A WARNING AND A PLAN FOR LASTING PEACE

Immanuel Kant knew partisanship and the violence of war at close hand. Most of his life had been spent in one of the most militaristic nations in history: Frederick the Great’s Prussia. All around him, Kant had heard ceaseless extolling of military courage, seen the young indoctrinated to accept death in battle, and witnessed war after war—now against one state, now against another, according to the changing patterns of alliances. He was scathing in his denunciation of rulers for siphoning off all available funds to pay for war, and he portrayed states as lawless protagonists displaying in their relations with one another “the depravity of human nature . . . without disguise.”

When, in 1795, Kant finally published “Perpetual Peace,” his passionate plea for a change in international relations, he was over seventy years old. In this essay, Kant presented a stark choice for governments: they must either make collective efforts to ensure survival or face joint self-destruction. To be sure, he argued, war had long served the function of motivating peoples to innovate and to exert themselves in order to prevail against their enemies. But unless nations could now reverse course, he
warned, wars would grow increasingly violent and periods of peace would become more burdened by rearmament and by hostile policies that would lead to further conflict, ending in a final war of extermination.

Such a war of extermination, he wrote, "in which both parties and justice itself might all be simultaneously annihilated, would allow perpetual peace only on the vast graveyard of the human race." To the story so relentlessly retold through the centuries, of societies caught in a spiral of mutual distrust and injury that inflames partisanship on all sides, Kant could hint at an ending so final as to preclude any further reenactment. His conjecture that warring nations and justice itself might perish together speaks to us today in a more direct way than he could have anticipated. His own conclusion was firm: "A war [of extermination] and the employment of all means which might bring it about must thus be absolutely prohibited." Kant proposed a plan, in his essay, for the nations of the world to break free from the destructive patterns of conduct that make such a war possible, by deciding to cooperate in bringing about a lasting peace. The plan involved a change, over time, to representative government in as many states as possible; and it called for their joining together in a federation of free states to keep the peace. Freedom and equality, he suggested, would be indispensable for citizens of such states and would enable them to resist being drawn into the new wars upon which their rulers were otherwise all too likely to embark. Federation would be most likely to promote justice within and between states, while preserving their unique characteristics and freedom vis-à-vis each other.

For this purpose, he called for autonomous states to join in submitting voluntarily to laws they had themselves authored. In speaking of "autonomy," Kant used a concept that the Greeks had applied primarily to states living under self-imposed laws; but he brought this notion of a law freely enacted and imposed upon oneself to bear on three levels of human conduct: on the conduct of individuals, of communities or nations in their internal affairs, and of a future federation of states. This self-imposed moral law would enjoin people, singly or collectively, to "act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." And such maxims could only be those which called for respecting all human beings in their own right, rather than treating them merely as means to other ends.

Only through autonomy, thus interpreted and applied, could governments achieve universal rather than partisan respect for human rights. First to go, for any person or group taking autonomy seriously, would be those policies of violence, deceit, and open or secret treachery which violate these rights and do most to increase distrust, exacerbate conflict, and endanger world peace. Such policies cannot be coherently framed as universal laws. If individuals could reject such policies in their own lives, and urge states to do so as well and to join with other states in diminishing their use internationally, they could help counteract the most debilitating aspects of partisanship. It would then be possible for people to strive for justice without blinding themselves to the humanity of others, without losing the capacity to reason adequately about their own predicament, and without succumbing to the patterns of bitterness and revenge that stand in the way of more reasonable approaches to conflicts.

For Kant to stress the need for attention to morality in order to reduce the threat of war was hardly new. But it was unusual to do so both with respect to individual and to government conduct, domestically and internationally. Those who have written on how to achieve a permanent peace before and after Kant have tended to focus, rather,
on one single level of conduct—personal, societal, or international. Some, like the early Christian pacifists or Erasmus and Tolstoy, have written as if what is primarily needed is some fundamental change in human nature and in the thinking and conduct of individuals. Others, Marx, Lenin, and Mao among them, have trusted that changes in social structure that they believed historically determined would do away with the need or desire to go to war; thus Mao claimed that humanity, once it had destroyed capitalism, would “attain the era of eternal peace.” Still others have proposed a world government or international order strong enough to prevent nations from going to war.

Kant, on the other hand, called for coordinated efforts at change on all three levels. Only in such a mutually supportive manner would it be possible to achieve the minimal trust without which no lasting peace can be established. Admittedly, there would be special difficulties in applying workable constraints at the international level. Kant fully agreed with the English thinker Thomas Hobbes that nations coexist in a “state of nature” in which they can call on no superior authority to impose justice among them. But unlike Hobbes, he nevertheless claimed that it was possible for them to bring about a condition of lasting peace, by freely choosing moral and political constraints and then abiding by them.

Of course Kant knew that despotism at home and lawlessness and intense distrust among nations stood in the way of bringing about such fundamental changes right away. He therefore proposed certain “preliminary articles” to help prepare the atmosphere for the larger institutional reforms and for lasting peace.* These articles

* After the preliminary articles, Kant states three “definitive articles” of a perpetual peace between nations. They stipulate that the civil constitution of every state shall be republican in the sense of guaranteeing freedom for all members of a society, a common legislation for all, and legal equality for all; that the right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states; and that hospitality shall be extended even to strangers in at least the limited sense of not oppressing them, conquering them, or otherwise treating them with hostility. Kant acknowledges that the definitive articles will be attained gradually, if at all, and only on the basis of the trust made possible by first adhering to the preliminary articles. Yet only the definitive ones provide the conditions for lasting trust and thus for a lasting peace. Many nations have come closer to living up to the first article than in Kant’s day, and we have much more experience with, and debate about, international federations (such as the UN) and the rights of strangers. While complexities far beyond what Kant envisaged have become apparent about the details of the institutions needed for a lasting peace, his three definitive articles point in the right direction. In this book, I focus primarily on the prerequisites for moving in that direction in a mixed world in which nonrepublics (in Kant’s sense) still have great power.
is the first, as far as I know, to have emphasized all four in
the context of war and peace. He saw them as fundamen-
tal, however often breached, to the conduct of individuals
and societies, no matter how different their forms of gov-
ernment. If they could be taken more seriously, not only
at the individual but at the national and international lev-
els, they could help establish the right climate for achiev-
ing widespread collaboration toward greater justice and a
lasting peace.

