The Militarization of US Higher Education after 9/11

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Abstract
Subject to severe financial constraints while operating within a regime of moral panics driven by the ‘war on terrorism’, higher education in the United States faces both a legitimation crisis and a political crisis. With its increasing reliance on Pentagon and corporate interests, the academy has largely opened its doors to serving private and governmental interests and in doing so has compromised its role as a democratic public sphere. This article situates the development of the university as a militarized knowledge factory within the broader context of what I call the biopolitics of militarization and its increasing influence and power within American society after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Highlighting and critically engaging the specific ways in which the forces of militarization are shaping various aspects of university life, this article focuses on the growth of militarized knowledge and research, the increasing development of academic programs and schools that serve military personnel, and the ongoing production of military values and subject positions on US campuses. It also charts how the alliance between the university and the national security state has undermined the university as a site of criticism, dissent and critical dialogue.

Key words
- 9/11
- America
- higher education
- militarism
- military
- neoliberalism
- pedagogy

War is the motor behind institutions and order. In the smallest of its cogs, peace is waging a secret war. To put it another way, we have to interpret the war that is going on beneath peace; peace is coded war. We are therefore at war with one another; a battlefront runs through the whole of society, continuously and permanently, and it is this battlefront that puts us all on one side or the other. There is no such thing as a neutral subject. We are all inevitably someone’s adversary. (Foucault, 2003: 50–1)

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NEOLIBERALISM HAS been the subject of intense discussion among various left intellectuals within the last few decades, and rightly so (Aronowitz, 2006; Giroux, 2004; Grossberg, 2005; Hardt and Negri, 2004; Harvey, 2005; Ong, 2006; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005; Smith, 2005). As a diverse political, economic and educational project, neoliberalism has constructed a grim alignment among the state, finance capital and transnational corporations, while embracing the ‘market as the arbiter of social destiny’ (Rule, 1998: 31). By extending the domain of economics into politics, neoliberal market rationality now organizes, regulates and defines the basic principles and workings of the state. Gone are the days when the state ‘assumed responsibility for a range of social needs’ (Steinmetz, 2003: 337). Instead, the state now pursues a wide range of ‘deregulations,’ privatizations, and abdications of responsibility to the market and private philanthropy’ (Steinmetz, 2003: 337). As Wendy Brown points out, ‘when deployed as a form of governmentality, neoliberalism reaches from the soul of the citizen-subject to educational policy to practices of empire’ (2005: 40). Throughout the globe, the forces of neoliberalism are on the march, dismantling the historically guaranteed social provisions provided by the welfare state, defining profit-making as the essence of democracy, imposing rapacious free-trade agreements, saturating non-economic spheres with market rationalities and equating freedom with the unrestricted ability of markets to ‘govern economic relations free of government regulation’ (Aronowitz, 2003: 101). Transnational in scope, neoliberalism now imposes its economic regime and market values on developing and weaker nations through the heavy-handed policies of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Western financial and commercial interests now manage and transfer resources and wealth from the poor and less developed nations to the richest and most powerful nation-states as well as wealthy corporate defenders of capitalism.

With the dawn of the new millennium, the Gilded Age, with its ‘“dreamworlds” of consumption, property, and power’, has returned with a vengeance (Davis and Monk, 2007: ix). Market rationalities and entreprenueiral subjects are produced within a growing apparatus of social control while a culture of fear and a battered citizenry are the consequences of the militarization of everyday life. As war has become ‘the organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 12), the state has been transformed from a social state into a punishing state, reinforcing what neoliberalism and militarism share in common: a hatred of democracy and dissent (Rancière, 2006b). The possibilities of democracy are now answered not with the rule of law, however illegitimate, but with the threat or actuality of violence (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 341). In a post-9/11 world, neoliberalism has been weaponized, and the high-intensity warfare it promotes abroad is replicated in low-intensity warfare at home. While both militarism and neoliberalism have a long history in the United States, the symbiotic relationship into which they have entered and the way in which this authoritarian ideology has become normalized...
constitute a distinct historical moment. Both neoliberalism and militarism produce particular views of the world and then mobilize an array of pedagogical practices in a variety of sites in order to legitimate their related modes of governance, subject positions, forms of citizenship and rationality (Ferguson and Turnbull, 1999: 197–8). Moreover, the ever-expanding militarized neoliberal state, marked by the interdependence of finance capital, authoritarian order, a vast war machine and a ‘culture of force’, now serves as a powerful pedagogical influence that shapes the lives, memories and daily experiences of most Americans (Newfield, 2006). While higher education in the United States has long been a major site for producing the neoliberal subject, it is only in the aftermath of 9/11 that the university has also become an intense site of militarization.

There has been increasing concern among academics and progressives over the growing corporatization of the university. Yet the transformation of academia into a ‘hypermodern militarized knowledge factory’ has been largely ignored as a subject of public concern and critical debate (Armitage, 2005: 221). Such silence has nothing to do with a lack of visibility or covert attempts to inject a military and security presence into both higher education and the broader society. Military symbols, representations, talk and images now dominate the cultural and political landscape (Bacevich, 2005; Boggs, 2005; Coker, 2007; Giroux, 2007; Johnson, 2004, 2006). But the idea that ‘military is to democracy as fire is to water’ has been consistently overlooked by the media and most academics, as well as by almost all major politicians under the Bush presidency (Beck, 1996: 78). As a result, a creeping militarism has materialized into a full-fledged coup, fueled by a war on terror, the military occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, and endless cases of kidnapping, torture, abuse and murder by the US government.

