of the training and capacity building bases across Iraq, and key nations operating out of those bases as reported by United States Central Command and supplemented with open source reporting. The second is a table depicting participants in the military campaign, and what specifically each country is contributing in terms of military forces, according to open source data compiled by CRS and information provided by United States Central Command at the time of writing. This report update reflects significant changes regarding the coalition’s composition up until March 25, 2016.

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Figure 2. Country Participation at Training and Capacity Building Bases in Iraq

Source: United States Central Command and Open Source Reporting, as of March 25, 2016.
Table 1. Military Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State

As of early March 2016, approximately 10,300 personnel from the U.S. and partner nations were deployed in support of counter-ISIL coalition operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>TRAINING AND ADVISING MISSION CONTRIBUTIONS</th>
<th>AIRSTRIKE CONTRIBUTIONS</th>
<th>OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Approx. 380 personnel, chiefly in Iraq, including 80 special forces personnel advising Iraqi counterterrorist units(^a)</td>
<td>Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; 6 F/A-18 Hornet fighters, a tanker aircraft, and an airborne control aircraft</td>
<td>Approx. 400 personnel in support of missions that include air-combat and air-combat support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Strike operations in Syria; unspecified number of aircraft</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Approx. 35 personnel</td>
<td>Strike operations in Iraq; airstrike mission discontinued(^b)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Approx. 207 personnel, chiefly in Iraq, including an unspecified number of medical personnel to train Iraqi security forces(^c)</td>
<td>Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; airstrike mission discontinued on February 15, 2016(^d) 1 CC-150 Polaris transport aircraft and 2 CP-140 Aurora surveillance aircraft remain in theater</td>
<td>Approx. 623 personnel in support of missions that include air-to-air refueling and aerial intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Approx. 120 personnel, chiefly in Iraq</td>
<td>Strike operations in Iraq; airstrike mission is currently non-operational(^e)</td>
<td>Approx. 20 staff officers at coalition regional headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Approx. 50 personnel, chiefly in Iraq(^f)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)\(^b\)\(^c\)\(^d\)\(^e\)\(^f\)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Unspecified number of approx. 1,000 total personnel in theater&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; at least 6 Dassault Rafale M multi-role fighters and 8 Dassault Mirage 2000D fighters; support aircraft that include at least 1 C-135FR tankers and 1 Breguet Atlantique 2 maritime patrol aircraft; and sea-based operations that include 1 La Fayette-class frigate&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Unspecified number of approx. 1,000 total personnel in theater in support of missions that include air combat and air combat support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Approx. 150 personnel, chiefly in Iraq</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Maximum of 1,200 personnel based in locations including Turkey, Qatar and Kuwait in support of missions that include air-to-air refueling and aerial ISR; additional platforms and systems including 6 Panavia Tornado ECR reconnaissance aircraft, 1 Airbus A310 MRTT tanker; and 1 F122 Bremen-class frigate&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Approx. 300 personnel, chiefly in Iraq, including approx. 90 Carabinieri military police personnel providing training for the Iraqi Police&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Approx. 260 personnel in support of missions that include air-to-air refueling and aerial ISR; additional platforms and systems including 4 Panavia Tornado IDS fighters (flying aerial ISR missions), 1 Boeing KC-767A, and 2 MQ-1 Predator UAVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Training grounds</td>
<td>Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; unspecified number of aircraft that include at least 20 F-16 fighters and 8 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Unspecified number of additional personnel in support of missions that include air combat and air combat support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Unspecified number of personnel, chiefly in support of training Iraqi Security Forces personnel</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>In February 2016, the NATO Defence Ministers agreed to deploy NATO-operated Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft to backfill national AWACS capabilities as needed&lt;sup&gt;h&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRY</td>
<td>TRAINING AND ADVISING MISSION CONTRIBUTIONS</td>
<td>AIRSTRIKE CONTRIBUTIONS</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Approx. 145 personnel, chiefly in Iraq</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Approx. 130 personnel, chiefly in Iraq</td>
<td>Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; at least 6 F-16 fighters and 2 reserve F-16s&lt;sup&gt;m&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Approx. 250 personnel in support of missions that include air-combat and air-combat support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Approx. 120 personnel, chiefly in Iraq</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Approx. 30 personnel</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>Training grounds</td>
<td>Unspecified number of aircraft</td>
<td>Provision of in-country basing and overflight authorizations for U.S. forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Training grounds; unspecified number of personnel to train Iraqi Security Forces</td>
<td>Strike operations in Syria; unspecified number of aircraft, including at least 4 F-15 fighters</td>
<td>Announcement of plans to form a 34-nation Islamic military alliance to combat terrorism in December 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Approx. 300 personnel</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Approx. 35 personnel, chiefly in Iraq</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Training grounds</td>
<td>Strike operations in Syria; unspecified number of aircraft&lt;sup&gt;®&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Long-range artillery strikes in northern Iraq and Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
<td>Unspecified number of personnel to be deployed in Iraq; unspecified number of special forces personnel to be deployed in Syria</td>
<td>Strike operations in Syria; at least 8 F-16 fighters&lt;sup&gt;®&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Approx. 275 personnel</td>
<td>Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; unspecified number of Tornado GR4 aircraft and Typhoon FGR4s&lt;sup&gt;®&lt;/sup&gt;.</td>
<td>Approx. 630 personnel in support of missions that include air-combat and air-combat support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Unspecified number of approx. 3,550 personnel in Iraq; approx. 700 personnel in Syria&lt;sup&gt;®&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Strike operations in Iraq and Syria; unspecified number of aircraft—largest contributor of material and personnel resources to the coalition</td>
<td>Cyber operations against Islamic State targets&lt;sup&gt;®&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Open source reporting as of 25 March 2016. CRS requested, but did not receive, DOD review of these figures.