MORAL CONSTRAINTS FREELY CHOSEN
I have nothing new to teach the world. Truth and
nonviolence are as old as the hills.

MOHANDAS GANDHI

Kant would have agreed with Gandhi. There is noth-
ing new either in stressing truth and nonviolence or in the
 corresponding constraints on deceit and violence, for
 these, too, are as old as the hills. Every major religion,
every moral tradition, every society has recognized the
need for at least some constraints on deceit and violence,
since they are the two ways by which human beings delib-
erately injure one another. 9 From the Buddhist Five Pre-
cepts that delineate “right action” to the Bible’s Ten
Commandments, from the five Jaina Great Vows to the
maxims of Confucius and his followers or the dictates of
the Roman Stoics, false speech and resort to violence are
consistently rejected. These traditions differ when it
comes to questions of religious belief, sexual conduct, and
asceticism; but they speak in unison in condemning vio-

To be sure, the various traditions do not agree in
every detail even on these two counts. Some texts speak
of violence in general, others of killing, still others of mur-
der. Some groups condemn violence against any living
organism down to the smallest gnat, as do the Jains; others
intend most living beings; still others prohibit it only
against human beings in particular or certain categories of
people. Likewise, with respect to falsehood, some rule out
all false speech, others all lies or, as in the biblical Com-
mandment, the bearing of false witness against one’s
neighbors. All have found it necessary to debate just how
to define and delimit the forms of violence and deceit that
they reject and to consider the questions of scope and per-
spective raised in Chapter I. But in spite of differences of
interpretation, the universal insistence on firm constraints
on violence and on deceit speaks to the need for any com-

Kant, like Gandhi, links both constraints; like Gan-
dhi, too, he sees them as required between all individuals
and all nations, not merely within a community. 11 Force
and fraud, violence and cunning—no lasting peace will be
possible, he argues, so long as nations continue to rely on
these means of aggression. He proposes a strong and im-
mediate prohibition of violence among nations, first of all,
to prevent peace from degenerating into war, or war into
mutual extermination. This is not to say that he was op-
posed to all use of force by a state; he concedes that the recourse to force is legitimate in defensive wars as a last resort. But even then, it must be limited to combatants; and forms of violence such as poisoning and assassination should be ruled out no matter what the provocation. He rejects the use of force to interfere in the governance of other nations and to colonize new territories. Like Simone Weil, Kant saw the capacity for violence brought by wars as intoxicating, corrupting, and debilitating to judgment. To him, war was "the destroyer of everything good." 13

Kant often denounced deceit with special vehemence. Even in his earliest lectures on ethics, he had singled it out as especially corrupting and as undermining the precarious trust on which human society is based. Though violence clearly represents the greatest immediate threat, deceit can disguise planned violence along with every other harm until it is too late to take precautions. Lying, for Kant, repudiates one's own human dignity just as it undercuts the communication that is the foundation of social intercourse. He therefore sees it as more hateful even than violence: it attacks "the very roots of our thinking," he wrote in a letter, "by casting doubt and suspicion on everything." 14 In his emphasis on the effects of deceit on trust, Kant was at one with John Stuart Mill, who argued that every deviation from truth helps weaken that trustworthiness of human assertion which is the "principal support of all present social well-being." 15

To keep such practices of violence and deceit under control and cut them back, however, more than principles or commandments are usually needed. People have to undertake to respect them. Promises, vows, or covenants play a central role in most societies, as does the related virtue of trustworthiness, of holding to one's word, of being a person of honor. As a result, a third constraint is stressed in just about all moral traditions: that on betrayal, on going back on one's word. Whatever principle one has promised to uphold, fidelity to one's promise then becomes essential, and breaching it constitutes betrayal. Indeed, keeping one's word is rarely more sacred than in criminal and other clandestine organizations, where members engage in violence and deceit directed against outsiders but need to guard against such tactics among themselves.

The conflict between fidelity and betrayal is therefore as common in all societies as that between violence and nonviolence, or between deceit and truthfulness. It is no accident that the three lowest circles in Dante's Inferno are those devoted, precisely, to the sins of violence, deceit, and treachery. 16 Nor is it hard to understand why those who personify evil as Satan or some other figure so often depict the character as a master tormentor, the "Father of Lies," and a traitor to all loyalties.

In his essay, Kant likewise emphasizes fidelity to promises and contracts. Breaches of trust, he argues, destroy not only the bonds between persons but also the far more fragile ones between nations. To undermine promises, contracts, and treaties is to invite further violence, further deceit, further betrayal. Elsewhere, he links the betrayal of promises with deceit and with the secrecy that conceals deceit. 17 In his eyes, the "fawning, clandestine, deceitful enemy" was "far baser than the open one, even though the latter be violent. He who openly declares himself an enemy can be relied upon; but the treachery of secret malice, if it became universal, would mean the end of all confidence." 18

Needless to say, Kant did not hold that all promises are valid—in particular, not promises to do something unlawful or to infringe on human rights, as in conspiracies to rob or kill. But lawful promises between individuals should be honored at all costs; so should commitments between citizens and governments, and treaties between nations. On this score, Kant was in full agreement with
Hugo Grotius, the Dutch scholar and diplomat, who had written a century and a half before that good faith is “not only the principal hold by which governments are bound together but the keystone by which the larger society of nations is united.”

