Counterinsurgency and terror expertise: the integration of social scientists into the war effort

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Abstract In this paper the authors draw upon the tradition of Power Structure Research to analyse the increased interpenetration of the military and the social sciences, particularly the recruitment of anthropologists and the adoption and adaptation of counterinsurgency strategies. It is argued that such actors should be understood not as disinterested ‘experts’ but as being organically embedded in a military–industrial–academic complex. The paper considers a number of contemporary examples as well as considering the historical roots of these trends. It is argued that this interpenetration violates the ethical norms of the academy and the moral and social responsibilities of intellectuals.

Introduction

The relationship of scholarship to war has become newly controversial since the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) governments have become markedly more interested in understanding the culture and motivations of those who oppose them, leading to increased involvement of social scientists in debates and research on counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism. Accompanying this has been an unprecedented interpenetration of the military and the social sciences, particularly through the recruitment of anthropologists and the adoption and adaptation of counterinsurgency and other insights and strategies.

This interpenetration is not new. Rather, we argue it should be understood as an intensification of an older trend and, more broadly, as one of a number of political and economic forces seeking effectively to instrumentalize academia. Though the relationship may in practice be felt to be one of mutuality—the military seek expertise whilst the academic seeks funding and an outlet for research—at the level of principle there is a fundamental tension.

Firstly, and most obviously, there are the ethical concerns raised by the provision of expertise to the military, even putting aside concerns about the legitimacy and legality of the US and the UK’s current engagements. The UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) states in its ethical guidance that research subjects must be ‘informed fully about the purpose, methods and intended possible “uses of the research,” that they must be “free from coercion” and that harm to the participants “must be avoided”’ (ESRC 2009). These principles are not satisfied in many of the cases we refer to in this article, particularly when research subjects are also the subjects of military occupation.
There are also particular issues surrounding academics’ involvement in coercion and propaganda, which we argue conflict with the ethical precepts governing scholarship. The most obvious of these being the truism stated by Noam Chomsky in 1967 that ‘it is the responsibility of intellectuals to speak the truth and to expose lies’ (Chomsky 1967).

In addition to these ethical issues, we argue that the interpenetration of the military and the academy undermines the latter’s obligation to remain critical and independent. Academia exists in principle not to provide knowledge or expertise in the same manner as a private consultant might serve a client, but rather to operate as a community of scholars and thereby to advance public knowledge and understanding. Whilst we are not suggesting that all military-sponsored scholarship necessarily fails this requirement, it should be clear from what follows that at best the research agenda of the academy is being weighted more in the interests of power, and that, at worst, particular experts are violating ethical norms.

The military–industrial–academic complex

In this article, we point to a collaboration between academia and companies and government agencies operating in and around the military sector—famously described as the ‘military industrial complex’ by President Eisenhower in his farewell address in 1961. Academia was a key part of Eisenhower’s speech, which warned of the ‘prospect of domination of scholars’ by the Federal government (cited in Giroux 2007, 15). Later in the 1960s, Senator William Fulbright spoke out against the military influence on academia, warning that, ‘in lending itself too much to the purposes of government, a university fails its higher purposes’ (cited in Turse 2004). Fulbright called attention to the ‘military–industrial–academic complex’, which was described by historian Stuart W Leslie as the ‘golden triangle’ of ‘military agencies, the high technology industry, and research universities’ (cited in Turse 2004).

The development of this ‘golden triangle’ can be analysed under the rubric of the ‘flex network’ wherein, in the contemporary period, the boundaries between previously separate domains have tended to dissolve (Wedel 2004). In our view, the concept of the flex network is a valuable corrective to the tendency to see epistemic communities as separate and bounded groups of scholars able to play a key policy role precisely because of their disinterestedness (Haas 1992). It allows us to understand the dynamic nature of the inter-relationships between expertise and power and, in the case of the terror and counterinsurgency experts, pushes us more towards a concept of ‘embedded expertise’, emphasizing the question of power and the structured subordination of experts in the ‘military–industrial–academic’ complex (Burnett and Whyte 2005). This is not to imply that experts have no effective role in providing knowledge that is of use to the military or the state, but merely that such knowledge is neither disinterested nor detached but embedded and, we argue, compromised.

Gil Eyal takes critics of this trend, like C Wright Mills and Noam Chomsky, to task for being ‘hopelessly mired’ in ‘boundary work’ (Eyal 2002, 653–654). In our view Eyal’s criticism is misconceived, since neither draws lines between scholars and ‘non-scholars’. Still, Eyal does a good job of showing how this is not just
a question of the traditional liberal model of policy ‘influence’. On the contrary the role of the scholar or intellectual is much more ‘organic’. As Eyal argues, what is needed is an approach

which shows how a certain form of expertise ... [is] strung together into ... a network composed of both human and non-human agents. (Eyal 2002, 657–658)

Integration into the network gives the experts significant benefits. In the case discussed by Eyal, Middle Eastern studies links with intelligence agencies in Israel included ‘classified and non classified information ... archival materials ... captured documents’ as well as ‘social proximity to decision-makers’ in the intelligence policy community, thus making the institute in question effectively the ‘auxiliary arm’ of the research branch of Israeli military intelligence (Eyal 2002, 682). In such networks, we have moved from ‘advisory’ relations to a ‘complex’ in which the line between academic expert at a distance and functionary of the state has, at least, been blurred. This is precisely the process described by Janine Wedel in her work on ‘flex networks’ (Wedel 2009).

