COMMENT

THE SEC AND FOREIGN BLOCKING STATUTES: NEED FOR A BALANCED APPROACH

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1. INTRODUCTION

The United States has a strong interest in protecting its securities markets. By maintaining strict prohibitions against fraudulent activity such as insider trading, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has succeeded in creating a securities market where investor protection is kept at a premium. When these prohibitions are enforced abroad, however, they may be perceived as threats to sovereignty interests.

To protect their national interests, countries such as the United Kingdom have enacted "blocking statutes" which effectively limit the flow of information to foreign entities, including the SEC. These blocking statutes have the dual effect of frustrating the SEC's enforcement of its regulations abroad and of providing undue protection for those persons committing fraud on United States markets. By their very


1 For a summary of arguments for and against the protection of United States securities markets from fraudulent activity, see Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983).

2 In this context, fraudulent conduct refers to "intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by . . . artificially affecting the price of securities." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976). See also, L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 799-818 (1983) (author giving comparative description of fraud under federal regulations).

3 By definition, "[i]nsider trading usually involves the sale or purchase of company shares or securities by persons connected with a company (insiders), who have price-sensitive information not generally known by the public or by the persons with whom the insiders deal." Herne, Inside Information: Definition in Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the U.S., 8 J. COMP. BUS. & CAPITAL MKT. L. 1, 1 (1986).

4 In this context, sovereignty interests refer to the power of a nation to prescribe laws regulating activities within its territory. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (Chief Justice Marshall noting that "[t]he jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute."); see infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.

5 See infra notes 64-112 and accompanying text.
nature, these blocking statutes represent a serious impediment to valid SEC actions. While resembling overbroad assertions of protectionism designed solely to frustrate the policing efforts of other nations, blocking statutes embody important national sovereignty interests arising from circumstances wholly apart from securities market regulation. Therefore, an understanding of the various interests at issue requires an analysis of both the context in which blocking statutes arise and the interests of the SEC in extraterritorial enforcement of its securities laws.

This Comment argues that an accommodation of the SEC's and the foreign nation's interests requires the joint effort of the parties to reach a compromise of the interests at stake. While bilateral agreements have assisted the SEC's efforts in countries which maintain bank secrecy laws, the need for negotiations becomes even more acute when blocking statutes are present. In this latter context, this Comment focuses on the blocking statutes enacted by the United Kingdom and suggests (a) that unilateral efforts by the SEC in enforcing its regulations abroad will be counterproductive, and (b) that a proper balancing of competing national interests is better left to the executive political process than to the courts. While the recently negotiated Memorandum of Understanding between the SEC and the United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) represents the beginnings of such a cooperative effort, the protection which it offers to valuable national interests is drastically insufficient. Therefore, as a proposal for future negotiations, this Comment argues that a procedural framework modeled on a recently negotiated antitrust treaty may provide a realistic means of balancing the interests of the SEC and the United Kingdom.

2. CONFLICT OF NATIONAL INTEREST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

2.1. Interests of the United States in Policing International Securities Fraud and the Potential for Conflict with Other Nations

The authority for the policing of international securities fraud by

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6 See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
the SEC is found in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Under the 1933 Act, investors in securities must receive from the issuer material information about a security offered for public sale. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 further protects investors beyond the public offering stage by restricting certain types of fraudulent transactions after the securities are issued and outstanding. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act prohibits any person from using "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the commission may prescribe as necessary." Adding substance to this provision, Rule 10b-5, promulgated under the authority of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, makes the following unlawful while trading in securities:

(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

As interpreted, Rule 10b-5 creates a broad prohibition against the trading of securities by corporate insiders based on material non-public information belonging to the corporation of which the insiders are a part. The SEC is granted the authority to make investigations of any suspected violations in its enforcement of Rule 10b-5.
Extending these prohibitions beyond the domestic setting has been fairly difficult for the SEC. While there is a general lack of legislative guidance for the extension of the antifraud provisions beyond United States borders, the federal courts generally have only applied United States securities laws extraterritorially in those instances where there has been either some conduct within the United States or a significant impact on the United States securities market by a foreign entity. In Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, the court held that the antifraud provisions of Rule 10b-5 apply both to losses of United States citizens caused


17 Id.

18 This notion of “conduct-based” jurisdiction has been widely used by the SEC in securities regulations. See, e.g., IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Continental Grain, Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Loomis & Grant, supra note 16, at 8; Moessle, supra note 15, at 10-12. A similar determination is also made under the Restatement (Second), where a determination is made of “whether there was sufficient conduct in the United States and/or whether transactions performed entirely outside the United States nevertheless had a direct, foreseeable, and substantial impact on United States investors and securities markets.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 17-18 (1965); Loomis & Grant, supra note 16, at 7; Moessle, supra note 15, at 10-12.

19 This assertion of “effects-based” jurisdiction was recognized by the court in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975), as a separate basis of jurisdiction apart from “conduct-based” jurisdiction. Hermann, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction in Securities Law Regulation, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 207, 216-17 (1986). See generally Loomis & Grant, supra note 16, at 11-13 (noting that “it appears clear that, in order for there to be jurisdiction over foreign acts constituting a substantive violation of the United States securities laws, those acts must in and of themselves result in substantial damage to an interest protected by the United States securities laws.”). While several commentators have noted that, in the area of securities law, effects-based jurisdiction was first established in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968) as an attempt to protect United States investors from foreign acts (see Hermann, supra, at 214-15; Loomis & Grant, supra note 16, at 19), the doctrine seems to have been first created in the area of antitrust laws in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), where Judge Learned Hand stated “it is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.” Id. at 443. As a limit to overly broad assertions of jurisdiction, Judge Hand noted that “[w]e should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no consequences within the United States.” Id. Other commentators have agreed that a further limitation to “effects-based” jurisdiction should be created where the offense is not recognized as such by foreign nations. Rosen, The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 15 INT’L L. LAW. 213, 216 (1981).

20 Hermann, supra note 19, at 213; Loomis & Grant, supra note 16, at 6-7; Thomas, Extraterritorial Application of the United States Securities Laws: The Need for a Balanced Policy, 7 J. CORP. L. 189, 192 (1982).

21 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
by fraudulent acts abroad and acts within the United States conducted
by United States citizens residing abroad.\footnote{Id. at 987-93.} A former SEC commis-
ioner has noted that one justification for applying United States securi-
ties law extraterritorially is to uphold the strong interest of the United
States in protecting its investors.\footnote{Thomas, supra note 20, at 190.} A related, but different, rationale is
to prevent the United States securities market from being used as a
forum for securities fraud.\footnote{Id.}

While the interests of the United States in protecting its investors
and preserving the integrity of its securities markets are undoubtedly
valid,\footnote{See generally Loomis & Grant, supra note 163, at 3 (authors noting that “[t]he
Commission also has a legitimate concern, in this time of rapid and sophisticated inter-
national communications, to prevent anyone from using foreign instrumentalities to
evade United States securities laws”).} the strength of these interests weakens when they are asserted
outside its borders. At first glance, it might appear that the problem
created by the extraterritorial application of the United States securities
laws is simply due to an inevitable conflict between very different sys-
tems of securities regulation;\footnote{One commentator has gone so far as to state that “[f]or most non-U.S. persons,
in particular for Europeans, the U.S. securities laws constitute an incomprehensible
bulk of infinitely complicated rules which are totally strange to them. Many look at
them simply as one of the bases for that great U.S. pastime of suing one another.”
Loomis and Grant), 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 39, 39 (1978).} on closer inspection, it is apparent that
foreign countries may well perceive attempts by the United States to
apply its securities laws abroad as either an interference with national
sovereignty,\footnote{See Thomas, supra note 20, at 193 (former SEC Commissioner noting that “[a]
foreign country might well view application of U.S. law to a securities transaction that
takes place within the foreign country’s borders and that involves non-U.S. citizens as
interference with the foreign country’s regulatory practices, economic philosophy or na-
tional policies”).} a lack of deference by United States courts to principles
of comity and procedural fair hearing,\footnote{See Liftin, Our Playing Field, Our Rules: An Analysis of the SEC’s Waiver by
Conduct Approach, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 525, 528 (1985) (“Under general prin-
ciples of comity, recognition and enforcement of judicial decrees rendered by the courts
of another sovereign nation are premised on observance by the rendering forum of the
essentials of judicial jurisdiction and of a fair hearing”).} a disrespect for internationally
recognized principles restricting the extraterritorial reach of a nation’s
laws,\footnote{Moessle, supra note 15, at 20 (author quoting the S.S. “Lotus” Case (Fr. v.
Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 18-19 (Judgment of Sept. 7)) (suggesting that
foreign nations often restrict foreign laws on the basis of their territoriality):}
or an offense to public policy unworthy of recognition.\footnote{Ac-
Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon
a State is that — failing the existence of a permissive rule — it may not
Accordingly, the extraterritorial assertion of securities laws by the United States may potentially create bitter and unnecessary conflicts with foreign regulators,\textsuperscript{31} as well as a reduction in the free flow of capital in world commerce.\textsuperscript{32}

2.2. Interests of the United Kingdom and the Development of Blocking Statutes

2.2.1. Extraterritorial Use of United States Law Leading Up to the Creation of Blocking Statutes

Application of federal regulatory law to cover acts occurring in foreign nations is largely premised on the effect of such acts on United States commerce.\textsuperscript{33} This "effects" doctrine, which requires an effect on United States commerce as a jurisdictional threshold,\textsuperscript{34} was broadly expanded in scope by the United States courts.\textsuperscript{35} By judging a foreign action solely on the consequences that the action may have on domestic commerce, however, the effects doctrine gives undue emphasis to domestic concerns, while it entirely ignores any counterbalancing foreign interests.\textsuperscript{36}

exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention.

\textsuperscript{30} See id. at 20.


\textsuperscript{32} Thomas, \textit{supra} note 20, at 190.

\textsuperscript{33} See \textit{supra} note 19 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{34} Kestenbaum, \textit{Antitrust's "Extraterritorial" Jurisdiction: A Progress Report on the Balancing of Interests Tests}, 18 \textit{STAN. J. INT'L L.} 311, 333 (1982). For discussion of "effects-based" jurisdiction, see \textit{supra} note 19 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{35} Id. at 312. One author has noted that the original "effects" doctrine was intended only to cover those acts affecting United States commerce which were shown to possess an "intent" to affect commerce. \textit{Id.} at 416. In Learned Hand's holding in \textit{Alcoa}, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), however, this limitation is not readily apparent. Looking to the possibility that Congress intended to regulate acts which had only an effect on United States commerce, the court only went so far as to note that, "[w]hen one considers the international complications likely to arise from an effort in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to assume that Congress certainly did not intend the Act to cover them." United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 443. However, the court never explicitly stated that once an effect on United States commerce was found, proof of existence of such intent was a prerequisite to maintaining jurisdiction.