Kant broke new ground in stressing a fourth constraint, on excessive government secrecy. The functioning of the representative form of government that he advocated (the only stable example at the time being that of the United States) depended crucially on citizens having access to accurate information on which to base their decisions. Both at the beginning and at the end of his essay, Kant insisted on the need to curtail official secrecy. When states sign a peace agreement, they should not make secret reservations enabling them to fight a future war. And between rulers and their subjects, matters of public concern should be openly debated. Secret police, star-chamber proceedings, and the rigid political and religious censorship that prevailed in so many nations offended justice and allowed corruption and abuses of every kind to flourish. It was the citizens’ right, however rarely honored, to be openly consulted about whether or not their nation should go to war. This, too, would serve the cause of peace; since citizens had to bear the brunt of the suffering that wars being, they would be much more cautious than kings and chancellors about agreeing to such ventures.

But the warning against state secrecy had to be carefully worded, since secrecy can also protect what is legitimately private. Secrecy differs from violence, deceit, and breaches of faith in that there can be no general presumption against it. While it is to be feared when it conceals wrongdoing, it can also protect individuals and groups from unjustified intrusions and all other harm. With respect to individuals, in particular, the presumption must be in favor of their retaining control over secrecy and openness regarding personal matters; the burden of proof is on those who would deny the individual citizen such control. But this burden shifts for governments. They must justify all recourse to secrecy, since their vast power to do harm and to disregard the rights of citizens is magnified to the extent that they can do so in a clandestine way.

The constraint on secrecy serves a double function in Kant’s essay. In the first place, it is meant to limit the degree to which governments actually engage in secret policies that cannot stand the light of day. And second, the publicity that it calls for can serve as a test of wrongful policies. “All actions affecting the rights of others are wrong if their maxim is not compatible with their being made public.” Secret government practices, unless they can be publicly and persuasively justified (as in the case of confidential employee records, ongoing diplomatic negotiations, and certain matters of military security), are dangerous in the extreme. The test of publicity can also be applied to forms of secrecy themselves. Citizens may well be able to accept secrecy with respect to employee records, for instance, if reasons thought to justify it are carefully explained; but they will judge very differently efforts to defend secrecy regarding the theft of public funds or other violations of the law.

Secretive regimes in Kant’s time and our own demonstrate the mismanagement and oppression that accompany unrestrained state secrecy. But the Spycatcher scandal in Great Britain and the Iran-Contra schemes of the Reagan government offer a reminder, if any were needed, that democratic nations are anything but immune to the plague of excessive state secrecy. The events in both cases have shown once again how secret practices permit abuses to grow, with corrupting effects on those who are empowered to deceive and to manipulate others undetected. These practices of secrecy tend to spread precisely because they are so tempting and because of the power
they confer, they add to the danger of acts of violence, deceit, and betrayal by concealing plans for such acts from normal legislative and judicial checks until it is too late.

Just as Kant saw all four constraints as necessary and as reinforcing one another, so he saw the breach of any one of them as facilitating breaches of the others. This was one of the reasons why he ruled out secret schemes of violence against enemies—of poisoning or assassination, for example—even in a war of self-defense. As for widespread deceit and betrayal through breaches of treaties or the secret instigation of treason within enemy ranks, such activities should also be ruled out, even in times of war. For a state to ask subjects to engage in any of them not only risks corrupting those who are thus made to go against their principles but also damages the integrity of the state in the eyes of outsiders. This undermines any chance of a lasting peace, for it "would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace." 23

The more governments disregard these fundamental moral constraints in wartime by sponsoring such practices, the easier it will be to do so in peacetime as well, whether to forestall attacks or prepare for new wars. At that point, they will have forfeited their own integrity and the capacity to inspire even the minimal trust that genuine negotiations and lasting peace require.

For Kant, some degree of trust is therefore a starting point in the development of fully viable international coexistence. By this he does not mean the naive trust that would invite aggression but, rather, the minimum of mutual and verifiable trust blended with commonsense caution without which the end of a war would lead to what he called "a mere truce." * This would be just a suspension

* Compare the function of trust among nations for Kant and in the lives of individuals for Erik Erikson. Both see it as a foundation. For

of hostilities rather than a true peace—a cold war. A truce between countries armed to the teeth and caught up in that atmosphere of mutual distrust which stems from longstanding policies of hostility, deceit, and treachery could hardly end in anything but another war.

ADDRESSING MACHIAVELLI

So far, no prince has contributed one iota to the betterment of mankind . . . ; all of them look ever and only to the prosperity of their own countries, making that their chief concern. A proper education would teach them so to frame their minds as to promote conciliation.

IMMANUEL KANT, Lectures on Ethics

From Kant’s earliest lectures and writings on political issues to his last, he addresses what he knows to be the most compelling challenge to views such as his: do they

Kant trust is indispensable if nations are to control violence enough to achieve a genuine peace; for Erikson it is necessary from early childhood on if individuals are to be able to live at peace with themselves and with others. Erikson speaks of trust as an individual’s attitude toward the world as well as toward the self—once that involves perceiving others and oneself as worthy of trust. 24 Kant similarly stresses the respect for others and for oneself that should preclude treating anyone unjustly. Neither writer claims that the requisite trust should go beyond prudence or call for some impossible moral perfection in others; rather, it operates together with the rational distrust discussed in Chapter I, and relies on certain minimal mutual expectations. And both Erikson and Kant recognize that such attitudes of even minimal trust are more difficult for nations to achieve and to maintain than for children, who do not generally experience the iniquity, treachery, and constant risk of assault that states have to guard against as a matter of common precaution.
work in practice or are they suited only to saints ready to suffer martyrdom for the sake of their principles? In so doing, he aims his remarks, as in the above quotation, at Niccolò Machiavelli, the most forceful proponent of such a challenge. In *The Prince*, his influential book of advice to rulers, Machiavelli argues that while it is all very well and good to preach moral constraints, following them simply does not work. Leaders foolish enough to insist on honoring their promises and to recoil from killing the innocent will end up tricked and defeated by those who lack such scruples.