In the next section, we outline our methodological approach before examining some of the history of the relationship between scholarship and war. First, we consider the intellectual and organizational history of counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism. We discuss the rise of the ‘warrior-intellectual’ in the contemporary period. We then explore the British links with these writers and the distinctive social science contribution to war-fighting, including a focus on central elements of the counterinsurgency and counter-terror nexus, in particular the RAND Corporation and the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at St Andrews University as well as the links of King’s College London with the military. The next section examines the use of counterinsurgency ideas in the ‘war on terror’ at home and in particular in the propaganda war in the UK. We conclude with an account of our understanding of the role of scholarship and academics in the war effort.

Method

This study draws on the tradition of Power Structure Research pioneered by C Wright Mills (1956) and subsequent sociologists such as William Domhoff (1975; 1983; 1990) in the US and Michael Useem (1984) and John Scott in the UK (1982; 1991). Domhoff argued that it is important for social scientists to investigate the activities, culture and milieu of powerful institutions and individuals. Methodologically, according to Domhoff, ‘there are two general aspects of any study that attempts to delineate a power structure and understand its workings’. The first is a network analysis. This ‘can reveal power structures to be more or less tightly knit, more or less focused in a few organizations or individuals, and more or less linked to a single social class.’ The second aspect is a ‘content analysis’ of ‘what is said and done within the power network’ (Domhoff 2005). This study investigates the terror and counterinsurgency experts in this spirit. In addition, we argue that research on the powerful cannot expect to use the same methods as research on the powerless. As a result, we have adopted an approach to network and content analysis that is best termed ‘Investigative Research’ (for more details see Spinprofiles 2009a).
Investigative Research is a means to sift large quantities of data in order to pursue hidden or obscure materials as well as allowing the combination of disparate evidence to glean new insights into organizations and individuals (Northmore 1996). It recognizes not just a methodological difference in researching powerful institutions, but has a specific conception of the context in which investigation takes place. This was outlined by Jack Douglas in the mid 1970s when he stated that it was based on the realization that ‘profound conflict of interest, values, feelings and actions pervade social life … Instead of trusting people and expecting trust in return, one suspects others and expects others to suspect him’ (1976, 55). While we need not go all the way with Douglas’ notion of suspicion, it is clear that scepticism about the accounts given by powerful institutions and individuals is warranted, especially in the context of societies in which power is highly concentrated.

This approach entails a combination of methodological and data-gathering techniques including citation analysis, advanced internet research, the use of Freedom of Information legislation and searching press and publications databases. The kinds of techniques we use, although similar, should not be confused with the routine practices of journalism. Our approach draws on a long tradition of sociological research going back at least as far as the Chicago School associated with Robert Park in the 1930s and 1940s. Park, who had previously been a journalist, believed that a sociologist was ‘a kind of super-reporter, like the men who write for Fortune … reporting on the long-term trends which record what is actually going on rather than what, on the surface, merely seems to be going on’ (Park 1950). Park’s view was echoed, in the 1990s, by Harvey Molotch in his famous piece, ‘Going out’, originally written for a journal special issue titled ‘What’s wrong with sociology’. He suggests that an engaged sociology should be thought not as ‘“mere journalism,” but [as] deep journalism’ (Molotch 1994, 223).

From ‘shock and awe’ to ‘hearts and minds’

The recent increase in the use of academic expertise in the military planning of the US and its allies follows, and we argue should be understood in the context of, the perceived failure of the approach taken in the earlier stages of the ‘war on terror’. That earlier approach involved the deployment of massive military firepower against military and civilian targets, in part as a demonstrative exercise of destructive power. It is perhaps best encapsulated by the phrase ‘shock and awe’, a strategy conceived at the National Defense University in Washington (Ullman and Wade 1996) and famously launched on Baghdad in 2003.

The fierce resistance the US and UK nevertheless faced in Iraq led to a disillusionment with this approach, which came to be seen as a blunt tool that was ultimately counterproductive. Thus, ‘shock and awe’ was over time displaced by a new approach encapsulated by the phrase ‘hearts and minds’. This involves the use of military force within a wider strategy of domination attentive to the politics and culture of the target society. It is understood as entailing not just soldiering skills, but also political skills and, crucially, propaganda and academic approaches. It is characterized by one of the leading contemporary writers as ‘armed propaganda’ (Kilcullen 2007a).
The ‘warrior-intellectual’

With the ‘surge’ in Iraq, the advocates of the ‘hearts and minds’ approach were brought to the very centre of policymaking. At their head was the director of the ‘surge’, General David Petraeus. While Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Petraeus oversaw the production of the new US army counter-insurgency manual (Nagl et al 2007). The manual notes that the army must ‘remember the global audience’, because ‘the decisive battle is for the people’s minds’. For Petraeus ‘every action, including uses of force, must be wrapped in a bodyguard of information’ (cited in Hughes 2007).

