TRAFFIC CIRCLES: THE LEGAL LOGIC OF DRUG EXTRADITIONS

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ABSTRACT

This Article examines nationality, transjudicialism, and the “war on drugs” as they have played out in extradition proceedings around the world. The judicial decisions explored here are from the Privy Council (on appeal from the English-speaking Caribbean), the Israeli Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of Canada. All of the judgments cite the same sources, engage in the same analytic process, and are under the same legal influence: a common language that talks about constitutional rights and then circles back to a starting point in international relations that augments rather than restricts state power. They also share a similar approach to the subject of drug policy and extradition law, in that all three national courts are located in states that have embraced U.S.-sponsored law enforcement while they at the same time have eschewed U.S. jurisprudence as a legal source. As the Article’s title suggests, the theory presented here is that the anti-drug campaign, with its non-American legal sources harnessed in support of American policy, has produced a self-referential legal world built on a peculiar form of logic whose circularity is hard to escape.

1. THE WAR ON LOGIC

This Article examines nationality, transjudicialism, and the “war on drugs” as they have played out in extradition

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1 The word “nationality” is generally used here in its international law sense and “citizenship” in its domestic law sense. See 7 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, § 1111b (2009) (“While most people and countries use the terms ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ interchangeably, U.S. law differentiates between the two. Under current law all U.S. citizens are also U.S. nationals, but not all U.S. nationals are U.S. citizens.”).
proceedings around the world. As its title suggests, the theory presented here is that the anti-drug campaign has produced a self-referential legal world built on a peculiar form of logic. The judicial decisions explored in this Article are from an assortment of national courts,4 but all cite the same sources, engage in the same process, and are under the influence of the same substance:5 a common language that talks about constitutional rights and then circles back to a starting point in international relations that augments rather than restricts state power.

In a pattern that spans three continents,6 extradition, as opposed to domestic prosecution, has become the law enforcement

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4 The cases are from the Privy Council on appeal from the Bahamas, the Israeli Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court of Canada. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.


vehicle of choice for governments willing to engage with the United States in the anti-drug campaign.\(^\text{7}\) When it comes to legal authority, however, it is not U.S. courts that are looked to for guidance, despite the self-image of American courts as being "studied with as much in New Delhi or Strasbourg as they are in Washington, D.C., or the State of Washington.\ldots\"\(^\text{8}\) Instead, the courts of countries whose governments have moved toward the American view of drug law enforcement\(^\text{9}\) have eschewed U.S. case law and placed others—especially Canadian court decisions\(^\text{10}\)—at the forefront of what is sometimes called the transjudicial conversation.\(^\text{11}\)

Why use Canadian jurisprudence in support of American policy?\(^\text{7}\) Extradition generally straddles international law and constitutional doctrine, and the type of comparative analysis described here is often seen as "relevant to the task of interpreting

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\(^7\) Extradition to the United States has become the next logical step in the foreign policy orientation of drug enforcement. See William B. McAllister, Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century; An International History 254 (2000) (["[I]n the late twentieth century the United States promoted adoption of American-style drug control laws in other countries as vigorously as any commercial export.\ldots")].

\(^8\) Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 541 (1988).


\(^11\) For an authoritative expression of the aspiration to be at the vanguard of the "internationalization of judicial relations," see Sandra Day O'Connor, Assoc. J., U.S. Sup. Ct., Remarks at the Southern Center for International Studies 1, 2, available at http://www.southerncenter.org/oconnor_transcript.pdf (Oct. 28, 2003) ("But conclusions reached by other countries and by the international community, although not formally binding upon our decisions, should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts—what is sometimes called 'transjudicialism'."); see also Slaughter, supra note 2, at 112 (defining direct judicial dialogue as "communication between two courts that is effectively initiated by one and responded to by the other").
constitutions and enforcing human rights.” 12 The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, has expressed a well-known and much debated antagonism to foreign and comparative law in recent years, 13 making U.S. judicial pronouncements less popular for others as a source of legal ideas. More than that, it is possible that the Supreme Court of Canada has a special place in the pantheon of national constitutional courts, in that “Canada, unlike the United States, is seen as reflecting an emerging international consensus rather than existing as an outlier.” 14 This Article aims to explore the phenomenon of foreign sources as it has developed among countries with a legal affinity to the United States, 15 and which have actively engaged in the U.S.-led enforcement efforts in the war on drugs, 16 but have nevertheless chosen to ignore U.S. sources of law.


15 See infra, note 163 and accompanying text.

16 See McAllister, supra note 7, at 254 (“The dynamic of drug diplomacy itself also represents a national security concern entwined with political, economic, social, and cultural implications.”); see also William O. Walker III, International Collaboration in Historical Perspective, in DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS
To that end, this Article examines three prominent international drug trafficking cases from three regions or countries participating in the anti-narcotics legal campaign: Knowles\textsuperscript{17} (the English-speaking Caribbean), Rosenstein\textsuperscript{18} (Israel), and Lake\textsuperscript{19} (Canada). While these cases are factually unrelated, all three involve extraditions to the United States in furtherance of a cooperative narcotics enforcement effort, and all three raise constitutional issues about the forcible removal of citizens from their country of origin to face trial elsewhere. In addition, all three cases, including the Lake decision by the Supreme Court of Canada,\textsuperscript{20} look not to U.S. courts but to Canadian legal sources in interpreting and applying the relevant constitutional norms.

The other unifying feature of the three otherwise disparate cases is that they all—including Lake—seem to misapply or misconstrue the Canadian case law from which they draw.\textsuperscript{21} Each decision reverses the usual relationship between citizen and state that prior Canadian cases had established: the Privy Council refuses to apply due process analysis to extraditions; the Israeli Supreme Court uses international law enforcement as a trump card for due process and citizenship rights; and the Supreme Court of Canada defers to the executive as the authoritative decision-maker over the mobility rights of citizens. The logic deployed by the

\textsuperscript{17} Knowles v. United States, [2006] UKPC 38 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Bah.) (detailing the issue of two extradition requests by the United States to extradite Knowles on drug charges).

\textsuperscript{18} CrimA 4596/05 Rosenstein v. Israel, [2005] 2 IsrSC 232, para. 1 (involving question of extradition to the United States with regard to an Israeli national wanted in the United States for conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics in the United States).

\textsuperscript{19} Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761, para. 2 (Can.) (involving question of extradition to the United States with regard to Canadian national convicted of trafficking and sale of crack cocaine in Canada).

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Id}. para. 49 (dismissing appeal for judicial review of a surrender order issued by the Minister of Justice of Canada and upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal in United States v. Lake, [2006] 212 C.C.C. (3d) 51 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.)).

\textsuperscript{21} French political theorist Ernst Renan wrote in the 1930s that one essential ingredient in the making of a nation is “to get one’s history wrong.” Ernst Renan, \textit{What Is A Nation?}, in MODERN POLITICAL DOCTRINES 186, 190 (Alfred Zimmerm ed., 1939). It is equally possible that an essential ingredient in the making of an international jurisprudence is to get one’s legal sources wrong.
three courts seems at war with linear thinking, with each expression of the citizen's rights folding back on the interests of the nation, and each discussion of state power folding back on the place of the national in international society.

The result of all this is an unlikely alliance between, on one hand, a jurisprudence that is often considered too interventionist for use by American courts, and, on the other, long arm U.S. law enforcement. In seemingly climbing aboard what has become a policy obsession for the United States, foreign courts have pulled a contorted Canadian mask over their legal face. Consequently, international relations is disguised as constitutional law, or interstate cooperation disguised as rights protection. Instead of

22 See James Allan et al., The Citation of Overseas Authority in Rights Litigation in New Zealand: How Much Bark? How Much Bite?, 11 OTAGO L. REV. 433, 437 (2007) ("As Canada’s judges are, by most accounts, the most judicially activist in the common law world—the most willing to second-guess the decisions of the elected legislatures—reliance on Canadian precedents will worry some and delight others."). One scholar notes the increase in judicial activism in countries outside the United States:

The trend abroad, moreover, is toward decisions of a distinctly liberal sort in areas like the death penalty and gay rights. "What we have had in the last 20 or 30 years," Professor Fried said, "is an enormous coup d'état on the part of judiciaries everywhere—the European Court of Human Rights, Canada, South Africa, Israel." In terms of judicial activism, he said, "they've lapped us."

Liptak, supra note 10, at A30 (quoting Harvard Law School Professor Charles Fried).


24 See, e.g., Jean-Gabriel Castel & Sharon A. Williams, The Extradition of Canadian Citizens and Sections 1 and 6(I) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 25 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 263, 268-69 (1987) (discussing the necessary tensions between extradition as a form of progressive cooperation and the influence a nation’s constitutional rights project as a form of retrogressive parochialism).

25 For a description of international cooperation in law enforcement as a genre of progressive rights protection, albeit in the different context of illegal weapons, see Condoleezza Rice, Op.-Ed., Why We Know Iraq is Lying, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 23, 2003, at A25.
normative concerns shaping policy, the foreign policy of cooperative drug enforcement has come to shape legal rights.

To understand how this could happen in the transparent world of appellate courts, this Article first takes a detour into international law and the place of nationals in the discourse of state sovereignty. It then examines citizenship issues with respect to constitutional law generally and drug extraditions in particular, before delving into the three decisions at hand. This Article posits that by exploring these underpinnings it is possible to come to grips with an otherwise perplexing legal phenomenon: the apparent misapplication of Canadian constitutional law in pursuit of American international law enforcement.

2. NATIONALITY RULES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Despite the plethora of U.N.-sponsored, multilateral conventions relating to narcotics trafficking, drugs have not been the focus of much adjudication by international judicial organs. The negotiations culminating in the Statute of the International

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26 For the now iconic statement of normative principles preceding government policy, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 107 (1977) (explaining that a legal decision-maker must “develop a theory of the constitution, in the shape of a complex set of principles and policies that justify that scheme of government . . .”).

27 See PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN A. NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (2006) (examining the development of international crime controls as a product of Western powers’ domestic systems); Jacob Sullum, Mind Alteration: Drug Policy Scholar Ethan Nadelmann on Turning People Against Drug Prohibition, REASON, July 1, 1994, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/_/print/PrintArticle.aspx?id=16075326 (observing that “[t]he roles that communism and drugs have played in American politics are quite similar”).

Criminal Court\textsuperscript{29} raised the possibility of categorizing drug trafficking as an international offense; however, the sessions concluded only with a resolution that the state parties consider including it at a future review conference.\textsuperscript{30} Although drug policy plays a central role in international legal discourse\textsuperscript{31} and the United Nations monitors narcotics treaty implementation by its member states,\textsuperscript{32} actual enforcement and prosecution has been left to the unilateral and coordinated actions of domestic legal systems.

By contrast, the concept of nationality—a central ingredient in the drug trafficking cases and in legal modernism generally\textsuperscript{33}—has been the subject of much international deliberation.\textsuperscript{34} Traditional


\textsuperscript{31} See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Evolution of International Drug Control, 51 BULL. NARCOTICS 1, 1–2 (1999) (prepared by I. Bayer & H. Ghodse) (discussing the historical evolution of drug abuse as a global problem and the subsequent international responses). See also Lyal S. Sunga, The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in Codification and Implementation 216 (1997) (“[T]he proliferation of international agreements designed to suppress trafficking in illicit drugs indicates that the international community has recognized the need for international rather than purely domestic solutions to the drug problem.”).

\textsuperscript{32} See International Narcotics Control Board, Mandate and Functions, http://www.incb.org/incb/mandate.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2009) (explaining that one of the functions of the Board is to identify “weaknesses in national and international control systems [for illicit drugs] and contributes to correcting such situations”).