Writing from his vantage point in sixteenth-century Italy, with its feuding city-states the pawns in a power struggle between the papacy, Germany, France, and Spain, Machiavelli has little patience with those well-meaning leaders who jeopardize the security of their states through excessive concern for piety and morality. He urges a prince eager to stay in power and to secure his state against attacks to disregard at will all fundamental moral constraints that stand in his way. Force and fraud, in particular, are indispensable, Machiavelli argues: almost all who have achieved great riches or power have attained them by such means.

A prince, Machiavelli suggests, must therefore learn “not to be good.” He must learn to make use of force and of fraud by imitating both the fox and the lion, “for the lion cannot protect himself from traps and the fox cannot defend himself from wolves.” When acting as a lion the prince has recourse to violence; and in his capacity as a fox he breaks his word when it suits his interest, and lies if he needs false excuses. But because such actions are likely to be misunderstood, Machiavelli advises a prince to proceed with all necessary secrecy and to be “a great feigner and a dissembler,” in order to get away with actions that would otherwise be held against him.

Machiavelli saw Cesare Borgia, with his ruthless recourse to force and fraud to consolidate his bloody reign, as a model for a prince striving to achieve greater power. “Cesare Borgia was considered cruel, but his cruelty had brought order to the Romagna, united it, and reduced it to peace and fealty,” Machiavelli writes; whereas others allow bloodshed and rapine to arise from “excess of tenderness.” The threat of force can often accomplish as much as actual violence; in relations with other states, fraud is less costly than force and therefore preferable as a means to achieving one’s ends.

Kant knows that if he wants to be persuasive in addressing this challenge, he has to use not merely the language of morality but also that of strategy; he has to speak of what works to promote the interests of a leader or a state. Consequently, “Perpetual Peace” stresses the shortsightedness and naiveté of imagining that violations of fundamental moral standards have no deleterious effect on those leaders responsible for them or on their nations. He points to the corruption and the evils that attend such violations and to the inevitable distrust they arouse; and he warns that the cumulative effects of such actions will be to undermine the negotiated collaboration that alone can avert a final war of extermination. He shows how narrow self-interest on the part of leaders, given such practical realities, will achieve short-term gains, if at all; at the cost of far greater long-term damage even to their own states. And though Kant agrees with Machiavelli that it is essential that leaders receive training more in line with the realities of governing, he insists that these very realities call for greater attention to an extended and deepened perspective on human affairs and to the moral constraints without which they will go from bad to worse.

In the four centuries since Machiavelli advised the judicious recourse to force and fraud, betrayal and secrecy,
these practices have found new expression. The technology that has permitted such extraordinary escalation in the violence at the disposal of rulers as well as insurgent groups, has also brought great sophistication to the techniques of deceit, cheating, and betrayal. Wars to end all wars have been followed by still more destructive ones; violent revolutions and coups have too often merely replaced one brutal regime with another.

But the countervailing responses have been strong and equally alert to the uses of new technologies, not least in the fields of information and communication. The efforts mentioned in Chapter I—in diplomacy, as in research and social action—constitute creative answers to the increased potential for violating moral constraints. In our century, we have witnessed the growth of movements that rely on nonviolent and open means of resistance to uphold human rights, bring about social change, and create the conditions for peace. Like Kant, their members address the challenge voiced so eloquently by Machiavelli. By now, their successes provide a telling answer to the charge that their methods won’t work. I considered, in Chapter I, the need for the extended and deepened perspective that is stressed by members of these movements. In their writings, some of them have also paid what may be the most serious and articulate attention to the equally indispensable implementation of the four moral constraints in both public and private life.

Gandhi’s leadership of the independence movement in India is a case in point. The central element in his efforts at personal and social change was nonviolence, or *ahimsa*. It was meant to be forceful and therefore different from the passive acceptance of evil that had traditionally been associated with the concept of nonviolence. For someone insufficiently prepared to practice such resistance against an aggressor, Gandhi acknowledged that it might be better to use violence in self-defense rather than to give up in cowardice. And he insisted from the outset that nonviolence by itself cannot render a cause just. It can be coercive, harmful, unfair, untrue—as in nonviolent slander campaigns or bureaucratic harassment. Nonviolence had, therefore, to be part of a framework of moral principles, or “observances,” as he called them.*

Along with nonviolence, the most important observance for Gandhi was a concern for truthfulness and truth.31 And fidelity—to his vows in their own right, to his ideals and thus to himself, to his obligations to others—was for him what held all the observances together and bound him to them in turn. Through making and holding such vows, he trained himself to become someone who could trust himself and who could be trusted by others. Finally, Gandhi rejected secrecy in his dealings with supporters as with those who opposed him. He regularly sent his policy statements and plans to those who might oppose him, to give them an opportunity to respond in the search for a just solution. He also disseminated these plans and articles on his movement as broadly as possible in the press. This allowed him to build up a much wider following at home and abroad than might otherwise have been possible, and helped prevent some of the worst forms of repression that could otherwise have been deployed against him. Secrecy in political work, moreover, would have exposed him to government spies and agents.