Petraeus was advised by an informal but influential group of highly educated military personnel who contributed to the counterinsurgency manual. According to the Washington Post these advisors were dubbed the ‘Petraeus guys’ by the military, whilst the paper describes them as ‘a small band of warrior-intellectuals’ (Ricks 2007).

The warrior-intellectuals espouse a brand of wisdom that focuses pre-eminently on ‘hearts and minds’. Whilst they perceive themselves as critics of the military establishment, they draw upon a tradition of military theory that is more established than ‘shock and awe’ and is rooted in the suppression of anti-colonial struggles and Cold War thinking (Schlesinger 1978). As we shall see, it is an intellectual tradition that is very much the product of a long interpenetration of the military and academia.

Let us start with three key theorist/practitioners—including brief biographical sketches, their views on counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism, and their practical roles. Montgomery McFate, David Kilcullen and John Nagl all have a high media profile and were centrally involved in writing the new US manual on counterinsurgency with David Petraeus (Price 2007). These three are amongst the most important of the recent counterinsurgents. All have doctorates but have played a role that is more than an academic advisory one, as all three have been practically, as well as intellectually, involved in counterinsurgency.

Montgomery McFate

Montgomery McFate has a BA from the University of California at Berkeley and a doctorate in anthropology from Yale. Her doctoral dissertation concerned British counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland. The thesis was based on ‘several years she spent living among supporters of the Irish Republican Army and then among British counterinsurgents’ (Packer 2006).

After a variety of posts, in 1997 she married a soldier (and sometime mercenary), Sean McFate, and they moved to Germany for three years (Stannard 2007). On their return to the US, McFate found herself ‘grasping for purpose until one night in 2002 when she ended a long talk with her husband about their futures by scribbling a sentence on a cocktail napkin: How do I make Anthropology relevant to the military?’ (Shachtman 2008)

McFate reportedly then worked at the RAND Corporation, an organization that has been formative in the development of counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism doctrine (Abella 2008). One of her publications there was titled ‘Manipulating the architecture of cultural control’ (McFate 2005a). Later, at the Office of Naval Research she says she got a call from an adviser to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on Iraq. The advisor ‘turned for help to one of the few anthropologists he could find in the Defense Department’ (Packer 2006). McFate’s ‘evangelical mission’ to ‘get the Department of Defense to understand the importance of “cultural knowledge”’ (Packer 2006) resulted in her becoming the senior social scientist for the US Army’s Human Terrain System. This is the system of embedding academics (mainly anthropologists) with the military to help with the military’s ‘need to map Human Terrain across the Kill Chain’, as the Assistant Undersecretary of Defense, John Wilcox, put it (cited in Price 2007).

McFate argues that the military use of social science is important not simply because of its efficacy, but also in terms of the humanitarian impact. In early 2007, she told the *San Francisco Chronicle* that she was worried that the occupation of Iraq would be ‘delegitimized’ and that the US Army would ‘fall back on what it had before … technology and firepower. But if you can figure out how a society is wired,’ she said, ‘you don’t need to do that. That’s what the game is. That’s what Petraeus is going to do. But you can’t do that if you don’t have information’ (cited in Stannard 2007).

David Kilcullen

David J Kilcullen is an Australian counterinsurgency writer. He studied counterinsurgency as a cadet at the Royal Military College in Duntroon, the Australian Army’s officer training establishment and served for 22 years in the Australian Army. He commanded an infantry company on counterinsurgency operations in East Timor from 1999 to 2000 and, after September 11, worked with police, paramilitary and military forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indonesia and elsewhere. During this time Kilcullen also studied for a doctorate at the University of New South Wales. Towards the end of his military service, he served in Australia’s Office of National Assessments and on the writing team for Australia’s 2004 Terrorism White Paper (Weisser 2007).

In 2004, Kilcullen took leave from Australia’s Defence Department to help the Pentagon with the drafting of the 2005 Quadrennial Defence Review. In July 2005, at a conference, he met Henry Crumpton, who had supervised the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA’s) covert activities in Afghanistan during the 2001 invasion. Condoleezza Rice, then secretary of state, later hired Crumpton as the department’s counter-terrorism coordinator. He offered Kilcullen the job of ‘Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, The State Department’ (Packer 2006).