\textsuperscript{34} For a recent example, see Press Release, Grassley Targets International Drug Traffickers, (July 29, 2008), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm?customel_dataPageID_1502=15740 (discussing the introduction by
international thinking held, as the title of this part of the Article suggests, that nationality rules, so that only the parent sovereign could make a claim of right on behalf of its individual nationals. Of course, states have always been considered competent to confer rights on persons within their scope, but the classical perception of individuals by international lawyers has been that the citizenry is a medium for, not a restraint on, state power. Thus, for example, the extra-territorial protection of one’s own citizens has been considered within a sovereign’s jurisdictional capacity rather than an incursion into a foreign state. Likewise, a state could claim breach of its international rights where another has mistreated its national, even where the identical acts aimed at the


36 See U.N. Charter Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 34, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945) (“Only states may be parties in cases before the Court”); Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 39 (Feb. 5) (noting only a state in which a corporate entity is registered has standing to assert a claim on that corporation’s behalf). The theme of international law and nationality rules is discussed more thoroughly in: Edward Morgan & Ofer Attias, Rabbi Kahane, International Law, and the Courts: Democracy Stands on its Head, 4 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 185 (1990).

37 See Hersch Lauterpacht, INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE COLLECTED PAPERS 469-71 (Elhu Lauterpacht ed., 1970) (explaining that individuals hold international legal rights solely by virtue of the intention of state parties through conventions or by incorporating international law into domestic law).

38 Much as when the individual is associated not with a state but with the United Nations, the “citizen” becomes a medium of institutional rights and power. See Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11).

39 See, e.g., S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (holding that Turkish jurisdiction on behalf of its nationals justifies jurisdictional incursion into French ship); United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that international law allows for passive personality criminal jurisdiction).

40 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2 (holding that injury to an alien national is an injury to the alien’s parent state).
foreign state’s own citizen would offend no domestic norm. The idea was that through their nationals, states could create and expand their presence, and were empowered and endowed with rights in a world of nations.

On the other side of the coin, the concept of nationality has also played an important role in restraining state power. While a state may gain rights through its nationals, it delineates the borders of its own legal rights by logical extension. Thus, for example, a state’s inherent legal jurisdiction has always fallen short of governing the nationals of a foreign state located within their own state, notwithstanding the possibility of extraterritorial legislation. Through nationality, states define and enforce their

41 See B. E. Chattin (U.S.) v. United Mexican States (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 282 (Gen. Cl. Comm’n 1927) (reporting that the United States claimed denial of due process by Mexican authorities towards American citizen arrested in Mexico even though due process was not recognized under Mexican law); Editorial Comment on Report Presented by the Commission of Jurists on Interpretations of the League of Nations Covenant and Points of General International Law of Unusual Interest, League of Nations (1934), reprinted in Quincy Wright, Opinion of Commission of Jurists on Janina-Corfu Affair, 18 AM. J. INT’L L. 536, 543 (1924) (“The recognized public character of a foreigner and the circumstances in which he is present in its territory entail upon the State a corresponding duty of special vigilance on his behalf.”).


43 See In the Matter of a Reference as to Whether Members of the Military or Naval Forces of the United States of America are Exempt From Criminal Proceedings in Canadian Criminal Courts, [1943] S.C.R. 483 (Can.) (holding that the U.S. had criminal jurisdiction over troops stationed on base in Canadian territory).


45 In the United States, this notion was reversed with the rediscovery of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (allowing jurisdiction over an alien tort claim brought by an alleged Paraguayan torture victim of the Paraguayan Inspector-General of the police).

46 See, e.g., Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., Ltd., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that the Lanham Trade-Mark Act does not apply to trademark infringement by a Canadian corporation in Canada despite its potentially extraterritorial application to United States companies).
collective differences; and these differences effectively restrain the acts of other states.48

One implication of the empowering and restraining effect of nationality in international discourse is that while states cannot wrongly impinge on the nationals of another, they have been at liberty as sovereigns to define the scope of their own citizenry. The seminal statement of this principle was in the Nationality Decrees case.49 The British government objected to French nationality decrees in its North African colonies on persons who, under English law, were British subjects. The Permanent Court of International Justice’s answer was that international relations required states to be at liberty to fashion their own nationality rules.50 Thus, the court supported unrestrained sovereignty with respect to French nationality laws,51 while it admonished France for having violated a treaty obligation toward Britain to respect British interests in the region.52

In sum, Nationality Decrees demonstrates that the concept can point to either state empowerment or state restraint. The jurisprudence of international tribunals seems to invoke both positions.53 Perhaps the starkest illustration of this rhetorical

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47 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that a Mexican national arrested and brought to the United States for trial lacks constitutional rights against wrongful arrest since “the people” as used in Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution refers to people of the United States).

48 See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (upholding the absolute theory of sovereign immunity by holding that the host state’s interference with the foreign public armed ship cannot occur without affecting its power and dignity; thus, the ship enjoys exemption from host sovereign’s jurisdiction while within host territory).

49 See Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4 (Feb. 7) (articulating the idea that states are free to define its citizenry).

50 The court reasoned that questions of domestic jurisdiction pose “an essentially relative question; it depends upon the development of international relations.” Id. at 24.

51 Id.

52 In the court’s view, the generally applicable international legal principle is one of the sovereign freedom, while the particular legal policy to which France is bound is one of restraint vis-à-vis Britain as its treaty partner. “For the purpose of the present opinion, it is enough to observe that it may well happen that, in a matter which, like that of nationality, is not, in principle, regulated by international law, the right of a State to use its direction is nevertheless restricted by obligations which it may have undertaken towards other States.” Id.

53 In a theme that harks back to the interplay between naturalist and positivist theories of law seen in Paquete Habana, the nationality cases highlight
phenomenon is provided by the International Court of Justice’s decision in the Nottebohm Case, in which Liechtenstein alleged mistreatment of one of its nationals by the authorities of its country of residence, Guatemala. Guatemala successfully challenged “the admissibility of the claim related to the nationality of the person for whose protection Liechtenstein had seised the Court . . . .” The legal focus in Nottebohm effectively shifted from Guatemala’s treatment of the individual to Liechtenstein’s connection to its citizen. Guatemala attacked the relatively lax Liechtensteinian laws under which Nottebohm had acquired citizenship. On the theoretical plane, the pattern of legal arguments all but revealed the dual nature of nationality norms and international legality: the substantive rights and wrongs of international law were inextricably tied to the process of state participation in international matters. It was difficult for the court to judge sovereign actions without speculating as to the nature of the relationships between state actors operating within a legally sovereign system.

international law’s need to cast what might appear to be a natural restraint on sovereign states in positive law terms. See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). Thus, sovereigns are limited in their actions in a way, which accentuates every sovereign’s unlimited ability to consent to international limitations. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text; Edward Morgan, Criminal Process, International Law and Extraterritorial Crime, 38 U. Toronto L.J. 245, 253 (1988) (stating that international case law is “permeated by various rhetorical techniques in which states are told what they should be doing simply by being told what they actually do.”).


Liechtenstein’s request to the International Court of Justice was for the international body to adjudge and declare that “[t]he Government of Guatemala in arresting, detaining, expelling and refusing to readmit Mr. Nottebohm and in seizing and retaining his property without compensation acted in breach of their obligations under international law.” Id. at 6–7.

Id. at 12.

The court summarized the Liechtensteinian law regarding the naturalization of foreigners (under which Mr. Nottebohm had acquired Liechtensteinian nationality) as one which allowed most of the typical residency and other requirements to “be dispensed with in circumstances deserving special consideration and by way of exception,” Id. at 14. Thus, the only mandatory criterion to which the non-resident candidate for naturalization had to conform was the submission of “proof that he has concluded an agreement with the Revenue authorities . . . [and] the payment by the applicant of a naturalization fee.” Id.

For a thorough discussion of the curiously separate yet connected categories of international substance and process, see DAVID KENNEDY,
The ruling in *Nottebohm* contained an interesting double edge. It managed to uphold Liechtenstein’s citizenship law and to undermine Liechtenstein’s standing to bring the claim. In its central passage, the judgment reasserted the fundamental rule of freedom that had been the starting point of the *Nationality Decrees* case: “It is for . . . every sovereign State to settle by its own legislation the rules relating to the acquisition of its nationality. . . .” In the first instance, the court was prompted by a desire to assert even the nonconforming state’s sovereign power to define its own nationality. Immediately following this, however, the court asserted that “the issue which the Court must decide is not one which pertains to the legal system of Liechtenstein. . . . It is international law which determines whether a State is entitled to exercise protection and to seise the Court.” Thus, the court simultaneously championed the cause of international legality over the domestic laws of the deviant state.

Given the generally defensive tone of classical international pronouncements, the court’s assertion of its own process rules over the laws of Liechtenstein represents an assertive moment for international jurisprudence. On the other hand, it did little more than to reintroduce, with a twist, the traditional international law ambivalence. In *Nottebohm*, international law seemed to actively override state power in its assessment of Liechtenstein’s standing, and to remain passive in its non-assessment of Guatemala’s treatment of its resident. If the result restricted sovereignty, it did so in a way which repeated the theme of the *Nationality Decrees*

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60 The customary law on point was described as follows: “According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial decisions and to the opinions of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.” *Id.* at 23. Evidently, Mr. Nottebohm’s connection with Liechtenstein was perceived as lacking the requisite level of intimacy.

61 *Id.* at 20–21.

62 The court stated emphatically that “[i]t does not depend on the law or on the decision of Liechtenstein whether that State is entitled to exercise its protection [in international adjudication].” *Id.* at 20. As if to tone down its assertiveness, the court then re-characterized its own decision as a matter of mere factual assessment. The decision, therefore, holds that in cases of disputed citizenship, “the real and effective nationality [is preferred], that which accorded with the facts, that based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned and one of the States whose nationality is involved.” *Id.* at 22.
judgment—the denial of one nation’s standing effectively empowering another nation (and all nations).

The lesson of international law’s nationality cases, therefore, is that sovereigns may appear to be restrained in the name of individuals and a superior normative force, but the cases are equally explicable as articulating sovereign restraint only in the name of sovereignty itself. Notwithstanding that nationality questions frequently have arisen in contexts which pose questions of aliens’ rights, the theme of individuals against state power is typically discernible only as a partial and subordinate aspect of these controversies. The primary emphasis has traditionally been one which allows sovereigns to assert their powers in delineating their own constituencies up until the point where they impinge the legal personality of another equal sovereign.63

For illustration of the point that nationality stands as much with sovereignty as against it, one need only examine the historic cases raising questions of alien’s rights. In the famous Roberts Claim,64 the United States sought damages against Mexico for the inhumane conditions which Roberts, a United States citizen, suffered during his eighteen months awaiting trial in a Mexican prison. The fundamental question, which seems at first to distinguish this adjudication from other international controversies of the era, was whether the treatment of Roberts violated an international norm with respect to aliens despite Mexico’s having acted within its rightful domestic jurisdiction.65

The tribunal’s opinion started out sounding like a precursor to the fully developed human rights law of a later era, asserting that

63 See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (recognizing that the world is “composed of distinct sovereignties possessing equal rights and equal independence”).


65 The case was adjudicated by the U.S.-Mexico General Claims Commission, established under the Convention for Reciprocal Settlement of Claims, U.S.-Mex., Sept. 8, 1923, 43 Stat. 1730, T.S. No. 678. Regarding the initial arrest, the Commission indicated that “[i]n the light of the evidence presented in the case the Commission is of the opinion that the Mexican authorities had ample grounds to suspect that Harry Roberts had committed a crime and to proceed against him as they did.” Roberts, supra note 64, at 359.
Roberts enjoyed a right to humane prison conditions. Nevertheless, the question of whether this right was attributable to, or stood against, state sovereignty was subtly answered with a “yes” and a “no.” The Commission characterized the conditions of Roberts’ captivity as depressingly substandard and articulated a universal test of “whether aliens are treated in accordance with ordinary standards of civilization.” The judgment seemed to imply, almost anachronistically, that Roberts’ prison conditions were inhumane regardless of his nationality. In this view, the individual claimant was attributed rights against any state, foreign or domestic, which so degrades his humanity.