* There were eleven of these observances. Among the others were ones also quite common in different traditions, such as courage and non-stealing. Some, such as celibacy, the cultivation of detachment, and work with the body, are found in different religions but far from all; and a few, such as the home production of goods and the disposition to touch everyone, including India’s so-called untouchables, were linked to the particular circumstances in which Gandhi carried on his struggle.
provocateurs, with all the smears and scandal they can
generate.*

In our own time, leaders of the Solidarity movement
in Poland have also stressed the moral constraints that I
have drawn from Kant's essay. Their purpose has been to
reflect in their present lives the atmosphere that they want
their society to exhibit in the future. As Adam Michnik
writes in Letters from Prison, two principal traits adopted
by Solidarity are "the renunciation of violence and the
politics of truth." The insistence on both is to his mind
utterly realistic. Violent resistance would most likely have
been brutally crushed from the outset, as happened so
many times in Polish history. And deceit undermines trust
within the group, even as it invites retaliation from with-
out. A policy of the greatest possible openness goes along
with and reinforces the first two. In Poland, full openness
like that practiced by Gandhi in India would nevertheless
have been impossible. But the movement is far more ac-
cessible both to Poles and to foreign media and sympathiz-
ers than secret resistance groups under repressive regimes
ordinarily are. And as with Gandhi's movement, Solidar-
ity's openness and broad media contacts have helped it to
gain widespread international support.

If these contemporary movements differ from Kant,
it is not in their insistence on breaking free from debilit-
ing patterns of reciprocal brutality and distrust, or in their

* Gandhi has been justly criticized for rushing to advocate an open
campaign of nonviolent resistance by Jews in Nazi Germany without
adequately understanding their predicament. In the fifty years since he
made suggestions to that effect, those who undertake or study
nonviolent resistance have been able to exchange information and to
learn from one another in ways denied to pioneers like Gandhi. One
can hardly accuse those who have taken part in such resistance in the
Philippines or Guatemala or Poland of ignoring the realities posed by a
government far more repressive than that of the British in India.

concern for the extended perspective on human rights and
the moral constraints that he advocated. Rather, the differ-
ence lies in their closer attention to, and their greater ex-
perience with, the practical requirements for effective
social change and, especially, in the active steps to combat
injustice that their members have taken, sometimes at
great personal risk. It matters, therefore, to ask, with re-
spect to Kant's views: How might such movements and
all who aim to further a strategy for peace draw on these
views, and in what respects must they look elsewhere for
practical guidance?

DRAWBACKS IN PRACTICE?

It had taken courage for Kant to publish his essay on per-
petual peace under the narrowly chauvinistic and doctrina-
re King Frederick William II of Prussia, the successor,
in 1786, of Frederick the Great. Only six months earlier,
the king had accused Kant of debasing Christianity
through his writings and insisted that he promise never to
write or lecture on religion again. Otherwise, "unpleasant
consequences" would ensue. Yet in this, his very next
published work, Kant denounced despotism and the bar-
barism of warring states like Prussia and dared to link the
observance of human rights to the prospects for world
peace.

It is perhaps no wonder that he begins his essay by
poking fun at philosophers who "blissfully dream of per-
petual peace." Practical politicians, he hints, need not
imagine that the abstract ideas of mere academics can en-
danger the state, which after all must be founded on ex-
perience: "it thus seems safe to let him fire off his whole
broadside, and the worldly-wise politician need not turn a
hair."33 Having said as much, Kant claims that he will
consider himself "expressly safeguarded, in correct and proper style, against all malicious interpretation." 34

In the remainder of the essay, he could not be farther from jesting or from dismissing the ideas he was setting forth. He is especially concerned to disprove the notion that his views might be impractical—that what seems simple in theory is bound to encounter obstacles and perhaps fail altogether in practice. 35 He intends his plan for a lasting peace to be more practical by far than the run-of-the-mill rationalizations of war on grounds of greater realism. As a result, he explores the practical aspects of achieving a "cosmopolitan"—or world citizen—perspective, of having moral principles guide political action, and of taking part in a program of gradual reforms within and among states.

Both from a theoretical and a practical point of view, Kant's plan represents a considerable improvement over all prior writings on perpetual peace. 36 Previous authors had been farsighted and often eloquent, but their solutions had tended to be simplistic. Some had advocated a change of heart among citizens and rulers, others rudimentary leagues or federations of nations, still others a delicate international system whereby a balance of power would keep war from getting out of control. In his essay, Kant responds to their writings and to other works on war and peace, drawing on the moral, religious, and political debates of his and earlier periods and on his own writings. The result is a forceful and subtle defense of the role that morality should play in human affairs and a persuasive insistence that it be allowed to do so while there is still time. In considering the moral foundation of a strategy for peace, I have found no other work that comes close to his in scope, in depth, and in relevance for our own period.

Nevertheless, Kant's essay has drawbacks from the point of view of the practical application of his views to present needs. He offers a strategy for peace in the most abstract sense of the word only. Much of what he says in his essay about the role of morality and about political changes such as bringing about a federation of states is too compressed to be practically applicable, say, by government leaders sincerely wishing to further the cause of peace. And while he gives advice about how a national and foreign policy that stresses human rights will further this cause, he does not address the question of how peoples and civic organizations might resist unjust governments or threats of invasions from abroad. 37 It would be difficult, therefore, to derive the specifics of a strategy for peace from his essay.

The obliqueness and abstraction of Kant's essay stem in part from his background. Although he followed political and diplomatic events closely, he never had to make day-to-day choices affecting them. Diplomats, military strategists, public officials, members of resistance movements, and the many others who have to do so—all need more to go on than he offers. Even if they agree with his views on an expanded perspective and on morality, they may wish to qualify some of his judgments. For instance, they may disagree with his view that rules out as "dishonorable" all spying. Intelligence-gathering is at present indispensable for defensive purposes. It can shorten some wars and prevent erroneous information from unleashing others. Kant himself might, faced with today's many forms of intelligence activities, evaluate codebreaking and satellite surveillance differently from, say, covert acts of deceit and violence that clearly breach basic moral constraints.