\textsuperscript{36} This lack of deference given by the effects doctrine created under the \textit{Alcoa} decision has been particularly troublesome for the British. Beyond the obvious problems of enforcement jurisdiction, whereby a state cannot coercively force acts within the jurisdiction of a foreign state without some form of permission from that state (Moessle, \textit{supra} note 15, at 16 n.88), there is a general feeling that the United Kingdom considers the effects doctrine as "pay[ing] comparatively little attention to the interests of
In the area of antitrust, affronts to interests of the United Kingdom through the assertion of effects-based jurisdiction have been widely recognized. In large part, the animosities that arise from such international conflicts are attributable to a difference in national policies towards collective commercial enterprises. This difference in orientations is particularly evident in the divergent approaches to international shipping. As noted in the parliamentary debates prior to the passage of the Protection of Trading Interests Act, an essential distinction between United States and British shipping policies derived from the fact that collective shipping activities were usually not illegal in the United Kingdom. The resulting unilateral attack on the shipping interests of


37 In Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), the court favored American interests in finding that an alleged cartel of international uranium suppliers had illicitly engaged in acts prohibited under the antitrust laws, despite strong arguments made by the British government on amicus curiae brief:

The application of the effects doctrine is regarded by Her Majesty’s Government as being particularly objectionable in the field of antitrust legislation:

1. The formation of a cartel and other activities against which anti-trust legislation is directed are not universally recognized as unlawful . . .

2. The assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in anti-trust matters represents an extension of the economic policy of one state which is likely to conflict with that of other states.


Apart from the uranium cartel cases, similar conflicts of American antitrust concerns and British commerce interests have occurred in the several shipping cases. See generally Cira, supra note 36, at 251; Rosen, supra note 19, at 223-24 (both Cira and Rosen giving fairly thorough accounts of shipping antitrust cases leading up to the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980). Less prominent instances of conflicts of United States and British interests in the antitrust setting are numerous. See also Simon & Waller, Analyzing Claims of Sovereignty in International Economic Disputes, 7 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 1-2 (1985).


40 Id. at 581.
the United Kingdom by the United States through the enforcement of its antitrust legislation had been felt heavily by the United Kingdom.  

Both the importance in British commerce and the intrinsically international character of British shipping has increased British sensitivity to this attack.  

The affront to British national interests is further highlighted by feelings that the United States, in attempting to exercise jurisdiction over its international antitrust cases, pays "comparatively little attention to the interests and policies of foreign Governments where [those interests] have been in conflict with those of the United States."  

In terms of the actual harm caused to British trading interests by the extraterritorial application of United States antitrust laws, the potential award of treble damages provided for in these laws may cause British corporate defendants significant economic hardship.  

As perceived by several British commentators, treble damage awards clearly go beyond compensation for the actual damages suffered by the United States plaintiff; instead, they are understood as being purely punitive in nature, and clearly constituting double jeopardy.  

Not surprisingly, in light of the perceived damage to British sovereignty caused by the punitive damage awards provided for in United States antitrust legislation, arguments calling for a strong assertion of British national interests have been advanced.  

Apart from the substantive differences between United States and
British legal theories, differences in what is perceived to be proper judicial procedure have also led to dissension between the two nations. While English courts have occasionally given undue deference to the interests of the United Kingdom over those of other nations, the extent to which the United States courts have convoluted United States antitrust principles and exported them abroad, has led a member of Parliament, during the debates prior to the enactment of the Protection of Trading Interest Act, to note:

[all] courts have, latent within them, a deep imperialism. They all wish to extend their jurisdiction. No court is more inclined to do that than one suffused with an ideology that is almost equivalent to a religion. Anyone who has talked to American competition lawyers, whether on the Bench or at the Bar, will know that the Sherman and Clayton Acts in the United States are the equivalent of holy books.

One area of particular trouble is the scope of discovery ordered by the United States courts. Under domestic rules of procedure, the scope of discovery requests can be very broad. In federal court, for example, a party is entitled to pretrial discovery of any nonprivileged information as long as it is “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action” and “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of

49 As Sir John Donaldson M.R. has stated on one occasion:

Relations between the United Kingdom and foreign states are not the subject of direct Parliamentary action, but are a matter for her Majesty acting on the advice of her Government. The foreign policy which is adopted is referred to as that of the United Kingdom Government, but this is misleading since in reality it is that of the nation. Accordingly, it would be strange if in this field courts and the executive spoke with different voices and they should not do so.


50 One British commentator has noted that “what we cannot quite comprehend is how the United States courts have managed to turn [an easily comprehensible body of antitrust laws] into such an instrument of torture. We are not used to trusting to our courts such extensive powers.” Beckett, supra note 38, at 774. See also, 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1551 (1979) (remarks of Mr. Graham Page noting that the principle reaction embodied in the Protection of Trading Interests Act is to the “way American courts have developed the American anti-trust law”).

51 See 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1572 (1979) (remarks of Mr. Ivan Lawrence noting that the American courts have used their antitrust laws to “dobbler the closest friend and ally that they have. It is a cruel stroke”).

52 Id. at 1566 (remarks of Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke).

admissible evidence." Such broad standards give the courts substantial freedom to order discovery from parties, which latitude has, in turn, subjected courts to accusations of undertaking fishing expeditions.

Given the breadth of pretrial discovery in the United States, it should come as no surprise that a similar vigor also carries over to the international setting. The broad scope of international discovery attempted by United States litigants, derogatorily termed by one British author as "fishing discovery" or as a "knee-jerk reaction," had led to hostile reactions prior to the passage of the Protection of Trading Interests Act. It is important, therefore, to bear in mind that many of the negative reactions to discovery requests issued by United States courts relate not to the contents of the documents which are sought, but rather to the means used to obtain them.

Aside from British reactions to the differences in law and judicial procedure between the United States and Great Britain, another area of concern relates to the nature of the party bringing suit. A private party is entitled to bring a civil action for treble damages against a defendant

\[5^{54}\text{ FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).}\]

\[5^{55}\text{ As the Supreme Court stated:}\]

No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise.


\[5^{57}\text{ Beckett, supra note 38, at 778.}\]

\[5^{58}\text{ Id.}\]

\[5^{59}\text{ Nelson, Insider Trading Originating Abroad and "Waiver by Conduct", 19 Int'l Law. 817, 830, n. 68 (1985). See also, 405 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 907, 910-13 (1980) (remarks of L. Hacking noting that the scope of clause 2(3)(b) of the Protection of Trading Interests Act should be broadened to protect against pretrial discovery in the United States).}\]

\[5^{60}\text{ See generally, Newcomb, Policing Trans-Border Fraud: The View From the Bridge, 11 Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 559, 574 (1985) (describing reactions to acts taken by United States courts and concluding that, "most often the foreign reaction to unilateral efforts by the United States to obtain information is a reaction not to the content of the information sought, but rather to the heavy-handed methods employed").}\]
corporation under the antitrust laws of the United States. Apart from the potential threat of punitive sanctions, a separate concern is that private plaintiffs might be unable to exercise either the deference to foreign interests or the degree of self-restraint necessary in cases where national interests collide. Therefore, the resulting fear of civil antitrust actions reaches beyond a concern with the private character of the plaintiff. Unfortunately, this fear may spread to civil actions generally, including those brought by United States federal agencies.

2.2.2. The Protection of Trading Interests Act and the Assertion of National Interests

In reaction to the extraterritorial expansion of United States antitrust laws, many countries have enacted “blocking” statutes. Under these forms of retaliatory legislation, judgments of foreign nations against a country’s residents or foreign requests for discovery may be “blocked” and rendered ineffective in the jurisdiction in which such remedy or discovery is being sought. Often, such blockage of judgments or information is within the discretion of a government official.

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61 See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
62 A similar point is developed in Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), where the court noted, as a second prong of a three-part balancing test, that “a greater showing of burden or restraint may be necessary to demonstrate that the effect is sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust laws” (emphasis added). Id. at 613. See also, 404 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 557 (1980) (remarks of L. Mackay noting concern that civil actions in the United States are not “subject to any of the limitations we would regard as appropriate to criminal proceedings”).
63 This strong ancillary concern with United States governmental agencies bringing civil actions was developed most strongly during the debates prior to the passage of the Protection of Trading Interests Act. 973 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 1533, 1534, 1538, 1541 (1979) (remarks of Mr. John Nott, Secretary of State); 404 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 559 (1980) (remarks of L. Mackay). The principle concern felt was that United States governmental agencies asserted their powers too broadly in imposing penal sanctions under the guise of “civil” actions. Id.
64 One estimate of the number of retaliatory blocking statutes created in other countries held that 26 countries have blocking statutes that either require refusal of compliance with foreign informational requests or disallow recognition of foreign judgments. Hurd, Insider Trading and Foreign Bank Secrecy, 24 Am. Bus. L.J. 25, 47 n.185 (1986).
65 Blocking statutes can be categorized into “discovery blocking statutes” (where compliance with discovery requests of foreign courts, agencies, or private parties is blocked) and “judgment blocking statutes” (where judgments rendered by foreign courts or agencies are not recognized in the state enacting such legislation, if certain preconditions stated in the statute exist). Fedders, Wade, Mann, Matthew, Bizer, Waiver by Conduct —A Possible Response to the Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 6 J. Int'l Comp. Bus. & Capital Mkt. L. 6, 35-37 (1984).
66 For instance, under the Protection of Trading Interests Act,

If it appears to the Secretary of State —
In addition to being retaliatory in form, blocking statutes are also a reaction to the scope of the extraterritorial assertion of United States laws. For instance, two blocking statutes were enacted in Great Britain in reaction to surges in United States antitrust litigation: the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act in 1964 and the Protection of Trading Interests Act in 1980.

The Protection of Trading Interests Act was, in effect, a revision of its predecessor, the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act. The earlier blocking statute was passed to protect several shippers in Great Britain against United States antitrust actions. At the time of its passage, the policy of the United Kingdom, as well as that of the European Economic Community in general, was that “the best way of achieving efficient and effective shipping services and [of] protecting the interests of the consumer” was through deregulation of collective commercial activities. The Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act was aimed at ensuring that this vital policy would not be abused by actions from within the United States. The 1964 Act, however, was intended to be limited to the shipping industry. After the Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd. case the 1964 Act was found to be too limited in application to address the concerns raised by the second thrust of United States antitrust laws. Accordingly, the

(a) that measures have been or are proposed to be taken by or under the law of any overseas country for regulating or controlling international trade; and
(b) that those measures, in so far as they apply or would apply to things done outside the territorial jurisdiction of that country by persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom, are damaging or threaten to damage the trading interests of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State may by order direct that this section shall apply to those measures either generally or in their application to such cases as may be specified in the order.

Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 1 (emphasis added). As a general matter, blocking statutes can be classified by whether their blocking effect is discretionary on the part of some government official or automatic upon the satisfaction of certain threshold events. Moessle, supra note 15, at 22.

See generally Newcomb, supra note 60, at 570-71 (brief description of waves of blocking statutes in reaction to United States litigation).

Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87, repealed by Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 8(5).

Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11.


Id.

See id. at 1544 (Mr. John Nott noting that the 1964 Act was “passed in response to a specific and offensive instance of extra-territorial claim to jurisdiction by the United States in shipping matters”).

Id.; see also supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.

617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.

973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1539-40, 1544 (1979) (remarks of Mr.
need for more protective legislation was a key motivation for the adoption of the Protection of Trading Interests Act in 1980.

As drafted, the Act was intended to focus on the protection of the trading interests of the United Kingdom. As originally introduced in the House of Commons by the British Secretary of State,

[the] objective in introducing this Bill [was] to reassert and reinforce the defenses of the United Kingdom against attempts by other countries to enforce their economic and commercial policies unilaterally on [the United Kingdom] . . . .

[T]he most objectionable method by which this [was] done [was] by the extra-territorial application of domestic law. Therefore, the Act goes further than merely protecting British interests; it also buttresses them against distortions of comity and sovereignty.

Section 2 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act, which provides the framework for establishing the basic conditions under which documents may not be produced, confers substantial authority to the Secretary of State. The broadest allowance for discretion is found in subsection 2(2) of the Act which prohibits the production of documents:

(a) if [production] infringes the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or is otherwise prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom; or
(b) if compliance with the requirement would be prejudicial

John Nott noting that 1964 Act was too limited in light of uranium cartel cases).

76 Id. at 1538-39.

77 Id. at 1533 (address of Mr. John Nott). See also Debate: Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law, supra note 46, at 620 (L. Kilgerran noting that intent of Protection of Trading Interests Act is to improve the defenses of the United Kingdom against "attempts by other countries to enforce their economic and commercial policies outside their own territories"); See also 405 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1501, 1517 (1980) (L. MacKay noting that intent of the Act was to protect the interests of the United Kingdom). Novicoff, supra note 38, at 33 (author noting that a strong motivation for the Act was a "British conviction that the nation's public policy was being steadily undercut by judicial activity in the United States"). It is worth noting that the protection of British interests created under the Protection of Trading Interests Act extends to not only protect against the specific extraterritorial actions of a foreign state, but also to deter acts by persons within the United Kingdom who should decide to abide by those foreign interests by violating the Act. Under section 3 of the Act, criminal sanctions are imposed on persons who violate an order not to produce documents. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 3(1).

78 The Act also emphasises [sic] that, in so far as the application or enforcement of any foreign law requires the active assistance or passive acquiescence of the United Kingdom the overseas country in question must have regard to the trading interests of the United Kingdom." 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1533-34 (1979) (remarks of Mr. Nott); see also 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 586 (1980) (remarks of L. Mishcon).

79 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 2(2).
to the security of the United Kingdom or to the relations of
the government of the United Kingdom with the government
of any other country.  

The degree of discretion left to the Secretary of State clearly implies
that the Act has no automatic application. There are several factors
which may sway the Secretary of State to bar the production of docu-
ments; examples may be:

[w]hether in the view of the United Kingdom, the subject
matter of the investigation is within the legitimate jurisdic-
tion of the foreign country, whether the United Kingdom's
significant interests are involved and whether a genuine need
for documents is demonstrated, and whether the scope of
compulsory discovery is consistent with practice in the
United Kingdom.  

This broad grant of discretionary powers to the Secretary of State was
intended to expand the powers conferred under the 1964 Act, and to
promote the Act's ease and breadth of application.

In addition to the far-reaching nature of the Protection of Trading
Interests Act, the Act is also retaliatory in application. While protect-
ning national interests against the expansiveness of the effects doctrine, the Act also represents a strong effort to deter encroachments of foreign
policy into the United Kingdom. Perhaps the strongest deterrent as-
pects of the Act can be found in its nonrecognition of multiple dam-
ages and in its so-called "clawback" provisions. Under section 6 of
the Act, any "qualifying defendant" who has been forced to pay dam-
ages in excess of a compensatory remedy shall be entitled to recover from the party in whose favour the judgment was given so much of the amount ... as ex-
ceeds the part attributable to compensation; and that part shall be taken to be such part of the amount as bears to the

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80 Id.
81 Beckett, supra note 38, at 778.
82 973 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1547-48 (1979) (remarks of Mr. John
Smith).
83 Rosen, supra note 19, at 227. See also 973 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533,
1547-48 (1979) (remarks of Mr. John Smith).
84 See Rosen, supra note 19, at 214.
85 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
86 Samie, Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws: The British Reac-
tion, 7 Int'l Trade L.J. 58 (1981-1982).
87 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 5.
88 Id. § 6.
whole of it the same proportion as the sum assessed by the court that gave the judgment as compensation for the loss or damage sustained by the party bears to the whole of the damages awarded to that party.\textsuperscript{89}

While the clawback of damages in excess of compensation is in line with the underlying policy of nonrecognition of multiple damages created by section 6 of the Act,\textsuperscript{90} it is novel and unprecedented\textsuperscript{91} in its pointed attack on multiple and punitive damages allowed in United States lawsuits\textsuperscript{92} and may make the collection of such damages impossible.\textsuperscript{93} The broad scope of the clawback provision is made more evident by the number of defendants who are its potential beneficiaries. Under the Act, any person who is "carrying on business in the United Kingdom,"\textsuperscript{94} is potentially qualified to bring an action for recovery of multiple damages. While appearing to be an "extraordinary gift"\textsuperscript{95} to non-British defendants affected under United States law but carrying on business within the United Kingdom, the Act does not give "the right to companies from third countries to enter this country and take action for recovery under clause six."\textsuperscript{96} Defendants that conduct any ongoing businesses within the United Kingdom have the clawback provision as a potential remedy.

While the clawback provision is broadly drafted, its actual effectiveness may be somewhat limited. During the debates preceding the passage of the Act, there was a grave concern as to the legitimacy, under principles of international law, of a "hit-back"\textsuperscript{97} made through

\textsuperscript{89} Id. § 6(2).
\textsuperscript{90} Apparently, section 5 is premised on concepts of international law:

It is a rule of international law that no country's courts will be allowed to be used by other countries for the benefit of recovering penalties that are enforced by other countries . . . . There is no earthly reason why our courts should be used as instruments for the recovery of foreign penalties.

\textsuperscript{91} The novelty of the remedy caused dissension during the debates prior to the passage of the Act. As one member of the House of Commons inquired, "[w]hy is it that Britain goes much further than anyone else in developing this principle [of clawback]?" 973 \textsc{Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.)} 1533, 1562-63 (1979); 974 \textsc{Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.)} 1024, 1033 (1979) (remarks of Mr. Prescott).

\textsuperscript{92} 404 \textsc{Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.)} 554, 562 (1980) (L. MacKay noting focus of Act on punitive aspects of antitrust litigation in the United States, which effectively allowed for an unjustified enrichment of American interests); Cira, \textit{supra} note 36, at 249; Rosen, \textit{supra} note 19, at 214.

\textsuperscript{93} Rosen, \textit{supra} note 19, at 214.

\textsuperscript{94} Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6(1)(c).

\textsuperscript{95} 404 \textsc{Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.)} 554, 590 (1980) (remarks of L. Mishcon).

\textsuperscript{96} 974 \textsc{Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.)} 1024, 1027 (1979) (remarks of Mr. John Nott).

\textsuperscript{97} 973 \textsc{Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.)} 1533, 1549 (1979) (remarks of Mr. Smith).
Whether the clawback provision, however, is ever used in contesting an award of multiple damages in a United States antitrust case is irrelevant because it appears that Parliament had intended the clawback provision to constitute either a "warning shot fired across the American judicial bow" or a symbol of "determination to do what [could] be done effectively to counter" objectionable United States policy.

The heart of the conflict giving rise to the Protection of Trading Act was a fear of an exportation of United States economic policy. As one author has noted, "[i]f American law could regulate British meetings and agreements with such consequences, it [was] feared, British law itself would be completely displaced whenever a disquieted consumer or partner chose to take his grievance across the Atlantic." At the same time, United States commentators recognize the breadth of the effects doctrine, but feel that a "deliberate frustration" of the enforcement of United States laws or pretrial discovery would be unfair. Despite the valid interests of the United States, British concerns are premised on the preservation of national sovereignty and run quite deep.

The national interests supporting the Protection of Trading Interests Act can be contrasted with a nation's concern for the protection of the rights of its citizens. For instance, many countries that place a strong emphasis on upholding privacy interests have enacted bank

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88 405 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 926, 942 (1980) (concern raised by L. MacKay as to whether such actions taken against a United States act accords with recognized principles of international law).
99 Novicoff, supra note 38, at 34.
100 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 594 (1980) (remarks of L. Lloyd of Clashfern). See also 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1550 (1979) (Mr. Smith effectively arguing that the real power of the clawback provision lies in its symbolic existence); Kestenbaum, supra note 34, at 315 (noting that the clawback provision "demonstrates the extent to which U.S. antitrust jurisdiction over foreign entities and foreign conduct has come to be viewed abroad as an overreaching interference with policies and laws of sovereign nations").
102 Id. at 31.
103 Id.
104 See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
105 For instance, in Switzerland, one's right to privacy is considered as an "integral part of his or her personality rights." Hurd, supra note 64, at 27; Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy And Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 18, 20-21 (1978). See also Note, The Effect of Swiss Bank Secrecy on the Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulations & the Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and Switzerland, 7 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 541, 544 n.32 (1984) (noting that personality rights protected in civil law jurisdictions typically encompass "physical and intellectual integrity, including the protection of health, family life, and financial affairs").
secrecy laws. While United States courts have held that such secrecy laws represent serious impediments to the enforcement actions of the SEC, the interests which these laws seek to protect may be accommo-

106 An individual's right to privacy in his own banking affairs is considered to be immediately derivative from the right of individual privacy and is given substantial protection. Note, supra note 105, at 544. In a country such as Switzerland, the duties placed upon a banker owe their existence to the privacy rights of the account holder; the Swiss banker is obligated by the agency duty owed by him to maintain the confidentiality of the customer. Hurd, supra note 64, at 29; Note, supra note 105, at 546. While some commentators have argued that the Swiss rights of bank secrecy are directly analogous to their counterparts in countries such as the United States (see, e.g., Newcomb, supra note 60, at 566 ("one finds that [such statutes] provide similar, limited protections against investigation with more than ample means for domestic policy authority to conduct investigations deemed appropriate")) it would appear that bank secrecy rights in the United States are, by comparison, superficial (see Hurd, supra note 64, at 32 (author noting that the banking relationship recognized in the United States resembles "little more than that of an ordinary debtor to a creditor")) and lack "any legitimate expectation of privacy concerning the information kept in bank records." United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).

