 PROFILE


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1. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. antidumping law suffers from a series of defects in its implementation, resulting in the unwarranted finding of illegal predatory pricing by foreign companies. In light of the existing technical flaws outlined in this Article, it is clear that the U.S. antidumping law is merely a form of protectionism, designed to serve the interests of domestic industry at the expense of consumers.

This Article briefly profiles the U.S. antidumping law in light of the U.S.-Korean trade experience. Section 2 provides background information on the U.S. antidumping law. Section 3 discusses the current U.S.-Korean trade policy. Section 4 analyzes some of the shortcomings of the U.S. law, using the U.S. relationship with Korea as a model for understanding these problems. Section 5 discusses the threat that the existing antidumping law poses as a means of harassing foreign producers. Section 6 addresses the effects of antidumping that are often overlooked by policy makers. In light of both the protectionist nature of the statute as well as the defects in the implementation of the statute, this Article concludes that a reexamination of the U.S. antidumping law is necessary, and that an outright repeal should be considered.

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Traditionally, dumping is defined as selling an internationally traded good at a lower price in one national market than in another. By dumping, an international firm can increase its profits by discriminating among customers, charging different customers different prices for virtually identical products. For example, if some consumers are willing to pay $10 for widgets and others are willing to pay $15, a firm will maximize its profits if it can successfully charge a higher price to the consumer who is willing to pay more. In general, domestic producers are harmed by dumping policies because when the price of dumped goods falls below the price of domestically produced goods, domestic consumers buy the foreign goods. Consumers, however, are the beneficiaries of these lower priced goods. There is a widespread view among international trade experts that the purpose of the antidumping duties imposed by the United States is to protect domestic industries from competition. According to the conventional theory upon which the antidumping law is based, foreign companies should be assessed for dumping if their purpose is to limit competition by driving other producers out of the domestic market. A number of commentators have concluded, however, that predatory pricing either does not exist, or exists only rarely. If predatory pricing does exist, it only inures to the benefit of consumers.

2.1. The U.S. Statute

Since the Revenue Act of 1916, the United States has enacted numerous trade laws and regulations aimed at protecting various domestic industries from "unfair" competition. The present antidumping law in the United States is based on the Trade Agreements Act of 1979. In essence, if imported goods are sold at "less than fair value" and "an industry in the United States is (i) materially injured, or (ii) is threatened with material injury," then the United States assesses a dumping duty equivalent to the amount by which the "foreign market value" exceeds the U.S. price.

The Trade Agreements Act has been modified over the past several years. The most significant change was the 1984 amendment which requires an assessment of the injuries to domestic companies from alleged dumping by examining the prices of competing imports. In addition, Congress has recently shifted the administration of the antidumping law from the Treasury Department to the Commerce Department, indicating Congressional intent to aggressively impose dumping duties.

2.2. Administration of the Antidumping Law

Antidumping actions may be initiated by a manufacturer that produces a product similar to the good allegedly being dumped. Once a petition is filed, the Commerce Department begins an inquiry, which usually involves sending questionnaires and requests for documents to the companies that are allegedly dumping. The Commerce Department

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7 Id. § 1673.

8 See Knoll, supra note 5, at 269-70 & n.31 (1987).


10 See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 675.
has the sole authority to prescribe the format of the reply, the
time within which a reply must be made and is the sole judge
of the adequacy of the reply.\footnote{Id.} The Commerce Department
also is the ultimate decision-maker in the underlying matter
for which the information is sought.

The administration of this system has been criticized for
making unreasonable demands on foreign producers for
data.\footnote{See, e.g., James Bovard, \textit{U.S. Protectionists Claim a Russian Victim},
\textit{WALL ST. J.}, June 8, 1992, at A-10.} For example, the Commerce Department imposed a
115\% dumping duty on uranium imports from six republics of
the former Soviet Union\footnote{See id. For more on the antidumping investigation that was filed in
determination).} for a period of time that predates
the separate political existence of these republics.\footnote{See \textit{Bovard, supra} note 12.} In effect,
the Commerce Department held the six republics responsible
for the pricing behavior of the former Soviet Union. As part of
its investigation, the Commerce Department sent the six
governments a sixty-six page questionnaire in English,
demanding detailed information regarding their uranium
operations.\footnote{Id.} The Commerce Department concluded that the
six republics were involved in dumping activities despite the
republics' inability to defend themselves by complying with the
document requests.\footnote{Id.} The Ministry of Atomic Power and
Industry of the Soviet Union could have provided the
information, but it had been abolished a few months earlier.
In addition, much of the information was highly
confidential.\footnote{Id.}

This example illustrates how the information demanded by
the Commerce Department can be highly burdensome for
producers. The Commerce Department can demand a
tremendous amount of information, subsequently leaving

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\footnote{Id.}

\footnote{See \textit{Bovard, supra} note 12.}

\footnote{Id.}

\footnote{Id.}
foreign producers in a double-bind. In essence, it appears that any refusal to comply is regarded as a confession of dumping, resulting in the imposition of the highest possible dumping margins. Foreign producers may choose not to comply, however, because the Commerce Department has often permitted confidential information to slip into the hands of U.S. competitors.\textsuperscript{18}

Another difficulty with the administration of the U.S. antidumping law is that it is jointly administered. This overlapping jurisdiction of both the Commerce Department and the United States International Trade Commission ("ITC") has resulted in confusion regarding each agency's function.\textsuperscript{19} The Commerce Department initiates antidumping investigations, determines whether there has been dumping or subsidization, and publishes the resulting orders. Simultaneously, the ITC determines whether a domestic industry has been materially injured or threatened with injury, or whether the growth of a domestic industry is being materially retarded. The statute and existing case law grant the Commerce Department the sole authority to determine standing.\textsuperscript{20} It is the ITC, however, which is charged with the authority for defining the relevant domestic industry and assessing whether that industry has been materially injured. This appears to be an anomaly, because the [ITC], the agency with the most detailed information about a particular industry, is precluded from evaluating a party's standing to petition on behalf of that industry. As a result, it could be argued that the Tariff Act cannot have granted the Commerce Department the sole authority to determine standing questions and that


\textsuperscript{20} At least two commentators take the position that the Commerce Department has the sole statutory power to make standing determinations. See Edwin J. Madaj & Charles H. Nalls, \textit{Bifurcation Without Direction: The United States International Trade Commission and the Question of Petitioner Standing in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases}, 22 \textit{Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus.} 673 (1991).
the [ITC] must also have such authority.\textsuperscript{21}

From the time a petition is filed, the law requires the Commerce Department to make a preliminary determination as to standing within 160 days and make a final determination within another 75 days.\textsuperscript{22} The Commerce Department, however, may extend a preliminary antidumping investigation for 50 more days and the final determination for 60 days, under certain circumstances.\textsuperscript{23} The final determination by the ITC as to material injury must be made within 390 days after the petition is filed.\textsuperscript{24} Both the ITC and the Commerce Department must agree that a U.S. industry has been materially injured before a dumping violation can be found. If either the ITC or the Commerce Department finds otherwise, no dumping margin is established.