While collaboration between the national security state and higher education developed during the Cold War (Chomsky et al., 1998; Lowen, 1997; Simpson, 1998), the post-9/11 resurgence of patriotic commitment and support on the part of faculty and administrators towards the increasing militarization of daily life runs the risk of situating academia within a larger project in which the militarized narratives, values and pedagogical practices of the warfare state become commonplace (Armitage, 2005; McColm and Dorn, 2005; Nelson, 2004; Perelman, 2005). As the ensemble of institutions, relations, culture and symbols of militarization now loom large in the civic order’s ‘field of vision and strategic action’ (Singh, 2006: 85), it becomes all the more important for higher education to be defended as a vital public sphere crucial for both the education of critical citizens and the defense of democratic values and institutions. Yet faith in social amelioration and a sustainable future appears to be in short supply as neoliberal capitalism performs the multiple tasks of using education to train workers for service sector jobs, creating life-long consumers, constructing citizen-warriors and expanding the production of militarized knowledge, values and research. Given the current threat posed by the national security state to higher education and democracy, I want to engage the question of
what role higher education should perform when ‘the government has a free hand to do whatever it wants in the name of national security’ (Perelman, 2005: 179). More specifically, I want to offer an alternative analysis of the fate of higher education as a democratic public sphere, one that refuses simply to serve the expressed needs of militarization, neoliberalism and the national security state, all of which appear to be pushing the United States towards a new form of authoritarianism. In what follows, I first situate the development of the university as a ‘militarized knowledge factory’ within the broader context of what I call the biopolitics of militarization and its increased influence and power within American society after the tragic events of 11 September 2001. Second, I highlight and critically engage the specific ways in which this militarization is shaping various aspects of university life, focusing primarily on the growth of militarized knowledge and research, as well as the growing influence of the CIA on college campuses. Finally, I offer some suggestions both for resisting the rising tide of militarization and for reclaiming the university as a democratic public sphere.

From Militarism to a Biopolitics of Militarization in a Post-9/11 World

After the events of 9/11, the United States became no longer simply a militarized state but a militarized society. What this means can, in part, be explained by making a broad, though hardly steadfast, distinction between militarism and militarization. Militarism, as John Gillis argues, ‘is the older concept, usually defined as either the dominance of the military over civilian authority, or more generally, as the prevalence of warlike values in a society’ (1989: 1). Militarism is often viewed as a retrograde concept because it characterizes a society in which military values and beliefs reside exclusively in a ruling group or class; it is also derided for its anti-democratic tendency to either celebrate or legitimate a hierarchy of authority in which civil society is subordinate to military power. Similarly, militarism makes visible the often contradictory principles and values between military institutions and the more liberal and democratic values of civil society. Militarism as an ideology has deep roots in American society, though it has never had enough force to transform an often-faltering liberal democracy into a military dictatorship.

Militarization suggests less a complete break with militarism – with its celebration of war as the truest measure of the health of the nation and the soldier-warrior as the most noble expression of the merging of masculinity and unquestioning patriotism – than an intensification and expansion of its underlying values, practices, ideologies, social relations and cultural representations. Michael Geyer describes militarization as ‘the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence’ (1989: 79). Catherine Lutz amplifies this definition, defining militarization as:

... an intensification of the labor and resources allocated to military purposes, including the shaping of other institutions in synchrony with
military goals. Militarization is simultaneously a discursive process, involving a shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and their leaders, and the higher taxes or tribute used to pay for them. Militarization is intimately connected not only to the obvious increase in the size of armies and resurgence of militant nationalisms and militant fundamentalisms but also to the less visible deformation of human potentials into the hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and to the shaping of national histories in ways that glorify and legitimate military action. (2002: 723)

Both definitions appear to be even more relevant today than in the past, especially in a post-9/11 society in which military ‘power is the measure of national greatness, and war, or planning for war, is the exemplary (and only common) project’ (Judt, 2005: 16).

The growth of the military model in American life has played a crucial role in the paramilitarizing of the culture, which provides both a narrative and legitimation ‘for recent trends in corrections, including the normalization of special response teams, the increasingly popular Supermax prisons, and drug war boot camps’ (Kraska, 2001: 10). As the matrix for all relations of power, war in all of its actual and metaphorical modalities spreads the discourse and values of militarization throughout a society that has shifted, as Hardt and Negri argue, from ‘the welfare state to the warfare state’ (2004: 17). What is new about militarization in a post-9/11 world is that it has become naturalized, serving as a powerful pedagogical force that shapes our lives, memories and daily experiences, while erasing everything critical and emancipatory about history, justice, solidarity and the meaning of democracy (see Laor, 2006). Military power now expands far beyond the realms of producing military knowledge, enshrining military values and waging wars. As a biopolitical force, military power produces identities, goods, knowledge, modes of communication and affective investments – in short, it now bears down on all other aspects of social life and the social order (see Foucault, 2003; Rose, 2007). And, in doing so, it not only undermines the memories of democratic struggles and hope for the possibility of a more democratic future, it also punishes dissent.

As the punishing state replaces the social state, examples of militarized sovereign power are put on full display by an American government that installs torture as integral to its military and clandestine operations, made visible in the public disclosure of the abuse and torture of prisoners at Abu Ghrab in Iraq, Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan and numerous other detention centers around the world (Mayer, 2005). The lethal consequences of the militarized state are also shamelessly visible in the sickening horror of the massacre which took place in Haditha in Iraq (Holland, 2006), and in a politics of ‘disappearing’ reminiscent of the Latin American dictatorships of the 1970s, in which human beings disappear outside of the boundaries of the law, sanctioned by a ruthless policy of ‘extraordinary rendition’ that enables the US government to abduct alleged enemies of the state and transport them to other countries to be
tortured (Arar, 2006; Gray, 2006). A politics of disposability and exclusion is also manifest in the existence of secret CIA prisons known as ‘black sites’ (Priest, 2005) and in the abrogation of basic civil rights enacted by the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which allows people named as ‘enemy combatants’ to be imprisoned and charged with crimes without the benefit of a lawyer or the right of habeas corpus.

What happens when militarism provides the most legitimate framing mechanism for how we relate to ourselves, each other, and the rest of the world? Andrew Bacevich, Chalmers Johnson, Kevin Baker and others claim that the military ‘has become the most revered institution in the country’ (Baker, 2003: 37), whose importance is repeatedly accentuated by manufactured moral panics about threats from ‘evil doers’ and by endless terror alerts that are designed to legitimate Bush’s notion of a ‘war without limits’ as a normal state of affairs. Under such circumstances, private insecurities and public fears translate into a kind of ‘war fever’ in which ‘[w]ar then becomes heroic, even mythic, a task that must be carried out for the defense of one’s nation, to sustain its special historical destiny and immortality of its people’ (Rosen, 2002). The spread of war fever carries with it both a kind of paranoid edge, endlessly mobilized by a high-octane culture of fear, government alerts and repressive laws used ‘to create the most extensive national security apparatus in our nation’s history’ (Rosen, 2002), and a masculine politics that refuses to recognize that ‘[t]he poison that is war does not free us from the ethics of responsibility’ (Hedges, 2003: 16). The politics of militarized masculinity finds its highest cultural expression in the kind of celluloid brutality, violence and carnage that characterizes standard Hollywood fare (see Giroux, 2002; Weaver and Carter, 2006). Indeed, the social topography of militarized masculinity is also evident in the return of the warrior male whose paranoia is endlessly stoked by the existence of a feminized culture of critical thinking, a gay subculture and a liberal ideology that exhibits a disrespect for top-down order and unquestioned authority and discipline. Cultural critic Jonathan Rutherford argues that the current militarization of masculinity is part of America’s revival of the fascination with war shaped by an older frontier spirit (2005: 622). Such a fascination also harks back to the shadow of fascism that loomed over Europe in the past century and emboldens the message that the warrior spirit revives an authentic manliness in which ‘war makes man’.