Swiss law specifically enumerates exceptions to the secrecy laws where it is understood that public good preempts private interests. Hurd, supra note 64, at 31. The rationale understood to be operative in such instances is that public law, in civil law countries, will outweigh private law where the two are in direct conflict. Note, The Effect of the U.S.-Swiss Agreement on Swiss Banking Secrecy and Insider Trading, 15 L. & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 565, 575 (1983). Therefore, since bank secrecy rights are founded on private law, they must be put aside where public law is brought into play. In addition to exceptions to secrecy rights created by public law, other exceptions can be created where there is an effective "waiver" of one's rights through involvement in certain types of transactions. Moessle, supra note 15, at 21-22. While some commentators have noted that waivers to Swiss secrecy rights when combined with other limitations makes such rights more illusory than real (Newcomb, supra note 60, at 566-69), the recognized scope of such waivers typically only extends to those acts which, by their very nature, reveal a protected fact (e.g., a client's identity) to such an extent as to imply that a waiver has been made. Moessle, supra note 15, at 21-22. Such a waiver will rarely, if ever, arise in the context of an investor's securities transaction. Id.

107 The court in SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), was faced with an action brought by the SEC against a Swiss corporation and several unnamed parties for violation of insider trading provisions. In holding that the defendants in that case could be compelled to disclose information to satisfy the SEC's discovery requests despite the possibility of criminal liability in Switzerland, the court noted that the strength of United States interests clearly outweighed the Swiss interests involved. Id. at 117 (the court noting "[t]he strength of the United States interest in enforcing its securities laws to ensure the integrity of its financial markets cannot seriously be doubted. That interest is being continually thwarted by the use of foreign bank accounts."). Emphasizing the clear preference for United States interests over that of the Swiss, the court noted in conclusion that "[i]t would be a travesty of justice to permit a foreign company to invade U.S. markets, violate American laws if they were indeed violated, withdraw profits and resist accountability for itself and its principals for the illegality by claiming their anonymity under foreign law." Id. at 119. In this same theme, one SEC official has noted that, given the deep-rooted American interests in obtaining information, there is a feeling among investigative authorities that Swiss secrecy laws serve only as "an infringement of their ability to enforce federal securities legislation." Interview with Edward Greene, former General Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15, 1982), cited in Note, supra note 105, at 570.
dated by agreements such as the Memorandum of Understanding of August 31, 1982. Through the procedural safeguards provided for in the Memorandum, both the SEC interests in policing insider trading were satisfied, and the Swiss interests in preserving the privacy rights of persons within its territory were upheld. In the area of blocking legislation, however, the interests at stake are of a wholly different character: rather than reflecting the rights of the individual, blocking legislation represents the sovereign interests of an entire nation. Accordingly, a procedural mechanism such as the Swiss Memorandum of Understanding cannot easily serve as an adequate means for

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108 Reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983) [hereinafter Memorandum]. This Memorandum supplemented the Treaty between the United States and Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Jan. 23, 1977, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302, which made assistance by the Swiss government mandatory in investigations if the offense was a crime in both Switzerland and the United States and was within the "Schedule of Offenses" attached to the Treaty. See generally, Hurd, supra note 64, at 43 (discussing provisions of Treaty). The Memorandum provided that SEC investigations of insider trading fall within the scope of the Treaty if that investigation was in relation to "conduct which might be dealt with by the criminal courts." Memorandum, at art. II, ¶ 3(a). The Memorandum goes further to note that insider trading could be an offense under the Swiss Penal Code. Id. at art. II, ¶ 3(b). Accordingly, the basic effect of the Memorandum was to clarify the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance so as to make it effective in providing the SEC with assistance in its investigations of insider trading. For a brief description of the problems faced by the SEC in such investigations prior to the development of the Memorandum, as well as a general description of the effect of the Memorandum in ensuring Swiss cooperation, see Note, supra note 105, at 565-66, 585-86.

109 Most significantly for the SEC, cooperation by the Swiss is ensured in many of its investigations of insider trading. While the terms of the Memorandum appear to limit the scope of assistance by the Swiss to those areas where a criminal investigation is being made, see supra note 108 and accompanying text, it is generally understood that the remote possibility that the Department of Justice will punish those inside traders is sufficient to invoke the language of the Memorandum in providing assistance in the civil actions brought by the SEC. Note, supra note 105, at 563. Under the broad language of the Memorandum, as long as the activities for which information is being requested might be brought in criminal court, the SEC is given assistance in its investigations. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.

110 Note, supra note 105, at 564-65. Under the provisions of the Memorandum, the SEC, when making a request to the Swiss Commission of Inquiry, is required to divulge all relevant information in the investigation and to demonstrate that there are "reasonable grounds" for proceeding with the request. Memorandum, supra note 108, at arts. III, ¶¶ (2)-(4). This request is then granted either automatically or if found to be reasonable, depending on such factors as whether trading volume has increased by a sufficient amount over a specific span of time and whether the Swiss Commission of Inquiry determines that insider trading may have actually occurred. Id. By constructing adequate procedural safeguards to SEC investigations of insider trading, the Memorandum effectively ensures that the private bank secrecy rights are not lost in the flood of discovery requests made from the United States. At the same time, the Memorandum also provides the SEC of some assurance that its investigations of insider trading are not frustrated by irreconcilable assertions of bank privacy.

111 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.

112 See supra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
lessening the tensions created by blocking statutes.

While the Protection of Trading Interests Act may try to protect legitimate interests, it runs the danger of asserting national interests beyond the intended scope of countering United States antitrust investigations. The Act has the effect of deterring any legal actions supported by the United States government. Therefore, while there have been situations where the Act was used to preserve interests that were intended to be protected, the Act is potentially overbroad. For instance, where the SEC is investigating an insider trading violation by investors within the United Kingdom, there is little to prevent Great Britain from invoking the Act and refusing to cooperate in any investigations. The possible frustration of United States interests in preserving the integrity of its securities markets through enforcement actions in the United Kingdom is thus conditioned upon the unfettered discretion of the British Secretary of State. Therefore, the Act poses the danger of frustrating enforcement of United States securities law abroad.

3. Resolving Conflicts of National Interests

Few would doubt that the United States has a legitimate interest in the protection of its securities markets from fraudulent activities at home and abroad. In achieving this end, the SEC will have to enforce aggressively its regulations in both the foreign and domestic settings.


114 One such use of the Protection of Trading Interests Act was made by statutory instrument in response to the actions of the American court in Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World Airways, 568 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1983). 1983 STAT. INSTRUMENT 900 (order by Secretary of State pursuant to § 1(1) of the Protection of Trading Interests Act). For a general discussion, see Novicoff, supra note 38, at 26-32; Atwood, supra note 53, at 7.

115 If release of any information requested by the SEC can be deemed, within the discretion of the Secretary of State, to be “prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom” (Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 2(2)(a)), then it may be barred from being released. Id. For a general discussion of discretion left to Secretary of State under the Act, see supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.

116 Although the discretion of the Secretary of State in applying blocking statutes has not previously presented a problem to enforcement efforts of the SEC, the potential for future abuse of that discretion, however, does exist. See infra notes 173-78.

117 This author wholly subscribes to the view posited by Mr. John Fedders:

If aggressive policing is not carried out, the SEC and United States investors will be accepting a de facto double standard of law enforcement—one standard for those trading from within the United States and a lesser standard for those trading from outside. The United States cannot permit foreign investors to violate its laws with impunity while holding its own citizens accountable for violations of the same laws.

Fedders, Policing Trans-Border Fraud in the United States Securities Markets: The “Waiver by Conduct” Concept — A Possible Alternative of a Starting Point for Dis-
Regrettably, due to such obstacles as blocking statutes and secrecy laws, the regulatory activities of the SEC are frustrated. In response to both the possible abuse of United States securities laws by foreign parties abroad and the rapid internationalization of the world securities markets, there is a growing sentiment that the SEC must devise alternative means of regulating international activities beyond those presently in effect.

3.1. Unilateral Efforts

In upholding the interests of the United States in protecting its securities markets, a possible solution would be for the SEC to unilaterally extend its regulations to cover all securities transactions in United States markets. Under the "waiver by conduct" doctrine, foreigners would automatically waive the protection of secrecy laws as a precondition for engaging in securities transactions in the United States. Such waiver would be implied by the fact that the transaction took place in our markets. Thus, the United States could require that foreign investors make an explicit choice - either forego the investment opportunities available here or give up the protection of foreign laws that might be used to conceal the identity of the investor and the circumstances of the transaction.

Viewed narrowly, the waiver by conduct doctrine constitutes merely an assertion of jurisdiction over conduct with substantial effects in the United States. From this same perspective, supporters of the doctrine...
note that it is not an attempt to export United States economic policy abroad, but rather a form of protective legislation without unfair effects on other nations' sovereignty interests. While simple and cost-effective, the doctrine is inconsistent with the need for a cooperative approach to securities regulation since it takes an immovable stance in claiming jurisdiction. Where national interests collide as clearly as in the case of the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in the face of blocking legislation, it makes little sense to suggest that the adoption of the waiver by conduct doctrine is in any way a "starting point" for the resolution of those conflicts. Furthermore, while United States securities law has not been subject to the foreign reactionary legislation which United States antitrust law has faced when applied abroad, an extension of the effects doctrine, as embodied in the waiver by conduct proposal, may trigger hostile reaction since it gives little deference to foreign interests. Not surprisingly, the SEC has never given much credence or serious consideration to the proposal. Given both the bitterly hostile reactions which the extraterritorial use of United States antitrust laws have received, and the growing perceptions that the United States is exporting its economic policy to foreign nations without giving proper deference to conflicting foreign interests, it would be an insult to nondomestic interests to suggest that a broad imposition of enforcement jurisdiction, such as that embodied in the waiver by conduct proposal, represents an attempt to apply principles of comity.

In application, the waiver by conduct doctrine is counterproductive in the face of blocking legislation. The waiver only extends the personal

504 n.49 (presenting argument through International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)); Hurd, supra note 64, at 48 (basing argument in support of waiver by conduct doctrine on Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)).

Fedders, supra note 117, at 503 n.48; Hurd, supra note 64, at 48-49.

Fedders, supra note 117, at 503 n.48.

Fedders also notes the other advantages to the waiver by conduct doctrine are that it (i) ensures that no person engaged in transactions can avoid scrutiny, (ii) enhances those aspects of the United States markets that attract capital investments, (iii) does not constitute an extraterritorial application of United States securities laws, (iv) creates a waiver consistent with and recognizable under foreign secrecy laws, (v) accords with principles of international justice, (vi) is constitutionally sound and (vii) places no presumption of guilt on the party investigated. Fedders, supra note 117, at 503-06.