3. THE U.S.-KOREAN TRADE RELATIONSHIP

In recent years, the trade relationship between the United States and Korea has become prominent. Korea is now the eighth largest trading partner of the United States, and the United States is the largest trading partner of Korea.\textsuperscript{25} Trade between these two countries has increased rapidly in the past quarter-century because of the industrialization of Korea. As a result of export-oriented industrialization, the per capita GNP grew to nearly $7,466 in 1993,\textsuperscript{26} a dramatic contrast to the meager $80 per capita GNP in 1961. Korea has been called "tomorrow's power house"\textsuperscript{27} and "Asia's next giant."\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{21} Id. at 674.
\textsuperscript{23} See JACkSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 676.
\textsuperscript{25} KOREA ECON. REP., Sept. 1993, at 22 col. 1.
\textsuperscript{26} KOREAN CENT. DAILY, Mar. 26, 1994, at 1.
\textsuperscript{27} Louis Kraar, Korea: Tomorrow's Powerhouse, FORTUNE, Aug. 15, 1988, at 75, 75.
\textsuperscript{28} See ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989).
3.1. U.S. Trade Barriers to Korean Exports

While the United States has been one of the most open economies in the world, it continues to impede trade with high tariffs, import quotas, and administered protection. Although the average U.S. tariff is small and now stands at about 5%, tariffs remain large for a number of industries. These industries typically involve goods that are labor-intensive and production-intensive. The average U.S. tariff on textiles is 11%, while the average rate on apparel is 20% and may be as high as 35%. Tariff rates on footwear range from 10% to 40%, while tariffs on leather goods such as gloves, handbags and luggage range from 12% to 16%. Korea's comparative advantage vis a vis the United States depends at least partially on the production of these types of goods. Korea's exports of apparel, textiles, footwear, and leather products accounted for nearly 40% of its total exports to the United States in 1991. These high U.S. tariff rates significantly impede Korean exports to the United States.

In addition to high tariffs, the United States also employs quantitative restrictions to limit imports. Two of these quantitative restrictions are of particular importance to Korea. First, the Multifiber Arrangement ("MFA") is a system of bilateral quantitative restraints used to limit textile and apparel imports from developing countries. The United States has negotiated several bilateral agreements with Korea, restricting textile and apparel exports from Korea to an annual growth rate of 1%. This restriction has contributed to the decline of Korea's share of textile and apparel exports to the

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29 According to the estimate by the Korean Central Daily, one of the leading newspapers in Seoul (with daily circulation of eight million copies), the "degree of trade liberalization" as of the end of 1992 was 78% for the United States, 58% for Korea, 54% for Japan, 80% for Germany, 88% for Singapore, and 89% for Hong Kong, respectively. Joongang Ilbo, What are the Characteristics of Developed Countries?, KOREAN CENT. DAILY, Sept. 22, 1993, at 5.

30 The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints, Phase I: Manufacturing, USITC Pub. 2222, Inv. No. 332-262, at 4-2 and 4-3 (Oct. 1989) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2222] (report to the Senate Committee on Finance) (table showing the percentage tariff rates for textiles and apparel).

31 Id. at 2-7.

The second important quantitative restraint involves the steel industry, which accounts for a significant portion of Korea's total exports to the United States. Steel trade between the United States and Korea has been reduced to 5.3%, and in the absence of a Multilateral Steel Agreement ("MSA"), more restrictive measures are likely to impede the steel trade between the United States and Korea.

Over the past decade, a number of Korean industries have been investigated for allegedly dumping their products in the United States by selling goods at prices that are too low.

3.2. Korean Trade Barriers To U.S. Exports

Prior to the Tariff Reduction Plan announced in 1988, Korea's average tariff rate was about 21%, only a slight decrease from the 25% rate in 1979. By 1991, the Korean trade reforms adopted in 1988 had reduced the average tariff rate in Korea to 11.4%. Further reforms should drive the average tariff rate down to 7.9% by the end of 1994. These

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Five percent of the total Korean exports to the United States is $1 billion. For Korea's relatively small economy, this is a significant amount.

35 Products that Korea allegedly dumped on the United States market include automotive batteries, ball bearings, brass sheet and strip, cast-iron pipe fittings, cold-rolled carbon steel, color picture tubes, computer chips, flat-rolled carbon steel, industrial belts, motorcycle batteries, nitrocellulose, offshore platform jackets and piles, photo albums, polyethylene terephthalate film, sheet and strip, stainless steel butt weld pipe fittings, steel pipes and tubes, sweaters, telephone systems and subassemblies, tubular goods, and welded stainless steel pipes. Full citations to each of these actions are given in Section 3.3., and a brief summary of each of these actions is provided in the Appendix to this Article.

36 See IL SAKONG, KOREA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 125 (1993).


38 See id.
rates are much higher than the 5% average tariff rate imposed by member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD").

While many of Korea's trade reforms have been voluntary, the United States has been successful in pressuring Korea to liberalize its trade policy in several areas through section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which allows the United States to retaliate against trading partners that unreasonably or unjustifiably restrict U.S. exports. Section 301 was used successfully to affect the trading of Korean products such as beef, cigarettes, and wine.

Despite the reforms made by the Korean government and the subsequent reduction in formal trade barriers, the United States has protested recently that informal trade barriers have allowed Korea to wage an "anti-import campaign." The Korean government insists that restrictions on "luxury" import goods are designed to reduce excessive consumption and to encourage saving.

3.3. Antidumping Duty Investigations

In recent years, the United States has initiated numerous antidumping actions against Korean companies and industries. Antidumping actions have been initiated against those Korean industries producing automotive batteries, ball bearings,

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39 The OECD is an international organization founded in 1961 to stimulate economic progress and world trade. It is currently composed of 24 developed countries such as the United States, Japan, Canada and Western European countries.


43 USITC Pub. 2554, supra note 33, at 121-22.


45 See Ball Bearings, Mounted or Unmounted, and Parts Thereof, from Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Hong Kong, Hungary, Mexico, the People's Republic of China, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey and Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 2374, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-307 and 731-TA-498-511 (Apr. 1991) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2374] (preliminary determinations finding that no material harm has resulted to the United States by the imports from the listed nations).
brass sheet and strip,\(^4\) cast-iron pipe fittings,\(^4\) cold-rolled carbon steel,\(^4\) color picture tubes,\(^4\) computer chips,\(^5\) flat-rolled carbon steel,\(^5\) industrial belts,\(^5\) motorcycle batteries,\(^5\) nitrocellulose,\(^5\) offshore platform jackets and


\(^{51}\) See Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 2549, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319 to 354 and 731-TA-573 to 620 (Aug. 1992) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2549] (preliminary determination); Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom vol. I, USITC Pub. 2664, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319 to 332, 334, 336-342, 344, 347-353 and 731-TA-573 to 579, 581-592, 594-597, 599-609, 612-619 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2664-I] (final determination); Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom vol. II, USITC Pub. 2664, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319 to 332, 334, 336-342, 344, 347-353 and 731-TA-573 to 579, 581-592, 594-597, 599-609, 612-619 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2664-II] (final determination).

\(^{52}\) See Industrial Belts from Israel, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC Pub. 2194, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-293 and 731-TA-412 to 419 (May 1989) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2194] (final determination).

piles, photo albums, polyethylene terephthalate film, sheet and strip, stainless steel butt-weld pipe fittings, steel pipes and tubes, sweaters, telephone systems and subassemblies, tubular goods, and welded stainless steel.

