McKinney's Penal Law Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
ENACTMENT OF CHAPTER OF THE CONSOLIDATED LAWS
AN ACT providing for the punishment of offenses, constituting chapter forty of the consolidated laws.
Became a law July 20, 1965, with the approval of the Governor. Passed, three-fifths being present.
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
CHAPTER 40 OF THE CONSOLIDATED LAWS
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 1.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title A. General Purposes, Rules of Construction, and Definitions
Article 1. General Purposes
§ 1.00 Short title
This chapter shall be known as the “Penal Law.”
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 1.05
Effective: June 7, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title A. General Purposes, Rules of Construction, and Definitions
Article 1. General Purposes
§ 1.05 General purposes
The general purposes of the provisions of this chapter are:
1. To proscribe conduct which unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests;
2. To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed and of the sentences authorized upon conviction;
3. To define the act or omission and the accompanying mental state which constitute each offense;
4. To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor offenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties therefor;
5. To provide for an appropriate public response to particular offenses, including consideration of the consequences of the offense for the victim, including the victim's family, and the community; and
6. To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, the rehabilitation of those convicted, the promotion of their successful and productive reentry and reintegration into society, and their confinement when required in the interests of public protection.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1982, c. 612, § 1; L.2006, c. 98, § 1, eff. June 7, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. ONE, T. A, Art. 5, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part One. General Provisions
Title A. General Purposes, Rules of Construction, and Definitions
Article 5. General Rules of Construction and Application
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 5.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title A. General Purposes, Rules of Construction, and Definitions
Article 5. General Rules of Construction and Application (Refs & Annos)
§ 5.00 Penal law not strictly construed
The general rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this chapter, but the provisions herein must be construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and effect the objects of the law.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 5.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title A. General Purposes, Rules of Construction, and Definitions
Article 5. General Rules of Construction and Application (Refs & Annos)
§ 5.05 Application of chapter to offenses committed before and after enactment
1. The provisions of this chapter shall govern the construction of and punishment for any offense defined in this chapter and committed after the effective date hereof, as well as the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense.
2. Unless otherwise expressly provided, or unless the context otherwise requires, the provisions of this chapter shall govern the construction of and punishment for any offense defined outside of this chapter and committed after the effective date thereof, as well as the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense.
3. The provisions of this chapter do not apply to or govern the construction of and punishment for any offense committed prior to the effective date of this chapter, or the construction and application of any defense to a prosecution for such an offense. Such an offense must be construed and punished according to the provisions of law existing at the time of the commission thereof in the same manner as if this chapter had not been enacted.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 5.10
Effective: October 20, 2000
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title A. General Purposes, Rules of Construction, and Definitions
Article 5. General Rules of Construction and Application (Refs & Annos)
§ 5.10 Other limitations on applicability of this chapter
1. Except as otherwise provided, the procedure governing the accusation, prosecution, conviction and punishment of offenders and offenses is not regulated by this chapter but by the criminal procedure law.
2. This chapter does not affect any power conferred by law upon any court-martial or other military authority or officer to prosecute and punish conduct and offenders violating military codes or laws.
3. This chapter does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture or other remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in a civil action, regardless of whether the conduct involved in such civil action constitutes an offense defined in this chapter.
4. Sections 120.45, 120.50, 120.55, 120.60 and 240.25, subdivisions two and three of section 240.26, and sections 240.70 and 240.71 of this chapter (a) do not apply to conduct which is otherwise lawful under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, the National Railway Labor Act as amended, or the Federal Employment Labor Management Act as amended, and (b) do not bar any conduct, including, but not limited to, peaceful picketing or other peaceful demonstration, protected from legal prohibition by the federal and state constitutions.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1971, c. 1097, § 72; L.1999, c. 635, § 12, eff. Dec. 1, 1999; L.2000, c. 434, § 6, eff. Oct. 20, 2000.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 10.00
Effective: March 16, 2013
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title A. General Purposes, Rules of Construction, and Definitions
Article 10. Definitions
§ 10.00 Definitions of terms of general use in this chapter
Except where different meanings are expressly specified in subsequent provisions of this chapter, the following terms have the following meanings:
1. “Offense” means conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or to a fine is provided by any law of this state or by any law, local law or ordinance of a political subdivision of this state, or by any order, rule or regulation of any governmental instrumentality authorized by law to adopt the same.