The new ethos of militarization no longer occupies a marginal place in the American political landscape, and it is reinforced daily by domestic and foreign policies that reveal a country obsessed with war and with the military values, policies and practices that drive it (see Chomsky, 2003). For instance, the military budget request for 2007 totals $462.7 billion, and when ‘adjusted for inflation [the 2007 military budget] exceeds the average amount spent by the Pentagon during the Cold War [and] for a military that is one-third smaller than it was just over a decade ago’ (Hellman, 2006). The US military budget is:
... almost 7 times larger than the Chinese budget, the second largest spender... almost 29 times as large as the combined spending of the six ‘rogue states’ (Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria) who spent [US]$14.65 billion [and is] more than the combined spending of the next 14 nations. (Shah, 2006)

Such immense levels of defense spending by the federal government have grave implications for expanding a US war machine that not only uses massive resources but is:

... devoted to the monopolistic militarization of space, the development of more usable nuclear weapons, and the strengthening of its world-girdling ring of military bases and its global navy, as the most tangible way to discourage any strategic challenges to its preeminence. (Falk, 2003)

The projection of US military force and power in the world can be seen in the fact that the United States owns or rents 737 bases ‘in about 130 countries – over and above the 6,000 bases’ at home (Sterngold, 2004). Not only does the United States today spend ‘approximately as much as the rest of the world combined on its military establishment’ (Fukuyama, 2007) – producing massive amounts of death-dealing weapons – but it is also the world’s biggest arms dealer, with sales in 2006 amounting to ‘about $20.9 billion, nearly double the $10.6 billion the previous year’ (Wolf, 2006).

What is clear in light of these figures is that militarization is not just a legitimating ideology for the state’s coercive power; it is also a source of economic power for US military industries and, unfortunately, a source of employment for significant portions of the labor force. Such high levels of military funding, spending and arms exporting both fail to guarantee security at home and give too much political power to the global producers and merchants of arms such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Raytheon and General Dynamics. Moreover, both major political parties have a stake in high military spending, and as reported in the New York Times ‘the billions that have been supporting the industry are expected to continue unabated, and perhaps even increase’ (Wayne, 2006: 7). Chalmers Johnson argues that US imperial ambitions are driven by what he calls ‘military Keynesianism, in which the domestic economy requires sustained military ambition in order to avoid recession or collapse’ (2007a: 63).

In the current historical conjuncture, ‘war has gone from an instrument of politics, used in the last resort, to the foundation of politics, the basis for discipline and control’ (Hardt and Negri, 2004: 334). Increasingly, military power and policies are being expanded to address not only matters of defense and security but also problems associated with the entire health and social life of the nation, which are now measured by military values, spending, discipline, loyalty and hierarchical modes of authority. While citizens increasingly assume the role of informer, soldier and consumer willing to enlist in or be conscripted by the totalizing war on terror, militarization has taken a sinister turn in the United States, as it has increasingly
been shaped by the forces of empire, violence and neoliberal global capital. As politics is reduced to the imperatives of homeland security and war becomes the major structuring force of society – a source of pride rather than alarm – it becomes all the more crucial to understand how a ‘mature democracy is in danger of turning itself into a military state’ (Monbiot, 2003). The increasing militarization of American society raises serious questions about what kind of society the United States is becoming, and how higher education might be implicated in what C. Wright Mills once called ‘a military definition of reality’ (1993: 191).

The Militarized Knowledge Factory: Research, Credentials and the CIA

While the Cold War and Sovietology are gone from the scene, a parallel project is now underway: the launching of large-scale initiatives to create a cadre and set of institutions that penetrate our campuses and link them to national security, military, and intelligence agencies. The aim is nothing less, as Congressional hearings show, than to turn back opposition on our campuses to imperial war, and turn campuses into institutions that will, over the next generation, produce scholars and scholarship dedicated to the so-called war on terror. These programs are part of a broader effort to normalize a constant state of fear, based on the emotion of terror, while criminalizing anti-war and anti-imperial consciousness and action. As in the past, universities, colleges and schools have been targeted precisely because they are charged with both socializing youth and producing knowledge of peoples and cultures beyond the borders of Anglo-America. (Martin, 2005)

Now that the war on terrorism and a gradual erosion of civil liberties have become commonplace, the idea of the university as a site of critical thinking, public service and socially responsible research appears to have been usurped by a manic jingoism and a market-driven fundamentalism that enshrine the entrepreneurial spirit and military aggression as the best means to produce the rewards of commercial success and power. Not only is the militarization of higher education made obvious by the presence of over 150 military-educational institutions in the United States designed to ‘train a youthful corps of tomorrow’s military officers’ in the strategies, values, skills and knowledge of the warfare state, but also, as the American Association of Universities points out, in the existence of hundreds of colleges and universities that conduct Pentagon-funded research, provide classes to military personnel, and design programs specifically for future employment with various departments and agencies associated with the warfare state (Turse, 2004; see also Johnson, 2004: 97–130). The intrusion of the military into higher education is also on full display with the recent announcement by Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush, of the creation of what he calls a new ‘Minerva consortium’, ironically named after the goddess of wisdom, whose purpose is to fund various universities to ‘carry out social-sciences research relevant to national security’ (Brainard,
2008). Without apology, Gates would like to turn universities into militarized knowledge factories producing knowledge, research, and personnel in the interest of the Homeland (In)Security State. Faculty now flock to the Department of Defense, the Pentagon and various intelligence agencies either to procure government jobs or to apply for grants to support individual research in the service of the national security state. At the same time, as corporate money for research opportunities dwindles, the Pentagon fills the void with millions of dollars in available grants, stipends, scholarships and other valuable financial rewards, for which college and university administrators actively and openly compete. Indeed, the Department of Homeland Security is flush with money:

[It] handles a $70 million dollar scholarship and research budget, and its initiatives, in alliance with those of the military and intelligence agencies, point towards a whole new network of campus-related programs. [For instance,] the University of Southern California has created the first ‘Homeland Security Center of Excellence’ with a $12 million grant that brought in multidisciplinary experts from UC Berkeley, NYU, and University of Wisconsin-Madison. Texas A&M and the University of Minnesota won $33 million to build two new Centers of Excellence in agrosecurity. . . . The scale of networked private and public cooperation is indicated by the new National Academic Consortium for Homeland Security led by Ohio State University, which links more than 200 universities and colleges. (Martin, 2005)

Rather than being the object of massive individual and collective resistance, the militarization of higher education appears to be endorsed by liberals and conservatives alike. The National Research Council of the National Academies published a report called *Frameworks for Higher Education in Homeland Security* (2006), which argued that the commitment to learning about homeland security is an essential part of the preparation for work and life in the 21st century, thus offering academics a thinly veiled legitimization for building into undergraduate and graduate curricula intellectual frameworks that mirror the interests and values of the warfare state. Similarly, the Association of American Universities argued in a report titled *National Defense Education and Innovation Initiative* (2005) that winning the war on terrorism and expanding global markets were mutually informing goals, the success of which falls squarely on the performance of universities. This group argues, with a rather cheerful certainty, that every student should be trained to become a soldier in the war on terror and in the battle over global markets, and that the universities should do everything they can ‘to fill security-related positions in the defense industry, the military, the national laboratories, the Department of Defense and Homeland Security, the intelligence agencies, and other federal agencies’ (Martin, 2005).

More and more universities are cooperating with intelligence agencies with few objections from faculty, students and other concerned citizens (Price, 2005). In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks,
many academics are enthusiastically offering their services for the plethora of expert personnel positions, which according to National Intelligence Director John Negroponte in 2006 were available among the 16 federal intelligence agencies and programs that employ over 100,000 personnel \((USA\, Today,\, 2006)\). The Wall Street Journal claims that the CIA has become a ‘growing force on campus’ (Golden, 2002), while a November 2002 issue of the liberal magazine American Prospect published an article by Chris Mooney calling for academics and the government intelligence agencies to work together. As he put it, ‘Academic–intelligence relationships will never be problem free. But at present, the benefits greatly outweigh the costs’ (Mooney, 2002). Such collaboration seems to be in full swing at a number of universities. For example, major universities have appointed former CIA officials as either faculty, consultants or presidents. Michael Crow, a former agent, is now president of Arizona State University and Robert Gates, the former Director of the CIA, was until recently president of Texas A&M. The collusion among the Pentagon, war industries and academia in the fields of research and development is evident as companies that make huge profits on militarization and war, such as General Electric, Northrop Grumman and Halliburton, establish crucial ties with universities through their grants, while promoting their image as philanthropic institutions to the larger society (see Roelofs, 2006). As the university is increasingly militarized, it ‘becomes a factory that is engaged in the militarization of knowledge, namely, in the militarization of the facts, information and abilities obtained through the experience of education’ (Armitage, 2005: 221). The priority given to such knowledge is largely the result of the huge amount of research money increasingly shaping the curricula, programs and departments in various universities around the country. Money flows from the military war machine in the post-9/11 world, and the grants and research funds that the best universities receive are not cheap. In 2003, for example, Penn State received $149 million in research and development awards while the Universities of California, Carnegie Mellon and Texas received $29.8 million, $59.8 million and $86.6 million respectively, and they are not even the top beneficiaries of such funds (see Turse, 2004). The scale, sweep, range and complexity of the interpenetration between academia and military-funded projects is as extensive as it is frightening. Nicholas Turse explains:

According to a 2002 report by the Association of American Universities (AAU), almost 350 colleges and universities conduct Pentagon-funded research; universities receive more than 60% of defense basic research funding; and the DoD is the third largest federal funder of university research (after the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation). . . . the Department of Defense accounts for 60% of federal funding for university-based electrical engineering research, 55% for the computer sciences, 41% for metallurgy/materials engineering, and 33% for oceanography. With the DoD’s budget for research and development skyrocketing, so to speak, to $66 billion for 2004 – an increase of $7.6 billion over 2003 – it
doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that the Pentagon can often dictate the sorts of research that get undertaken and the sorts that don’t. (Turse, 2004)

Along with the money that comes with such defense-oriented funding is a particular assumption about the importance of ideas, knowledge and information and their relevance to military technologies, objectives and purposes. Of course, this is about more than how knowledge is obtained, shaped and used by different elements of the military-industrial complex; it is also about the kind of pressure that the Department of Defense and the war industries can bring to bear on colleges and universities to orient themselves towards a society in which non-militarized knowledge and values play a minor role, thus removing from higher education its fundamental purpose in educating students to be ethical citizens, learn how to take risks, connect knowledge to power in the interests of social responsibility and justice, and defend vital democratic ideals, values and institutions. In this context, it would be worthwhile to heed the warning of Jay Reed:

Universities are not only hotbeds of military activity, they are adversely affected by the ethical compromises and threats to academic freedom that accompany a Department of Defense presence. The dream of the University as a place of disinterested, pure learning and research is far from reality as scientists and administrators from across the country are paid directly by the military to sit on Department of Defense scientific advisory boards and perform other research. It is naive to think that an abundance of funding from the military does not affect the projects chosen to be worthy of scientific inquiry. University research is not the result of objective decisions made in the spirit of an enlightened quest for knowledge; rather, these scientists’ agendas are determined by the bloodthirsty architects of military strategy. (Reed, 2001)