54 See Industrial Nitrocellulose from Brazil, Japan, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 2231, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-439 to 445 (Nov. 1989) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2231] (preliminary determination); Industrial Nitrocellulose from Brazil, Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC Pub. 2295, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-439 to 444 (June 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2295] (final determination).


60 See Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2312, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-448 to 450 (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2312] (final determination); Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan: Views on Remand, USITC Pub. 2577, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-448 to 450 (Nov. 1992) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2577] (final determination).


62 See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Brazil, Korea, and Spain, USITC
pipes. A summary of each of these actions is contained in the Appendix.

4. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF U.S. ANTIDUMPING LAW: AN ILLUSTRATIVE LOOK AT KOREA

The implementation of the U.S. antidumping law is flawed. First, the method of computing dumping duties is unduly biased against foreign manufacturers. Second, the U.S. antidumping law does not adequately take into account the fluctuations of international exchange rates in determining whether dumping has occurred. Third, the process by which the U.S. antidumping law treats goods for which there is no domestic market in the exporter's country is often inconsistent.

4.1. Computational Problems: The Use of Average Prices

In essence, under U.S. law, the price of the goods in the United States is compared to the price of the goods sold in the exporter's home market ("foreign market price"). If the foreign market price exceeds the U.S. price, a dumping duty equivalent to the difference between the two prices will be applied. The problem lies in the manner by which U.S. law determines the U.S. price and the foreign market price. The Commerce Department uses average prices to set foreign market price. A representative sample of individual U.S. sales are then compared to this average foreign market price. If the U.S. price is less than the foreign market price in any individual case, dumping is determined to have occurred.

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See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 679.

See id. at 678-79.

For example, in the Korean computer chip (DRAM) case, the Commerce Department made one hundred comparisons between the prices of Korean products and the prices of U.S. products. The Commerce Department found that in forty-seven cases, the Korean company undersold the U.S. company by a range of 0.1% to 28%. In forty-eight cases, the Korean product had a higher price than the U.S. product by a range of 0.3% to 69.2%. In the remaining five cases, the prices of the Korean product were identical to those of the U.S. products.

In nearly one-half of the cases, the price charged by the Korean firm was actually more than that charged by the domestic firm. This suggests that as to half of its products there was no dumping. The Commerce Department, however, can impose a dumping margin if a foreign company sells any units in the U.S. market at a price lower than the average foreign price for the period being investigated. Therefore, if the foreign exporter charges a range of prices over some relevant period of time, it may be that some of the prices will be below the average foreign price and some will be above the average foreign price. This means that some of the sales could potentially be categorized as dumping. Such an approach is illogical and inherently unfair. Indeed, the General Accounting Office has criticized the practice of using the average price for these reasons as well as because this

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67 See infra Appendix.
69 The dissenting opinion in the final determination raised another point: Although the underselling/overselling comparisons are almost evenly split, we do not place much weight on evidence of underselling. As discussed above, the confluence of demand for memory and the point in the product life cycle largely explain the price of DRAMs at any particular point in time. As a result of market forces, price comparisons are only meaningful if they are contemporaneous, i.e., at the same point in the DRAM product life cycle. In this investigation, the price comparisons between domestic DRAMs and subject imports are not contemporaneous. Accordingly, the price comparisons do not constitute substantial evidence that any underselling is significant.
USITC Pub. 2629, supra note 50, at 49.
70 See BOVARD, supra note 9, at 120-21.
practice increases existing dumping margins or creates new ones.72 The Court of International Trade has also criticized this method of price comparison, stating that it “leads to loss of reasonable fairness in the results.”73 This averaging method produces a built-in bias against foreign producers. It compares the average foreign price with the price at which each sale is made in the United States. When sales are made at a price above this “fair value,” it treats such sales as if they were made at fair value. Therefore, these sales are assigned a less than fair value (“LTFV”) amount of zero rather than a negative value. Thus, when the Commerce Department combines sales made at prices lower than fair value with those made at prices higher than fair value, it invariably skews the statistical result in favor of a higher dumping margin.74 In some cases, this method calculates a dumping margin where none exists.75

An alternative method for computing the dumping margin is necessary. Using a negative number rather than zero when

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74 See Knoll, supra note 5, at 278.

75 For example, assume that the average foreign price for a certain product is $5.00 and the actual prices charged in the U.S. market for five specific domestic sales are $6.00, $5.50, $5.00, $4.50, and $4.00. The less than fair value (“LTFV”) amounts would be computed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case No.</th>
<th>Average Foreign Price</th>
<th>Actual Sale Price in U.S.</th>
<th>LTFV Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td>$5.50</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td>$0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td>$4.50</td>
<td>$0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td>$1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first three cases, no dumping margins are found because the price charged in the United States is higher or equal to the average price charged in foreign markets. There is a dumping margin in the fourth and fifth cases, however, because the U.S. price is less than the average foreign price. Yet if one takes the average of the prices charged in the United States, it is exactly the same as the average foreign price—$5.00. But the LTFV amounts add up to a positive number, $1.50, because whenever the U.S. price is higher than the average foreign price, the LTFV amount is assigned a zero value, whereas whenever the U.S. price is lower than the average foreign price, the LTFV amount is assigned a positive value.
analyzing prices above fair value provides, overall, a more accurate calculation of the dumping margin.

To illustrate, assume that a Korean firm sold ten units of a product in Korea for $20 per unit on January 20. Assume that it sold an equal number of units in the U.S. market on the same day for the same price. On June 15, the same Korean company sold ten more units in Korea for $10 per unit, and ten units in the United States for the same price. The weighted average foreign market price ("fair value") is calculated to be $15 per unit. According to the method currently used by the Commerce Department, a LTFV of $0 and a LTFV of $5 should be assigned to the January and the June sales, respectively. This results in a dumping margin of 16.67%.

This entire calculation is flawed on a number of counts. It is questionable to compare the actual price charged for particular U.S. sales to the average foreign price. Individual foreign prices should be compared with individual U.S. prices, or average foreign prices should be compared with average U.S. prices. The correct way to compute the dumping margin would be to assign a LTFV of minus $5, not $0, to the January sale, thus resulting in a zero dumping margin.

4.2. Shifts In Exchange Rates

In order to compare the foreign price with the domestic price, the foreign price must be converted into dollars. As a

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76 This number is derived as follows: 
\[
\frac{20 \times (10 \text{ units}) + 10 \times (10 \text{ units})}{20 \text{ units}} = 15
\]
weighted average foreign market price.