2. “Traffic infraction” means any offense defined as “traffic infraction” by section one hundred fifty-five of the vehicle and traffic law.
3. “Violation” means an offense, other than a “traffic infraction,” for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen days cannot be imposed.
4. “Misdemeanor” means an offense, other than a “traffic infraction,” for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen days may be imposed, but for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year cannot be imposed.
5. “Felony” means an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year may be imposed.
6. “Crime” means a misdemeanor or a felony.
7. “Person” means a human being, and where appropriate, a public or private corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a governmental instrumentality.
8. “Possess” means to have physical possession or otherwise to exercise dominion or control over tangible property.
9. “Physical injury” means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain.
10. “Serious physical injury” means physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.
11. “Deadly physical force” means physical force which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury.
12. “Deadly weapon” means any loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, may be discharged, or a switchblade knife, gravity knife, pilum ballistic knife, metal knuckle knife, dagger, billy, blackjack, plastic knuckles, or metal knuckles.
13. “Dangerous instrument” means any instrument, article or substance, including a “vehicle” as that term is defined in this section, which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury.
14. “Vehicle” means a “motor vehicle”, “trailer” or “semi-trailer,” as defined in the vehicle and traffic law, any snowmobile as defined in the parks and recreation law, any aircraft, or any vessel equipped for propulsion by mechanical means or by sail.
15. “Public servant” means (a) any public officer or employee of the state or of any political subdivision thereof or of any governmental instrumentality within the state, or (b) any person exercising the functions of any such public officer or employee. The term public servant includes a person who has been elected or designated to become a public servant.
16. “Juror” means any person who is a member of any jury, including a grand jury, impaneled by any court in this state or by any public servant authorized by law to impanel a jury. The term juror also includes a person who has been drawn or summoned to attend as a prospective juror.
17. “Benefit” means any gain or advantage to the beneficiary and includes any gain or advantage to a third person pursuant to the desire or consent of the beneficiary.
18. “Juvenile offender” means (1) a person thirteen years old who is criminally responsible for acts constituting murder in the second degree as defined in subdivisions one and two of section 125.25 of this chapter or such conduct as a sexually motivated felony, where authorized pursuant to section 130.91 of the penal law; and
(2) a person fourteen or fifteen years old who is criminally responsible for acts constituting the crimes defined in subdivisions one and two of section 125.25 (murder in the second degree) and in subdivision three of such section provided that the underlying crime for the murder charge is one for which such person is criminally responsible; section 135.25 (kidnapping in the first degree); 150.20 (arson in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 120.10 (assault in the first degree); 125.20 (manslaughter in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 130. 35 (rape in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 130.50 (criminal sexual act in the first degree); 130.70 (aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree); 140.30 (burglary in the first degree); subdivision one of section 140.25 (burglary in the second degree); 150.15 (arson in the second degree); 160.15 (robbery in the first degree); subdivision two of section 160.10 (robbery in the second degree) of this chapter; or section 265.03 of this chapter, where such machine gun or such firearm is possessed on school grounds, as that phrase is defined in subdivision fourteen of section 220.00 of this chapter; or defined in this chapter as an attempt to commit murder in the second degree or kidnapping in the first degree, or such conduct as a sexually motivated felony, where authorized pursuant to section 130.91 of the penal law.
19. For the purposes of section 260.30 and 120.01 of this chapter the term “child day care provider” shall be defined as provided for in section three hundred ninety of the social services law.