John Nagl

John A Nagl reportedly ‘graduated close to the top of his West Point class in 1988 and was selected as a Rhodes Scholar’ (Maass 2004). He studied for a master’s in international relations at Oxford University before the 1991 Gulf War—during which he led a tank platoon (Ricks 2008)—and then returned to Oxford to study for a doctorate at St Antony’s College, where he ‘immersed himself in the classic texts of guerrilla warfare’ (Maass 2004). His thesis was supervised by Professor Robert O’Neill, who, at that time, was also director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)—one of the key nodes in the military industrial
complex in the UK. Nagl writes that O’Neill ‘suggested the topic and saw it through to the end’ (Nagl 2002). The thesis was published as a book *Learning to eat soup with a knife* (Nagl 2002), a title taken from TE Lawrence. According to *The Times*, it was so influential that General George Casey [Petraeus’s predecessor], the U.S. Commander in Iraq, is said to carry it with him everywhere. Most of his staff have been ordered to read it and he pressed a copy into the hands of Donald Rumsfeld when he visited Baghdad in December. (Baldwin 2006)

This anecdote is perhaps most significant when one considers that Rumsfeld was the figure most associated with the ‘shock and awe’ approach in the Iraq war. Nagl ‘served in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 as the operations officer for an Army battalion in Iraq’s Anbar province’ (Ricks 2008). After serving in Iraq, Nagl helped produce the US Army’s counterinsurgency manual FM 3-24, which McFate and Kilcullen also worked on (Nagl et al 2007).

Nagl then became the commander at Fort Riley, Kansas, where he teaches US soldiers how to train and advise Iraqi forces. In 2008 it was reported that Nagl had ‘decided to leave the service to study strategic issues full time’ at the Center for a New American Security, the security-related think-tank that also employs Kilcullen (Ricks 2008).

*Academic research in the service of ‘improved cultural capability’*

Kilcullen argues that ‘new approaches to systems analysis’ developed by scientists suggest that the US should use a ‘model of insurgencies as biological systems’ in order to identify ‘key system elements and means to attack them’ (Kilcullen 2005). A key aspect of this approach, Kilcullen writes, is ‘improved cultural capability’ (Kilcullen 2005). McFate put this even more explicitly in her doctoral thesis, where she writes that ‘knowledge of the enemy leads to a refinement in knowledge of how best to kill the enemy’ (cited in Price 2009).

In other words, the warrior-intellectuals seek a more advanced understanding of particular cultures and societies, in order that America and its allies can dominate them more efficiently. Kilcullen writes that ‘in modern counter-insurgency … there is no single insurgent network to be penetrated but rather a cultural and demographic jungle of population groups to be navigated’. That being the case, ‘the counterinsurgent must control the overall environment rather than defeat a specific enemy’ (Kilcullen 2006, 111–130). Cultural knowledge therefore becomes crucial to military strategy. Nagl writes of the need to create ‘a force capable of the cultural and linguistic sophistication necessary to defeat a very capable enemy’ (Nagl 2002, xv).

This is a strain of thought most explicit in McFate and Kilcullen. In his research Kilcullen seeks to develop what he calls a ‘conflict ethnography’, that is, ‘a deep, situation-specific understanding of the human, social and cultural dimensions of a conflict’ (Kilcullen 2007b).

*‘Hearts and minds’ or ‘armed propaganda’*

Kilcullen and the others have a specific model of ‘hearts and minds’. It integrates communication with research and military and political action. Bacevich refers
to two camps within the military he labels ‘Crusaders and Conservatives’. These
groups differ on the extent that they believe in the use of social and political tools
to achieve victory. Nagl is ‘Among the Crusaders’ most influential members’, and
is said to believe that ‘winning battles becomes less urgent than pacifying
populations and establishing effective governance’ (Bacevich 2008).

Kilcullen has, as Tom Hayden points out, advocated ‘actions to target the
insurgent infrastructure that would resemble the unfairly maligned (but highly
The original ‘Phoenix’ was a detention, torture and assassination programme in
South Vietnam, which was denounced and disbanded by the US Congress in
the 1970s (Hayden 2008). Hayden also notes how Kilcullen’s goal of controlling
the civilian population in Iraq mimics the ‘strategic hamlets’ programme in South
Vietnam, originally developed by the British counterinsurgency theorist Robert
Thompson in Malaya and justified as an effort to ‘protect’ the occupied population
(Hayden 2008).

Kilcullen’s approach, and that of ‘the surge’ more generally, can be seen as a
modern, urbanized form of the ‘strategic hamlets’ programme. This is evident in a
presentation Kilcullen gave at the RAND Corporation in May 2008, in which he
described the ‘breaking [of] the cycle’ of violence through ‘gated communities’ and
‘access controls’ to prevent the mixing of Shia and Sunni populations, ‘domination
of “belts”’ (Provinces adjacent to Baghdad), ‘control of access to Baghdad’, and
‘Joint Security Operations’ to ‘protect people in their homes.’ (Kilcullen 2008)

Kilcullen stresses that population control cannot be brought about by military
means alone. For him, and the other counterinsurgents, information control is
also crucial:

I sometimes feel as if a new paradigm is on the tip of my tongue, and I have a strong
feeling that the solution (if there is one) is about a strategic form of armed
propaganda that goes well beyond our current concept of IO [Information
Operations] into a type of semi-kinetic ‘influence operations’. (Kilcullen 2007a)

Similarly, Nagl has referred to the necessity for ‘diplomacy, information
operations, intelligence, financial and military’ power in order to ‘prevail in
irregular warfare’ (Nagl 2002, xv), and has written that ‘The most important
warriors of the current century may fight for the US Information Agency rather
than the Department of Defense’ (Nagl 2007).