For instance, the Department of Defense, along with a number of other departments and agencies invested in the process of militarization, largely support two main areas of weaponry: space-based armaments and so-called Future Combat Systems. The space weapons being researched in universities around the country include ‘microwave guns, space-based lasers, electromagnetic guns, and holographic decoys’ while the future combat weapons include ‘electric tanks, electro-thermal chemical cannons, [and] unmanned platforms’ (Reed, 2001). Such research is carried out at universities such as MIT, which gets 75 percent of its funds for its robotics program from the Department of Defense. How these funds shape research and development and the orientation of theory towards the production of militarized knowledge is evident in MIT’s design and production of a kind of RoboMarine called ‘the Gladiator’, which is a tactical unmanned ground vehicle containing an MT40G medium machine gun, surveillance cameras, and slots for launching paint balls and various smoke rounds, including ‘tear gas, or stingball and flashbang grenades’ (Cole, 2003). One Pittsburgh paper called it:
a remote-controlled ‘toy,’ [with] some real weapons . . . [and] containers for hand grenades that can be used for clearing obstacles and creating a footpath on difficult terrain for soldiers following behind. It also features what looks like organ pipes to produce smoke, and it has a mount on top for a medium-size machine gun or multipurpose assault weapon. (Shropshire, 2005)

Critical commentary apparently not included. In fact, the Gladiator is designed for military crowd-control capabilities, reconnaissance, surveillance, and direct fire missions. Carnegie Mellon University received a $26.4 million Defense Department grant to build six Gladiator prototypes. The University of Texas received funding from the Department of Defense for its Applied Research Laboratories, which develop in five separate labs everything from Navy surveillance systems to ‘sensing systems to support U.S. ballistic missile targeting’ (Reed, 2001). MIT, one of the largest recipients of defense research money, has also been using its talented research-oriented faculty and students to develop remote sensing and imaging systems that would ‘nullify the enemy’s ability to hide inside complex mountain terrains and cityscapes’ (Edwards, 2006). Universities around the country are funded to do similar military-oriented research, producing everything from global positioning systems to undersea surveillance technologies.

Another important element of the military-industrial-academic complex that contributes to the growing presence of military values and interests on campuses can be found in the increasing numbers of college degree programs that serve military employees. As part of a new recruiting strategy, the military adjusted its policies so that its spending for educational benefits has spiked in the last few years to more than a ‘half a billion dollars a year in tuition assistance for the members of its active-duty force’, thus opening up a market for profit and non-profit educational institutions (Blumenstyk, 2006). Some branches such as the Navy are increasing the importance of education by requiring all sailors beginning in 2011 to have ‘an associate degree to qualify for promotion to senior enlisted ranks’ (Blumenstyk, 2006). Fueled by a desire for more students, tuition money, and a larger share of the market for online and off-campus programs, many universities and colleges are altering their curricula and delivery services to attract the lucrative education market for military personnel. The military's increased interest in education has proven to be such a bonanza for recruiting and retaining soldiers that one Army officer claims: ‘The military has turned the entire recruiting force into essentially admissions counselors’ (Carnevale, 2006).

The rush to cash in on such changes has been dramatic, particularly for online, for-profit educational institutions such as the University of Phoenix, which has high visibility on the Internet. Other colleges such as Grantham University and the American Military University use military-friendly messages distributed across cyberspace in order to reach this new
market of students and potentially large profits. Creating virtual universities has been a boon for colleges willing to provide online courses, distance-education degrees and programs that appeal to military personnel. In some cases, enrollment figures have skyrocketed as colleges tap into this lucrative market. Dan Carnevale, a writer for the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, reports that in 2006 at Touro University International in California ‘about 4,000 of its 6,000 students serve in the military. And more than half of the nearly 11,000 students at Grantham University are in the armed forces’. The importance of online education can be seen in the creation of eArmyU, which is a partnership between the Armed Forces and higher education that allows enlisted personnel to use tuition assistance money to take online courses through 28 selected colleges. Those colleges that offer traditional classroom instruction rely heavily on setting up satellite campuses on or close to military bases in order to get a profitable share of the market. Some colleges, such as Central Texas, provide both online courses and on-base classroom instruction. For Central Texas, 74 percent of its 63,000 students are members of the active-duty military.

I should like to be very careful about how this expansion of educational benefits to military personnel contributes to the militarization of the academy. I certainly believe that people who serve in the armed services should be given ample educational opportunities, and that for me is not at issue. What I think is problematic is both the nature of these programs and the wider culture of privatization and militarization legitimated by them. With respect to the former, the incursion of the military presence in higher education furthers and deepens the ongoing privatization of education and knowledge itself. Most of the players in this market are for-profit institutions that are problematic not only for the quality of education they offer but also for their aggressive support of education less as a public good than as a private initiative, defined in this case through providing a service to the military in return for a considerable profit. And as this sector of higher education grows, it will not only become more privatized but also more instrumentalized, largely defined as a credentializing factory designed to serve the needs of the military, thus falling into the trap of confusing training with a broad-based education. Catering to educational needs of the military makes it all the more difficult to offer educational programs that would challenge militarized notions of identity, knowledge, values, ideas, social relations and visions. Military institutions radiate power in their communities and often resemble updated versions of the old company towns of 19th-century America – hostile to dissent, cultural differences, people who take risks and any discourse that might question authority. Moreover, the sheer power of the military apparatus, further augmented by its corporate and political alliances and fueled by an enormous budget, provide the Pentagon with a powerful arm-twisting ability capable of bending higher education to its will, an ominous and largely ignored disaster that is in the making in the United States.

One of the more disturbing indications of academe’s willingness to accommodate the growing presence and legitimating ideologies of the
national security state can be found in the increasing presence of the CIA and other spy agencies on American campuses. Daniel Golden, writing for the *Wall Street Journal* in 2002, noted that in the aftermath of 9/11 an increasing number of faculty and universities – capitalizing on both a new found sense of patriotism and less politicized sense of self-interest – were turning to the 16 intelligence agencies and offering them their services and new recruitment opportunities. Moreover, as universities recognize that the intelligence agencies have deep pockets for funding opportunities, the CIA has benefited from this new receptivity and is reciprocating by ‘turning more to universities . . . to develop high-tech gadgets that track down terrorists and dictators’ (Seaver, 2003). In addition, it is developing more federal scholarship programs, grants and other initiatives in order to attract students for career opportunities and to involve faculty in various roles that address ‘security and intelligence goals’ (Clayton, 2003). The CIA’s cozy relationship with academics has also been reinforced by the agency’s increased presence at annual meetings held by academic groups such as the International Studies Association and the American Anthropological Association.