20. For purposes of sections 120.13, 120.18, 125.11, 125.21 and 125.22 of this chapter, the term “peace officer” means a peace officer as defined in subdivision one, two, three, four, six, twelve, thirteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty, twenty-one, twenty-three, twenty-three-a, twenty-four, twenty-five, twenty-six, twenty-eight, twenty-nine, thirty, thirty-one, thirty-two, thirty-four, thirty-five, thirty-six, forty-three, forty-five, forty-seven, forty-eight, forty-nine, fifty-one, fifty-two, fifty-eight, sixty-one, as added by chapter two hundred fifty-seven of the laws of nineteen hundred ninety-two, sixty-one, as added by chapter three hundred twenty-one of the laws of nineteen hundred ninety-two, sixty-two, as added by chapter two hundred four of the laws of nineteen hundred ninety-three, sixty-two, as added by chapter six hundred eighty-seven of the laws of nineteen hundred ninety-three, sixty-three, as amended by chapter six hundred thirty-eight of the laws of two thousand three, sixty-four, sixty-five, sixty-eight, as added by chapter one hundred sixty-eight of the laws of two thousand, sixty-eight, as added by chapter three hundred eighty-one of the laws of two thousand, seventy, seventy-one, seventy-four, as added by chapter five hundred forty-eight of the laws of two thousand one, seventy-five, as added by chapter three hundred twenty-one of the laws of two thousand two, seventy-five, as added by chapter six hundred twenty-three of the laws of two thousand two, seventy-seven, as added by chapter three hundred sixty-seven of the laws of two thousand four, seventy-eight or seventy-nine, as added by chapter two hundred forty-one of the laws of two thousand four, of section 2.10 of the criminal procedure law, as well as any federal law enforcement officer defined in section 2.15 of the criminal procedure law.
21. “Drug trafficking felony” means any of the following offenses defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter: violation of use of a child to commit a controlled substance offense as defined in section 220.28; criminal sale of a controlled substance in the fourth degree as defined in section 220.34; criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree as defined in section 220.39; criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree as defined in section 220.41; criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree as defined in section 220.43; criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds as defined in section 220.44; unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine in the second degree as defined in section 220.74; unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine in the first degree as defined in section 220.75; or operating as a major trafficker as defined in section 220.77.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 1; L.1968, c. 73, § 9; L.1975, c. 686, § 1; L.1978, c. 481, § 27; L.1979, c. 411, § 20; L.1980, c. 295, § 1; L.1981, c. 335, § 4; L.1986, c. 328, § 1; L.1995, c. 219, § 1; L.1998, c. 435, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 1998; L.1998, c. 600, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 1998; L.2003, c. 264, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2005, c. 765, § 11, eff. Dec. 21, 2005; L.2007, c. 7, § 47, eff. April 13, 2007; L.2008, c. 257, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2008; L.2013, c. 1, § 26, eff. March 16, 2013.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 15.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 15. Culpability
§ 15.00 Culpability; definitions of terms
The following definitions are applicable to this chapter:
1. “Act” means a bodily movement.
2. “Voluntary act” means a bodily movement performed consciously as a result of effort or determination, and includes the possession of property if the actor was aware of his physical possession or control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate it.
3. “Omission” means a failure to perform an act as to which a duty of performance is imposed by law.
4. “Conduct” means an act or omission and its accompanying mental state.
5. “To act” means either to perform an act or to omit to perform an act.
6. “Culpable mental state” means “intentionally” or “knowingly” or “recklessly” or with “criminal negligence,” as these terms are defined in section 15.05.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 15.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 15. Culpability
§ 15.05 Culpability; definitions of culpable mental states
The following definitions are applicable to this chapter:
1. “Intentionally.” A person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct.
2. “Knowingly.” A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstance exists.
3. “Recklessly.” A person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of voluntary intoxication also acts recklessly with respect thereto.
4. “Criminal negligence.” A person acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he fails to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 15.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 15. Culpability
§ 15.10 Requirements for criminal liability in general and for offenses of strict liability and mental culpability
The minimal requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act which he is physically capable of performing. If such conduct is all that is required for commission of a particular offense, or if an offense or some material element thereof does not require a culpable mental state on the part of the actor, such offense is one of “strict liability.” If a culpable mental state on the part of the actor is required with respect to every material element of an offense, such offense is one of “mental culpability.”
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 15.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 15. Culpability
§ 15.15 Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements
1. When the commission of an offense defined in this chapter, or some element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms “intentionally,” “knowingly,” “recklessly” or “criminal negligence,” or by use of terms, such as “with intent to defraud” and “knowing it to be false,” describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.