77 The dumping margin is calculated with the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Korean Price</th>
<th>U.S. Price</th>
<th>Average Price</th>
<th>Foreign Price</th>
<th>LTFV Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>$20</td>
<td>$20</td>
<td>$15</td>
<td>$15</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/15</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>$15</td>
<td>$15</td>
<td>$5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dumping margin is computed as follows:

\[
\frac{0 \times (10/20) + 5 \times (10/20)}{15} = \frac{25}{15} = 16.67\%.
\]

78 The dumping margin is calculated with the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Korean Price</th>
<th>U.S. Price</th>
<th>Average Price</th>
<th>Foreign Price</th>
<th>LTFV Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/20</td>
<td>$20</td>
<td>$20</td>
<td>$15</td>
<td>$15</td>
<td>$-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/15</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>$15</td>
<td>$15</td>
<td>$5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dumping margin is computed as follows:

\[
\frac{-5 \times (10/20) + 5 \times (10/20)}{15} = \frac{0}{15} = 0.00\%.
\]
result, shifts in exchange rates can cause a company, through no fault of its own, to be liable for dumping. Ever since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, exchange rates have been floating rather than fixed. Currently, the way the Commerce Department uses exchange rates creates cases of dumping where none previously existed. For example, if the British Pound is equal to $1.50 at the time the contract is entered into and the price of the product in question is £1 in England and $1.50 in the United States, then there is no dumping because the price is the same in both countries. But if the exchange rate shifts so that £1 equals $1.75, then there is dumping because the product sells in England for an amount equivalent to $1.75, whereas the price in the United States is $1.50. Consequently, even if there was no intent to dump, a foreign exporter can still be found to have dumped if the exchange rates shifted in the wrong direction. Exporters that are based in countries that have hyperinflation can be severely penalized by the Commerce Department's

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79 When exchange rates were fixed, it was simpler to predict future exchange rates because they would be the same as current exchange rates. But having fixed, rather than flexible, exchange rates causes other problems. For example, to prevent a run on (or toward) a particular country's currency, central banks have to intervene by buying or selling the target currency. One advantage of flexible exchange rates over fixed exchange rates is that flexible rates provide a check on inflation. A country that inflates its currency at a faster than average rate will have the value (and the desirability) of its currency adversely affected in the international marketplace because supply and demand will automatically shift to reflect the currency's true relative value. Having fixed exchange rates, coupled with central bank intervention, prevents this natural shift from taking place, thus causing disruption and distortion throughout all the major economies. For arguments in favor of flexible exchange rates, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 157-203 (1953); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. ROOSA, THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS: FREE VS. FIXED EXCHANGE RATES (1967), reprinted in MILTON FRIEDMAN, DOLLARS AND DEFICITS 218-34 (1968).


methodology because of frequent devaluation of their home currency.

4.3. Comparing Prices In Dissimilar Markets

When the allegedly dumped good is not sold in the exporter's home market it can be difficult to determine the foreign market price. In such cases, the Commerce Department compares the prices the foreign exporter charges in the United States to those it charges in a third country. For example, several Korean sweater companies were penalized because they sold their sweaters in the U.S. market for slightly less than the price charged in other foreign markets. The Commerce Department's investigation determined that the price of the sweaters one Korean company sold in the United States was 1.20% lower than the price of the sweaters in Mexico. The price another company charged in the United States was 1.11% lower than the price charged in Canada. A third company sold its sweaters for 0.73% less in the United States than in the United Kingdom. The Commerce Department found that all of these companies had violated U.S. antidumping law.

Several factors were ignored in the Commerce Department's analysis. For example, each shipment of sweaters was a custom order, and there were significant differences in the actual sweaters the Korean companies exported to the three different countries. The Commerce Department, however, treated the sweaters as identical.

In light of this criticism, it is appropriate to consider what standard the Commerce Department should have used in

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81 Some commentators have suggested that the Commerce Department should use a different methodology in cases involving a hyper-inflationary currency. See Gilbert B. Kaplan et al., Cost Analysis Under the Antidumping Law, 21 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 357, 409-10 (1988).
82 See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 679.
83 See USITC Pub. 2312, supra note 60, at B-33.
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 See BOVARD, supra note 9, at 121; see also USITC Pub. 2577, supra note 60, cited in I. M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 396 (2d ed. 1992).
arriving at the price of Korean sweaters. Certainly it should have allowed for differences in quality and type, and in addition, it should have considered each shipment as a custom order.

5. USE OF THE ANTIDUMPING LAW TO HARASS FOREIGN COMPETITION

More antidumping penalties on low-priced imported goods have been imposed in the United States than in any other country. Under the U.S. rules, nearly all the foreign sellers that were investigated for dumping between 1980 and 1989 were found liable. Even if a company ultimately is determined not to have dumped, the time and money involved in settling the case can bankrupt a small or medium-size company, and the expense would force even a large company to think twice about exporting to the United States. As a result, the U.S. antidumping law significantly chills foreign competitors from exporting their goods to the United States at all. For example, the Matsushita company withdrew from one antidumping case that involved the investigation of small business telephone systems—consequently abandoning more than $50 million in export sales—because the Commerce Department requested on a Friday afternoon that the Company translate 3,000 pages of Japanese financial documents into English by the following Monday morning.

Another example suggests that at least one antidumping investigation “effectively wrecked the exports of hundreds of Taiwanese sweater companies because a few small Taiwanese companies could not quickly respond to [the Commerce Department’s] massive information requests.” The Commerce Department required that the companies respond to a 100-page English questionnaire and provide more than

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89 Only six of the Commerce Department investigations made between 1980 and 1986 resulted in those investigated being found not liable for dumping. See Bovard, supra note 18, at F13. For a summary of antidumping investigations undertaken between 1979 and 1990 and their outcomes, see DESTLER, supra note 87, at 326-403.

90 See BOVARD, supra note 9, at 136.

91 See BOVARD, supra note 9, at 139.
The U.S. Antidumping Law

200,000 pieces of information. The management “team” of one of these companies consisted of a business run solely by a husband and his wife. The Commerce Department held that lack of management was an inadequate justification for failing to respond. Another company did not respond because a fire destroyed all of its records. This too was determined to be an insufficient reason for not responding to the Department’s inquiry. Because of the lack of response from these companies, and other small Taiwanese manufacturers, a 21.94% dumping duty was assessed on all Taiwanese sweater manufacturers, which when combined with a 34% tariff, makes it very difficult, if not impossible, for a Taiwanese company to sell sweaters in the United States. Within a year after this investigation commenced, more than two-thirds of the Taiwanese companies that manufacture acrylic sweaters had gone out of business.

Domestic companies are aware of this situation, and often use the antidumping law to harass or intimidate foreign competitors. This harassment is likely to occur whenever the cost of filing a petition is lower than the potential benefits to the petitioning company from an investigation. The government pays all of the costs of an antidumping prosecution. Therefore, the domestic firm that initiates the proceeding does not incur any cost, but stands to gain much if a foreign competitor is either forced to raise its prices, or is turned away from the U.S. market completely. Thus, by initiating a proceeding, a domestic producer can reduce competition from abroad and avoid lowering prices to meet a foreign producer’s prices.

6. THE HARMs OF ANTIDUMPING PROTECTIONISM

The U.S. antidumping law is unduly protectionist. As numerous studies have indicated, the antidumping law

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92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 155.
98 See BOVARD, supra note 9, at 78-83.
produces more losers than winners. Although domestic industry is certainly being protected by protectionist policies, a study of 203 ITC investigations in five industries found that protectionism was not effective in stimulating output in the protected domestic industry because the reactions of consumers tended to offset the actions of producers. In essence, if the protected industry raises the price of its product, consumers will often shun the high-priced product and buy a lower-priced substitute product instead. A study by the Congressional Budget Office also reached this same conclusion.