Id. at 481.

See also Hurd, supra note 64, at 47 (making analogous statement that the waiver by conduct doctrine is necessary since prior efforts at negotiation and balancing of interests have failed). Contra Fedder, supra note 117, at 480.

See supra notes 65-104 and accompanying text.

Moessle, supra note 15, at 43.

See supra text accompanying notes 64-104. But see Fedders, supra note 117, at 480.
interests of the investor. Since bank secrecy laws provide privacy rights to the individual, the waiver by conduct doctrine is clearly applicable in that context. In confronting blocking statutes, however, the doctrine only creates international discord. Unlike secrecy laws, the interests upheld by blocking statutes are entirely those of the state. It would be difficult to conceive how a person could "waive" the interests of the state; therefore, claiming jurisdiction against a person in a blocking statute jurisdiction through the waiver by conduct doctrine would be useless.

The most obvious downfall of the waiver by conduct doctrine is its inability to weigh foreign and domestic interests before granting jurisdiction to the United States courts. Unilaterally claiming jurisdiction is not as justifiable as obtaining jurisdiction after accounting for both foreign and United States interests. The waiver by conduct doctrine fails to take such a balanced approach. Unilateral assertions of jurisdiction in contexts unrelated to securities law (principally antitrust enforcement) originally led to the formation of blocking statutes. Therefore, should history provide any lesson, unilateral attempts to enforce United States securities laws abroad may be not only ineffective, but also counterproductive due to their potential to create reactionary legislation such as blocking statutes. Furthermore, assertions made by such unilateral efforts offend principles of international comity.

Under general principles of comity, recognition and enforcement of judicial decrees rendered by the courts of another sovereign nation are premised on observance by the

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132 See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
134 Moessle, supra note 15, at 46-47 ("legal war").
135 See supra notes 64-104 and accompanying text; Moessle, supra note 15, at 22; Note, supra note 133, at 22.
136 It should be noted that the waiver by conduct doctrine has been attacked on a variety of fronts in addition to those relevant here. See, e.g., Liftin, supra note 28, at 555-56 (noting that the waiver by conduct doctrine is a weak imposition of jurisdiction due to its lack of due notice of its effect to foreign investors); Moessle, supra note 15, at 44-45 (noting that waiver by conduct doctrine would effectively create a set of double standards for foreign banks with clients investing in the United States); Widmer, supra note 26, at 42 (noting that, due to unilateral efforts by the United States, foreign banks would probably have to give up their securities business with the United States).
137 Moessle, supra note 15, at 42-43.
138 Id.
139 See supra notes 64-104 and accompanying text.
140 See also, Moessle, supra note 15, at 46-47 (for a similar argument in a somewhat different context).
141 Liftin, supra note 28, at 528.
rendering forum of the essentials of judicial jurisdiction and of a fair hearing. In addition to reservations based on procedural considerations, courts of foreign nations may decline to enforce a United States judicial order if the United States law on which the order is based offends the public policy of the forum nation.\(^{142}\)

If one goal in these times of rapid internationalization of the world securities markets is to facilitate the free flow of capital between markets,\(^{143}\) a unilateral approach to enforcing one nation's securities laws will have the effect of impeding that result.\(^{144}\) Unilateral approaches are inappropriate in addressing the problems of international securities fraud. Considerations of both domestic and foreign interests must be made.

3.2. Balance of Interests

3.2.1. Towards a Balancing Approach

A viable alternative to the unilateral actions taken by the United States in preserving its securities markets would have to involve a balancing of both the domestic and foreign national interests at issue. Many authors have both advocated a need for such an approach\(^{145}\) and attacked the reluctance of administrative bodies or national governments to balance interests.\(^{146}\) Several different balancing tests have been proposed. One example is provided by the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States,\(^{147}\) which outlines several relevant considerations:

In issuing an order directing production of information located abroad, a court in the United States should take into account the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the information originated in the United States; the extent to which compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state

\(^{142}\) Id. (emphasis added).

\(^{143}\) Widmer, supra note 26, at 40-42.

\(^{144}\) Id. See also Williams & Spencer, supra note 31, at 59 (noting that assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction can create "counterproductive confrontations between regulators"); Thomas, supra note 20, at 190 (author noting that "adverse reaction" to foreign regulators may "impede free flow of capital").

\(^{145}\) See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 20, at 189; Widmer, supra note 26, at 43.

\(^{146}\) See, e.g., Novicoff, supra note 38, at 13-14.

\(^{147}\) Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985).
where the information is located; and the possibility of alternative means of securing the information.\textsuperscript{148}

The drafters of these provisions clearly intended to prevent the courts from broadly expanding the effects doctrine\textsuperscript{149} by forcing them to consider carefully an enumerated set of factors which bring foreign interests into focus.\textsuperscript{150}

A more elaborate balancing approach was adopted in \textit{Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America}.\textsuperscript{151} In this antitrust action against several Honduran entities for allegedly attempting to maintain control of the Honduran lumber export business, the court developed a three prong test in deciding whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should be exercised.\textsuperscript{152} The first prong of the test resembled the traditional effects doctrine — was there an effect or an intent to cause an effect to the foreign commerce of the United States?\textsuperscript{153} Under the second prong, a determination was made as to whether the harm done was of such a scope and nature as to justify use of the antitrust laws.\textsuperscript{154} Under the last prong, the inquiry was, "[a]s a matter of international comity and fairness, should the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States be asserted to cover [the activity]?"\textsuperscript{155} In adding substance to this last prong, the court noted:

The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.\textsuperscript{156}

This standard, like that of the \textit{Restatement}, gives substantial deference to interests of international comity by requiring a careful balancing of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[148] Id. § 437(1)(c).
\item[150] Hurd, \textit{supra} note 64, at 34.
\item[151] 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
\item[152] Id. at 615.
\item[153] Id.
\item[154] Id.
\item[155] Id.
\item[156] Id. at 614.
\end{footnotes}
national interests.\textsuperscript{187} A substantial degree of discretion, however, is necessarily vested in the court. Some degree of comity must be exercised by each state’s executive in order to ensure the reciprocal effectiveness of each nation’s “regulatory expectations,”\textsuperscript{188} but injecting comity as a consideration to be weighed by the courts does not ensure that those interests will be sufficiently considered when domestic policy is perceived to be strong.\textsuperscript{189} This may be a result of the flexibility underlying the notion of comity.\textsuperscript{190}

3.2.2. Interests in the Balance

The unilateral exportation of United States economic policy does not accord with the cooperative spirit of internationalizing the world securities markets, but neither does an absolute blockage of the information necessary to the SEC. Given their effect on regulatory proceedings in this country, blocking statutes, although created in reaction to extraterritorial actions, have an extraterritorial reach of their own\textsuperscript{160} and represent a serious impediment to the regulation of the international securities markets.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{187} See Hurd, supra note 64, at 35; Liftin, supra note 28, at 553.
\textsuperscript{188} Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
\textsuperscript{189} As one judge has stated,

\begin{quote}
No nation is under an unremitting obligation to enforce foreign interests which are fundamentally prejudicial to those of the domestic forum. Thus, from the earliest times, authorities have recognized that the obligations of comity expire when the strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by the foreign act.
\end{quote}

\textit{Laker Airways,} 731 F.2d 937; see also Liftin, supra note 28, at 553 (for a similar point in a different context).

\textsuperscript{190} “[C]omity” summarizes in a brief word a complex and elusive concept — the degree of deference that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the forum. \textit{Since comity varies according to the factual circumstances surrounding each claim for its recognition, the absolute boundaries of the duties it imposes are inherently uncertain.} However, the central precept of comity teaches that, when possible, the decisions of foreign tribunals should be given effect in domestic courts, since recognition fosters international cooperation and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability through satisfaction of mutual expectations. The interests of both forums are advanced — the foreign court because its laws have been vindicated; the domestic country because international cooperation and ties have been encouraged, which benefits all nations.

\textit{Laker Airways,} 731 F.2d at 937 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{162} Inasmuch as it is absurd to argue that unilateral efforts to enforce securities overseas represents a “starting point” for international negotiation among market regulators, see supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text, so too is it difficult to maintain
Blocking statutes are premised on an interest in protecting the sovereignty interests and public policy of the state; however, since virtually any international action may intrude upon a nation's sovereignty interests, something more than a mere request for assistance in a discovery proceeding is expected before a broad assertion of national sovereignty can be made through the use of sweeping blocking legislation. One problem with raising claims of sovereignty interests is their inherent indefiniteness. Sovereignty interests are, after all, completely within the eye of the beholder. Where foreign actions clearly go beyond the scope which is necessary to protect the interests which they were intended to support, a balance of national interests may tip in favor of some limited form of discovery by United States courts.

In principle, sovereignty interests are as vague as comity concerns. Sovereignty, like jurisdiction, represents a notion of territorial integrity. The actions of one state are bound to the territory of that state, unless a permissive rule exists allowing actions in other states. In reality, such permissive rules must exist in order to avoid isolationism. Therefore, claims to international sovereignty should be limited to those situations where actual macroeconomic harm may be done to the nation. Otherwise, any dispute between parties of differing nations can escalate into a conflict of national interests, thereby evading the actual underlying issues. Several commentators have noted that in a

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that unilateral action in the form of blocking statutes is, in any way, conducive to eventual negotiations. Contra 973 PArL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1577 (1979) (Mr. Thomas noting that "[i]t is important the [Protection of Trading Interests] bill should be regarded by our trading partners not as an exercise of economic nationalism but as a measure that fosters international trade); 974 PArL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1024, 1044 (1979) (Mr. Lawrence noting that intent of Protection of Trading Interests Bill is to "liberate" international trade); 405 PArL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1515, 1518 (L. MacKay noting that Protection of Trading Interests Bill will help to contribute to international understandings and negotiations with the United States); 405 PArL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1515, 1519-20 (remarks of L. Hacking noting that, in light of the United States interest in enforcing its economic policy abroad, the Protection of Trading Interests Bill is a spur to further negotiations).

See, e.g., Atwood, supra note 53, at 15 (noting a similar conclusion reached by several nations in bilateral agreements with the United States).


Kestenbaum, supra note 34, at 326.

Moessle, supra note 15, at 20.

Simon & Weller, supra note 37, at 6.

Moessle, supra note 15, at 20.

Note, supra note 106, at 606.