That said, the tribunal proceeded to describe the Mexican offense in a way that distinguished the foreigner from his cell-mates. The tribunal stressed that Roberts was made to share a toilet and prison cell only “thirty-five feet long and twenty feet wide” with, at times, “thirty or forty [Mexican] men.” The crucial point, of course, was that Roberts and his cell-mates were normatively unequal. The holder of international rights was, in classic international law style, identified on the basis of his representative capacity as a member of a foreign nation. The domestic prisoners belonged to the imprisoning nation, and therefore had to find their rights, if any, in Mexican law; contrarily, the alien prisoner belonged, by definition, to a foreign nation with international legal rights of its own.

While the upshot of the case law is that citizenship and alienage can protect persons against the acts of nations, the thematic undercurrent is that nationality represents a sense of belonging to a given nation. Aliens and nationals can be significant in international law as persons, but their significance derives primarily from the fact that they have been perceived as

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66 In the Commission’s words, “We do not hesitate to say that the treatment of Roberts was such as to warrant an indemnity on the ground of cruel and inhumane imprisonment.” Roberts, supra note 64, at 361.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 360.
71 See, e.g., Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (holding that Spanish fishing vessels are exempt from capture as prize of war).
individual appendages of their parent nations. Correspondingly, states are both empowered in the delineation and treatment of their nationals, and restrained in their impact on alien nationals. Nationals are linked to their sovereign state, the point of their rights being in the first instance that they are not linked to some other sovereign state with nationals of its own.

3. CITIZENSHIP RULES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Nationality plays a similarly ambiguous role in the domestic legal system, although in modern constitutional law it may be said—again, as the title of this part of the Article suggests—that citizenship rules. As in international discourse, domestic contests

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72 This is as true for corporate citizens as for natural ones. See generally Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 5) (noting only a state in which a corporate entity is registered has standing to assert a claim on that corporation’s behalf); Rosalyn Higgins, Aspects of the Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd., 11 V.A. J. INT’L L. 327 (1971) (contemplating who or what has a cause of action with respect to damages sustained by shareholders, resulting from unlawful treatment of the company); Herbert W. Briggs, Barcelona Traction: The Jus Standi of Belgium, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 327 (1971) (commenting on the jus standi of Belgium); Brian Flemming, Note, Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, Preliminary Objections, 3 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 306 (1965) (analyzing the preliminary objections put forward by Spain).

73 For a full discussion, see Peter J. Spiro, Mandated Membership, Diluted Identity: Citizenship, Globalization, and International Law, in PEOPLE OUT OF PLACE: GLOBALIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE CITIZENSHIP GAP 87 (Alison Brysk & Gershon Shafir eds., 2004).

74 See, e.g., S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4 (holding that Turkey free to try ship captain for injury to Turkish sailors by acts done on board French ship).

75 The issue comes to the fore with respect to dual nationals. See generally, MOHSEN AGHAHOSSEINI, CLAIMS OF DUAL NATIONALS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007) (discussing the controversy surrounding the question of whether a dual national may state a claim against one of her States of nationality); Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411 (1997) (tracing the evolution of the discourse surrounding dual nationality).


77 See British Nationality Act, 1981, c. 61, § 1 (U.K.) (modifying territorial basis for birthright citizenship by including parentage qualifications); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (stating that the Fourteenth
over nationality commence with an understanding that citizenship is a badge of inclusion in the polity. Accordingly, most disputes over citizenship entail questions about its relinquishment. In particular, courts in the United States have focused their attention on the naturalization process, and have asked the question of whether the citizen has either voluntarily or implicitly "expatriated" herself.

The United States inherited its attitudes towards citizenship from the English common law, which held nationality to be an


For a general history of the naturalization process in U.S. law, see J.P Jones, Comment, Limiting Congressional Denationalization After Afroyim, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 121 (1979).

See Richard R. Gray, Comment, Expatriation—A Concept in Need of Clarification, 8 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 375, 379–87 (1975) (analyzing the confusing expatriation law in the U.S. by exploring its historical sources, its present manifestations, and a conceptual approach that could eliminate it).
immutable feature of human nature.  This sentiment found expression in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the early Federalists argued for governmental confirmation of this entrenched right. The notion of U.S. citizenship as a right was then supplemented in the mid-nineteenth century by a statutory guarantee to U.S. citizens of the right to expatriate themselves. It was not until the early twentieth century that American federal legislation identified acts that could result in the involuntary relinquishment of citizenship. This method of denationalization by implied expatriation has been the governing norm of American law since that time.

Citizenship as a legal badge of national inclusion was a continuous feature of U.S. enactments until at least the 1950s, reaching its high point in the Expatriation Act of 1954. Under that legislation, a U.S. national could lose her status by serving in the armed forces of a foreign sovereign state, voting in a foreign state’s election, taking employment or holding public office in a

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81 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370 (noting that no person is “able at pleasure to unloose those bonds, by which he is connected to his natural prince”).
82 See generally CHARLES GORDON & HARRY N. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE (1959).
83 See generally Expatriation Act of 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223 (“Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness . . . any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of the this government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government.”).
84 See generally Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228 (stating that any American citizen has expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state or taken an oath of allegiance to any foreign state, while any naturalized citizen expatriates himself if he has “resided for two years in the foreign state from which he came, or for five years in any other foreign state.”).
86 See Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228, § 3 (providing as an example of early gender discriminatory ground for expatriation, an American woman marrying a foreign man as grounds for losing U.S. citizenship).
89 Id. § 1481(a)(5).
foreign government, becoming a naturalized citizen of a foreign state, or even residing for three years in a country in which she holds dual citizenship by birth. Various other voluntary acts, which while falling short of explicit renunciation of citizenship were nevertheless deemed contrary to the duties of citizenship, could likewise result in the revocation of U.S. citizenship. These voluntary acts included desertion from the U.S. military, avoiding compulsory military service, or committing acts of treason against the United States. Formally, it was the Congressional power to regulate foreign affairs that grounded the legislatively defined expatriations, but the normative thrust of the citizenship policy was inward rather than outward looking. The idea behind defining specific acts of self-exclusion was to give practical meaning to citizenship as a symbol of inclusion.

The power to enact expatriation rules and to thereby define the American polity was initially upheld as an extension of Congressional authority over foreign affairs rather than over any area of domestic policy. In Perez v. Brownell, the Supreme Court overrode the dissenting objections voiced by Chief Justice Warren, and found an identifiable link between prohibiting U.S. citizens from voting in foreign elections and avoiding any embarrassment of the U.S. government or conflict with foreign nations. At the same time, the Court put restrictions on this

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90 Id. § 1481(a)(4).
91 Id. § 1481(a)(1). Becoming a dual national may or may not include the alternative grounds for expatriation for swearing allegiance to a foreign sovereign. Id. at § 1481(a)(2).
92 Id. § 1481.
93 Id. § 1481(a)(6) (addressing formal renunciation of citizenship).
94 Id. § 1481(a)(9).
95 Id. § 1481(a)(10).
96 Id. § 1481(a)(8).
97 See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958) (addressing expatriation due to avoiding the draft and voting in foreign election).
98 Id. at 57 (discussing the expatriation resulting from U.S. citizens voting in a foreign election).
99 Id. at 66 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (“Under our form of government, as established by the Constitution, the citizenship of the lawfully naturalized and the native-born cannot be taken from them.”).
100 Id.
power, opining in *Trop v. Dulles*\(^{101}\) that a deserter from the U.S. military could not be stripped of his citizenship, because using denaturalization as a criminal sanction was considered “cruel and unusual punishment” and contrary to the Eighth Amendment.\(^{102}\)

Congressional and executive authority over expatriation was further eroded in *Nishikawa v. Dulles*,\(^{103}\) where the Court made it clear that any doubt about the voluntariness of the expatriating act must fall to the benefit of the citizen wishing to maintain his status.\(^{104}\) The 1950s therefore ended with a weakened, but nevertheless intact notion that citizenship—and the corresponding congressional authority to define the terms on which naturalization and denaturalization occur—is congruent with the inclusive meaning attached to nationality by the International Court of Justice in the *Nottebohm Case*.*\(^{105}\) In determining the actual import of congressionally defined expatriating acts, the U.S. courts continued to give practical application to the international requirement to determine “real and effective nationality.”\(^{106}\)

A separation of U.S. thinking from international opinion on nationality as a legal concept came toward the end of the 1960s in *Afroyim v. Rusk*.\(^{107}\) Revisiting a factual scenario almost identical to the one in *Perez*, the Supreme Court concluded that the act of voting in a foreign election could not form the basis of denationalization absent some evidence of the U.S. citizen’s consent to the expatriation.\(^{108}\) This time around, the majority

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\(^{101}\) *Trop v. Dulles*, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (deciding that stripping military deserters of their citizenship was unconstitutional). The decision in *Trop* was rendered the same day as the decision in *Perez*.

\(^{102}\) *Id.* at 99–101.

\(^{103}\) *Nishikawa v. Dulles*, 356 U.S. 129 (1958) (reinstating citizenship for U.S.-born dual citizens who were involuntarily inducted into the Japanese army during the Second World War).

\(^{104}\) *Id.* at 136. For an earlier version of a similar analysis, see *Perkins v. Elg*, 307 U.S. 325, 337 (1939) (opining that the “[r]ights of citizenship are not to be destroyed by an ambiguity”).

\(^{105}\) *Nottebohm* (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 6) (deciding that nationality depends on the strength of an individual’s ties to the nation of which he is claiming nationality).

\(^{106}\) *Id.* at 22.

\(^{107}\) *Afroyim v. Rusk*, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) (deciding that unless a U.S. citizen consented to expatriation, citizenship could not be revoked as a consequence of voting in a foreign election).

\(^{108}\) *Id.* at 255 (describing how Afroyim was a dual U.S.-Israeli national whose U.S. citizenship had been revoked when he voted in an Israeli election).
picked up a strand that had been expressed by Chief Justice Warren in the minority a decade earlier; the Fourteenth Amendment’s expression of birthright nationality has the effect of “defining a citizenship which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it.” The thrust of the Afroyim decision, therefore, was to convert nationality discourse into rights discourse, making what had been a badge of inclusion in the polity into a legal bulwark against the polity’s excesses. In the Supreme Court’s words, each citizen has a “constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.”

Following Afroyim, Congress amended the governing legislation to eliminate those expatriating acts—foreign voting, desertion, and evasion of military service—that had been declared unconstitutional. Thus, by the end of the 1960s, the Act provided that the taking of an oath of allegiance to a foreign sovereign government, joining a foreign armed forces or holding office in a foreign state were virtually the only ways, short of a formal renouncing of citizenship, that denationalization of an American-born citizen could occur. The one legislative question that Afroyim left unanswered, and the one power that Congress continued to wield against those it deemed wayward citizens, was the ability to infer from the expatriating act that the citizen had consented to the loss of nationality, albeit without saying so. The

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109 Id. at 262.
110 See, e.g., Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915) (highlighting how in the early part of the twentieth century, subjective intent, or personal choice, was not necessary for denationalization to occur).
112 See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (holding that it was unconstitutional for a statute to divest an American of his citizenship for evading military service by leaving or remaining outside U.S. territory during wartime).
113 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (1952) (referencing the loss of nationality by native-born or naturalized citizens through voluntary action, the burden of proof required and presumptions).
115 For an exploration of this caveat to the Afroyim ruling, see J.P. Jones, Comment, Limiting Congressional Denationalization After Afroyim, 17 SAN DIEGO L.
deemed intent power was, in effect, the last defense of the position that it is the government as institutional embodiment of the society, and not the citizen as an individual member of that society, that ultimately demarcates who falls inside or outside of the nation.