The British link

It is not inconsequential that McFate and Nagl have significant UK connections,
having been based at UK institutions (Nagl) or conducted fieldwork in the UK
among opponents and supporters of the British state (McFate). Like Kilcullen they
have drawn heavily on British approaches to counterinsurgency, in particular
those developed whilst dealing with anti-colonial liberation movements. McFate
has noted approvingly that the British counterinsurgency theorist Robert
Thompson, while advising the US in Vietnam, ‘suggested that anthropologists
be used to recruit aboriginal tribesmen as partisans’ (McFate 2005c). Nagl also
cites Thompson, and both cite Frank Kitson, another counterinsurgency writer
who remains highly regarded in the British military (McFate 2005b; Nagl 2002).
It is thus worth considering these earlier counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners briefly. Robert Thompson is probably the most influential. He had 27 years of almost uninterrupted military, political and advisory service in Southeast Asia, starting in Malaya and ending when the US withdrew from Vietnam. The counterinsurgency operation of which Thompson was an integral part was, the Foreign Office conceded in a secret file, ‘very much a war in defence of [the] rubber industry’, which was an important source of wealth for Britain (quoted in Curtis 2003, 336). An integral part of Britain’s operation was Harold Briggs’ ‘Briggs Plan’, which began in 1950 and targeted Malaya’s Chinese population through a ‘resettlement’ programme. Thompson himself recalled one such operation as follows:

Just as an example of a ruthless measure, I quote the case of a village in Malaya (Jenderam) of about three thousand inhabitants ... Everyone in it, men, women and children, went into detention for two years. All the houses were razed to the ground. Surprisingly, this did not cause a public outcry and the effectiveness of the result, by leading to the elimination of the communist terrorist unit concerned, silenced all criticism. (Cited in Curtis 2004)

When Thompson was appointed head of the British Advisory Mission to Vietnam in 1961, he famously advocated the same repressive tactics developed in Malaya (Beckett 1997). He became a prominent counterinsurgency expert and in 1966 published Defeating communist insurgency, a book considered one of the classics of counterinsurgency literature. He was then engaged by the RAND Corporation as a consultant, and paid annual visits to Vietnam. After one of these, in 1968, he wrote a new book, No exit from Vietnam (The Times 1992), which criticized the use of heavy firepower as ineffective—advocating instead a combination of political propaganda and military repression. In 1970, Thompson became a founding member of the Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC), a London based right-wing think-tank with links to the CIA and British intelligence (The Times 1970).

Another counterinsurgency expert who cut his teeth in Malaya was Frank Kitson. He saw further active service, most notoriously in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s, where he attempted to apply the doctrine gleaned from Malaya and codified it in his most well-known book, Low intensity operations (Kitson 1971), drafted while a defence fellow at Oxford (Mockaitis 1990, 186). As John Newsinger writes, ‘there is much to be said’ for Nationalist politician Paddy Devlin’s view that Kitson ‘probably did more than any other individual to sour relations between the Catholic community and the security forces’ (2002, 171).

The terror–counterinsurgency connection

The ‘warrior-intellectuals’ share this intellectual heritage with the counter-terror establishment. Indeed an early critic of ‘terrorism studies’ described it as ‘counterinsurgency doctrine masquerading as political sociology’ (Schlesinger 1978, 117).

The British counterinsurgency experts could rely on official sponsorship, as well as informal political networks. In the 1960s, Britain’s Defence Secretary Denis Healey set up ‘Defence Lectureships’ to sponsor military subjects at universities. Michael Howard, who had set up the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, and was also a co-founder of the IISS with Healey, was awarded one such
lectureship at All Souls College, Oxford. After Howard took up the post at All Souls, Laurence Martin took his chair at King’s College and became head of the Department of War Studies (Howard 2006, 196). The central importance of the IISS and of King’s College in the British military–industrial–academic complex remains today.

It was just after this period—in the early to mid 1970s—that ‘terrorism’ first emerged as a unique subject of study. Influential experts who emerged during the 1970s include Martha Crenshaw, Brian Jenkins, Paul Wilkinson, Yonah Alexander, Walter Laqueur and Ariel Merari. Though not numerous, these early experts were well connected to governments and the military. The ‘invisible college’ they developed formed the nucleus of the ‘terrorism industry’ that was to develop in the 1980s and markedly expand after September 11 (Miller and Mills 2009).

Like the counterinsurgency experts, several of the most influential early terrorism experts were connected to the neoliberal and neoconservatives networks. In the UK, an important focal point of terrorism studies in the 1970s was the right-wing think-tank the Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC), which produced a number of reports and journals on ‘terrorism’ and counterinsurgency during the 1970s. The ISC had grown out a London-based CIA propaganda operation called Forum World Features that was set up in 1965 with covert funding from the CIA. Its chairman Brian Crozier was one of the first to address the topic of terrorism (Crozier 1959; 1960).