2. Although no culpable mental state is expressly designated in a statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be required for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or all of the material elements thereof, if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such culpable mental state. A statute defining a crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to impose strict liability, should be construed as defining a crime of mental culpability. This subdivision applies to offenses defined both in and outside this chapter.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 15.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 15. Culpability
§ 15.20 Effect of ignorance or mistake upon liability
1. A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief of fact, unless:
(a) Such factual mistake negatives the culpable mental state required for the commission of an offense; or
(b) The statute defining the offense or a statute related thereto expressly provides that such factual mistake constitutes a defense or exemption; or
(c) Such factual mistake is of a kind that supports a defense of justification as defined in article thirty-five of this chapter.
2. A person is not relieved of criminal liability for conduct because he engages in such conduct under a mistaken belief that it does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense, unless such mistaken belief is founded upon an official statement of the law contained in (a) a statute or other enactment, or (b) an administrative order or grant of permission, or (c) a judicial decision of a state or federal court, or (d) an interpretation of the statute or law relating to the offense, officially made or issued by a public servant, agency or body legally charged or empowered with the responsibility or privilege of administering, enforcing or interpreting such statute or law.
3. Notwithstanding the use of the term “knowingly” in any provision of this chapter defining an offense in which the age of a child is an element thereof, knowledge by the defendant of the age of such child is not an element of any such offense and it is not, unless expressly so provided, a defense to a prosecution therefor that the defendant did not know the age of the child or believed such age to be the same as or greater than that specified in the statute.
4. Notwithstanding the use of the term “knowingly” in any provision of this chapter defining an offense in which the aggregate weight of a controlled substance or marihuana is an element, knowledge by the defendant of the aggregate weight of such controlled substance or marihuana is not an element of any such offense and it is not, unless expressly so provided, a defense to a prosecution therefor that the defendant did not know the aggregate weight of the controlled substance or marihuana.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 2; L.1995, c. 75, § 19.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 15.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 15. Culpability
§ 15.25 Effect of intoxication upon liability
Intoxication is not, as such, a defense to a criminal charge; but in any prosecution for an offense, evidence of intoxication of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the crime charged.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. ONE, T. B, Art. 20, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 20. Parties to Offenses and Liability through Accessorial Conduct
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 20.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 20. Parties to Offenses and Liability through Accessorial Conduct (Refs & Annos)
§ 20.00 Criminal liability for conduct of another
When one person engages in conduct which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 20.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 20. Parties to Offenses and Liability through Accessorial Conduct (Refs & Annos)
§ 20.05 Criminal liability for conduct of another; no defense
In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to section 20.00, it is no defense that:
1. Such other person is not guilty of the offense in question owing to criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or to unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in question or of the defendant's criminal purpose or to other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of the offense in question; or
2. Such other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based upon the conduct in question, or has previously been acquitted thereof, or has legal immunity from prosecution therefor; or
3. The offense in question, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class or classes of persons, and the defendant, not belonging to such class or classes, is for that reason legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 20.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 20. Parties to Offenses and Liability through Accessorial Conduct (Refs & Annos)
§ 20.10 Criminal liability for conduct of another; exemption
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 20.00 and 20.05, a person is not criminally liable for conduct of another person constituting an offense when his own conduct, though causing or aiding the commission of such offense, is of a kind that is necessarily incidental thereto. If such conduct constitutes a related but separate offense upon the part of the actor, he is liable for that offense only and not for the conduct or offense committed by the other person.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 20.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 20. Parties to Offenses and Liability through Accessorial Conduct (Refs & Annos)
§ 20.15 Convictions for different degrees of offense
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, when, pursuant to section 20.00, two or more persons are criminally liable for an offense which is divided into degrees, each person is guilty of such degree as is compatible with his own culpable mental state and with his own accountability for an aggravating fact or circumstance.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 20.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 20. Parties to Offenses and Liability through Accessorial Conduct (Refs & Annos)
§ 20.20 Criminal liability of corporations
1. As used in this section:
(a) “Agent” means any director, officer or employee of a corporation, or any other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.
(b) “High managerial agent” means an officer of a corporation or any other agent in a position of comparable authority with respect to the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees.