While part of this receptivity by faculty can be attributed to the scramble for research funding, it is only one factor in the equation. At a time when college students are in desperate need of jobs in an increasingly fragile market, the CIA, because of its political prominence in fighting the war on terrorism, is expanding rather than shrinking its employment opportunities and is viewed by many students – who seem to be beating a path to the agency’s employment officers – as a promising career choice. Equally important is the upsurge in patriotic correctness following 9/11 coupled with the ongoing right-wing campaign to squelch ‘un-American’ dissent in the university. Hence, amid the resurgence of political quietism and hyper-patriotism, and growing job insecurities among college graduates, an unparalleled détente has emerged between academia and the CIA at the beginning of the new millennium. This détente is furthered in part by a new generation of academics more favorable to forging a connection with the CIA. A resurgent sense of patriotism has also energized an older generation of closeted pro-CIA faculty, who either formerly worked with the CIA but did so in secrecy or supported efforts for collaborative work between academia and the CIA but were hesitant to make their views public.

One of the most controversial post-9/11 programs sponsored by the CIA is the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISP). The program is named after Senator Pat Roberts, who was the head of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under the Bush administration until the takeover of the Senate by Democrats in 2006 (see ThinkProgress.org, 2006). The Roberts Program was designed to train 150 analysts in anthropology, each of whom would receive a $25,000 stipend per year, with a maximum of $50,000 over the two-year period. The program also provided tuition support, loan paybacks and bonuses for the immediate hiring of those
candidates considered to have critical skills. In return, each participant in the program agreed to work for an intelligence agency for one-and-a-half times the period covered by the scholarship support. In this case, two years of support would demand that an analyst work for a government intelligence agency for three years. Students who receive such funding cannot reveal their funding source, are not obligated to inform their professors or fellow students that they are being funded for and will work for an intelligence agency, and are required to attend military intelligence camps (for a description of the program, see CIA, 2007). The association of such a program with Senator Roberts seems particularly apt given that Roberts was well-known for siding with the Bush administration on warrantless domestic spying practices, blocking a vote to investigate the practices, consistently stonewalling an investigation into Bush’s use of pre-war intelligence to justify the war in Iraq, defending Guantanamo Bay Prison, and refusing to investigate the CIA’s complicity in the abuse and torture of detainees. The Los Angeles Times in 2006 claimed that ‘In a world without Doublespeak, the panel, chaired by GOP Sen. Pat Roberts of Kansas, would be known by a more appropriate name – the Senate Coverup Committee.’ It is altogether mystifying what such practices and policies could bring to higher education in order to enhance the sharing of institutional knowledge and foster the intellectual independence of students and faculty.

Nevertheless, criticisms of the Roberts Program have emerged among a few prominent academics, including David Price, David Gibbs and William Martin. Price, an associate professor of anthropology at St Martin’s College in Olympia, Washington, argues that the Roberts Program permits the CIA not only ‘to return to its historical practice of operating within universities’ but also to revert to its old habit of collecting information on professors, dissenting students, and what goes on in general in the classroom (cited in Glenn, 2005; see also Price, 2004). Professor Price also believes that such programs give authoritarian regimes ‘an excuse to forbid all American social scientists to conduct research in those countries on the grounds that they are spies’ (cited in Glenn, 2005). Phil Baty writing in the Times Higher Education Supplement extends this argument by insisting that such a program places the lives of all anthropologists in the field at risk of physical danger because they might be suspected of being spies and a danger to the people whom they study. Gibbs, an associate professor of history and political science at the University of Arizona, Tucson, argues that any close relationship between the intelligence services and higher education compromises the ability of academia to make power accountable by undermining the possibility of academics to criticize the policies and practices of intelligence agencies. He argues that the secrecy imposed on scholars working for the CIA is antithetical to the notion of the university as a democratic sphere that fosters critique, open dialogue and engaged debate. He also insists that the CIA practices of engaging in disinformation and propaganda tactics, along with its long and continuing history of destabilizing democratic governments, committing human rights abuses,
engaging in acts of abduction and torture, and undermining popular democratic movements, put it at odds with any viable notion of what higher education should represent (Gibbs, 2003). At the very least, the research that is supported in many universities under the funding of the intelligence agencies raises serious questions about what kind of relationship there is between these agencies and academia, and whether such a relationship is capable of producing the ends for which it is purportedly espoused in the first place.

Perhaps the most stinging criticisms come from William Martin, whose comments are aimed not merely at the CIA, but at all Homeland Security Programs working in conjunction with higher education. Martin suggests that the government’s efforts to redirect general educational funding towards specific programs not only impoverishes universities and renders them increasingly dependent on alternative sources of funding (such as corporations whose financial support also comes with strings attached), but also denies universities the kind of institutional autonomy needed to conduct important research not directly related to governmental goals and values. He writes:

What these programs signal is thus not simply an attack on academic freedom or even the diversion of education funding into secret intelligence projects. For students and scholars alike these new programs threaten to solidify dangerous institutional changes. Secret military and intelligence agencies will increasingly dictate which languages, religions, and peoples – both beyond and within our borders – will be studied and by whom. New networked centers and programs, created by and tied to federal security funding, will form an academic homeland security complex destined to implement the fear of ‘un-American others’, all in pursuit of an increasingly profitable and increasingly illusory ‘war on terror’. Meanwhile, hidden behind these facades, marches the development of security and intelligence student trainees who report to security agencies and move back and forth, unknown and unobserved, from our classrooms to security agencies. The forgotten exposés of the 1970s demonstrate what these kinds of programs produce: an academy not simply compromised and at risk, but riddled with secret military and intelligence projects, slowly spreading all over the world in service of misguided imperial ambitions. (Martin, 2005)

Martin’s argument appears to be lost on a majority of academics. What is overlooked in the growing, enthusiastic collaboration between the military-industrial complex and academe within the context of developing a powerful post-9/11 national security state is that the increasing militarization of higher education is itself a problem that may be even more insidious, damaging and dangerous to the fate of democracy than that posed by terrorists who ‘hate our freedoms’. Heretofore, the university has been one of the few remaining sites where genuine criticism, critical scholarship, spirited debate and organized resistance to the abuse of government power could take place.
Conclusion