Crozier co-founded the ISC in 1970 with the leading Sovietologist Leonard Schapiro. Both men held notably right-wing views and had covert intelligence experience (Evans 1993). Most of the individuals who made up the ISC’s Council of Management also had affiliations to the military or to covert propaganda organizations. The group’s chief fundraisers were a retired major-general called Fergus Ling and the aforementioned Robert Thompson (The Times 1970).

The ISC journal Conflict Studies stated that ISC’s ‘main object’ was ‘the systematic and comparative study of the causes and manifestations of conflict, with special but not exclusive reference to social and political unrest, urban terrorism, guerrilla war, revolutionary war and related phenomena’ (Sim 1978). As in Crozier’s earlier work, terrorism was thus viewed as part of a continuum of ‘social and political unrest’ which should be met by Western governments with effective countermeasures both military and psychological (Crozier 1959). An early issue of Conflict Studies entitled ‘Uruguay: terrorism versus democracy’, was written by Crozier’s friend Robert Moss. Moss, who had previously been a professor of ancient history, was a journalist at The Economist and later became a lecturer at the Royal College of Defence Studies (New World Library 2009). The theme of a battle between ‘terrorism’ and ‘democracy’ was later borrowed by the prominent terrorism expert Paul Wilkinson when he wrote an issue of Conflict Studies in 1976 under the title ‘Terrorism versus liberal democracy’. The theme dominated much of Wilkinson’s work including his most influential book, Terrorism and the liberal state (1977).

Wilkinson, a former Royal Air Force officer, remains the most influential of the early experts and—though retired—is still consulted by the media today. His affiliations with right-wing groups like the ISC are not well known. His first two books, Social movement (1971) and Political terrorism (1974), were part of a book series overseen by the ISC founder Leonard Schapiro (Wilkinson 1974, 2). Wilkinson even briefly joined the Council of Management of the ISC between
October 1980 and May 1981 (Companies House 1981). In 1986 he founded his own think-tank called the Research Foundation for the Study of Terrorism. It shared an office with the right-wing lobby group Aims of Industry (Leonard 1988) and later merged with the ISC. As an academic Wilkinson was based at Aberdeen University during the 1980s, where he developed a computer database of terrorism incidents in coordination with the RAND Corporation (Schmid 1988). He later moved to St Andrews University, where he co-founded perhaps the most important academic centre on terrorism in the 1990s.

The RAND Corporation and CSTPV

The RAND Corporation, which had already played an important role in linking academia and the military, became the most important centre for terrorism research in the US. The RAND terrorism programme was developed by Brian Jenkins, a key expert in the 1970s, who is still active today. A former captain in the Green Berets, Jenkins had been involved in US counterinsurgency operations in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam. Jenkins was followed by Bruce Hoffman, who went on to become one of the most influential terrorism experts. Hoffman joined RAND as an intern whilst studying for his doctorate at Oxford University on the British experience in Palestine. In 1994, he left RAND to set up the CSTPV at the University of St Andrews with Paul Wilkinson (RAND 1998).

The CSTPV has like other such centres developed strong links with the state and the corporate sector. In addition to its academic work it provides training to the military, the police and companies. It has also organized a series of conferences attended by senior police officers and civil servants, hosted by the Royal United Services Institute and sponsored by security and arms companies like BAe Systems, QinetiQ, Risk Management Solutions and Jane’s Intelligence Group. The CSTPV has provided training to several companies operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, including Aegis Defence Services, Control Risks Group and Erinys, as well as the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), the US Department of Defence and the US Army and Air Force. CSTPV founder Bruce Hoffman has himself actively assisted with the occupation of Iraq. He recommended that the occupation follow a British counterinsurgency model, citing in particular Frank Kitson’s *Low intensity operations* as a model (Burnett and Whyte 2005). This mixing of academia, government and the private sector is typical of the terrorism studies field.

King’s College London

King’s College illustrates more than any other higher education institution in the UK the blurring of the line between government, the military and academia. It also illustrates the interconnections between scholarship on counterinsurgency and terrorism through both organizational and personnel connections. King’s operates as part of the Defence Academy of the UK, which provides higher education for the military and civil service. The Academy includes the Royal College of Defence Studies, responsible for training senior officers from the UK and abroad.

The Defence Academy also includes several other elements, of which the most important are the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC),
Watchfield, Oxfordshire and the Defence College of Management and Technology (DCMT), Shrivenham, Wiltshire. These units are located inside military bases, but much of their training is carried out through King’s College.

The Centre for Defence Studies was established at King’s College in 1990, with a grant from the UK MoD. It is part of the War Studies Department, which also includes the Insurgency Research Group. The latter was established in 2007 in response to the revival of interest in insurgency and counterinsurgency ‘in the military and government’, as opposed, perhaps, to the academy. The group’s membership also includes members of military units such as the Development, Doctrine and Concepts Centre (Shrivenham) and the Land Warfare Centre (Warminster) as well as two representatives from the controversial mercenary firm Aegis Defence Services (Spinprofiles 2009b).