There are a number of general results associated with protectionist antidumping policy. First, when the government narrowly defines an industry so that it can show injury from imports, users and foreign suppliers often shift to substitute items, which essentially circumvents the antidumping law. Second, when the United States adopts a temporary protectionist measure in order to protect an “infant” industry or to provide breathing room for an ailing

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99 We will discuss some of these studies infra.
102 See Baldwin & Green, supra note 100, at 223-24.
103 The “infant” sugar industry has been protected by the U.S. government since 1816. This protection has resulted in the domestic sugar industry charging up to four times the world price for sugar. Restrictions on sugar imports in 1987, for example, cost American consumers between $2.1 and $3 billion. The high cost of sugar led to increases in the price of corn sweeteners, which cost consumers an additional $1 billion a year. Sugar became so expensive that Coke and Pepsi switched to high fructose corn syrup, which caused U.S. sugar consumption to fall by more than 500,000 tons a year. Thus, the long-run effects of protection may actually harm the protected industry more than it helps. See generally BOVARD, supra note 9, at 71-72; Bruce L. Gardner, The United States, in AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD 47 (Fred H. Sanderson ed., 1990); Janet Novack, Three Yards and a Cloud of (Sugar) Dust, FORBES, Sept. 4, 1989, at 39.
104 The breathing room argument has been used to provide “temporary”
industry, problems arise because such temporary measures tend to become permanent. Consequently, industries that are relieved of the pressure of competition do not take advantage of the opportunity to compete and often use their resources to lobby the legislature to continue the protection rather than invest in cost reduction. In short, using the antidumping law to protect domestic industry from Korean exporters may result in domestic industries becoming uncompetitive.

Consumers must also bear the cost of the current U.S. trade policy with Korea. Antidumping duties have led to a reduction in consumer choice. If goods are prevented from entering the United States because antidumping duties make the product’s price too high to be competitive, or because quotas or the antidumping law prevents the goods from even crossing the border, consumers may have to settle for their second or third choice. This is economically inefficient. The loss in utility is the difference between the utility consumers would gain by purchasing their first choice product and the utility they receive by settling for their second or third choice.

7. CONCLUSION

This Article has examined the shortcomings of U.S. antidumping policy using the Korean trade experience as a case study. Given the protectionist nature of U.S. antidumping policy generally, which is compounded by technical flaws in the existing U.S. statute—problems in computing dumping margins, inadequate consideration of fluctuating exchange rates, and inconsistent treatment of goods not sold in the exporter’s home market—the only proper recourse is a serious and comprehensive reexamination, or protection for a number of declining industries, such as automobiles, steel and textiles. In the steel industry, for example, various government policies have cushioned it from foreign competition at least since 1969 through quota agreements and restrictions. Yet unit costs have risen and production has fallen. Labor productivity actually declined after the passage of temporary protectionist measures and cost-cutting has not been implemented. Investment in the steel industry actually declined after the government imposed import restrictions. See WAYNE GABLE, MYTHS ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TRADE 14 (n.d.).

even outright repeal, of the U.S. antidumping statute.
APPENDIX\textsuperscript{106}

Summarized below are twenty antidumping and countervailing duty investigations that have been conducted against Korean companies and industries in the last decade.

1. AUTOMOTIVE BATTERIES\textsuperscript{107}

An investigation began on May 8, 1985 by General Battery International Corporation of Puerto Rico\textsuperscript{108} to determine whether certain 12-volt lead-acid type automotive storage batteries from Korea were being sold, or were likely to be sold, in the United States market at less than fair value.\textsuperscript{109} The ITC unanimously determined that "there [was] no reasonable indication that an industry in the United States [was] materially injured; or threatened with material injury; or that the establishment of an industry in the United States was materially retarded by reason of imports from the Republic of Korea."\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{106} Citations to each footnote are given in full in the Appendix for the reader's convenience, although they are also cited in footnotes 44-63 in the body of the Article. Subsequent citations to sources in the Appendix will refer to the citation given in the Appendix, not to citations given in the body of the Article.

\textsuperscript{107} 12-Volt Lead-Acid Type Automotive Storage Batteries from the Republic of Korea, USITC Pub. 1710, Inv. No. 731-TA-261 (June 1985) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 1710] (preliminary determination).

\textsuperscript{108} 12-Volt Lead-Acid Type Automotive Storage Batteries from Korea, 50 Fed. Reg. 20,302 (Dep't Comm. 1985) (institution of preliminary antidumping investigation).

\textsuperscript{109} 12-Volt Lead-Acid Type Automotive Storage Batteries from Korea, 50 Fed. Reg. 23,486 (Dep't Comm. 1985) (initiation of antidumping duty investigation).

\textsuperscript{110} USITC Pub. 1710, \textit{supra} note 107, at 1.
2. BALL BEARINGS

This investigation was instigated as a result of a petition filed by the Torrington Company of Torrington, Connecticut on February 13, 1991 to determine whether Korean ball bearing imports were being sold in the United States for less than fair value. The Torrington Company alleged that the Korean dumping margins ranged between 7.41% and 149.78%. The ITC determined that there was no reasonable indication of dumping.

3. BRASS SHEET AND STRIP

This investigation was initiated as the result of a petition filed March 10, 1986 by American Brass, Bridgeport Brass Company, Chase Brass and Copper Company, Hussey Metals Division, the Miller Company, Olin Corporation—Brass Group, and Revere Copper Products, Inc., all domestic manufacturers of brass sheet and strip, and by three unions: the International Union—Allied Industrial Workers of America...
(AFL-CIO); Mechanics Educational Society of America (Local 56); and United Steelworkers of America (AFL/CIO-CLC). The petition was filed on behalf of the domestic industry in the United States that casts, rolls and finishes brass sheet and strip. The ITC found that brass sheet and strip from Korea were being, or were likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value, and found the weighted-average dumping margin to be 7.17%. In arriving at this determination, the ITC made fair value comparisons based on sales of the class or kind of merchandise shipped to the United States for the period October 1, 1985 to March 31, 1986, the period of investigation.

4. CAST-IRON PIPE FITTINGS

This investigation began from petitions filed July 31, 1985 by the Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings Committee, which is composed of Stanley G. Flagg & Co., Inc., ITT-Grinnell Corp., Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., U-Brand Corp., and Ward Foundry Division of Clevepak Corp. The petitions charged that Korean companies were selling their malleable cast-iron pipe fittings in the United States at less than fair value. The preliminary investigation found a reasonable indication that an industry in the United States was materially injured due to the importation of the merchandise in question. The ITC's final determination found dumping margins ranging from less than 1% to 93.42% percent, with a weighted-average

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118 Id.
119 Only one firm responded to requests for information.
120 51 Fed. Reg., supra note 117, at 40,833. The Commerce Department justified using the trade figures for only one company (Poongsan) because the imports from this company represented more than 97 percent of the total Korean imports. Id. at 40,834-35.
122 Certain Cast-Iron Pipe Fittings from Brazil, Korea and Taiwan, 51 Fed. Reg. 4660, n.2 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm. 1986) (institution of final antidumping investigations). U-Brand Corp. did not join the other committee members in filing petitions. Id. at n.2.
123 Id. at 4660.
margin of 12.48%.124

5. **COLD-ROLLED CARBON STEEL**125

This countervailing duty investigation followed a petition filed on June 18, 1984 by the United States Steel Corporation on behalf of the carbon steel structural shapes and cold-rolled carbon steel flat-rolled products (shapes and sheet) industries.126 The petition charged that certain benefits, which constituted subsidies within the meaning of the countervailing duty laws, were being provided to manufacturers, producers or exporters in Korea of (1) cold-rolled carbon steel flat-rolled products and (2) carbon steel structural shapes. The ITC found a 3.6% subsidy to exist for the first category of products. The subsidy for the second category of product was 0.37%, which was held to be de minimis, and therefore not subject to a penalty.127 According to the ITC, the following Korean programs were conferring subsidies:

- Short-term export financing under the export financing regulations,128
- Tax incentives for exporters;129
- Special depreciation;130
- Government equity infusions;131
- Reductions in port charges;132
- Tariff reductions on plants and equipment133

124 Malleable Cast Iron Pipe Fittings, Other than Grooved, from Korea, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,900-901 (Dep't Comm. 1986) (final determination of sales at less than fair value).