Those involved daily in practical decisions having to do with war and peace might find another aspect of Kant's position unacceptable: his all-or-nothing attitude toward what he regarded as right and wrong. Though he despised political or religious zealotry, he had an insensitivity all his own with respect to morality. There could, he de-
clared, be no exception to moral prohibitions. Unlawful recourses to force, as well as all lying and all breaches of valid promises, in particular, were out of the question, no matter how catastrophic the consequences at stake. He ruled out a lie even to save the life of a friend being stalked by a murderer. To be truthful, he held, is “a sacred and absolutely commanding decree of reason, limited by no expediency.” On this subject, most people have disagreed with him. A lie may offer the only way to avert disaster in exceptional circumstances; why should we accept the use of force in an emergency to defend ourselves or our fellow citizens but reject deception under the same circumstances?*

It is clear from “Perpetual Peace” that Kant meant to uphold absolute moral intransigence in international affairs as vigorously as in relations between individuals. Not even national security or self-defense in extreme danger could give reasons, in his view, for breaching moral principles. “Do what is right though the world should perish” was for him no idle rhetoric. Here is yet a third aspect of Kant’s impracticality: in spite of his own warnings about a possible end to human existence, he refused to believe that it might come about as a result of someone following such a motto.† He defended the motto against all comers.

* Indeed it is possible to use Kant’s own criterion of publicity in order to show that a maxim of lying in defending oneself or another person from direct and imminent assault is as legitimate as the recourse to violence at such a time. A maxim allowing both forms of self-defense is perfectly compatible with its being public; indeed, most people would surely prefer forms of self-defense that endangered no one’s life.
† Kant undoubtedly realized that the consequentialist challenge to his position has special force here. What is at issue is not only “the vast graveyard of the human race” but also the end of “justice itself” (see note 2 above). In this context, his unsupported claims that this fate won’t come about if uncompromising morality guides political choice—because moral evil is self-destructive and because Providence may holding that though it might sound inflated it was nevertheless true: it was a “sound principle that blocked up all the devious paths followed by cunning or violence.” The world would not in fact come to an end if governments took such a motto literally, he argued, since moral evil is inherently self-destructive and “makes way for the moral principle of goodness, even if such progress is slow.”

In Kant’s defense, it must be said that though he could imagine a final war of extermination, neither he nor anyone else in the eighteenth century could possibly envisage what we now know to be true: that such a war might be sudden, brief, and single-handedly brought about by the decision of just a few individuals. Moreover, he clung to the belief that Providence had a plan for mankind that included the achievement of permanent peace on earth rather than in some future existence, no matter how horrendous the events that would lead up to it. According to this belief, the world could in fact not perish if one did what was just.

I say that Kant “clung” to this belief, for all his late essays show extraordinary anguish about it. In his earlier writings, he was still imbued with the optimism about peace and human progress so common to Enlightenment thinkers. But as he grew older without witnessing the slightest sign that the human propensity for war was abating, his writings show increasing ambivalence in this regard. In “Perpetual Peace” he alternately suggests and then doubts the possibility of a peace that could stave off a final war of extermination. He had to hope, he wrote, have a different plan for humanity—are not adequate to meet the consequentialist challenge. On the contrary, it is Kant’s appeal to the disastrous consequences for humanity if nations do not take moral considerations into account that are most persuasive; and such an appeal need not be linked with his particular view of the uncompromising nature of these considerations.
that Providence had planned something nobler and better for human beings and aimed to teach them—if need be, through the very horrors of war—to turn to peace.

Yet he also held that human beings will progress only by their own efforts—Providence won't do it for them; and he feared that, although it would be best for governments to recognize right away the peril in which they were placing humanity, the world might have to go through ever more horrendous wars until one final war of extermination would be staring everyone in the face. The prospect of such a war could then force the shift of perspective and implement the moral constraints that all should have acknowledged long before.

Kant's warning that nations would face a war of extermination unless they could establish a lasting peace speaks to us more directly than ever. We can draw on his essay in working out a perspective and a set of constraints capable of guiding a strategy to deal with this threat. In so doing, however, we need to look elsewhere for ways to overcome in practice the three drawbacks of his proposals: their generality and abstraction, their absolutism, and their reliance on Providence to still any doubts about the consequences of acting on such absolutist views.

For a century and a half after his death, Kant's warning sounded too alarmist by far. It was ridiculed by many who proclaimed the virtues of war, from Joseph de Maistre to Hegel and Mussolini. Their voices ring hollow now as we hear them extolling war's cleansing nature, its nurturing of manliness, and its capacity to stir peoples to great and noble deeds. But the strongest of their taunts remains troubling. It questions the practicality of Kant's entire approach by rejecting as sheer, unrealistic folly any effort to do away with so elemental and abiding an aspect of the human condition as war.
CHAPTER II. KANT ON PEACE


2. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 96. A central reason why Kant objected so fiercely both to individual suicide and to collective
self-annihilation was that the link to justice and morality would then be lost.

3. Ibid.


8. For an incisive discussion of these three approaches, see Kenneth Walz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). Walz (pp. 162–164) takes Kant to focus especially on the second of these levels. I believe that a close reading of Kant’s works on war and peace, on ethics, education, and political philosophy will support, rather, the view that he is concerned with the interaction of all three.

9. Summarizing this ancient perception and echoing Kant’s language, Arthur Schopenhauer writes, in *On the Basis of Morality*, tr. E. F. J. Payne (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), p. 158, that “there are two ways of doing wrong, those of violence and of cunning. Just as through violence I can kill another, or rob him, or force him to obey me, so by means of cunning I can do all these things, since I confront his intellect with false motives, in consequence of which he must do what he otherwise would not.” The quotation from Gandhi is taken from a wall in his ashram in Ahmedabad, now a museum; but he stressed the same thought throughout his writings. See Mohandas Gandhi, *Non-Violent Resistance (Satyagraha)* (New York: Schocken, 1961), p. 88; and Martin Green, ed., *Gandhi in India in His Own Words* (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1987), “Two Posers,” p. 328.