Evidence of the internationalization of this network comes in the form of the recently created International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), which is a partnership between King’s, the University of Pennsylvania, the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (Israel) and the Regional Center on Conflict Prevention (Jordan). According to its own account, ‘ICSR is the first project aimed at countering radicalization and political violence in which Arab and Israeli academic institutions openly collaborate’ (cited in Spinprofiles 2009c). Leaders of this initiative include Lawrence Freedman of King’s College London and Boaz Ganor of the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya. Freedman (Professor of War Studies since 1982) has a long history of involvement in officially oriented think-tanks, including the IISS. Ganor was Israel’s counter-terrorism coordinator at the prime minister’s office from 1993 to 1996.

This nexus of institutions shows more than connections between academia and the military; it shows that the organizational lines between academia and the military/government have been at minimum blurred, perhaps even erased altogether.

Social science and armed propaganda in the UK

The UK government has also taken advice from academics in counterinsurgency and counter-terror work. Three examples are the updating of UK counterinsurgency doctrine, the funding of social science research, and the creation of new propaganda bodies in the UK after September 11. Each shows the integration of academics into the war effort, while the latter suggests the adoption of counterinsurgency tactics as part of the domestic ‘counter-terror’ effort.

Revising counterinsurgency doctrine in the UK

The revision of counterinsurgency doctrine in the UK has taken rather longer than the rush job that was evident in the US and has been more low-profile. In the US one of the leading university publishers even republished the manual complete with ‘a stylish, olive drab, faux-field ready edition, designed to slip into flack jackets or Urban Outfitter accessory bags’ (Price 2007). In the UK by contrast the manual has had to be prised out of the MoD using the Freedom of Information Act by one of the authors in a long-running process that took almost a year.

The team revising UK doctrine was led by Col Alexander Alderson and also includes Brigadier Gavin Bulloch, Dr Daniel Marston, leader of the Royal Military
Academy Sandhurst’s counterinsurgency group or ‘COIN team’, and Lieutenant Colonel Marcus Good (Alderson 2007, 10). All four are members of the King’s College Insurgency Research Group (Spinprofiles 2009b). Gavin Bulloch, who has been described by Alderson as the British Army’s ‘preeminent doctrine writer’, served as an infantry officer for 36 years and ‘was involved in counterinsurgency operations in several theaters during his service’. Marston reportedly lives ‘outside of Boston, Massachusetts’, but has also been a ‘Senior Lecturer in War Studies at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst’, a visiting research fellow at Oxford University and a research fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University (Spinprofiles 2009d). He has contributed to counterinsurgency doctrine for the American, Australian, British and Canadian armed forces. In 2008 he worked as a visiting fellow at the US Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center of Excellence in Iraq, where he briefed marines on counterinsurgency fundamentals and historical case studies for incoming battalions’ (cited in Spinprofiles 2009d). The team very much echo the US theorists emphasizing ‘minimum force’ and ‘soft’ tactics. Bulloch has written that the ‘use of the minimum necessary force is a well-proven counterinsurgency lesson’, but he has also noted that

Physical destruction of the enemy still has an important role to play … but the number of insurgents killed should be no more than is absolutely necessary to achieve success … For example, the killing of a teenage gunman could be justifiable in military terms, but its possible effect on his community could jeopardize a potentially far more significant though less spectacular Hearts and Minds operation. (Bulloch 1996)

The advocacy of hearts and minds shows the significant influence of both Thompson and Kitson as well as that of Nagl and Kilcullen on British thinking. Indeed both Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Foreign Secretary David Miliband have cited Kilcullen’s work. Miliband wrote in his Foreign Office blog, ‘I think that some of the best thinking about terrorism has been done by David Kilcullen’ (Miliband 2009).

The ESRC and the Intelligence Services

In 2006 the ESRC cancelled plans for a £1.3 million government-backed research programme after revelations of the involvement of British intelligence caused protests from academics.

The programme—jointly funded by the FCO, the ESRC and the Arts and Humanities Research Council—was called ‘Combating Terrorism by Countering Radicalisation’. Selected academics were approached and according to the ESRC over 100 attended three seminars before the project was cancelled in October 2006 (Baty 2006). The initiative had not been publicly advertised as normal. The ESRC subsequently noted that ‘we recognise that the decision not to place a public advertisement was not the most effective way of encouraging a wide range of high-quality applications’ (Sooben 2006).

According to one report, ‘An integral part’ of the bid ‘was to prioritise the compilation of a 5,000-word report for the FCO’ (Keenan 2007). Academics were to ‘scope the growth in influence and membership of extremist Islamist groups in the past 20 years’, ‘name key figures and key groups’ and ‘understand the use of theological legitimisation for violence’ (Baty 2006). Specific regions and countries
for the study were identified by the Security Service’s Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (Baty 2006).

Though protests from the chair of the Association of Social Anthropologists and others caused the cancellation of the programme, it was revised and relaunched in 2007 as ‘New Security Challenges: “Radicalisation” and Violence—A Critical Reassessment’, with £2.5 million of funding (Attwood 2007; Garner 2007).