126 Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat-Rolled Products from Korea and Carbon Steel Structural Shapes from Korea, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,284 (Dep't Comm. 1984) (final determination).

127 Id.

128 Id. at 47,286-87.

129 Id. at 47,287.

130 Id. at 47,287-88.

131 Id. at 47,288.

132 Id.

133 Id.
Interestingly enough, the same government assistance in foreign nations labelled as subsidies under U.S. countervailing duty laws are not much different from the types of domestic assistance given by the past few administrations to help U.S. companies and industries compete in international markets.

6. COLOR PICTURE TUBES\textsuperscript{134}

This investigation was initiated on November 26, 1986 by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers; the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; the International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Technical, Salaried & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC; the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO; and the Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO.\textsuperscript{135} These unions represent four of the five producers of color picture tubes\textsuperscript{136} in the United States.\textsuperscript{137} The ITC determined that imports from Korea were being sold in the United States market for 1.91\% less than fair value.\textsuperscript{138}

7. COMPUTER CHIPS\textsuperscript{139}

This investigation was instigated by Micron Technology, Inc. of Boise, Idaho in April 1992.\textsuperscript{140} The petition requested

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\textsuperscript{136} Color picture tubes are defined as "cathode ray tubes suitable for use in the manufacture of color television receivers or other color entertainment display devices intended for television viewing." Color Picture Tubes from Korea, 52 Fed. Reg. 44,186, 44,186 (Dep't Comm. 1987) [hereinafter Color Picture Tubes] (final determination).

\textsuperscript{137} Color Picture Tubes (final investigation), supra note 135, at 28,354.

\textsuperscript{138} Color Picture Tubes, supra note 136 at 44,190.


the investigation of Goldstar Electron Co., Hyundai Electronic Industries and Samsung Electronics Co. for selling dynamic random access memory semiconductors of one megabit and above (DRAMs)\textsuperscript{141} for less than the cost of production.\textsuperscript{142} The range of dumping margins assessed, based on a comparison of U.S. prices to constructed value alleged by Micron, was for Hyundai: 94.29% - 170.89% (one meg) and 278.83% - 282.51% (four meg); for Goldstar: 132.11% - 165.29% (one meg) and 273.25% (four meg); for Samsung: 0.62% - 3.83% (one meg) and 93.18% - 97.39% (four meg).\textsuperscript{143} In arriving at these dumping margins, 100 price comparisons were made between U.S. prices and Korean prices. In forty-seven cases, the Korean price was lower than the U.S. price ranging between 0.1% and 28%. In forty-eight cases, the Korean price was higher than the domestic product price ranging from between 0.3% and 69.2%. In five cases, the prices of the two products were identical.\textsuperscript{144} In its final investigation, the ITC found no evidence of dumping.\textsuperscript{145}

\textsuperscript{141} The items covered by this petition included processed wafers, uncut die, cut die, and assembled 1 Meg and above DRAMs produced in Korea and imported directly or indirectly into the United States; processed wafers produced in Korea and further processed into finished or semi-finished 1 Meg and above DRAMs in a third country before exportation to the United States; finished or semi-finished DRAMs assembled in Korea from wafers produced in another country; memory modules, such as Single In-Line Processing Modules (SIPs) and Single In-Line Memory Modules (SIMMs), containing more than one 1-Meg or above DRAMs mounted on their own small printed circuit board, as well as memory cards, which are memory modules about the size of a credit card which are designed to be easily inserted into portable computers, printers, and similar applications; so-called video random access memory (VRAM) which is DRAM designed to improve the video performance of computers; and any future packaging and assembling of DRAMs. \textit{Id.} at 18,163.

\textsuperscript{142} Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of one Megabit and Above from the Republic of Korea, 57 Fed. Reg., 21,231 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (initiation of investigation).

\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{144} USITC Pub. 2519, \textit{supra} note 139, at A-50.

\textsuperscript{145} USITC Pub. 2629 \textit{supra} note 139, at 65.
8. FLAT-ROLLED CARBON STEEL

This investigation was initiated by Armco Steel Co., L.P.; Bethlehem Steel Corp.; Geneva Steel; Gulf States Steel, Inc. of Alabama; Inland Steel Industries, Inc.; Laclede Steel Co., Inc.; Lukens Steel Co.; National Steel Corp.; Sharon Steel Corp.; USX Corp./U.S. Steel Group; and WCI Steel, Inc. against several steel companies in Korea and steel companies in more than a dozen other countries for alleged countervailing duty and antidumping violations. In Korea's case, items under the antidumping investigation involved certain hot-rolled carbon steel flat products; certain cold-rolled carbon steel flat products; certain corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products; and certain cut-to-length carbon steel plate. The countervailing duty investigation involved certain equity infusions into POSCO (one of the Korean companies accused of being subsidized) in 1981, and from 1986 to 1988. In

\[146\] Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, USITC Pub. 2549, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319 to 354 (Aug. 1992) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2549] (preliminary determination); Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom vol. I, USITC Pub. 2664, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319 to 332, 334, 336-342, 344, 347-353, 731-TA-573 to 579, 581-592, 594-597, 599-609, 612-619 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2664-I] (final determination); Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom vol. II, USITC Pub. 2664, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-319 to 332, 334, 336-342, 344, 347-353, 731-TA-573 to 579, 581-592, 594-597, 599-609, 612-619 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2664-II] (final determination).


\[148\] The companies being sued are named in USITC Pub. 2549, supra note 146, at I-99.

\[149\] Certain Steel Products from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom, 57 Fed. Reg. 32,971 (Dep't Comm. 1992) (preliminary investigation).
addition, the investigation resulted in government land transfers to POSCO for the Pohang facility (one of POSCO’s plant facilities).\textsuperscript{151} In the case of the Korean companies, alleged dumping margins at the preliminary investigation ranged from 5.53\% to 152.84\%.\textsuperscript{152} The subsidy rate was alleged to be 11.74\%.\textsuperscript{153}

This barrage of investigations virtually closed portions of the U.S. steel market to certain kinds of foreign steel for a significant period of time.\textsuperscript{154} This put a number of U.S. steel producers in the awkward position of having to increase the amount of semi-finished steel they imported in order to fill their own orders for finished steel.\textsuperscript{155} The ITC’s final ruling stated that steel imports did not injure the U.S. industry in over half of the seventy-four cases that were investigated.\textsuperscript{156} As a result of this ruling, steel prices are expected to drop.\textsuperscript{157}

9. INDUSTRIAL BELTS\textsuperscript{158}

This investigation resulted from the petition filed on June 30, 1988 by the Gates Rubber Company of Denver, Colorado.\textsuperscript{159} The petitioner alleged that Korean industrial