Higher education should play a particularly important role in opposing not only its own transformation into a ‘hypermodern militarized knowledge factory’ but also the growing impact of militarization in the larger society. One crucial step in this process is to reclaim higher education as a democratic public sphere, one that provides the pedagogical conditions for students to become critical agents who connect learning to expanding and deepening the struggle for genuine democratization. Students should be versed in the importance of the social contract (in spite of its damaged legacy), provided with classroom opportunities to become informed citizens, and given the resources to understand politics in both historical and contextual terms as part of the broader discourse of civic engagement. Educators have a responsibility to provide rationales for defending higher education as a public sphere while putting into place long-term strategies and policies that resist the ongoing militarization (and corporatization and political homogeneity) of the university. This means refusing to instrumentalize the curriculum, giving the humanities a larger role in educating all undergraduate students, putting into place curricula, programs and courses that stress a critical education over job training, and enabling students to learn how to read the political and pedagogical forces that shape their lives not as consumers and soldiers but as critically engaged citizens.

Educators need to more fully theorize how pedagogy as a form of cultural politics actually constructs particular modes of address, modes of identification, affective investments and social relations that produce consent and complicity in the ethos and practice of neoliberalism and militarization. Clearly, there is a need to refute the notion that neoliberal hegemony and militarization can be explained simply through an economic optic, one that consequently gives the relationship of politics, culture and education scant analysis. Any serious opposition to militarization and neoliberalism will have to engage pedagogy as a form of cultural politics that requires a concern not only with analyses of the production and representation of meaning, but also with how these practices and the subjectivities they provoke are implicated in the dynamics of social power. Pedagogy as a form of cultural politics and governmentality raises the issue of how education might be understood as a moral and political practice that takes place in a variety of sites outside of schools. Pedagogy as defined here is fundamentally concerned with the relations among politics, subjectivities, and cultural and material production, and takes place not only in schools but also through the myriad technologies and locations that produce and shape the educational force of the wider culture. In this instance, pedagogy anchors governmentality in the ‘domain of cognition’, functioning largely as ‘a grid of insistent calculation, experimentation and evaluation concerned with the conduct of conduct’ (Dillon, 1995: 330). As Gramsci reminds us, hegemony as an educational practice is always necessarily part of a pedagogy of persuasion, one that makes a claim to ‘speak to vital human needs, interests, and desires, and therefore will be persuasive to many and
ultimately most people’ (Willis, 1999: xiv). Similarly, Lawrence Grossberg insists that the popular imaginary is far too important as part of a larger political and educational struggle not to be taken seriously by educators. He writes:

The struggle to win hegemony has to be anchored in people’s everyday consciousness and popular cultures. Those seeking power have to struggle with and within the contradictory realms of common sense and popular culture, with the languages and logics that people use to calculate what is right and what is wrong, what can be done and what cannot, what should be done and what has to be done. The popular is where social imagination is defined and changed, where people construct personal identities, identifications, priorities, and possibilities, where people form moral and political agendas for themselves and their societies, and where they decide whether and in what (or whom) to invest the power to speak for them. It is where people construct their hopes for the future in the light of their sense of the present. It is where they decide what matters, what is worth caring about, and what they are committed to. (Grossberg, 2005: 220–1)

Students need to learn more about how the educational force of the culture actually works pedagogically to produce neoliberal and militaristic ideologies, values, and consent – how the popular imagination both deploys power and is influenced by power. They need a better understanding of how neoliberal and militarized discourses, values and ideas are taken up in ongoing struggles over culture, meaning and identity as they bear down on people’s daily lives (Kelley, 1997: 108–9). At stake here are a number of pedagogical challenges such as overcoming the deeply felt view in American culture that criticism is destructive, or for that matter a deeply rooted anti-intellectualism reinforced daily through various forms of public pedagogy as in talk radio, newspapers and the televisual info-tainment sectors. Central to such a task is challenging the neoliberal/militarized mode of governmentality that locates freedom in individual responsibility, views military supremacy as central to national identity, celebrates the armed services as the highest expression of national honor and reduces citizenship to a notion of market entrepreneurship. How might educators and others engage pedagogical practices that open up spaces of resistance to neoliberal/militarized modes of governance and authority through a culture of questioning that enables people to resist and reject neoliberal assumptions that reduce masculinity to expressions of military valor, values and battle? What are the implications of theorizing pedagogy and the practice of learning as essential to social change and where might such interventions take place? How might the related matters of experience and learning, knowledge and authority, and history and cultural capital be theorized as part of a broader pedagogy of critique and possibility? What kind of pedagogical practice might be appropriate in providing the tools to unsettle what Michael Dillon calls hegemonic ‘domains of cognition’ and break apart the continuity of consensus and common sense as part of a broader political and pedagogical
attempt to provide people with a critical sense of social responsibility and agency? How might it be possible to theorize the pedagogical importance of the new media and the new modes of political literacy and cultural production they employ, or to analyze the circuits of power, translation and distribution that make up neoliberalism’s vast apparatus of public pedagogy – extending from talk radio and screen culture to the Internet and print culture? These are only some of the questions that would be central to any viable recognition of what it would mean to theorize pedagogy as a condition that supports both critique, understood as more than the struggle against incomprehension, and social responsibility as the foundation for forms of intervention that are oppositional and empowering.

Large numbers of students pass through the hallowed halls of academe, and it is crucial that they be educated in ways that enable them to recognize creeping militarization and its effects throughout society, particularly in terms of how these effects threaten ‘democratic government at home just as they menace the independence and sovereignty of other countries’ (Johnson, 2004: 291). But students must also recognize how such anti-democratic forces work in attempting to dismantle the university itself as a place to learn how to think critically and engage in public debate and civic engagement. In part, this means giving them the tools to fight for the demilitarization of knowledge on college campuses – to resist complicity with the production of knowledge, information and technologies in classrooms and research labs that contribute to militarized goals and purposes, which further, to quote Michael Geyer again, is ‘the process by which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence’ (1989: 79). Even so, there is more at stake than simply educating students to be alert to the dangers of militarization and the way in which it is redefining the very mission of higher education. Chalmers Johnson, in his continuing critique of the threat the politics of empire presents to democracy at home and abroad, argues that if the United States is not to degenerate into a military dictatorship, a grassroots movement will have to occupy center-stage in opposing militarization and reclaiming the basic principles of the republic – though he is far from optimistic. He writes:

The evidence strongly suggests that the legislative and judicial branches of our government have become so servile in the presence of the imperial Presidency that they have largely lost the ability to respond in a principled and independent manner. . . . So the question becomes, if not Congress, could the people themselves restore Constitutional government? A grass-roots movement to abolish secret government, to bring the CIA and other illegal spying operations and private armies out of the closet of imperial power and into the light, to break the hold of the military-industrial complex, and to establish genuine public financing of elections may be at least theoretically conceivable. But given the conglomerate control of our mass media and the difficulties of mobilizing our large and diverse population, such an opting for popular democracy, as we remember it from our past, seems unlikely. (Johnson, 2007b)
Such a task may seem daunting, but if the American people are to choose democracy over empire, as Johnson puts it, then there is also the crucial need for faculty, students, administrators and concerned citizens to develop alliances for long-term organizations to resist the growing ties among government agencies, corporations and higher education that engage in reproducing militarized knowledge, which might require severing all relationships between the university and intelligence agencies and war industries. It also means keeping military recruiters out of public and higher education. One such example can be found in People Against Militarization (PAMO) of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), which brought faculty, students and community activists together to protest a partnership between OISE and the Atlantis Systems Corporation, a company that provides knowledge, training and simulation equipment for the militaries of a number of countries, including the United States and Saudi Arabia (for more information, see Homes Not Bombs, 2005). PAMO provides a valuable model, proving that such protests can be used to make visible the ongoing militarization of higher education, while also providing strategies indicating how faculty, students and others can organize to oppose it.

Opposing militarization as part of a broader pedagogical strategy in and out of the classroom also raises the question of what kinds of competencies, skills and knowledge might be crucial to such a task. One possibility is to develop a kind of praxis that addresses what I call an oppositional pedagogy of cultural production, one that defines the pedagogical space of learning not only through the critical consumption of knowledge but also through its production for peaceful and socially just ends. What is at stake here is the crucial need for students to learn how to do more than critically engage and interpret print, visual and media texts, as significant as such a task might be as part of their learning experience. This means that, as the forces of militarization increasingly monopolize the dominant media, students, activists and educators must imagine ways to expand the limits of humanities education to enable the university to shape coming generations of cultural producers capable of not only negotiating the old media forms, such as broadcasting and reporting, but also generating new electronic media, which have come to play a crucial role in bypassing those forms of media concentrated in the hands of corporate and military interests. The current monopolization of the media suggests that students will have to be educated in ways that allow them to develop alternative public spheres, where they can produce their own films, videos, music, radio talk shows, newspapers, magazines and other modes of public pedagogy. The militarization of everyday life – from the production of video games to the uncritical analysis of war and violence in the nightly news – must be challenged through alternative media. Examples of this type of oppositional public pedagogy is evident in the work of a wide range of individuals and groups who make cultural politics and public pedagogy central to their opposition to a number of anti-democratic forces, such as militarization and neoliberalism. For instance, the Media Education Foundation (n.d.) produces
a range of excellent documentaries and videos for youth, many of which address the militarization of the culture, and the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space (n.d.) enables songwriters and singers to disseminate music protesting the militarization of space.

In the fight against the biopolitics of militarization, educators need a language of critique, but they also need a language that embraces a sense of hope and collective struggle. This means elaborating the meaning of politics through a language of critique and possibility, on the one hand, and making a concerted effort to expand the space of politics by reclaiming ‘the public character of spaces, relations, and institutions regarded as private’, on the other (Rancière, 2006a: 299). We live at a time when matters of life and death are central to political sovereignty. While registering the shift in power towards the large-scale production of death, disposability and exclusion, a new biopolitics must also point to notions of agency, power and responsibility that operate in the service of life, democratic struggles and the expansion of human rights. Such struggles must be made visible, and can be found among AIDS workers in Africa, organized labor in Latin America, and Palestinians acting as human shields against Israeli tanks in the West Bank and Gaza. We can also see a biopolitics of resistance and hope at work in a long tradition of anti-militarist struggles in the United States, which have taken place not only in the wider public sphere but also in the military itself (see, for example, the very powerful film, *Sir, No Sir!*, n.d.). Efforts to end violence, speak out against war, and criticize acts of torture and abuse extend from the founding of the nation to the anti-war movements of the 1960s and the new millennium, and include the emergence of groups fighting against global sweatshops, the arms race, wage slavery, racism, child poverty, the rise of an imperial presidency and the ongoing wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East. In addressing the militarization of the academy and everyday life, it is also crucial for educators to recognize that power works in myriad ways in the interest of both domination and struggle. In contemporary times, this suggests that educators should pay more attention to how different modes of domination inform each other, so that strategies for resistance can be layered, complex, and yet held together by more generalized notions of hope and freedom. As Jean Comaroff (2007) has recently argued, progressives need a more adequate theory of power and, as I have argued, a more complicated notion of politics. For example, any redemptive biopolitics of demilitarization would have to be understood in relation to an equally powerful biopolitics of capital, raising fundamental questions about how capital in its neoliberal incarnation and militarization in its various forms connect and inform each other on the level of the local, national and global. We might, for instance, raise the question of how neoliberalism, with its fragmenting of democratic solidarities, privatized notions of agency and eviscerated conception of politics, paves the way for the production of militarized subjects, as well as the normalization of military mentalities and moralities, and how these practices affect generations of young people.
Finally, if higher education is to come to grips with the multilayered pathologies produced by militarization, it will have to rethink not merely the space of the university as a democratic public sphere, but also the global space in which intellectuals, educators, students, artists, labor unions, and other social actors and movements can form transnational alliances both to address the ongoing effects of militarization on the world – including war, pollution, massive poverty, the arms trade, growth of privatized armies, civil conflict and child slavery – and to develop global organizations that can be mobilized in the effort to supplant a culture of war with a culture of peace, whose elemental principles are grounded in the relations of economic, political, cultural and social democracy. Militarization poses a serious threat to higher education, but more importantly it threatens to distort the promise of democracy at home and abroad, and the very meaning of democratic politics and the sustainability of human life. Surely it is time for educators to take a stand and oppose the death-dealing ideology of militarization as it lays siege to higher education and spreads insidiously through every aspect of the social order.

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