The issue came to a head in *Vance v. Terrazas*, where a dual U.S.-Mexican national swore an oath of allegiance to Mexico and consequently found his American citizenship revoked. In an effort to clarify once and for all the issue of voluntariness, the Supreme Court declared that the government bears the “burden of proof that the expatriating act was performed with the necessary intent to relinquish citizenship.” Within a few years of this ruling, the administrative tribunals and federal courts implementing the expatriating rules looked only for criteria that “would render it impossible for [the citizen] to perform the obligations of U.S. citizenship.” Thus, Rabbi Meir Kahane was found not to have intended his own expatriation when he ran for election and took an oath of office as a member of the Israeli Knesset. Likewise, Laurence Terrazas himself was found not to have undertaken a voluntary expatriation, despite having sworn an oath containing an express denunciation of his U.S. citizenship.

As a result, a citizen can engage in self-contradiction and even blatant hypocrisy and still remain a citizen. The U.S. case law on

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Rev. 121, 138 (1980). *But see* United States v. Matheson, 532 F.2d 809 (1976) (asserting that *Afroyim* required the government to provide proof of the citizen’s specific intent).


117 *Id.* at 255–256 n.2 (translating into English the full Mexican oath of allegiance).

118 *Id.* at 270.

119 In Re P.A.B., Bd. App. Rev. 6 (Sept. 29, 1982); Abramson, *supra* note 114, at 878.


121 *Vance*, 444 U.S. at 255–56 (“I therefore hereby expressly renounce [United States] citizenship, as well as any submission, obedience, and loyalty to any foreign government. . . .”).

122 Kahane, 653 F. Supp. at 1494 (“The government’s burden is to prove that Kahane intended to relinquish American citizenship. The most it can prove, instead, is that Kahane is a hypocrite, for telling people that they should do as he says and not as he does.”).
citizenship and expatriation has effectively transformed the legal vision. Focus is redirected from the sovereign nation and its demographic self-identity to the inviolable individual and his self-interested legal status. The Constitution’s preferred theme of personal liberty has come to prevail over international law’s preferred theme of nationhood. While nationality in the international law arena has come to establish the legal integration of persons within sovereign nations, citizenship in the constitutional law arena establishes the legal protection of persons from the acts of their government. The law thus embraces two distinct possibilities when it comes to the meaning of citizenship: the nation as a collective whole needing legal definition as a single entity, and the state as an aggregate of individuals each needing protection against the society at large.

4. NATION AND CITIZEN IN EXTRADITION LAW

The vision of nationals as a cog in the societal wheel and that of the citizen as a self-standing force in opposition to state action have met directly, and clashed, in the law of extradition. As a starting point, international theorists have long perceived the community of nations to operate under a natural duty to extradite offenders from neighboring states. This duty is most frequently translated into an interstate obligation to ensure that no one jurisdiction stands as a safe haven or refuge for serious offenders fleeing another jurisdiction. Some early theorists limited the sphere of operation of extradition only to those international relations

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123 See Morgan & Attias, supra note 36, at 204–06 (discussing the interconnection between these two apparently contradictory themes).

124 Id. at 206.

125 See, e.g., 3 EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, ch. 6, reprinted in CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 136–37 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. 1916) (1758) (“[T]he sovereign should not permit his subjects to trouble or injure the subjects of another State . . . [the sovereign] should . . . deliver [the offender] up to the injured State, so that it may inflict due punishment upon him.”)

backed by an enforceable treaty. However, Grotius' maxim: “extradite or prosecute,” has long placed the international exchange of fugitives between nations at the epicenter of the contest between the national as owing duties and allegiance to the state community of which he is a member, and the citizen as holding rights to be asserted against any combination of sovereign states.

The compromise followed by most civil law jurisdictions, and a number of common law countries, has been to extradite only third-party nationals, protecting citizens of the requested state from being the subject of an international exchange. In contrast, the United States has, since its first extradition agreements with England, France, and Switzerland, been prepared to extradite its own citizens on the same basis as nationals of the treaty partners or of third countries. While it is possible for a treaty to preclude the extradition of nationals, U.S. policy has generally been antagonistic to the idea. In fact, in 1913, the Supreme Court ruled that reciprocity is not a necessary ingredient to extradition treaty enforcement, and American fugitives can be sent by the

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128 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, ch. XXI, §§ 3, 4, 5(1), 5(3) (Francis W. Kelsey trans. 1925) (1642), referenced and discussed in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 218 n.135 (2d ed. 1999).


130 See Robert W. Rafuse, The Extradition of Nationals, 24 ILL. STUD. SOC. SCI. 75 (1939) (providing an early review of these policies).

131 IVAN ANTHONY SHEARER, EXTRADITION LAW IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97-98 (1971).


United States to countries which refuse to send their own nationals in return.\textsuperscript{134}

While the blanket exemption of nationals from the extradition process has been condemned as a matter of international law theory,\textsuperscript{135} several prominent civil law countries in Western Europe continue to refuse extradition of their own citizens.\textsuperscript{136} Among Latin American countries, the practice has also tended to exempt nationals, despite substantial American pressure to change policies to accommodate the war on drugs. Thus, for example, Colombia agreed in 1982 in a revised extradition treaty to send fugitive citizens to the United States, but the treaty was declared unenforceable by the Colombia Supreme Court in 1986 in a decision widely perceived to be a capitulation to the power of narcotics cartels.\textsuperscript{137} Extraditions were reinstated for Colombians, without judicial review, by executive order of the President in 1989,\textsuperscript{138} but were permanently eliminated in 1991 when extradition

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{134} See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 451 (1913) (granting an order for extradition to Italy of a U.S. citizen who murdered his wife in Italy).

\textsuperscript{135} See Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM J. INT. L. Supp. 123–36 (1935) (discussing how a requested state will not decline to extradite an individual on the grounds that he is a national of that state); Yoram Dinstein, Major Contemporary Issues in Extradition Law, 84 AM. SOC’Y INT’L PROC. 389, 404 (1990). But see Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 116, art. 4(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 (stating that the General Assembly has resolved that the refusal to extradite nationals is reasonable if there is a domestic prosecution is offered in the alternative).

\textsuperscript{136} Switzerland, Germany, and France are the most prominent of these. Italy changed its policy to permit extradition of Italian nationals in 1946. See Shearer, supra note 131, at 102–10 (discussing the relevance of the nationality of a fugitive in international extradition law). The Netherlands is one notable exception to this rule among European civil law countries. See Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Neth., art. 1, June 24, 1980, 35 U.S.T. 1334 (allowing extradition in art. 1); Nadelmann, supra note 132, at 431 (discussing how the U.S.-Netherlands extradition treaty permits extradition as long as a prisoner transfer treaty binds both the United States and the Netherlands).

\textsuperscript{137} See Decision on Extradition, Case File No. 1558, June 25, 1987 (S. Ct.) (Colom.), reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 492 (1988) (holding unanimously that the law was unconstitutional because the President had not signed it). See also Mark A. Sherman, United States International Drug Control Policy, Extradition, and the Rule of Law in Colombia, 15 NOVA L. REV. 661, 687 (1991) (discussing the case).

\textsuperscript{138} See Bruce Michael Bagley, Dateline Drug Wars: Colombia: The Wrong Strategy, FOR. POL’Y, Winter 1989–90, at 154, 155 (describing President Barco’s declaration of “all-out war on Colombia’s drug cartels”); Nadelmann, supra note 132, at 433 (explaining how President Barco renewed extradition without judicial review for Colombian drug traffickers after the assassination of the leading candidate in the upcoming presidential election).
\end{footnotesize}
of citizens was rendered unconstitutional by means of a specific constitutional amendment.139

The extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico has likewise proved to be a highly contentious instrument in terms of the two-way flow of nationals. In the first place, although the treaty was negotiated in terms meant to grant each of the signing governments the discretionary power to extradite its own nationals,140 the governing clause is stated in the negative: “[n]either [c]ontracting [p]arties shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals. . . .”141 For its part, the United States government has been willing to extradite U.S. citizens even in the face of a credible claim that the evidence supporting the Mexican allegations were obtained through torture.142 Moreover, the Courts of Appeals have specifically rejected the argument that the United States should put a moratorium on extraditions of U.S. citizens to Mexico until such time as Mexico determines that it will extradite its nationals for trial in the United States.143

By contrast, the Mexican legal system has traditionally barred extradition of citizens,144 although it has reserved for the executive branch the discretion to determine case by case whether exceptional circumstances warranting extradition of a Mexican citizen exist.145 This has typically been justified on the ground that the Mexican courts have inherent jurisdiction over and are competent to try all crimes, wherever committed, that are


140 See Joshua S. Spector, Extraditing Mexican Nationals in the Fight Against International Narcotics Crimes, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1007, 1020 (1998) ("Some extradition treaties, such as the treaty between Mexico and the United States, give the executive discretionary power to determine whether to extradite a national."); see also, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 589 (3d ed. 1996).


142 See, e.g., Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 1999) (declining to overturn an extradition order based on the facts of the case because of the rule of non-inquiry and minimal grounds for creation of a humanitarian exception).

143 See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1107 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that whether the United States should deny extradition to Mexico until Mexico reciprocates is a question for the executive branch and not the judicial branch).


145 See Spector, supra note 140, at 1008 n.15 (describing how, in contrast, Mexican law is interpreted by its executive to de facto prohibit extradition).
perpetrated by Mexican nationals.\textsuperscript{146} Despite assurances to the contrary,\textsuperscript{147} through most of the twentieth century Mexican officials so rarely acted on extradition warrants aimed at their citizens that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency developed a practice of bypassing the extradition process altogether by kidnapping fugitives and smuggling them into U.S. territory for trial.\textsuperscript{148} In recent years, in response to increased pressure to follow U.S. law enforcement policies,\textsuperscript{149} Mexico has been more willing to deem drug traffickers as falling under the “exceptional circumstances” category denying selected Mexican nationals from the exemption otherwise applicable to all Mexican nationals.\textsuperscript{150} That said, the Mexican policy has been enforced inconsistently, with protection from extradition frequently applied even to fugitives accused of crimes of extreme violence.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{146} See 6 WHITEMAN DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 866, 877 (1968); Spector, supra note 140, at 1023.

\textsuperscript{147} The U.S. Secretary of State was apparently assured by his Mexican counterpart as early as 1928 that Mexico has no firm policy of exempting its nationals from extradition. See Bruce Zagaris & Julia Padierna Peralta, Mexico–United States Extradition and Alternatives: From Fugitive Slaves to Drug Traffickers–150 Years and Beyond the Rio Grande’s Winding Course, 12 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 519, 530 (1997) (describing how Mexico’s Foreign Affairs Minister assured the United States ambassador that Mexico “considered each case only after a careful study of the circumstances”).

\textsuperscript{148} See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 656 (1992) (holding that being forcibly abducted did not prevent Alvarez-Machain’s trial in the United States for violation of U.S. law). On the fallout of the reciprocal Mexican and American policies toward extradition and kidnapping, see Aimee Lee, Comment, United States v. Alvarez-Machain: The Deleterious Ramifications of Illegal Abductions, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 126, 128 (1993) (arguing that the United States “should make every effort to refrain from abductions in order to avoid consequences ranging from international censure to retaliatory measures”).

\textsuperscript{149} See Maria Celia Toro, The Internationalization of Police: The DEA in Mexico, 86 J. Am. Hist. 623, 637 (1999) (“All major ‘wars on drugs’ undertaken by the Mexican government have had an important outward orientation.”).