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{151} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{152} Richard K. Bank, \textit{Trade Horizons}, KOREA BUS. WORLD, Aug. 1992, at 12.
\item \textsuperscript{153} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{154} Experts say that foreign steel is effectively barred from the U.S. market when dumping duties exceed 15\%. James Bovard, \textit{Steel Rulings Dump on America}, WALL ST. J., June 23, 1993, at A14.
\item \textsuperscript{155} Dana Milbank, \textit{U.S. Steel Industry’s New Strength May Soon Weaken}, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1993, at B4. Milbank points out that these suits may actually damage the steel industry in the United States because the breathing room provided by the suits allowed inefficient capacity to remain, while encouraging the growth of mini mills and making the domestic steel industry more isolated and parochial. \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{156} Asra Q. Nomani & Dana Milbank, \textit{Trade Panel Backs Foreign Steel Concerns}, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1993, at A3; see also USITC Pub. 2664-I, supra note 146.
\item \textsuperscript{157} Erle Norton & Dana Milbank, \textit{ITC Stance Puts Pressure on Steel Prices and Eases Concerns About Inflation}, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1993, at A2.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Industrial Belts from Israel, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC Pub. 2194, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-293 and 731-TA-412 to 419 (May 1989) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2194] (final determination).
\item \textsuperscript{159} Industrial Belts from Israel et al., 54 Fed. Reg. 6970-6971 (U.S. Int’l
belts\textsuperscript{160} were being sold in the United States for less than fair value. The ITC determined that the Korean industrial belts were indeed being sold, or were likely to be sold, in the United States for less than fair value,\textsuperscript{161} and estimated the average of the highest margin to be 64.3\%.\textsuperscript{162} The ITC, however, determined that the countervailing duty laws were not violated; and the estimated net subsidy of 0.41\% was held to be de minimis.\textsuperscript{163}

10. **MOTORCYCLE BATTERIES\textsuperscript{164}**

This investigation commenced on May 17, 1989 in response to a petition filed by Yuasa-Exide Battery Corp. of Reading, Pennsylvania to determine whether an industry in the United States was materially injured, or was threatened with material injury, or the establishment of an industry in the United States was materially retarded by 12-volt motorcycle batteries imported from Korea.\textsuperscript{165} The target of the investigation was Korea Storage Battery Co., Ltd.\textsuperscript{166} The ITC unanimously found that the charges were groundless.\textsuperscript{167}
11. NITROCELLULOSE\textsuperscript{168}

This investigation began as the result of a petition filed on September 19, 1989 by Hercules, Inc. of Wilmington, Delaware.\textsuperscript{169} The petitioner alleged that imports of industrial nitrocellulose from Korea were being, or were likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value.\textsuperscript{170} The ITC determined that there was a reasonable indication that an industry in the United States was materially injured as a result of these imports.\textsuperscript{171} It determined the weighted-average dumping margins to be 66.0%.\textsuperscript{172}

12. OFFSHORE PLATFORM JACKETS AND PILES\textsuperscript{173}

This investigation was initiated by Kaiser Aluminum Corporation and the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers in April, 1985.\textsuperscript{174} A countervailing duty investigation was brought against Korean manufacturers, producers and exporters of offshore platform jackets and piles for receiving benefits that constitute subsidies.\textsuperscript{175} The ITC

\textsuperscript{168} Industrial Nitrocellulose from Brazil, Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Yugoslavia, USITC Pub. 2231, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-439 to 445 (Nov. 1989) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2231] (preliminary determination); Industrial Nitrocellulose from Brazil, Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, USITC Pub. 2295, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-439 to 444 (June 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2295] (final determination).

\textsuperscript{169} Industrial Nitrocellulose from Brazil, Japan, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Yugoslavia, 54 Fed. Reg. 39,055 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm. 1989) (institution of investigation).


\textsuperscript{171} USITC Pub. 2231, \textit{supra} note 168, at 1.

\textsuperscript{172} Industrial Nitrocellulose from the Republic of Korea, 55 Fed. Reg. 21,054, 21,056 (Dep't Comm. 1990) (final determination).


\textsuperscript{175} Id. at 20,253-54.
determined that industries in the United States were materially injured by Korean imports.\textsuperscript{176}

13. \textsc{Photo Albums}\textsuperscript{177}

This investigation was instigated in January, 1985 by Esselte Pendaflex, Inc., The Holson Co., Kleer-Vu Plastics Corp. and SPM Manufacturing on behalf of the U.S. photo albums and photo album filler pages industry.\textsuperscript{178} The investigation was brought against Korean manufacturers for allegedly selling their products in the United States for less than fair value. Preliminary dumping margins ranged from 26\% to 83\%.

14. \textsc{Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet and Strip}\textsuperscript{179}

This investigation was initiated in response to a petition filed on April 27, 1990 by E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Wilmington, Delaware; Hoechst Celanese Corp., Charlotte, North Carolina; and ICI Americas, Inc., Wilmington, Delaware. These companies alleged that Korean imports of PET film, sheet and strip were being sold in the United States at less than fair value.\textsuperscript{180} The ITC determined that an


\textsuperscript{180} Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from Japan and the Republic of Korea, 55 Fed. Reg., supra note 179, at 52,105.
industry in the United States was materially injured as a result of the Korean imports and computed the weighted-average dumping margins to be between 3.88% and 5.38%.

15. STAINLESS STEEL BUTT-WELD PIPE FITTINGS

This investigation began as the result of a petition filed on May 20, 1992 by the Flowline Division of Markovitz Enterprises, Inc. of New Castle, Pennsylvania. The petitioner alleged that certain stainless steel butt-weld pipe fittings from Korea and Taiwan were being, or were likely to be, sold in the United States for less than fair value. The ITC determined unanimously that there was a reasonable indication that an industry in the United States was materially injured by reason of imports from Korea.

16. STEEL PIPES AND TUBES

This investigation was instituted on September 24, 1991 by counsel for Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., Harvey, Illinois; American Tube Co., Phoenix, Arizona; Bull Moose Tube Co.,

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181 USITC Pub. 2383, supra note 179, at 1.
182 Polyethylene Terephthalate Film, Sheet, and Strip from the Republic of Korea, 56 Fed. Reg. 16,305, 16,317 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (final determination of sales at less than fair value).
185 Certain Stainless Steel Butt-Weld Pipe Fittings from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, 57 Fed. Reg. 26,645, 26,645 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm. 1992) (initiation of antidumping duty investigations). The products subject to these investigations were stainless steel butt-weld pipe fittings, whether finished or unfinished, under 14 inches inside diameter. Id.
186 USITC Pub. 2534, supra note 183, at 3.
Gerald, Missouri; Century Tube Corp., Pine Bluff, Arkansas; Sawhill Tubular Division of Cyclops Corp., Sharon, Pennsylvania; Laclede Steel Co., St. Louis, Missouri; Maruichi American Corp., Santa Fe Springs, California; Sharon Tube Co., Sharon, Pennsylvania; Western Tube & Conduit Corp., Long Beach, California; and Wheatland Tube Co., Collingswood, New Jersey. The petition alleged that circular welded non-alloy steel pipe from Korea and other countries was being, or was likely to be, sold in the United States for less than fair value. The petitioners estimated the United States price based on two methods: (1) export price quotes obtained from two Korean producers of standard pipe, and (2) the customs value of standard pipe imported into the United States from Korea during the second quarter of 1991. The petitioners estimated fair value based on actual transaction prices for welded standard pipe in Korea as reported in the Korean publication COMPREHENSIVE COMMODITY PRICE INFORMATION (June, 1991), which listed the average FOB (freight on board) transaction price for standard pipe during May, 1991. Based on these comparisons, they alleged antidumping margins ranging from 1.81% to 25.04%. The ITC found that there was a reasonable indication of material injury resulting from Korean imports that were sold at less than fair value, and assessed dumping margins ranging from 4.91% to 11.63%. In 25 of


189 The circular welded non-alloy steel pipe covered in this investigation included certain circular, welded, non-alloy steel pipes and tubes or circular cross section, regardless of wall thickness not more than 406.4 mm (16 inches) in outside diameter. Id. at 49,904 n.2.