10. In his writings, John Stuart Mill likewise stresses the primacy of avoiding such forms of harm. He calls moral rules that forbid mankind to hurt one another “more vital to human beings than any maxims, however important, which only point out the best mode of managing some department of human affairs. . . . It is their observance which alone preserves peace among human beings; if obedience to them were not the rule, and disobedience the exception, everyone would see in everyone
else an enemy against whom he must be perpetually guarding himself." See George Sher, ed., John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1979), p. 58. Friedrich Nietzsche makes a similar claim only to draw a radically different conclusion: in Beyond Good and Evil, p. 201, he argues that the perspective from which moral valuations are made is distorted by "the utility of the herd . . . the preservation of the community."

11. In referring to constraints rather than to rules, principles, laws, or prohibitions, I mean to emphasize the variation, from one culture to another, in the degree to which these constraints are formalized and the degree to which exceptions are allowed as, say, in deciding which resorts to violence are allowable in self-defense; and to stress, also, the need in all communities to constrain, hold back, limit the forms of harm to which these constraints refer. Others who speak of moral constraints include Thomas Nagel, who refers to "the general constraints of morality" in Mortal Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 79; Robert Nozick, who employs the concept of "side constraints" on action, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 32, to express "the inviolability of others" and prohibit "primarily physical aggression against them"; and Ruth Ann Putnam, who speaks of a "framework of constraints" in "Weaving Seamless Webs," Philosophy 62 (1987): 207–220, at 210.

12. Kant also allowed for capital punishment, though only in retribution for murder, claiming that it was a legitimate exercise of state force. For a critical analysis of this argument by Kant, see Steven S. Schwartzchild, "Kantianism on the Death Penalty (and Related Social Problems)," Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 71 (1985): 343–372.

13. Kant, "The Contest of Faculties," in Reiss, ed., p. 187. See also p. 183, where Kant characterizes war as the "source of all evils and moral corruption," and p. 189, where it is described as "the greatest obstacle to morality and the invariable enemy of progress." But Kant had also written of war as promoting human progress by the very distress it brings, forcing individuals and societies to make greater efforts. In his last writings, however, such as "Perpetual Peace" and "The Contest of Faculties," much of this rhetoric is gone. Hannah Arendt suggests a possible interpretation for Kant's complex view of war, in Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). According to Arendt, Kant takes war to appear one way to those who take part in the action of war and suffer its consequences, whereas someone assuming the perspective of a spectator can see the design that Providence has for humanity's progress through war and discord. But the double vision recurs, I suggest, even within the perspective of the spectator in Kant's later writings. It is precisely as a spectator taking the largest possible perspective that Kant envisages the end that continued wars could bring to all human undertakings and to "justice itself," in "Perpetual Peace," the Metaphysics of Morals, and "The Contest of Faculties."

14. Letter to Maria von Herbert, Spring 1782, in Arnulf Zweig, ed., Kant: Philosophical Correspondence 1759–99 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 189. Kant argued repeatedly that lying constitutes a breach of one's duty not only to oneself and to others but also to humanity and even to duty itself: See the Lectures on Ethics recorded by students though never published by Kant himself, tr. Louis Infield (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1963); the Critique of Practical Reason, tr. Lewis W. Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956); and the Metaphysics of Morals, in Ellington, ed., Immanuel Kant: Ethical Philosophy. For a thoughtful view of morality drawing on Kant's moral philosophy, as well as on Judaism and Christianity, to stress the centrality and universality of moral precepts such as those ruling out harming or killing others and deceiving, see Alan Donagan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

15. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 22. Mill adds: "Yet that even this rule, sacred as it is, admits of possible exceptions is acknowledged by all moralists," the chief of which is to prevent great and unmerited evil. While Mill was wrong in attributing this view to "all moralists," the vast majority do agree with him on the subject of exceptions.

For a chart of the “Slopes of Hell,” see Singleton’s Commentary, 2: 44.

17. Thus in speaking of keeping or breaking promises, Kant often used examples involving a false promise to begin with.

18. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, p. 215. On p. 229 of that work, Kant distinguishes false promises from promises honestly made and then broken: “To cheat is to make a lying promise, while a breach of faith is a true promise which is not kept.”


20. Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” p. 100. Kant used the term “Publicität” in referring to the action of making something public. The corresponding term “publicity” can be confusing for contemporary readers, unless they distinguish Kant’s usage, and that of John Stuart Mill, John Rawls, and other philosophers, from other senses of the word in political and commercial contexts, as in references to “publicity stunts” and “publicity hounds.” For references to different usages of this term and a discussion of its role in ethics, see my books Lying, ch. 7, and Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (New York: Pantheon, 1982), ch. 8.

21. Kant drew a distinction between existing laws, even unjust ones, that might require citizens to go to war against their will, and the kind of state that he advocated, in which citizens would be consulted about prospective wars. Thus he explains, in “On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice,’” (Reiss, ed., Kant’s Political Writings), p. 91, that “each state must be organized internally in such a way that the head of the state, for whom the war actually costs nothing (for he wages it at the expense of others, i.e., the people) must no longer have the deciding vote on whether war is to be declared or not, for the people who pay for it must decide. (This, of course, presupposes that the idea of an original contract has already been realized.)”

22. Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” p. 126. While Kant holds that actions affecting the rights of others are wrong if they cannot be made public, he adds that the reverse does not follow: actions are not necessarily right if they can be made public. Even the most violent action may be openly performed by individuals or governments so powerful as to have nothing to fear from disclosure.