\textsuperscript{151} See Kate O’Beirne, Like a Good Neighbor? Mexico and its Refusal to Extradite, NAT’L REV., Feb. 9, 2004, at 26 (discussing how a deputy sheriff’s killer who fled to Mexico was unlikely to face imprisonment because Mexican policy forbids extradition of its nationals).
The controversy over extraditing nationals strikes the dual chords of which the international and constitutional norms surrounding nationality and citizenship are composed. On one hand, the image of citizens as non-extraditable parts of the nation stands opposite that of citizens as rights holder as against her nation, although both lead to the same result. By contrast, the image of fugitives as extraditable individuals imbued with personal stature and responsibility stands opposite that of accused persons wedded to the society and locale in which their crime was committed, although again both lead to the same result. Whether the state in question chooses to extradite its nationals or to keep them at home, the dual strands of nationality law are inevitably in play. Persons are both part of society and apart from it, and their citizenship can potentially stand for both positions.

4.1. Law and Politics of Drug Extraditions

Among U.S. policymakers and critics, it has often been debated whether the anti-narcotics campaign of the past several decades is a product of law enforcement necessity or cynical politics; likewise, it has been debated whether the global drug prohibition has been a winning or a losing endeavor. Additionally, in U.S.

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152 As Kelsen has said, these approaches are wrapped up in the notion of “a citizen’s right to be ‘protected’ by his state as the counterpart of his allegiance.” Kelsen, supra note 69, at 237.

153 As the Privy Council has said, these approaches are wrapped up in the aphorism, “all crime is local.” Mcleod v. Attorney-General, [1891] A.C. 455 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Austl.).


155 See, e.g., Fintan O’Toole, Drug War Invented By Nixon to Extend His Power, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, available at http://www.druglibrary.org/think/~jnr/nixon.htm (explaining that the drug war began with the Nixon administration’s cynical politics).

156 See, e.g., Mitchell S. Rosenthal, Consultant Paper: Winning the War on Drugs, Oct. 1, 1985, available at http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/govpubs/amhab/amhabe9d.htm (expressing that the government cannot win the war on drugs until there is a “positive consensus on the strict enforcement of drug laws,” but that this increased pressure will eventually erode drug use and the drug market).

legal commentary, it has frequently been debated whether the Constitution supports the fight against drug use and trafficking\footnote{\textit{See} Radley Balko, \textit{War on Drugs -- and the Bill of Rights}, CATO INST., Jan. 31, 2005, \url{http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3659} ("Since one can’t have property rights for illicit drugs, a search can’t violate the Fourth Amendment.").} or is contrary to the “war” effort\footnote{\textit{See} Ethan A. Nadelmann, \textit{The War on Drugs is Lost}, NAT’L REV., Feb. 12, 1996, at 38, 38 (1996), ("The ‘war on drugs’ has failed to accomplish its stated objectives, and it cannot succeed so long as we remain a free society, bound by our Constitution.").}. Whatever side one prefers in these debates, it is clear from the U.S. interventions in the Colombian and Mexican drug wars that international politics cannot be factored out of the debates over extraditing nationals\footnote{\textit{See} Feature: In Mexico, Now It's Calderon’s Drug War, DRUG WAR CHRON., Jan. 26, 2007, \url{available at http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/470/fulltext#2}. For a more thorough exploration of the relationship between the drug wars on U.S. foreign policy, see \textit{Andreas & Nadelmann, supra} note 27, at 153 (illustrating how political turmoil in Colombia led the Colombian government to flip-flop between implementation and refusal to implement its extradition treaty with the United States).}. Running parallel with the explicit linkage of drug law enforcement to foreign policy goals\footnote{\textit{See U.S.-Colombia Relations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Western Hemisphere of the H. Comm. of Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 1, 2 (2007) (statement of Hon. Rep. Hastert) ("The illicit drug trade is a high priority and a national security issue we must continue to deal with and defeat. It is a part of the war on terrorism. . . .")}. are the judicial politics that underscore recent judgments. The dual nature of nationality, as an identity marker that affiliates persons with sovereign states and as a rights emblem that sets persons apart from state power, has given rise to a set of cases that reflect a confusion of ideological motifs. The nationality cases in extradition law bring to the surface the fact that courts appear unable to determine whether due process is owed by states to persons or to each other. This dilemma, in turn, has led adjudicators to confuse the civil libertarianism of criminal law with state self-interest, and the authoritarianism of law enforcement with international cooperation.

Three contemporary extradition cases\footnote{\textit{See} Knowles v. United States, [2006] UKPC 38 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Bah.); CrimA 4596/05 Rosenstein v. Israel, [2005] 2 IsrSC 232, para. 44 (discussing with approval the “center of gravity” approach as the preferred rule in extradition law in Canada); Lake v. Canada (Minister of Just.), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761 (Can.)}, each sending a suspected drug fugitive to the United States, will illustrate the
phenomenon. Although all three of the judgments discussed below are from legal systems with much in common with the United States, the judiciary in each case draws not on U.S. constitutional law as a source of authority but on the nearest thing: Canadian constitutional law. The geographic proximity to the ultimate enforcement jurisdiction, however, is not as important as the normative proximity of Canadian jurisprudence to both U.S.-style constitutional law and international law. Of course, to say that Canadian extradition law includes constitutional and international legal norms is to express an ambiguity; as has been seen, nationality and citizenship rules are capable of pointing in both a state-oriented and a rights-oriented direction.

(dismissing an appeal for extradition to the United States after pleading guilty to charges including conspiracy to traffic crack cocaine). See also supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text.

163 See, e.g., Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938) (exhibiting the English common law origins of U.S. state common law systems as reflected in the long-standing influence of Swift v. Tyson); Canada’s Legal System, THE CANADA E-BOOK, Jan. 15, 2004, at 1, available at http://www43.statcan.ca/04/04b/04b_005_e.htm (describing how outside Quebec, which utilizes a civil law system, the Canadian legal system is based on common law); Shlomo Guberman, The Development of the Law in Israel: The First 50 Years, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Former Deputy Attorney General (Legislation), Sept. 25, 2000, https://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/Israel at+50/Development+of+the+Law+in+Israel+-+The+First+50+Yea.htm (discussing how the Israeli system incorporated British Mandate law upon independence); Permanent Mission of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas to the United Nations, Bahamas Government Information, http://www.un.int/bahamas/Ba hamas_Government_Info.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2009) (illustrating that the English common law was a basis for Bahamian legal system and recognizing Queen Elizabeth II as the Bahamian head of state).

164 See Beverley McLachlin, P.C., Chief Justice of Canada, Remarks at the Supreme Court of Canada: Protecting Constitutional Rights: A Comparative View of the United States and Canada, Apr. 5, 2004, transcript available at http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/ju/spe-dis/bm04-04-05-eng.asp (“Canada, like the United States, is a federal democracy. We vote for our politicians at federal and state (we call them provincial) elections and if we don’t like what they do, we vote them out the next time. Canada, like the United States, has a constitution that guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of every person in the country.”).

4.1.1. Knowles: ‘Ninety’ Percent Wrong

In December of 2000, a federal grand jury in Florida indicted Samuel “Ninety” Knowles—a colorful Bahamian national who, as reported by the local press, “got his nickname by blowing $90,000 in one day”¹⁶⁶—on several counts of conspiracy to possess, distribute, and import cocaine and marijuana into the United States.¹⁶⁷ The indictment formed the basis of an extradition request from the U.S. government to the Republic of Bahamas,¹⁶⁸ which was in turn challenged in habeus corpus proceedings on the grounds that the statutory conditions for extradition had not been met.¹⁶⁹ During the course of lengthy appeal and review proceedings, and well before the signing of an extradition order by the Bahamian Foreign Minister,¹⁷⁰ the President of the United States exercised his statutory authority to designate Knowles as a foreign drug “kingpin,”¹⁷¹ thereby seizing his U.S. assets and barring him from using the U.S. financial system prior to any judicial finding of guilt.¹⁷²

In one of his two trips to the Privy Council, Knowles challenged the extradition to the United States on the grounds that the “kingpin” designation was widely published, notorious, and tantamount to a public declaration of his guilt.¹⁷³ As the defense

¹⁶⁷ Knowles v. United States (Knowles II), [2007] W.L.R. 47, para. 2.
¹⁶⁸ Knowles v. United States (Knowles I), [2004] UKPC 10, para. 3 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Bah.).
¹⁶⁹ See Extradition Act, 1994, § 7(1) (Bah.) (restrictions on extradition); id. § 11(3) (Bah.) (court’s power to discharge extradition request).
put it, once in the United States, “the jurors at his trial might well
know or learn of his designation . . . [and] his trial would not be
fair if a juror were prejudiced by such knowledge.” 174 Moreover,
the U.S. statute triggered a citizenship issue, the other half of
Knowles’ challenge being that the prejudice against his fair trial
“derived from his nationality, since the [Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation] Act did not apply to U.S. citizens.” 175 Thus, although
the terms of the U.S.-Bahamas Extradition Treaty specify that
“extradition shall not be refused on the grounds that the fugitive is
a citizen or national of the Requested State”, 176 the citizenship
question played a central role in the fairness/discrimination
argument both in court and in the public discourse that
accompanied the Bahamian proceedings. 177

The “kingpin” issue barely got off the ground when “Ninety”
was sent fifty miles across the Gulf Stream to face the federal
charges in Miami. 178 Indeed, the Bahamas Court of Appeal ruled
after his departure that the government had acted prematurely in
sending him to stand trial. 179 The identical question of prejudice to
foreign extraditees, however, had in the meantime been considered
by the Privy Council in yet another drug extradition from yet
another Caribbean jurisdiction, the islands of St. Kitts and Nevis. 180
Two cocaine co-conspirators, Noel Heath and Glenroy Mathews,
had been designated as foreign drug “kingpins” on June 1, 2000. 181

175 Id.
17 (1994).
177 See Candia Dames, U.S. Ambassador Says Ninety Will Get Fair Trial, BAHAMA
(explaining U.S. Ambassador Rood’s belief that the larger jury pool and
anonymity available in the U.S. would guarantee a fair trial).
178 See Raymond Kongwa, Ninety’s Lawyers Retaliate, NASSAU GUARDIAN, Aug.
30, 2006, at A1 (noting that Knowles was extradited after a date had been set for a
further Bahamian court hearing).
179 See Tosheena Robinson-Blair, Ninety’s Extradition Wrong, BAHAMA J., Sept.
procedural negligence on the part of the Bahamian Courts resulted in wrongful
extradition of Ninety).
taken from St. Kitts and Nevis).
181 See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, WHAT
YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT SANCTIONS AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKERS, AN OVERVIEW
and, according to the Privy Council, had been announced as such on a U.S. government website despite provisions in the legislation for non-disclosure of the designee’s name if such disclosure could jeopardize the integrity of the ongoing criminal trial.182

In a relatively brief judgment, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood gave the kingpin argument relatively short shrift. Analogizing the problem to one of ordinary domestic publicity,183 the law lords were willing to leave it to the ultimate trial judge to determine an appropriate remedy.184 Turning to the particular problem of foreign proceedings, and the fact that the domestic extradition court cannot predict the remedies that a foreign trial court will invoke, the court fell back on a presumption of judicial innocence.185 Lord Brown cited the 1987 judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Argentina v. Mellino186 in order to invoke what he found to be the commonplace principle that “[o]ur courts must assume that [the defendant] will be given a fair trial in the foreign country.”187

While the presumption may sound uncontroversial on the surface, a closer reading of the Canadian jurisprudence reveals the logical platform on which it rests to be a platform in motion. In the first place, Lord Brown credited Justice Lamer with the persuasive quote,188 although it was Justice La Forest’s majority judgment in which the relevant passage appeared,189 and not Justice Lamer’s dissent which came to the directly opposite conclusion.190 That error, however, was only the tip of the iceberg. More significantly,