**Notes:** Country personnel and material contributions are approximate due to rotations in and out of theater, and are subject to rapid fluctuations based on changing operational circumstances.

- b. Belgium’s contribution to the airstrikes against ISIL ended June 30, 2015, due to financial constraints. Six Belgian F-16 fighters spent nine months in Jordan. In a joint press conference with Secretary of State John Kerry on March 25, 2016 Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel indicated that Belgian F-16s may resume airstrike operations against Islamic State targets in the coming months.
- d. 6 Canadian Armed Forces CF-18 Hornets conducted 1,378 sorties between October 2014 and February 2016. See also Government of Canada, “Canadian Armed Forces cease airstrike operations in Iraq and Syria,” February 17, 2016.
- e. 7 Danish F-16 fighter aircraft were redeployed to Denmark for refitting and refurbishment in late August 2015. In early March 2016, the Danish Ministry of Defense submitted a proposal to the Danish Parliament that would authorize the re-deployment of F-16s for airstrike operations in Iraq and Syria, deploy a C-130J transport aircraft, and add a new personnel contingent that would include approximately 60 special forces personnel to train and advise Iraqi Security Forces personnel. Approximately 170 personnel would be deployed in air-combat and air-transport roles.
- f. On February 26, 2016, the Finnish government announced that as of September 1, 2016, approximately 50 additional personnel would be deployed in support of existing training and advising missions in Northern Iraq, for a total of 100 trainers and military advisers.
France began conducting ground-based airstrikes against Syrian targets in September 2015. France’s capacity to conduct airstrikes increased during December 2015-February 2016, when the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, together with France’s carrier battle group (Groupe Aéronaval or GAN) arrived in theater and took command of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s Task Force 50.


Open sources indicate that up to 20 Jordanian F-16 aircraft participated in airstrikes against ISIL carried out in early 2015, but do not indicate approximate numbers of F-16s that may participate in regular Jordanian airstrikes against ISIL.


Open sources do not indicate if all of these aircraft are flown in combat sorties against ISIL or if they provide force protection for Dutch ground forces.

In early 2015, the Swedish Parliament approved 35 trainers to be sent to Iraq, with an additional 85 personnel available if necessary for reinforcement or evacuation operations.

On or around December 3, 2015, Turkey deployed “hundreds” of personnel to northern Iraq as part of a “routine rotation” of its train-and-assist mission. The Iraqi Government disputed the legality of the deployment. While Turkey maintains that this action was undertaken with the “full knowledge” of the counter-ISIL coalition, this deployment appears to be a bilateral move independent of the U.S.-led military campaign. Open source reports from February 2016 indicate that Turkish personnel may still be conducting operations in the region.

Based on a recent agreement struck between the United States and Turkey on July 23, 2015.

Estimated number of F-16s derived from press photos of the UAE squadron deployed in Jordan.

The United Kingdom House of Commons voted on December 2, 2015 to authorize airstrikes against IS targets in Syria—Royal Air Force airstrikes against IS targets in Iraq have been ongoing since October 2014.

The United States has pledged 400 to 700 troops to train Syrian forces. It is unclear how many forces are currently in place. The U.S. is also deploying 50 Special Operations Forces plus an “expeditionary targeting force” of approximately 100 soldiers to Northern Iraq, who may conduct operations in Syria if operational circumstances dictate.

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