Hearts and minds on the home front

In the case of the war on terror at home we can note the role of Dr Mils Hills and Dr Jamie Macintosh. Hills claims to be the first social anthropologist appointed to the UK MoD and then later the first to join the Cabinet Office (Hills 2005, 130). ‘Happily,’ he writes, ‘my entry into the defence and security community some four years ago [in 1998] coincided with an upsurge of interest in understanding cultures and social change’ (Hills 2003).

Hills worked at the Defence Evaluation Research Agency (DERA—an MoD agency) from 1998, the year he was awarded his doctorate. There he worked on ‘leading-edge research in Information Operations (IO) [and] Psy Ops’ (Spinprofiles 2009e). He moved to Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL—the part that remained after the part privatization of DERA) in 2002, where he was ‘Capability Group Leader for Information Operations in the Human Sciences Team’. While at the MoD he worked with Dr Jamie Macintosh, who holds a doctorate in social psychology (Hills 2005).

Macintosh joined DERA in 1993 after ten years in the British Army, moving on to DSTL on its creation in 2001. During his time there, he made ‘strategic and operational contributions in the emerging fields of Information Superiority and Information Operations (IS-IO)’.

From 2001 Macintosh and Hills worked on the creation of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, the main body responsible for coordinating counter-terrorism preparations in the UK. Macintosh co-authored the White Paper that led to the creation of the Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) in 2001 (Spinprofiles 2009f). The CCS was the body involved in issuing information about the alleged threat to Heathrow Airport and on the ‘ricin plot’, which turned out not to involve any ricin (Miller 2004). In other words the information issued by the government on ricin was entirely false.

Hills left government in 2005, founding a consultancy called Analytic Red that subsequently worked for clients including 10 Downing Street, QinetiQ, the Home Office, the FCO and the DSTL (Spinprofiles 2009e). Macintosh meanwhile joined the Defence Academy in 2004 and from 2006 spent over a year as the ‘home personal advisor’ to Home Secretary John Reid on ‘Transformation and National Security’. His advice was reportedly ‘instrumental’ in the creation of the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) and the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) (Spinprofiles 2009g).

RICU, based in the Home Office, has been controversial because of its alleged similarity to the covert Cold War propaganda department the Information Research Department—a perception reinforced by the involvement of the FCO and the Home Office (and therefore it is assumed the Secret Intelligence Service and the Security Service).
RICU has a brief to undertake research to strategically feed into government counter-terror policy. Since its formation in 2007 it has undertaken or initiated ten separate projects, most of which have been contracted out to research agencies. One has, however, been undertaken by an academic at the University of Nottingham with ESRC funding. Contrary to the usual procedure the research design and results, being ‘somewhat sensitive’, are not being made public (cited in Spinprofiles 2009g). This is unusual for ESRC research and indeed secrecy was one of the issues leading to the objections against the intelligence-sponsored research that the ESRC withdrew (Sooben 2006).

Conclusion

Academic research is increasingly important in delivering the capacity to conduct military and counterinsurgency campaigns. The war on terror has further integrated academia into the war machine, eroding possibilities for independent social science. The entire field of terrorism studies has emerged at the behest and with the active support of the state. In particular both the Pentagon and the MoD in the UK have been heavily involved in this, as have the intelligence services, which have promoted particular types of scholarship through a wide range of activities from covert front operations, through think-tanks to the funding of university chairs, scholarships and research (Herman and O’Sullivan 1989).

If indeed it is true that the role of the intellectual engaged in writing about war is in general one of structured subordination to great power (Chomsky 1997), then the role played by anthropologists, counterinsurgency writers and terror experts in the wars and occupations of the last decade and beyond certainly provide a compelling case in point. An overwhelming majority of writers on terrorism, counterinsurgency and associated topics operate within the dominant paradigm of assuming the legitimacy of Western governments and defining the ‘terrorist’ and the ‘insurgents’—at least for public consumption—in terms consonant with the needs of great power. At best we find a criticism of power, strategy or policy only in order that they can be made more efficient or effective. The creation of ‘flex networks’ (Wedel 2004) by the military–industrial–academic complex suggests both integration and the reduction of the possibility of academics acting as guardians of science and truth. It also poses challenges for codes of ethical conduct in the social sciences.

This has not been all one way, however, as the enterprise of ‘critical terrorism studies’ shows. This has emerged in reaction to the significant increase in work on terrorism in the period since 2001. It is explicitly critical of ‘orthodox’ terrorism studies and has drawn significant sustenance from the anti-war movement in the UK and elsewhere. It is internationally linked but the main impetus has come from the UK and the new journal titled *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, edited from Aberystwyth University, which has also overseen a number of books in the area (such as Jackson et al 2009). This is a hopeful sign for those in favour of academic independence, though it is too early to say how much of an impact it will make and there remain very significant pressures, both financial and ideological, for academics to orient themselves more closely with official agendas.
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