190 Certain Circular, Welded, Non-Alloy Steel Pipes and Tubes from Brazil, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Romania, Taiwan, and Venezuela, 56 Fed. Reg. 52,528, 52,528 (Dep't Comm. 1991) (initiation of antidumping investigations).

191 Id.

192 USITC Pub. 2454, supra note 187, at 27.

55 possible quarterly price comparisons, the Korean companies sold pipe at prices that were between 0.3% and 19.5% less than those of domestic products. In the other 30 cases, the Korean companies sold their pipe at higher than domestic prices, at margins ranging from 0.6% to 15.3%.184

It should be noted that this was not the first investigation involving circular, welded, non-alloy steel pipes and tubes. The ITC previously conducted ten antidumping investigations and six countervailing duty investigations involving these products. Many of these investigations were terminated before final antidumping and/or countervailing-duty orders were issued. Some orders were revoked after the subject country entered into a voluntary restraint arrangement with the United States.185

17. SWEATERS186

This investigation was initiated by a petition filed on September 22, 1989 by counsel on behalf of the National Knitwear and Sportswear Association, New York, New York.187 The petitioner alleged that Korean sweaters made of man-made fiber were, or were likely to be, sold in the United States for less than fair value.188 The ITC determined the weighted-average dumping margins to be between 0.73% and 3.17%.189 The ITC's holding that an industry in the United States was materially injured was appealed to the Court of International Trade, which remanded the matter for further

185 Id. at A-4.
186 Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, USITC Pub. 2312, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-448 to 450 (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2312] (final determination); Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan: Views on Remand, USITC Pub. 2577, Inv. Nos. 731-TA-448 to 450 (Nov. 1992) [hereinafter USITC Pub. 2577] (final determination).
188 Sweaters Wholly or in Chief Weight of Manmade Fibers from Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, 55 Fed. Reg. 32,659, 32,659 (Dep't Comm. 1990) (final determination of sales at less than fair value).
189 See id. at 32,672.
determinations. Upon remand, the ITC determined that no industry in the United States was materially injured, or threatened with material injury, by reason of the imported Korean sweaters.

18. TELEPHONE SYSTEMS AND SUBASSEMBLIES

This investigation responded to a petition filed on December 28, 1988 by American Telephone & Telegraph Co. of Parsippany, New Jersey and Comdial Corp. of Charlottesville, Virginia. It alleged that certain telephone systems and subassemblies were being sold in the United States for less than fair value. The ITC's preliminary determination found that there was a reasonable indication that an industry in the United States was materially injured by reason of imports. The ITC's final determination found dumping margins ranging from 13.4% to 14.75%.

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201 USITC Pub. 2577, supra note 196, at 1.
203 For purposes of this investigation, "small business telephone systems and subassemblies thereof" consisted of telephone systems, whether complete or incomplete, assembled or unassembled, with intercom or internal calling capability and total non-blocking ports capacities of between 2 and 256 ports, and discrete subassemblies thereof designed for use in such systems. A subassembly is designed for use in small business systems if it functions to its full capability only when operated as part of a small business telephone system. These subassemblies consist of control and switching equipment, circuit cards and modules and telephone sets and consoles. See Certain Telephone Systems and Subassemblies thereof from Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, 54 Fed. Reg. 33,783, 33,783 n.1 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm. 1989) (institution of final antidumping investigations).
204 See id. at 33,784.
205 See id.
206 USITC Pub. 2254, supra note 202, at B-3 to 4.
19. TUBULAR GOODS\textsuperscript{207}

This investigation was instigated by Lone Star Steel Company of Dallas, Texas, CF&I Steel Corporation of Pueblo, Colorado; LTV Steel Company of Cleveland, Ohio; and the United States Steel Corporation of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in June, 1984.\textsuperscript{208} The investigation was brought against five Korean producers\textsuperscript{209} of oil country tubular goods\textsuperscript{210} and five Korean trading companies\textsuperscript{211} that exported the goods to the United States as well as to companies located in Brazil and Spain. The petitioners alleged that these companies received export subsidies from the governments of Korea, Brazil\textsuperscript{212} and Spain.\textsuperscript{213} The investigation found the Brazilian and Spanish companies to be guilty, but did not find the Korean companies guilty of any violations.\textsuperscript{214}


\textsuperscript{209} The five Korean companies were Hyundai Pipe Company, Korea Steel Pipe Company, Pusan Steel Pipe Company, Dongjin Steel Company and Union Steel Manufacturing Company. Id. at 46,777.

\textsuperscript{210} Oil country tubular goods include hollow steel products of circular cross-section intended for use in the drilling of oil or gas. These products include oil well casing, tubing, and drill pipe of carbon or alloy steel, whether welded or seamless, manufactured to either American Petroleum Institute or proprietary specifications. Id. at 46,776.

\textsuperscript{211} The five Korean trading companies were the Hyundai Corporation, Kukje-ICC Corporation, Sunkyong Limited, Samsung Co. Ltd. and Daewoo Corporation. Id. at 46,777.

\textsuperscript{212} For a discussion on the countervailing duty case against the Brazilian companies, see Oil Country Tubular Goods from Brazil, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,570 (Dep't Comm. 1984) (final affirmative countervailing duty determination).

\textsuperscript{213} For a discussion of the countervailing duty case against the Spanish companies, see Oil Country Tubular Goods from Spain, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,060 (Dep't Comm. 1984) (final affirmative countervailing duty determination).

\textsuperscript{214} USITC Pub. 1633, supra note 207, at 1. The Brazilian and Spanish companies were found guilty of materially injuring an industry in the United States by reason of their imports, pursuant to § 705(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(b).
20. WELDED STAINLESS STEEL PIPES

This investigation was initiated by a petition filed November 18, 1991 by Avesta Sandvik Tube, Inc., Bristol Metals, Damascus Tubular Products, Trent Tube Division of Crucible Materials Corp., and the United Steelworkers of America. The petition alleged that welded ASTM A-312 austenitic stainless steel pipe was being, or was likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value. The ITC found the Korean companies guilty of dumping at margins of up to 30% in its preliminary investigation. The final investigation also found the Korean companies guilty of dumping and assigned weighted-average dumping margins of between 2.55% and 7.75%.

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218 USITC Pub. 2474, supra note 215, at 1.

219 Id. at 17 n.73.


221 Id. at 53,705.