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182 See Heath, [2005] UKPC, para. 24 (noting legislative provisions for non-disclosure of a person’s name if such disclosure would compromise an ongoing criminal prosecution).
183 See id. para. 25 (explaining the trial court, rather than the appellate court, is the appropriate forum for such challenges on the basis of publicity concerns).
185 See Heath, [2005] UKPC, para. 26 (stating fugitives must be “at risk of suffering a flagrant denial of justice”).
187 Id. para. 36.
188 See Heath, [2005] UKPC, para. 26 ("A convenient statement of that principle in the specific context of extradition is to be found in Lamer J.'s judgment . . . .").
190 Id. paras. 40-43 (Lamer, J., dissenting).
Justice La Forest himself appears to have been flowing against the tide of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms\(^{191}\) in his *Mellino* judgment, opining that “the Charter has no application to extradition hearings,”\(^{192}\) and likening the proceeding to a preliminary inquiry.\(^{193}\) As Justice Lamer pointed out in dissent, this pronouncement replayed a debate in which that same court had engaged earlier that very year in *Canada v. Schmidt*.\(^{194}\) There, the court had reasoned that, “[t]here can be no doubt that the actions undertaken by the Government of Canada in extradition as in other matters are subject to scrutiny under the Charter (s. 32).”\(^{195}\)

The novel task for the court in *Mellino* was not assessing the legal question of the Charter’s application,\(^{196}\) but determining the factual question of whose actions caused the violation of procedural rights since the Canadian Charter would not ordinarily apply to the acts of a foreign legal system alone.\(^{197}\)

The crucial sentence in Justice La Forest’s judgment in *Mellino* is his assertion that, “extradition proceedings must be approached with a view to conform with Canada’s international obligations.”\(^{198}\) The application of constitutional rights to the extradition context was perceived as contrary to international norms. Indeed, the judgment goes out of its way to characterize the entire constitutional challenge as an attempt to have Canadian courts assume responsibility for supervising what is essentially diplomatic activity; this, La Forest opines, “strikes me as being in fundamental conflict with the principle of comity on which extradition is based.”\(^{199}\) Harking back to a point he had made in *Schmidt*, La Forest perceives extradition process not as part and

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\(^{193}\) See *id.* para. 10 (explaining the Court’s review of the executive’s decision to extradite is limited to specific circumstances and highly deferential).

\(^{194}\) *Id.* para. 41 (Lamer, J., dissenting).

\(^{195}\) *Canada v. Schmidt*, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, para. 35 (Can.).

\(^{196}\) The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, by the express terms of section 24(1), is enforceable by any superior court judge, which would generally be the presiding judge at an extradition hearing. *Mellino*, 1 S.C.R., para. 49 (Wilson, J., concurring).

\(^{197}\) See *Spencer v. The Queen*, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278, para. 5 (Can.) (holding that the Canadian Charter did not apply to the operation of Bahamian law in the Bahamas).


\(^{199}\) *Id.* para. 24.
parcel of criminal law—which is characterized as having a labyrinth of “requirements and technicalities . . . [which] apply only to a limited extent in extradition proceedings”\(^{200}\)—but as a process engaged “pursuant to a treaty or other arrangement between these states acting in their sovereign capacity and obviously engages their honour and good faith.”\(^{201}\)

The fundamental legal relationship, in other words, is portrayed as an international one, with matters of due process taking a back seat to comity among nations.\(^{202}\) Thus, the *Mellino* judgment, on which the Privy Council relied in assessing the prejudicial “kingpin” designation, portrays the contest in an extradition case as not so much between the prosecution and the defense, but rather between the sovereign treaty partners.\(^{203}\) For this reason, procedural concerns can be all but ignored by the judicial branch, leaving the matter to the presumably more diplomatically sensitive judgment of the executive.\(^{204}\) It is a paradigmatically internationalist vision, where the legal identity of the defendant/fugitive is submerged to that of the nations he offended and to which he belongs. The point is more than a practical one designed to ease the burdens of law enforcement, a frequently stated position in the discursive world of transnational crime and

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\(^{200}\) Id para. 23.


\(^{202}\) Justice La Forest emphasized the concern of comity among nations in making decisions that necessarily involve extradition issues:

> Matters of due process generally are to be left for the courts to determine at the trial there as they would be if he were to be tried here. Attempts to pre-empt decisions on such matters, whether arising through delay or otherwise, would directly conflict with the principles of comity on which extradition is based. . . .


\(^{203}\) This tendency was reinforced in the 1999 amendments to Canada’s Extradition Act, S.C. 1999, c. 18. Commenting on the pattern initiated by her father in his judicial capacity, Professor Anne LaForest has observed:

> [I]n enacting the 1999 Act, Canada did not merely follow and respond to an international movement that led it to alter the balance between comity and liberty in extradition hearings. The reality is that Canada has gone further than virtually any other country in facilitating extradition.


punishment. Rather, it is a deeply structured alternative vision of the nature of legal relations, perceiving the interstate mutuality of rights and obligations as the keynote to legality in an interdependent world.

What went unmentioned by the Privy Council in considering the arguments of the various Caribbean defendants is that the Mellino judgment—or at least “Ninety” percent of it—had been more recently set aside by the Supreme Court of Canada in United States v. Cobb. In that judgment, rendered some four years after Justice La Forest’s retirement from the Court, Justice Arbour declared that “the Charter applies to extradition proceedings in the sense that the treaty, the extradition hearing in Canada and the exercise of the executive discretion to surrender the fugitive all have to conform to the requirements of the Charter.” The problem, of course, is more than that the Privy Council couldn’t see the Arbour for La Forest. It revitalized the vision of legal relations that had been suppressed in Mellino.

In coming to her conclusion in Cobb, Justice Arbour set out the fugitive’s basic legal point, which in the circumstances was remarkably close to that argued by Knowles, Heath and Matthew in the Privy Council: “[t]he respondent argues that any concern that the appellants may face unfair proceedings in the United States is a matter for the Minister, not for the extradition judge.” At the same time, she indicated that a full answer to this contention has already been provided: “both the extradition hearing and the exercise of the executive discretion to surrender a fugitive must conform with the requirements of the Charter, including the

205 See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), para. 89 (1989) (“As movement about the world becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is increasingly in the interests of all nations that suspected offenders that flee abroad should be brought to justice.”).

206 See Sharon A. Williams, Human Rights Safeguards and International Cooperation in Extradition: Striking the Balance, 3 CRIM. L.F. 191 (1992) (“This view of extradition law and process is one of mutual assistance in criminal matters between states. Reciprocity is the keynote, with states having a mutuality of obligations.”).


210 Id. para. 33.
principles of fundamental justice.” 211 In fact, the Supreme Court’s embrace of individual liberty over interstate cooperation in law enforcement had, after the La Forest era, become so powerful that it prompted legislative reform in order to tip the balance back. 212 As the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Justice commented on introducing the Bill, “[e]ven with countries with a similar legal tradition such as the United States, we have heard on numerous occasions how difficult it is to obtain extradition from Canada.” 213

What the Privy Council’s confusion demonstrates is more than weak research; it is that the competing visions of the individual citizen in international law are all equally cogent. Canada has swung from a regime under Mellino in which the constitution did not apply at all to interstate extraditions, to a regime under Cobb in which the Charter trumped all treaty powers, to its current regime under revised legislation and a new treaty 214 which analysts claim “rival[s] in stark efficiency interstate rendition between individual states of the United States.” 215 In other words, the citizen is elevated above the state or submerged within it, seemingly on an equally alternate footing. The sovereignty of the constitution in protecting individual rights and the sovereignty of the state in facilitating cooperative law enforcement are easily flipped around, as they represent the two halves of the citizenship coin in international legal discourse. One can turn 180 degrees with the case law and bar extradition that is prejudicial to citizens, or one can make a half turn and bid Ninety goodbye.

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211 Id. para. 30.
215 Botting, supra note 212, at 43.
4.1.2. Rosenstein: Thin Reasoning

In September of 2004, a grand jury in southern Florida indicted Ze’ev Rosenstein—a stocky, domineering figure in the Tel Aviv underworld referred to as “The Fat Man” by undercover U.S. investigators in taped telephone conversations—on charges of heading an international conspiracy to traffic in the drug methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (“MDMA,” more generally known as “ecstasy”). The indictment formed the basis of an extradition request from the government of the United States to the State of Israel. That request, in turn, prompted a challenge by the defense in the Jerusalem District Court on the grounds that extradition would violate Israeli constitutional safeguards.

In his appeal to Israel’s Supreme Court, Rosenstein presented a long list of legal arguments, the crux of which contended that since he is “an Israeli citizen and resident, and the alleged offense was committed entirely in Israel, extradition to another country deviates from the balance required by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom, and by fundamental principles of penal law.” Although by the time of his arrest Israel had revised its law to permit the extradition of Israeli citizens under certain circumstances, the defense argued that for a person whose center

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216 CrimA 4596/05 Rosenstein v. Israel, [2005] 2 IsrSC 232, para. 1 (“[T]he United States Government relayed a request to the Government of the State of Israel, for the extradition of [] Ze’ev Rosenstein. . ..”).


218 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (making it illegal to knowingly or intentionally “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance”), § 841(b)(1)(C) (laying out the sentences for different drug offenses), § 846 (punishing attempt and conspiracy to commit any of the offenses defined in this subchapter the same as committing the actual offense), § 952(a) (prohibiting imports into the U.S. any controlled substance specified in the statute except where the “Attorney General finds it necessary to provide for medical, scientific, or other legitimate purposes”), § 960(b)(3) (defining the penalties for violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 953, 955, 957, 959).

219 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 5.


221 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 7.

222 For a history of Israel’s citizenship bar to extradition, see Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, The Post-Sheinbein Israeli Extradition Law: Has it Solved the Extradition Problems Between Israel and the United States or Has it Merely
of life is in the territory of the State, “the prosecution’s policy on drug offenses has long been to conduct trials in Israel, even if the act was committed outside of Israel.” Under the circumstances, the due process demanded by the alleged ecstasy financier was presented as a counterweight to the lead prosecutor’s assertion that extradition “is good for the country and good for the cooperation between countries against international crime.”

In rejecting the defendant’s challenges and arriving at its conclusion that Rosenstein can be sent to the United States, the court relied heavily on American investigatory evidence. While this appears to be part of an ongoing law enforcement strategy by Israeli authorities to contract large drug prosecutions out to the United States, the Israel Supreme Court relied not on American precedent but on Canadian constitutional law. Two cases in particular, Libman and Cotroni, drew heavy attention. Both decisions were authored by Justice La Forest in the 1980s and have become mainstays of Canadian legal thinking on international crime. Each, however, imports as many problems into the Rosenstein analysis as it resolves, and each should be examined in the context in which the Israeli court deployed them.

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225 Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales, Remarks at Tel Aviv University (June 27, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2006/ag_speech_060627.html) (“The Rosenstein case highlights one of the most important ways in which we cooperate with our international law enforcement partners: our strong network of extradition treaties and mutual legal assistance treaties. These agreements allow the United States to share and receive assistance in obtaining evidence and bringing fugitives to justice around the world.”).
227 Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 (Can.).
228 Cotroni v. United States, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 (Can.).
Turning first to Libman, the Israeli court had an ear for sound bites, making reference to the most memorable line of Justice La Forest’s judgment declaring that, “In a shrinking world we are all our brother’s keepers.” The poetic language and sentiment was deployed in support of the portion of the Rosenstein judgment that dealt with “Cooperation in the Fight Against Crime.” It was quoted in support of the message that in a world of globalized crime the Israeli legal system must cooperate with U.S. law enforcement in sending an Israeli citizen to face justice in an American court rather than insisting, as the defendant requested, on a trial at home in Israel. The deep irony is that Libman, which involved a Canadian defendant who defrauded American customers in a mostly United States-based securities scam, endorsed the trial at home of a Canadian who could have, and arguably should have, been sent for prosecution in the United States. In other words, the Libman judgment stood for an approach to transnational crime—prosecution at home—that was the exact opposite of what the Rosenstein court used it to support.