Simon & Weller, supra note 37, at 11. One example of such an abuse of both sovereignty interests and public policy has been noted with respect to the divorce laws of the United Kingdom. Under the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations Act, 1971, ch. 53, a British court can arbitrarily decide to refuse to recognize a foreign divorce decree if it is deemed to be against "public policy." Id. § 8(2)(b). See also
variety of contexts, claims of public policy and sovereignty interests have been abused by other nations, and such assertions of national sovereignty now constitute little more than self-serving declarations to preserve the interests of a country's nationals. Therefore, in giving credence to claims of sovereignty, considerations of actual harm in terms of such factors as overall "macroeconomic effect," and relative degree of closeness of the two nations to the underlying controversy must be carefully appraised.

Apart from the potential for abuse in laying broad claims to sovereignty interests, other considerations also weigh in favor of assisting the SEC in its regulatory affairs. United States securities law is unlike other regulatory areas such as antitrust because it does not represent "a misguided sense of United States economic imperialism." While some commentators have argued against the broad extraterritoriality of United States securities laws, the SEC's efforts may represent both a "genuine concern for the regulation and integrity of a finite and specific marketplace" and a promotion of friendly internationalization of the world securities markets. Since blocking legislation is in large mea-
sure a reaction to the enforcement and not the substance of foreign law, the relatively limited nature of the SEC's discovery requests, as well as the limited injunctive relief typically sought by the SEC against foreign acts which pose potential harm to the United States markets, combine to weigh heavily in favor of United States interests. In addition, arguments have been made that blocking statutes are intended as protection against extraterritorial use of antitrust law and are thereby inappropriate when used against the SEC; any use of blocking legislation is entirely improper for a nation hoping to participate in a worldwide securities market.

Another significant fact that weighs heavily for the SEC is that, unlike the antitrust laws, the antifraud provisions of the United States securities laws have analogous provisions in the United Kingdom. The basic prohibitions against insider trading recognized in Great Britain are provided by the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985:

an individual who is, or at any time in the preceding six months has been, knowingly connected with a company shall not deal on a recognised stock exchange in securities of that company if he has information which —

(a) he holds by virtue of being connected with the company,
(b) it would be reasonable to expect a person so connected, and in the position by virtue of which he is so connected, not to disclose except for the proper performance of the functions attaching to that position, and
(c) he knows is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those securities.

This regulation of securities fraud may not be enforced to the same degree as that in the United States due to the "inadequacy of the methods of enforcement and the scope for clandestine dealing behind the

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180 Newcomb, supra note 60, at 569-70.
181 Fedders, supra note 117, at 506 n.56 (noting, "[t]he SEC does not engage in fishing expeditions. But were it to abuse its power — whether it did so with respect to a United States or foreign citizen trading on American markets — it would be restrained by United States courts").
182 Loomis & Grant, supra note 16, at 18-19.
183 Fedders, supra note 117, at 484 n.18.
184 Id. at 496.
186 Id. § 1(1).
front of a foreign bank nominee"; however, the legislation does nonetheless recognize the importance of limiting fraudulent activity. The only substantial difference between the two policies is that the United Kingdom's legislation readily imposes criminal sanctions, whereas the United States' securities laws do not.

Counterbalancing the factors weighing in favor of the SEC's efforts abroad, several considerations remain which suggest that it is unwise to attempt to export United States securities laws too strongly. One reaction made to United States securities law resembles that made to United States antitrust laws: courts have convoluted United States securities law to the point of incomprehensibility.

For most non-U.S. persons, in particular for Europeans, the U.S. securities laws constitute an incomprehensible bulk of infinitely complicated rules which are totally strange to them. Many look at them as one of the bases for that great U.S. pastime of suing one another.

A further complication involves the type of the civil remedies allowed under United States securities laws. Under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act, the SEC is allowed to bring civil actions for treble damages:

The legislation gives the Commission authority to seek from a court a civil penalty of up to three times the amount of profit gained or loss avoided by a person who violates the federal securities laws by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material nonpublic information. The new civil penalty may also be sought by the Commission from a person who aids and abets a violation, within limitations discussed below. The Committee believes the new penalty provided by the legislation will serve as a powerful de-

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188 As one author has noted, "it is the deterrent effect that advocates of the legislation see as the main purpose of the law." Id.
190 This distinction is also drawn by other authors. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 187, at 390 ("In the United States, civil remedies have dealt with the problem for many years, and the criminal provisions have rarely been invoked.").
191 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
192 Widmer, supra note 26, at 39.
193 Id.
terrent to insider trading abuses.\textsuperscript{195}

While this powerful legislation provides a substantial deterrent to insider trading,\textsuperscript{196} the United Kingdom has already vehemently reacted to the use of similar treble damages in the antitrust context.\textsuperscript{197} If the United States wants to avoid the same bitter international reaction that its antitrust law suffered prior to the passage of the Protection of Trading Interests Act, it must avoid the same pitfalls. Therefore, the United States, while enforcing its securities laws abroad, should proceed with carefully enumerated policies and nonoffensive remedies.

3.2.3. Balancing by the Courts and Government

Assuming that a balancing approach must be adopted, the next obvious question is to whom that task should be left. The balancing of interests is usually left to the courts. Occasionally, the courts, in cases such as Timberlane Lumber,\textsuperscript{198} strike an accord under principles of comity,\textsuperscript{199} which adequately balances competing interests. In other cases, the result is less than satisfactory for foreign concerns. A recent example of this latter situation is provided by the court in Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines.\textsuperscript{200} Plaintiff, a transatlantic airline carrier, brought an antitrust action against several defendants who had allegedly engaged in monopolistic behavior to drive the plaintiff out of business.\textsuperscript{201} After noting the place of comity in balancing national interests,\textsuperscript{202} the court stated that a limitation is placed on comity considerations where "the foreign act is inherently inconsistent with the policies underlying comity."\textsuperscript{203} The court criticized the British government's use of the Protection of Trading Interests Act\textsuperscript{204} and noted:

\textsuperscript{196} Moessle, \textit{supra} note 15, at 5-6.
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{See supra} notes 40-47, 61-63 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{198} Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); \textit{see supra} notes 33-78 and accompanying text. In a later case, Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979), plaintiffs alleged that defendant's licensing practices in foreign countries for the manufacturing of vinyl floor tiles violated the Sherman Act. In passing on the issue of whether the defendant's act, if as alleged, were held accountable under the Sherman Act, the court, after tracing through the history of the Alcoa effects doctrine, adopted a balancing of interests test very similar to the test adopted in \textit{Timberlane Lumber. Congoleum Corp.}, 598 F.2d at 1291-98.
\textsuperscript{199} \textit{See supra} notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{200} 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
\textsuperscript{201} \textit{Id.} at 916-17.
\textsuperscript{202} \textit{Id.} at 937-39. \textit{See generally supra} notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{203} Laker Airways, at 939-41.
\textsuperscript{204} \textit{Id.} at 940-41. The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, authorizes a "losing British defendant in a U.S. antitrust action to sue a prevailing U.S. plaintiff in
that in this situation, a balancing of interests clearly favored the plain-
tiff's cause. The *Laker Airways* decision has been often criticized, due
to its apparent bias toward American interests.\(^\text{205}\) The value of the
*Laker Airways* decision, however, derives not from its eventual holding,
but from lengthy dicta placed in a footnote:

Of course, the British government does not intend to invoke
the Protection of Trading Interest Act to bar all jurisdiction
exercised by United States courts over foreign airlines — just
that necessary to provide a forum for the enforcement of
American antitrust laws. This illustrates that the conflict
here is between deeply felt and long held economic and polit-
cal policies of both the United States and the British govern-
ments, and that the courts of the respective jurisdictions are
in no position to resolve that dispute by conceding comity to
the decrees of the other. *The comity we are asked to invoke is
thus the comity for the British Executive — and that is
something better left to the American Executive to negotiate.*
Conceding comity to the actions of the British courts, which
were brought about and directed rather specifically by the
actions of the British Executive, and whose sole purpose is
the unilateral subjugation of United States interests to those
of Great Britain, would require the American judges to ab-
dicate their oath of office to uphold the laws of the United
States. This we cannot conscientiously do, however much we
understand and respect the position that our English peers
are in.\(^\text{206}\)

Despite arguments that the fault lies in the United States court's failure
to give adequate deference to the interests of foreign countries,\(^\text{207}\) the
actual fault may lie with the inadequacy of the political branch in ar-
ving at mutual understandings between the executive branches of for-
eign governments which hold competing interests.

A related argument can be made that the judiciary is simply not
the proper body for bearing the responsibility of balancing national in-

\(^{205}\) Liftin, *supra* note 28, at 553.

\(^{206}\) *Laker Airways*, 731 F.2d at 941-42 n.121 (emphasis added).

\(^{207}\) See, e.g., Hurd, *supra* note 64, at 35-37 (criticizing failure of United States
courts to accord adequate deference to foreign interests in nondisclosure from the deci-
sion of Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
terests. Unlike many countries, the United States maintains a relatively strong and independent judicial system. The potential exists for a United States court to abuse its power by transcending the immediate issues raised in international cases and prematurely considering the respective national interests which are affected. Experience has shown that courts will almost invariably favor domestic interests over foreign ones when balancing national interests. Superficially, this empirical fact may be explained by the inherent nationalism of any state's judiciary system. A more thorough analysis reveals, however, that when national interests are sufficiently divergent and incongruous, a balancing of those interests may not work. A perceived bias towards domestic interests may properly reflect different national outlooks to the same problem. In the antitrust area, for instance, American and British interests diverge because "cartel and competition are direct opposites[;]" since each nation's view arguably has some degree of validity, a true balance of interests by courts on either side of that controversy becomes impossible. Shortly after writing the majority opinion in the Laker Airways decision, Judge Wilkey stated on a separate occasion:

"The basis of our decision [in Laker Airways] therefore is that we as judges do not have the authority to decide that the longstanding, definite, clear antitrust policy of the political branches of our government can be compromised because it comes into conflict with the desires and policy of another government. That is not for the judges to do . . . . It may be that it is very unwise for the United States to insist on jurisdiction in this case. But if so, that should be spelled out by negotiations which judges are not in a position to conduct."

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209 See Fedders, supra note 28, at 553-55.
210 See supra note 28, at 505-06 n.53 (citing to English case, where court noted, in weighing foreign interests in nondisclosure, "[w]hy should a true foreigner, while able to enjoy all the benefits of holding shares in an English company, be intended to escape the burdens?"); Liftin, supra note 28, at 551 (noting that, in a balance of national interests, there is "substantial judicial authority" holding that fundamental United States interests outweigh competing foreign ones); Moessle, supra note 15, at 32 (noting "[t]he case analysis has demonstrated that the application of a mere balancing of interests test provides for litigation certainty only insofar as the interests of the enforcing state usually prevail").
211 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
212 Kestenbaum, supra note 34, at 325.
Some might argue that a balancing approach taken by the judiciary would solve many of the problems encountered in international securities regulations. However, an understanding of the difficulties facing other regulatory areas such as antitrust, as well as an appreciation for the political undercurrents of any judicial decision, suggest that a balancing of national interests should not be entirely entrusted to the judiciary.