23. Ibid., p. 96. Compare John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 379: “The aim of war is a just peace and therefore the means employed must not destroy the possibility of peace or encourage a contempt for human life that puts the safety of ourselves and of mankind in jeopardy. The conduct of war is to be constrained and adjusted to this end.”


25. See, for example, Reiss, ed., Kant’s Political Writings, pp. 53 and 188–189.


27. Ibid., p. 318. For a more absolute claim, see the statement that Machiavelli attributes to the leader of a rebellion in Florence: “If you will observe the way in which men act, you will see that all those who attain great riches and great power have attained them by means of either fraud or force.” The History of Florence, bk. 3, ch. 12, in Allan Gilbert, tr., Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1965), p. 1160.

28. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 64. When discussing republics, Machiavelli could nevertheless express caution about the distrust that results from a people’s consciousness of having been deceived: “And if it happens that the people have no confidence in anyone, as sometimes will be the case when they have been deceived before by events or men, then it will inevitably lead to the ruin of the state” (ibid., p. 247).

29. Ibid., p. 64.


31. Gandhi gave his Autobiography the subtitle Experiments with Truth (Boston: Beacon Press, 1977). For the observances he stressed, see his From Yeravda Mandir: Ashram Observances (Ah-
medabad: Navajivan, n.d.). Gandhi stressed that truth and truthfulness differ; he thought that he might never attain full knowledge of the former but saw the latter as indispensable in any effort to do so. And nonviolence becomes the more needed as one realizes one may never be in the possession of full truth, nor even as close to it as others. To kill or harm others is therefore to risk injuring persons closer to the truth than oneself.


33. Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” p. 93. Hannah Arendt suggests, in her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, that “the ironical tone of Perpetual Peace . . . shows clearly that Kant himself did not take his essays on history and politics seriously.” Neither Kant’s own writings nor their reception by his contemporaries (see note 1 above) supports such an interpretation.


35. See Kant’s discussion of this issue in his essay “On the Common Saying: ‘This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice,’” in Reiss, ed., Kant’s Political Writings, pp. 61–92.

36. See note 6 above. It is clear from Kant’s Lectures on Ethics and his essays that he was familiar with many of these works, especially those by the Abbé St. Pierre and Rousseau.

37. For views on Kant’s views on revolution, see Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy; the articles by Lewis W. Beck, Sidney Axinn, John E. Atwell, and C. Dyke in Symposium: Kant on Revolution, Journal of the History of Ideas, 32 (July–September 1971): 402–440; and Williams, Kant’s Political Philosophy, ch. 8.

38. Immanuel Kant, “On A Supposed Right to Lie from Benevolent Motives,” in The Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, ed. and tr. Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), pp. 346–350, at 348. In his Lectures on Ethics, presented before he had worked out his complete moral philosophy, Kant appears to hold that the case in which someone attempts to force statements from one who seems intent on making improper use of them, in order to misuse them, is the only one in which a lie can be justified. It would be wrong, however, to see the later Kant as being bound to impossible rigidity in responses to practical difficulties. He insisted on an imaginative search for alternative responses that would avert both the need to act immorally and the damage from acting morally. I have discussed this approach in my article “Kant on the Maxim ‘Do What is Right Though the World Should Perish,’” Argumentation 2 (February 1988): 7–25.


40. Ibid. For a discussion, see my article cited in note 38 above. Among commentators who have either accepted Kant’s claim concerning providence or left it unchallenged are Friedrich, Schwarzwald, and Smith, cited in note 1 above. Diana T. Meyers argues, in “Kant’s Liberal Alliance: A Permanent Peace?” in Kenneth Kripal and Diana T. Meyers, eds., Political Realism & International Morality (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), p. 215, that “Kant’s claim that peace is the end of history is highly dubious if it is taken to mean that circumstances will conspire to bring about an enduring peace.”

41. See, for instance, the last paragraphs of Kant’s Lectures on Ethics, clearly intended as a summing up and a peroration, in which Kant speaks of “the ultimate destiny of the human race,” which is the Kingdom of God on earth. Justice and equity will then rule the world, Kant predicts; but he closes by saying that “the hope of it is still distant; it will be many centuries before it can be attained.”

the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness
which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so also corrup-
tion in nations would be the product of prolonged, let alone
'perpetual,' peace." See also Joseph de Maistre, Les Soirées de St.
Pétersbourg, vol. 2; and Benito Mussolini, "Dottrina del Fascismo," in Encyclopedia italiana (1932) 14: 847–851: "War alone
brings up to their highest tension all human energies and puts
the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to
meet it. . . . War is to the man what maternity is to the woman.
I do not believe in perpetual peace; not only do I not believe in
it but I find it depressing and a negation of all the fundamental
virtues of man."

CHAPTER III. CLAUSEWITZ, WAR, AND STRATEGY

1. Clausewitz, On War, p. 75. For commentaries on the views
of Clausewitz, see Raymond Aron, Penser la guerre, Clausewitz
(Paris: Gallimard, 1976); W.B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Henry A.
Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1984), ch. 10; the essays by Peter Paret, Mi-
chael Howard, and Bernard Brodie in Clausewitz, On War; and
H. Rothfels, Carl von Clausewitz: Politik und Krieg (Bonn:
Duemmler, 1980).
2. Clausewitz, On War, p. 192.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 78.
5. Many have speculated about whether Clausewitz knew
Kant's writings and about whether he modeled his dialectical
views on Kant or on that of his own contemporary, Hegel. The
evidence is far from clear; all that can be said with certainty,
since Clausewitz never expressed himself on these subjects di-
rectly, is that he had studied with a popularizer of Kant, W. G.
Kiesewatter, and that, like all educated Prussians, he was bound
to have general knowledge about Kant and about Hegel. See
Aron, Penser la guerre, pp. 360–371; and Rothfels, Clausewitz,
ch. 1.