The transformation from Libman’s “brother’s keepers” to Rosenstein’s ‘brother’s senders’ stood the comity of nations on its head. Having performed this summersault, the Israeli court then turned its attention to Cotroni, the Supreme Court of Canada’s leading case on extradition and the constitutional rights of

230 Id.
231 Id. (“The first and central purpose of extradition law is the creation of an effective instrument for international cooperation in the fight against crime, particularly transnational crime.”).
232 For the factual background, see Libman, 2 S.C.R., paras. 2–5.
234 Libman, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, para. 78 (“I have no difficulty in holding . . . that the counts of fraud with which the appellant is charged may properly be prosecuted in Canada, and I see nothing in the requirements of international comity that would dictate that this country refrain from exercising its jurisdiction.”).
235 Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 39 (“[I]t is inappropriate for a state, as a society in the community of civilized nations, to seclude itself within the narrow boundaries of its sovereignty. . . .”).
Unlike its reverse use of *Libman*, the *Rosenstein* court’s use of *Cotroni* was the same as the original Canadian court’s use of the case—i.e. in support of the idea that “it is often better that a crime be prosecuted where its harmful impact is felt and where the witnesses and the persons most interested in bringing the criminal to justice reside...” The problem the court encountered was that the *Cotroni* logic, which was far from generous in its characterization of the Charter of Rights, was deployed in a judgment that otherwise endorsed a liberal view of constitutional safeguards based on the “human dignity” of persons coming before the Israeli courts. Moreover, the special protections for Israeli citizens, which parallel those at the heart of the *Cotroni* case for Canadian citizens, were interpreted in exactly the same way as the Canadian ones even though the policy implications of the two arguably pointed moved in opposite directions.

In a factual situation parallel to that of *Rosenstein*, *Cotroni* was a Canadian citizen wanted for extradition to the United States for criminal conduct which took place entirely in the confines of his disposition.

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238 See *Rosenstein*, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 53 (citation omitted):

The right of a person accused of a criminal offense to due process is a constitutional basic right. It stems from the right of the individual to freedom and dignity. Dorner J. discussed this point:

Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom... granted the status of constitutional basic right to a person’s right to criminal due process, especially pursuant to Article 5 of the basic law, which determines the right to freedom, and pursuant to Articles 2 & 4, which determine the right to human dignity.

239 Extradition Law, 1999, S.H. 1708, amend. 6 (Isr.).

240 Section 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Mobility Rights”) provides: “Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada.” Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, Ch. 11 (U.K.).

241 *Rosenstein*, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para. 61 (“True, appellant is Israeli. The conspiracy was made in Israel.”).
Montreal home. As made clear in the Parliamentary committee in which section 6(1) of the Charter was originally debated and as can be discerned by comparison to other human rights instruments which provide for a more circumscribed right of mobility, and as articulated in the relatively limited prior case law, the right to remain as an subset of mobility rights generally rests on “[t]he intimate relationship between a citizen and his country.” Indeed, it was this national bond that was stressed by Justice Wilson in her dissent, indicating that not only had the fugitive never voluntarily left his country of citizenship but that the very accusations at issue in the extradition hearing represented an exercise in extraterritorial law enforcement by the United States.

For Justice La Forest, the object of the Cotroni exercise appears to have been to send the citizen away, but to do so in a rhetorically more generous way than one might otherwise expect. He therefore paid considerable lip service to prior Supreme Court pronouncements that Charter rights are to be subjected to “a generous rather than a legalistic” interpretation. Furthermore, he advocated interpretive flexibility in order to overcome any perceived formulaic rigidity of Charter tests such as that set out in

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242 For a description of the background facts, see Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R., paras. 2-11.


244 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May, 3, 2002, protocol no. 4, art. 3(1), Europ. T.S. No. 005 (“No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual or of a collective measure, from territory of the State of which he is a national.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 12 (granting the right to leave any country, enter one’s own country, and move about in a country where one has legally entered); Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III, § 2 (“No law of Canada shall be construed or applied as to (a) authorize or effect the arbitrary . . . exile of any person.”).

245 See Skapinker v. Law Soc’y of Upper Can., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 382 (Can.) (holding that the right to work is not separate and distinct from the mobility provisions in which this right is discussed).


247 Id. paras. 66–100.

248 Id. para. 36 (citing R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, 300 (Can.)).

249 Id. para. 37 (citing R. v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 768 (Can.) (accepting a flexible approach to the proportionality test)).
R. v. Oakes. This interpretive approach, in turn, had an ideological gloss that took as its starting point a view reminiscent of Justice La Forest’s opinion in Schmidt. That is, that international cooperation in law enforcement, of which extradition is the prime example, is the modern antidote to the historic problem of legal parochialism. In this rendition of international law, quite ironically, Charter protections are a retrograde force, “confining” [Canadian society] to parochial and nationalistic concepts of community,251 in the face of “an emerging world community from which not only benefits but responsibilities flow.”252 Quoting approvingly from those international law scholars most closely associated with this view, Justice La Forest indicated that, “[t]his attitude of lack of faith and actual distrust,”253 so typical of constitutional rights,254 “is not in keeping with the spirit behind extradition treaties.”255

The great irony of the Cotroni judgment is that this espousal of international progressivism as a bulwark against the perceived regressivism of constitutional rights is premised on a view of the traditional place of extradition in the legal lexicon. “For well over 100 years,” Justice La Forest noted, “extradition has been a part of the fabric of our law.”256 This placing of the extradition issue, along with the Charter itself, in historical context,257 had its own

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250 See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 114 (Can.) (establishing a two-step test that involves asking (1) if a specific Act violates the Charter and then (2) if there is a violation, whether the Act is “a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society . . .”).


252 Id.

253 Id. para. 52 (citing Jean-Gabriel Castel & Sharon A. Williams, The Extradition of Canadian Citizens and Sections 1 and 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 25 CANADIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 268–9 (1987) [hereinafter Extradition of Canadian Citizens].)

254 Whether intentionally or coincidentally, this formulation of the attitude underlying constitutional rights reflects a view expressed by constitutional theorists who come at constitutional law from the opposite ideological point of view from those expressed in Justice La Forest’s judgment or in the Castel and Williams piece from which he quotes. See generally John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980) (discussing the various versions of representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review).


256 Id. para. 40.

257 Id. para. 40 (citing Re Federal Republic of Germany and Rauca, [1983] 4 C.C.C.3d 385, 404 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.)) (“The Charter was not enacted in a vacuum
interesting spin. In effect, Justice La Forest succeeded in anchoring the un-anchorable. He did so by supporting change on tradition and erecting the imagined future on the discernable past. In one intricate set of reasons, Canada managed to look simultaneously forward and backward, ostensibly freeing itself from its nationalist past while realizing its time honored internationalist traditions.

Thus, Rosenstein cited a Canadian judgment that belittled constitutionalism and elevated law enforcement, in support of the proposition that the constitutionalized Basic Laws require the court “to balance the unequal power relations between the accused and the prosecution, which usually enjoys an advantageous procedural status and additional advantages, and to ensure that the accused is given a full opportunity to make a case for his innocence...” Likewise, the Rosenstein judgment cited a case that characterized sovereignty of the state as “parochial and nationalist,” in support of a pronouncement that “international cooperation in the fight against crime” and “reinforces the principle of state sovereignty.”

The use of prominent Canadian cases in the Rosenstein judgment demonstrates that the state and the subjects of state power are reversible at will. Libman was exploited for its rhetorical power in favor of international cooperation in a way that allowed its actual application of domestic unilateralism to go unnoticed. Cotroni was utilized for its result in favor of extradition in a way that allowed for its normative position downgrading constitutionalism and sovereignty to remain submerged. In other words, the case of the Fat Man became a perfect laboratory for exploiting the thematic underbelly of Canadian constitutional law.

and the rights set out therein must be interpreted rationally having regard to the then existing laws and, in the instant case, to the position which Canada occupies in the world and the effective history of the multitude of extradition treaties it has had with other nations.”). Rauca is also cited in Rosenstein. See Rosenstein, [2005] 2 IsrSC, para 46.


262 Id. para. 57 (observing that the decision not to apply local law in certain circumstances may also serve to reinforce state sovereignty).
The citizen, as answerable to any state and as protected by his own state, seems to go hand-in-hand with the Israeli court’s reversals of Canadian jurisprudence. The reasoning may have been thin, but Rosenstein provides a stout platform for speculating about the relationship between international and constitutional theory. In a close parallel to international pronouncements about citizenship rights, the Israeli court portrayed the state as subject to the sovereignty of an overarching legal regime while simultaneously being a sovereign master of its own house.

4.1.3. Canada Jumps into Lake

If there is any jurisdiction that can be counted on to properly rely on the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada, one would think it would be Canada itself. However, that assumption has now been tested and undermined in Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice). Talib Steven Lake was caught selling roughly 100 grams of crack cocaine in a series of transactions in Windsor, Ontario, and across the bridge in Detroit, Michigan, with an undercover officer of the Ontario Provincial Police. He was tried and convicted for the Canadian transactions. After serving a relatively light sentence of three years in prison, he was processed for extradition to the United States where an indictment had been issued in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan relating to the Detroit transaction. Upon losing his committal battle in the Ontario courts, Lake requested that the Minister of Justice exercise his discretion not to order him extradited, but the Minister decided against him and ordered him sent back to Michigan in February 2005.

The Minister incorrectly determined that Canada had no jurisdiction to try Lake on the Michigan charge and thus, the

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263 See the discussion of Nottebohm, supra notes 41–50, and accompanying text.
265 Lake v. Canada (Minister of Just.), [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761 (Can.).
266 Id. paras. 5–7.
267 Id. para. 9 (noting that “[A]t the sentencing hearing before Ouellette J. of the Ontario Court (General Division) . . . Crown counsel indicated that . . . a three-year sentence . . . [is] on the low end of the range with respect to these types of offenses”).
268 Id. paras. 9–11.
269 The Minister was found to be wrong, but not unreasonably wrong, by the Ontario Court of Appeal. See United States v. Lake, [2006] 212 C.C.C. (3d) 51 (Ont.)
extradition did not infringe his mobility rights under the Charter. The Minister also considered the prospect of Lake facing a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years under U.S. law—a far more severe punishment than would be meted out by the Canadian judicial system. However, the Minister rejected Lake’s potential punishment under U.S. law as grounds for exercising his discretion in the fugitive’s favor because the minimum incarceration term was not seen to shock the conscience of Canadians. Lake sought judicial review of the Minister’s discretionary decision, and on appeal the Supreme Court of Canada determined that, whatever its failings, the ministerial decision deserved a level of deference with which the court should not interfere. Although he argued heatedly that “[t]he Minister is required to respect a fugitive’s constitutional rights in deciding whether to exercise his or her discretion . . .,” the court effectively threw cold water on Lake.

The crux of the Lake decision is that “deference is owed to the Minister’s decision whether to order surrender once a fugitive has been committed for extradition.” Insisting that such decisions “will not be interfered with absent evidence of improper or arbitrary motives,” Lake analogized ministerial discretion in extradition to prosecutorial discretion in indictments. Since one or more of the “Cotroni factors” could be invoked to ground a

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271 For the Supreme Court of Canada’s views on the standards of correctness and reasonableness in judicial review of administrative or executive decision-making, see Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (Can.).