The only practical means by which national interests can be balanced in this area is through negotiations between the political branches of the two countries. While admittedly somewhat slow, costly and potentially inconsistent in treatment, such cooperative ventures between nations have the advantage that "cooperation increases mutual understandings of the goals and methods of the various regulatory schemes. It permits a beneficial exchange of ideas, information and experiences." Additionally, such an approach has the advantage of easing international tensions, thereby fostering a movement towards the eventual formation of multilateral agreements in policing the world securities markets. At the very least, "[f]ormalization regularize[s] contacts so that people can respond quickly to create the flexible ad hoc arrangements for special situations [of securities fraud]."

4. TOWARDS A MORE ADEQUATE BALANCING OF NATIONAL INTERESTS

4.1. Approach Under the Present Memorandum of Understanding

On September 23, 1986, the United States SEC and Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) formed an agreement addressing a "corresponding need for mutual cooperation between relevant national authorities" in light of "increasing international activity in the securi-

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214 Thomas, supra note 20, at 194.
216 Williams & Spencer, supra note 31, at 60. This recognition of the need for mutual cooperation has been realized in the antitrust area by both the United Kingdom, 973 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533, 1534 (1979) (remarks of Mr. John Nott); 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 555 (1980) (remarks of L. MacKay); 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 554, 583 (1980) (remarks of Earl of Inchcape) and the United States Justice Department (Cira, supra note 36, at 263) for quite some time.
217 Fedders, supra note 117, at 497.
218 Newcomb, supra note 60, at 576-77.
220 Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 7.
221 Id. at preamble.
ties, futures and investment markets." Among the regulatory interests specifically addressed under the Memorandum of Understanding are those rules of either nation "relating to the prevention of insider dealing in, misrepresentation in the course of dealing in, and market manipulation in, securities listed on an investment exchange."

The Memorandum of Understanding is a cooperative effort assuring the SEC that it can obtain much of the information needed for its regulatory functions if the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding are satisfied. The DTI and the SEC agree that they "shall assist the other by providing to [each other] any information that is either already in its hands or that it can by its best efforts obtain in order to enable the other to secure compliance with the relevant legal rules and requirements."

Furthermore, the SEC’s ability to gather information under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding is clarified. The scope of the SEC’s information gathering abilities extends to investigations which comply with the domestic rules under which the information is sought, and to any "civil or administrative enforcement proceeding, assisting in a criminal prosecution, or conducting any investigation related thereto for any general charge applicable to the violation of the legal rule or requirement identified in the request." The SEC is also not rigidly limited to the procedures created under the Memorandum of Understanding, provided that the SEC observes certain minimal guidelines.

Finally, the SEC has the assurance that the protections given under the Memorandum of Understanding will have effect and will not be revoked without either thirty days notice or until such time as a treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom relating to insider trading is created.

While the SEC is given broad rights of enforcing its securities laws, the Memorandum of Understanding also confers substantial protection to the national interests of the United Kingdom. A principal concern of Great Britain embodied by the Protection of Trading Inter-

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222 Id.
223 Id. § 1(h)(i)(A).
224 Under the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding, both the DTI and the SEC agree to a "statement of intent," id. § 3, to reciprocally "exchange information for the purpose of facilitating the performance of their respective duties." Id. § 2.
225 Id. § 4 (emphasis added).
226 Id. § 8(a).
227 Id. § 8(c).
228 See id. § 12.
229 Id.
230 Id. § 18.
231 Id. § 17.
ests Act was the breadth of the antitrust actions being brought by private plaintiffs in the United States.\textsuperscript{232} A similar concern is addressed in the Memorandum of Understanding because private plaintiffs are specifically excluded from obtaining any rights under the Memorandum of Understanding.\textsuperscript{233} The flexibility of the United Kingdom's sovereignty interests\textsuperscript{234} is accommodated by conditioning disclosure of information on public interest.\textsuperscript{235} A strong objection to the extraterritorial use of the United States antitrust laws has been that discovery requests made within the United Kingdom constituted "fishing expeditions"\textsuperscript{236} beyond the realm of relevant information.\textsuperscript{237} To accommodate this concern, the scope of informational requests allowed by the SEC must satisfy three requirements for disclosure. The first two are the relatively strict standards of disclosing both the purpose\textsuperscript{238} and the legal grounds\textsuperscript{239} for which the information is sought. There are also strict limitations upon the purposes for which the SEC can use such information\textsuperscript{240} as well as explicit rules of confidentiality that apply once that information is released.\textsuperscript{241} The third requirement is the imposition of a minimal standard of "reasonable relevancy" of the information to justify disclosure.\textsuperscript{242} Apart from the limitations placed on the SEC in its requests under the Memorandum, an alternative set of requirements ensures that the SEC does not engage in broad discovery proceedings through alternate channels. The Memorandum of Understanding does not force the SEC to make all of its requests for information through the Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{243} In following such alternate channels, however, the SEC must exercise "moderation and restraint"\textsuperscript{244} and follow separate procedures which require, except in cases of urgency,\textsuperscript{245} that the SEC first make its requests through the Secretary of State.\textsuperscript{246}

The Memorandum of Understanding accommodates both the interests of the United States and the United Kingdom without any obvi-

\textsuperscript{232} See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{233} Memorandum of Understanding, § 3.
\textsuperscript{234} For a description of the indefinite quality of sovereignty interests, see supra notes 159-60, 166-75 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{235} Memorandum of Understanding, § 5.
\textsuperscript{236} See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{237} Id.
\textsuperscript{238} Memorandum of Understanding, § 7(b)(i).
\textsuperscript{239} Id. § 7(b)(ii).
\textsuperscript{240} Id. § 7(b)(iii).
\textsuperscript{241} Id. § 7(d).
\textsuperscript{242} Id. § 8.
\textsuperscript{243} Id. § 9.
\textsuperscript{244} See supra note 228-29 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{245} Memorandum of Understanding, § 12(a).
\textsuperscript{246} Id. § 12(b).
ous favoritism towards either side. The United States' interests are satisfied to the extent that assurances are created to give some degree of legitimacy to the enforcement of its regulations in the United Kingdom. At the same time, the United Kingdom's interests in maintaining its sovereignty are for the moment accommodated. As an "interim" agreement, the Memorandum of Understanding provides a temporary compromise to the balance of two otherwise irreconcilable national interests.

As a temporary framework, the Memorandum of Understanding fails to create any mechanisms for ensuring that an adequate balance of those interests is maintained. For United States concerns, the greatest accomplishment of the Memorandum of Understanding may be its effect of extending the investigatory powers of the SEC. However, the

247 Id. § 17.

248 Under the statutory provisions of the 1934 Act, the SEC has the authority to issue subpoenas and to compel the production of witnesses in its investigations of potential violations of the federal securities laws. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1982). When applied within the territorial boundaries of the United States, such exercises of power are considered valid uses of sovereign power, Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that "[t]raditionally, a state has plenary power to prescribe rules within its own territorial boundaries"), and are supported by the enforcement powers of the federal courts. Id. at 1311. However, when applied outside of the United States, the powers of the SEC are not so clearly defined. See Case Comment, Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz: An Undue Extension of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under the Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securities Laws, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 579, 584-85 (1985) (noting that neither legislative history nor express wording places any guidelines on the extraterritorial use of the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act).

A distinction should be noted between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction to prescribe signifies a state's authority to enact laws governing the conduct, relations, status or interests of persons or things, whether by legislation, executive act or order, or administrative rule or regulation. Jurisdiction to enforce, by contrast, describes a state's authority to compel compliance or impose sanctions for noncompliance with its administrative or judicial orders.

Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1315.

Therefore, although the United States may have the authority to prescribe laws relating to securities regulations where there is a showing of either an effect on American investors or conduct in the United States, see supra note 19 and accompanying text, a court order enforcing an agency's investigatory subpoena "represents an attempt by the U.S. to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction within foreign territory before its prescriptive jurisdiction over the investigated conduct has been proved to exist." Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1317.

Agencies such as the SEC, are severely limited in their ability to issue investigatory subpoenas abroad. Id. at 1309; Securities and Exchange Commission v. Zanganeh, 470 F. Supp. 1307 (D.C. 1978); Securities and Exchange Commission v. Minas de Artemisa, 150 F.2d 215, 218 (9th Cir. 1945). In large measure, this result is due to the fact that enforcement of a subpoena issued by a United States agency through a federal court represents an exercise of enforcement jurisdiction without a requisite showing of prescriptive jurisdiction. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1316.
need for a sensible balance of national interests becomes acute once a

case proceeds towards litigation before a United States court. The

Memorandum of Understanding provides no permanent mechanisms

for guaranteeing that a proper balance is struck. A procedural frame-

work is needed through which the agencies of governments with con-

flicting interests can arrive at such a compromise.

4.2. Establishing a Balancing Procedure: The Australian-United

States Antitrust Approach

Much of the hostility felt in the United Kingdom against the ex-

traterritorial use of United States' laws is generated by the application

of the effects doctrine. Since it is the use, rather than the theoretical

existence of that doctrine which appears to generate foreign irrita-

tion, an acceptable limit to its application should be found before any

resulting international conflicts develop. A well-formulated balance of

national interests may provide such a limit. Therefore, to avoid po-

tential conflict which may otherwise be generated by SEC actions

abroad, it is necessary that both sides of any controversy establish a

preliminary balance of interests at the earliest possible moment.

A means of balancing the United States' interests with those of the

United Kingdom can be derived from the approach taken in the Agree-

ment Between the Government of the United States of America and the

Government of Australia Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters

(Agreement).

An alternative means by which American agencies can obtain information from

abroad is through the use of international agreements and treaties. Through such

mechanisms, a nation may specify the appropriate procedural channels for an agency to

proceed thereby ensuring that a minimal infringement of another nation's jurisdiction

occurs. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d at 1313-14 n.69.

Larose, supra note 204, at 119 (noting that "[t]he Reporters are undoubtedly

correct in identifying chauvinistic applications of U.S. regulations based solely on the

economic effect of a foreign transaction in the United States as a source of irritation to

foreign sovereigns").

Note, The United States — Australian Antitrust Cooperation Agreement: A


See supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.

This same need for an early balance of interests has also been perceived in the

antitrust context. Kestenbaum, supra note 34, at 342 (1982) (noting that "every effort

should be made to accommodate the balancing of interests process at an early stage").

Agreement Relating to Cooperation on Antitrust Matters, June 29, 1982, Aus-


Agreement]. In the area of antitrust law, agreement has been viewed quite

favorably.