273 Id. para. 34.


276 The court identified the relevant factors as: a) where the impact of offense was felt or likely to be felt; b) jurisdiction with greatest interest in prosecuting; c) police force that played the major role; d) jurisdiction to first lay charges; e)
U.S.-based prosecution, and the Minister could not “point to any public purpose that would be served by the [non-] extradition,”277 the Minister’s decision to override the fugitive’s rights under section 6(1) of the Charter need not be reviewed. Expressing the sentiment that contemporary law enforcement “cannot realistically be confined within national boundaries,”278 the court allowed the Minister—the very official whose actions are limited by the Charter279—to be the sole arbiter of the citizen’s fate under the Charter.

In taking this deferential approach, the Supreme Court of Canada effectively reversed its own interpretive guidelines. Charter jurisprudence in Canada has taken a cue from early American expressions of popular sovereignty—government is seen to be “‘ordained and established’ in the name of the people.”280 It likewise has drawn inspiration from British constitutionalism, conferring “a generous interpretation . . . suitable to give individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms. . . .”281 This synthesis has led to an original approach to the application and interpretation of the Charter that is oriented not toward the state power in issue,282 but toward the individual rights holder. From its inception, the Charter has been called a “purposive document,”283 whose purpose is to “constrain governmental action . . . and not simply [to assess] its rationality in furthering some valid government objective.”284 Thus, Constitutional interpretation has proceeded as an “affirmation of jurisdiction ready to proceed to trial; f) place where evidence located; f) whether evidence is mobile; g) number and location of the accused; h) place of most of the criminal acts; i) nationality and residence of accused; j) severity of sentencing in each jurisdiction. Lake, [2008] 1 S.C.R. para. 29.

278 Cotroni v. United States, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469, para. 27 (Can.).
280 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403 (1819).
283 Id.
284 Id. at 156–57.
rights and freedoms and of judicial power and responsibility in relation to their protection,” and not as an affirmation of government authority.

Twenty-five years into the Charter era, the Supreme Court of Canada has taken its original conception of citizen as rights holder, and thrown it into the Lake. What has emerged is a deference-soaked jurisprudence, where the dominant consideration is not the judicial expertise in protecting rights but “the Minister’s superior expertise in relation to Canada’s international obligations and foreign affairs.” In characterizing the ministerial decision to extradite a citizen as parallel to the ministerial decision to deport a non-citizen, and in characterizing both processes as possessing “a negligible legal dimension,” the court drowned its own prior case law. In the process, it engineered a complete international law reversal. What surfaced in Lake was a Loch Ness monster of international relations and constitutional rights—not the sovereign law enforcing the rights of the national, but rather the sovereign state enforcing the interests of the nation. The law may not be cut-and-dry enough to say that this, or any such decision, is wrong, but the cases demonstrate that the legal logic of any one strand of the case law is necessarily all wet.

4.2. Trafficking in Circles

The case law reveals that when the United States calls for drug extraditions, the fugitives tend to come; or, more accurately, tend to be sent. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the facts of the Cotroni case itself. As recounted by Justice La Forest, Frank Cotroni was a Canadian citizen, all of whose alleged criminal conduct took place without his ever having left Montreal. As

288 Id. para. 38 (comparing extradition of citizens to deportation of refugees).
290 For a description of the background facts, see Cotroni, [1989] 1 S.C.R., paras. 2–11. On Frank Cotroni’s life and times, see Reputed Montreal Crime Boss
already indicated, the crux of the defense surrounded the assertion that this factual link to Canada reflected the concrete legal link “between a citizen and his country.” This constitutional bond of citizen to state found favor in Justice Wilson’s dissent in Cotroni, where it was suggested that the entire affair be dismissed as a product of the excessively long reach of U.S. law enforcement.

On the other hand, the second sentence of Justice La Forest’s recitation of the facts, which stressed that the fugitive was sought by the United States “on a charge in that country of conspiracy to possess and distribute heroin,” went a long way toward terminating the asserted right to remain in Canada. There was something about identifying the substantive issue as a drug extradition that placed the fugitive in a category of near statelessness. Since the early 1970s, with the House of Lords’ specific assertion that “crime is an international problem—perhaps not least crimes connected with the illicit drug traffic,” narcotics offenses have taken on a character that overrides other domestic legal concerns. While in the ordinary course criminal law may be grounded in the local community vindicating itself through prosecution of the crime, drug trafficking has detached itself from any such local roots to become a universal legal issue. The “interests of society”, reasoned Justice La Forest, are found in cases such as Cotroni insofar as they aspire to the most universal of legal


292 Id. para. 68 (holding that the defendant could have been prosecuted under Canadian criminal laws).

293 Id. para. 67.

294 For a description to the literal statelessness of international drug traffickers, see United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372–73 (9th Cir. 1995) (resulting in an arrest for traffickers on high seas in flagless ship).


296 See Bd. of Trade v. Owen, [1957] A.C. 602, 611 (explaining that conspiracy in England to commit offense abroad is not subject to English prosecutorial jurisdiction); Treacy v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, [1971] A.C. 537, 540 (explaining how jurors are drawn from county in which alleged offense occurred).

297 See Liangsiriprasert v. United States, [1991] 92 Cr. App. R. 77, 78 (P.C.) (explaining that an agreement abroad to traffic in heroin is triable in England if the parties were intended to result in criminal acts in England). See also _Doot_, [1973] A.C., at 831 (describing how drug trafficking triable in England despite the fact that offence is “more likely to ruin young lives in the United States of America than in this country . . .”).
ideals: “to discover the truth in respect of the charges brought against the accused.”

Drugs have reintroduced the national to the sovereign nation, removing the protections afforded by a sovereign law. The American insistence on policing the worlds of narcotics trade, and the changes wrought by that insistence on the character of global society, has had this transformative effect on extradition policy around the world. Although the “war on drugs” has been a failure if measured by the goal of eradication it has set for itself, it has had remarkable impact on judicial opinions among neighbors and allies of the United States. In particular, the Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of the Charter of Rights, which has become the role model of choice, has been influenced in a way which seems diametrically opposed to its own interpretive tradition.

301 The transformative effect, of course, could be perceived as either positive or negative. Compare Ethan Nadelmann, Ending the War on Drugs, LAPS MAG. (2001), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/library/nadelmann_lapis2.cfm (labeling the war on drugs an “international disgrace”), with Lori Scott Fogelman, DEA Director Discusses War on Drugs, Public Service Careers, BAYLOR U. NEWS, Sept. 17, 2002, http://www.baylor.edu/pr/news.php?action=story&story=4196 (“There is some pleasant news. On the demand side, we’ve reduced casual use, chronic use and prevented others from even starting.”).


303 Weinrib, supra note 258, at 85 (“[t]he Canadian Charter offers a more attractive system of rights protection than, for example, its American counterpart.”). The phenomenon is new for courts, but not necessarily for legal scholars. See, e.g., W. Ivor Jennings, Note, Constitutional Interpretation: The Experience of Canada, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1, 39 (1937) (arguing that “judges can interpret a fairly closely-defined Constitution according to the principles of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.”).

As a product of international law thinking, however, the Canadian Charter was already prone to the reversals that the drug extradition cases have brought out. Although it is most often thought that the introduction of international legal ideas helped the constitutional rights holder put a break on state power, it is also international law, incorporated into the Constitution, that historically declared the sovereign government to have “plenary powers of legislation” and unrestrained authority. Accordingly, the Knowles court wondered into Mellino’s holding that the Constitution doesn’t apply to foreign relations and extraditions, the Rosenstein court discovered Cotroni’s “progressive” vision of cooperative law enforcement as a constitutional norm, and the Lake court stumbled into the idea of government itself as constitutional decision-maker, all without


307 Croft v. Dunphy, [1932] 59 C.C.C. 141, 144 (P.C.); Statute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo. 5, c. 4, § 4 (Eng.) (discussing the extra-territorial operation of Dominion laws); see also Reference re Resolution to Amend the Constitution (Patriation Reference), [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753, 831 (“The history of constitutional amendments also parallels the development of Canadian sovereignty.”). For a contemporary restatement of this proposition and a review of the sources on which it is based, see R. (Bancoult) v. Secretary of State, [2008] UKHL 61 (U.K.) (stating that “international law, forming no part of domestic law, could not support any argument for the invalidity of a purely domestic law . . .”).

straying far from a well worn path. Surprising as they may seem, each holding is also par for the circuitous course.

The citizen as subject of the nation and the nation as subject of the law have always shared international legal space as alternative realities. Judicial perspective may be such that each has frequently been hidden from the other, but both visions co-exist in the legal system. It is this co-existence of incompatible ideas that has allowed rights talk to fall back on law enforcement, and the Constitution to merge with international relations.

The basic norm of the constitutional order can be seen as either the restricted state or the empowered state, while the basic norm of the international order can be seen as either the unrestrained sovereign or the submerged sovereign within a system larger than itself. Either way, where the two come together, as in extradition law, the basic norms are relative and dependent on perspective.

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309 See Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight 103 (1971) (discussing contradictions in literary language and how “the one always lay hidden within the other as the sun lies hidden within a shadow, or truth within error.”).

310 For a general theoretical explanation of this possibility and its relationship to linear logic, see Hector C. Sabelli, et. al., Anger, Fear, Depression, and Crime: Physiological and Psychological Studies Using the Process Method, in Robin Robertson & Allan Combs, Chaos Theory in Psychology and the Life Sciences 65, 67 (1995) (“Opposite actions, each asymmetric, complement each other to create partial symmetries, such as cycles, folds, and structures, rather than neutralizing each other in formless equilibrium.”).

311 This harks back to Chief Justice Marshall’s view of popular sovereignty, whereby constitutional power flows up from the founders of the Constitution who define the specific powers of government. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 326 (1819) (trumpeting sovereignty of the people in constitutional assembly over sovereignty of the several states). For the relationship of Marshall’s take on popular sovereignty to international law, see Edward M. Morgan, Internalization of Customary International Law: An Historical Perspective, 12 Yale J. Int’l L. 63, 65 (1987), discussing Chief Justice Marshall’s assertion of the power of the judiciary over the executive for purposes of internalization.

312 This harks back to Lord Atkin’s view of state sovereignty, whereby constitutional power flows down from the Crown at the pinnacle of the constitutional order. See A.-G. Can. v. A.-G. Ontario (Labour Conventions Case), [1937] A.C. 326 (P.C.) (discussing the ratification of treaty in British and Canadian constitutional law entails executive act or Royal assent). For the relationship of the Privy Council’s take on state sovereignty to international law, see Edward M. Morgan, Criminal Process, International Law, and Extraterritorial Crime, 38 U. Toronto L. J. 245, 249 (1988), explaining that the Privy Council believed international law derived from state sovereignty because states consented to restrictions on their freedoms.

313 See Kelsen, supra note 69, at 368 (stating that basic norms of state formation are a matter of perspective and can be judged only in a relative sense from either constitutional law or international law).
One is almost tempted to say that “subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall within [individual rights], may in another aspect and for another purpose fall within [international cooperation].”\textsuperscript{314} American pressure to traffic in fugitive traffickers may have pushed for a change in legal direction,\textsuperscript{315} but the circular road the law travels \textit{en route} to its drug extraditions was already in place.

\textsuperscript{314} See Hodge v. The Queen, [1883] 9 A.C. 117, 130 (P.C.) (addressing the double aspect doctrine for interpreting the British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.): “[s]ubjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall within sect. 92, may in another aspect and for another purpose fall within sect. 91”).

\textsuperscript{315} On the tilt toward law enforcement objectives generally spawned by the international “war on drugs,” see Ethan A. Nadelmann, \textit{Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society}, 44 INT’L Org. 479, 526 (1990) (discussing how developments in drug testing and the drugs themselves will change the drug enforcement regime). On the link to foreign policy and international security, see David Bewley-Taylor and Martin Jelsma, \textit{The Internalization of the War on Drugs: Illicit Drugs as Moral Evil and Useful Enemy, in Selling US Wars} 270 (2007), examining the war on drugs and its damaging impact on U.S. relations with many other countries in the world.