The existing antitrust cooperative agreements with Canada and West Ger-

many have functioned well. They and the new Australian government

may be useful models for other bilateral agreements on notification and
Australia, like the United Kingdom, has had numerous difficulties with extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction in United States antitrust cases.\textsuperscript{254} Objections have been voiced against the broad discovery requests,\textsuperscript{255} treble damages actions,\textsuperscript{256} and, in particular, the private party character of United States antitrust litigation.\textsuperscript{257} The point is that exactly the same principle of jurisdiction — of extraterritorial jurisdiction — applies in those private suits. In that event, the same possibilities exist for collision between the United States national economic policy and those of foreign governments and there is the same likelihood of the sovereignty of other countries being affected by extraterritorial enforcement . . . . Questions of sovereignty or comity are matters between nations. In no way should the principle of international comity depend upon private litigants.\textsuperscript{258}

Largely in response to perceptions that the United States was exporting its economic policy, the Australian government passed strong blocking statutes.\textsuperscript{259} The stated intent was to "[prevent] the [p]roduction of consultation. The subject matter of the future agreements should elaborate on the Australian agreement proviso on extraterritorial discovery and intervention by the Executive Branch in private cases. Griffin,\textit{ supra} note 208, at 305 (1982).

Although the Australian Agreement was created in the antitrust context, the principles of balancing of interests involved in creating such antitrust agreements may be applied quite easily in the securities regulations area. Murano,\textit{ Extraterritorial Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2} \textit{Int'l Tax & Bus. Law.} 298, 317-19 (1984).

\textsuperscript{254} For a general discussion of Australian objection to American exportation of economic policy, see Note,\textit{ supra} note 250, at 127 (1983).

\textsuperscript{255} \textit{Id.} at 146.

\textsuperscript{256} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{257} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{258} Press Release of Australian Attorney-General Durack on Oct. 5, 1980,\textit{ quoted in} Note,\textit{ supra} note 250, at 146.


It is particularly noteworthy both that the Australian blocking legislation was passed very quickly in response to litigation arising from the case of In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), and that the resulting blocking legislation vested considerable discretion in the Attorney-General in deciding whether information was to be released. As amended, the Act provides that:

The Attorney-General shall exercise his powers under this Act so as to impose restriction only where he is satisfied that . . . a foreign tribunal is exercising or proposing or likely to exercise jurisdiction or powers of a kind or in a manner not consistent with international law or comity in proceedings having a relevance to matters to which the laws or executive powers of the Commonwealth relate, being the only proceedings of a for-
[c]ertain [d]ocuments, and the [g]iving of [c]ertain [e]vidence, for the purposes of [p]roceedings in [f]oreign [c]ourts.\textsuperscript{260} The Agreement was intended to allow the United States to enforce its antitrust laws in light of this blocking legislation.

As a protection to United States interests, the Agreement obligates the Australian government to cooperate in any antitrust investigations or enforcement actions, as long as there is no "adverse effect" on Australian interests.\textsuperscript{261} As long as adequate notice is given, United States investigations and discovery requests in Australia will not automatically trigger the use of blocking statutes.

The mere seeking by legal process of information or documents located in its territory shall not in itself be regarded by either Party as affecting adversely its significant national interests, or as constituting a basis for applying measures to prohibit the transmission of such information or documents to the authorities of the other Party, provided that in the case of United States legal process prior notice has been given of its issuance. Each party shall, to the fullest extent possible under the circumstances of the particular case, provide notice to the other before taking action to prevent compliance.\textsuperscript{262}

Other provisions also act to protect Australian interests. For instance, the obligation to notify the Australian government starts before investigations have commenced.\textsuperscript{263} When a United States governmental agency "decides to undertake an antitrust investigation that may have implications for Australian laws, policies or national interests, the Government of the United States shall notify the Government of Australia foreign tribunal in relation to which the restriction are to have effect.


For a general discussion of the conflict giving rise to the Australian blocking legislation, see Note, supra note 250, at 145.


\textsuperscript{261} Under article five,

When a proposed investigation or enforcement action under the antitrust laws of one nation does not adversely affect the laws, policies or national interests of the other, each Party shall cooperate with the other in regard to that investigation or action, including through the provision of information and administrative and judicial assistance to the extent permitted by applicable national law.

Agreement, art. 5, ¶ 1.

\textsuperscript{262} \textit{Id.} at art. 5, ¶ 2.

\textsuperscript{263} \textit{Id.} at art. 1, ¶ 2.
of the investigation."

A further procedural mechanism for assuring that an adequate balance of interests is struck is provided by the obligation of mutual consultation created under article two. Whenever either the United States or the Australian government perceives that actions of one nation have effects on the other's national interests, an affirmative obligation is placed on the nation causing the effects to participate in consultations after notice and a request from the affected nation. These consultations are required to focus on the effects that a nation's acts have on the interests of the other nation.

Of significant importance to the Australian government, article six of the Agreement adds substance to the consultation and notification requirements by obligating the United States government to notify its courts of the relevant national interests balanced during such consultations.

When it appears to the Government of Australia that private antitrust proceedings are pending in a United States court relating to conduct, or conduct pursuant to a policy of the Government of Australia, that has been the subject of notification and consultations under this Agreement, the Government of Australia may request the Government of the United States to participate in the litigation. The Government of the United States shall in the event of such request report to the court on the substance and outcome of the consultations.

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264 Id.; see, Griffin, supra note 208, at 290-91 (noting that such obligations to notify and consult with foreign governments prior to bringing enforcement or investigatory actions is essential to a balance of national interests).
265 Agreement, art. 2.
266 Id. at art. 2, ¶ 1-3.
267 Under the Agreement,

Both parties during consultations shall seek to identify any respect in which (a) implementation of the Australian policy has or might have implications for the United States in relation to the enforcement of its antitrust laws; and (b) the antitrust enforcement action by the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission of the United States has or might have implications for Australian laws, policies or national interests.

Id. at art. 2, ¶ 4.

268 Note, supra note 250, at 159 (noting that foreign governments should welcome the procedural framework established in article six of the Agreement, since "relevant foreign interests should now be clear to the court before it decides to exercise subject matter jurisdiction in private treble damages suits. These reports also will add legitimacy to foreign government amici briefs and discourage denigrating language by United States courts in the future").
269 Agreement, art. 6.
Since it is essential that courts strike an adequate balance of national interests once international antitrust litigation has commenced, a requirement that the United States government report to the courts as to the outcome of such balancing consultations goes far to reduce international tensions.

Under the Agreement, joint negotiating efforts are entirely apart from the judicial setting. In this way, the Agreement adds legitimacy to its eventual result by dispelling any claims of latent "imperialism" thought to inhere in any decision by the United States courts. Furthermore, by allowing the Australian government the right to require the United States government to "participate in the litigation" and to "report to the court on the substance and outcome of the consultations," the Agreement ensures that a balance acceptable to Australian interests is presented to United States courts at any subsequent stage of litigation.

Since the Agreement appears to present an ideal procedure for accommodating national interests in the antitrust setting, there is reason to believe that a similar procedural safeguard might be useful in limiting the enforcement of United States securities laws. A procedural mechanism similar to that embodied in article six of the Agreement could provide protection of foreign interests in litigation — a safeguard which the Memorandum of Understanding does not ensure. Given the divergence of interests represented by blocking statutes from those supporting the United States efforts in regulating securities fraud, a negotiated effort outside of the courtroom may be more important in securities law than in the antitrust context. A securities regulation treaty modeled on article two of the Agreement could provide a listing of negotiated factors to be balanced by the courts under their own balancing procedures. The appropriate considerations to be balanced could be easily provided by the United States government to its courts whenever balancing became necessary. Therefore, by allowing for provisions

270 Kestenbaum, supra note 34, at 342-43.
271 An analogous point raised by several commentators is that the United States government should impress upon the courts both the foreign and domestic interests at stake. Id.; Note, supra note 250, at 151-52 (1983).
272 See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
273 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
274 Id.
275 See supra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
276 See supra notes 199-219 and accompanying text.
such as those contained in article six of the Agreement in any eventual cooperative effort between the United States and Britain pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding, a balance of the interests of both the SEC and Britain could be maintained at virtually any stage of litigation.

In addition to creating provisions modeled on article six of the Agreement, other considerations must be addressed in the negotiation of an agreement to supersede the Memorandum of Understanding. Limitations should be imposed on the discretion given to the British Secretary of State in the application of blocking legislation. Again, the Agreement, which both establishes an obligation on the part of Australia to cooperate in United States agency efforts and forbids the automatic blocking of information, is instructive. If the SEC wishes to apply United States securities laws in the face of blocking legislation, it should seek guarantees from foreign nations similar to those outlined in the Agreement. The United Kingdom should seek protections in addition to those created under the present Memorandum of Understanding. For instance, a requirement may be imposed that the SEC notify the DTI prior to its starting any investigations of securities fraud and enter into consultations similar to those provided under the Agreement. More importantly, protection of British interests may require that the SEC seek information only on the condition that it would not seek treble damages under the Insider Trading Sanctions Act. Such a condition to disclosure may help to prevent the harsh criticism which treble damages evoke from the United Kingdom when the United States seeks such damages in the antitrust context.

5. CONCLUSION

World securities regulators are faced with rapid internationalization of the world capital markets. With advances in technology, communicative barriers of oceans and continents fade away and transactions between nations become almost instantaneous. At the same time, important national interests, in the form of sovereignty and integrity of national markets, remain and become new barriers to the grow-

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277 See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
278 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 265-74 and accompanying text.
280 Such a provision may be modeled on the requirements presently in effect under the Agreement. See supra notes 263-64 and accompanying text.
281 See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
282 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
283 Thomas, supra note 20, at 190; Williams & Spencer, supra note 31, at 55.
ing trend towards the internationalization of these markets. While it is improper to lightly compromise national interests, a functioning interaction between markets may be sacrificed by stubbornly clinging to national ideals. Insofar as we are willing to believe that “[a] properly functioning world securities market would permit the more efficient allocation of the increasingly scarce world resources,” such a sacrifice is one which few of us should be willing to make.

The only efficient remedy for this dilemma is through cooperative approaches that recognize and give credence to the various interests that each nation holds. From this perspective, bilateral agreements must be undertaken to lessen international conflict. This need is even greater when national interests, such as those represented in blocking statutes, are buttressed by tensions created by transnational conflicts. Admittedly, a cooperative approach offers no expedient solution to the problems faced by the SEC in enforcing its regulations abroad. However, given the difficulties which unilateral measures may create through bold assertions of enforcement jurisdiction, expedient solutions are not always best. As this Comment has argued, such quick solutions may be disastrous and counterproductive.

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284 Williams & Spencer, supra note 31, at 56.
285 Id. at 61.