2. A corporation is guilty of an offense when:
(a) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or
(b) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation; or
(c) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation, and the offense is (i) a misdemeanor or a violation, (ii) one defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative intent to impose such criminal liability on a corporation, or (iii) any offense set forth in title twenty-seven of article seventy-one of the environmental conservation law.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1981, c. 719, § 1; L.1986, c. 671, § 24.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 20.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title B. Principles of Criminal Liability
Article 20. Parties to Offenses and Liability through Accessorial Conduct (Refs & Annos)
§ 20.25 Criminal liability of an individual for corporate conduct
A person is criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a corporation to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. ONE, T. C, Art. 25, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 25. Defenses in General
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 25.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 25. Defenses in General (Refs & Annos)
§ 25.00 Defenses; burden of proof
1. When a “defense,” other than an “affirmative defense,” defined by statute is raised at a trial, the people have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. When a defense declared by statute to be an “affirmative defense” is raised at a trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. ONE, T. C, Art. 30, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 30. Defense of Infancy
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 30.00
Effective: April 13, 2007
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 30. Defense of Infancy (Refs & Annos)
§ 30.00 Infancy
1. Except as provided in subdivision two of this section, a person less than sixteen years old is not criminally responsible for conduct.
2. A person thirteen, fourteen or fifteen years of age is criminally responsible for acts constituting murder in the second degree as defined in subdivisions one and two of section 125.25 and in subdivision three of such section provided that the underlying crime for the murder charge is one for which such person is criminally responsible or for such conduct as a sexually motivated felony, where authorized pursuant to section 130.91 of the penal law; and a person fourteen or fifteen years of age is criminally responsible for acts constituting the crimes defined in section 135.25 (kidnapping in the first degree); 150.20 (arson in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 120.10 (assault in the first degree); 125.20 (manslaughter in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 130.35 (rape in the first degree); subdivisions one and two of section 130.50 (criminal sexual act in the first degree); 130.70 (aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree); 140.30 (burglary in the first degree); subdivision one of section 140.25 (burglary in the second degree); 150.15 (arson in the second degree); 160.15 (robbery in the first degree); subdivision two of section 160.10 (robbery in the second degree) of this chapter; or section 265.03 of this chapter, where such machine gun or such firearm is possessed on school grounds, as that phrase is defined in subdivision fourteen of section 220.00 of this chapter; or defined in this chapter as an attempt to commit murder in the second degree or kidnapping in the first degree, or for such conduct as a sexually motivated felony, where authorized pursuant to section 130.91 of the penal law.
3. In any prosecution for an offense, lack of criminal responsibility by reason of infancy, as defined in this section, is a defense.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1978, c. 481, § 28; L.1979, c. 411, § 21; L.1981, c. 335, § 5; L.1998, c. 435, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 1998; L.2003, c. 264, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2007, c. 7, § 48, eff. April 13, 2007.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 30.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 30. Defense of Infancy (Refs & Annos)
[§ 30.05. Repealed by L.1984, c. 668, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1984]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. ONE, T. C, Art. 35, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 35. Defense of Justification
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 35.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 35. Defense of Justification (Refs & Annos)
§ 35.00 Justification; a defense
In any prosecution for an offense, justification, as defined in sections 35.05 through 35.30, is a defense.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 35.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 35. Defense of Justification (Refs & Annos)
§ 35.05 Justification; generally
Unless otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this article defining justifiable use of physical force, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when:
1. Such conduct is required or authorized by law or by a judicial decree, or is performed by a public servant in the reasonable exercise of his official powers, duties or functions; or
2. Such conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor, and which is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding such injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue. The necessity and justifiability of such conduct may not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder. Whenever evidence relating to the defense of justification under this subdivision is offered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a defense.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1968, c. 73, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 35.10
Effective: September 28, 2004
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 35. Defense of Justification (Refs & Annos)
§ 35.10 Justification; use of physical force generally
The use of physical force upon another person which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal under any of the following circumstances:
1. A parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one or an incompetent person, and a teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a person under the age of twenty-one for a special purpose, may use physical force, but not deadly physical force, upon such person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person.
2. A warden or other authorized official of a jail, prison or correctional institution may, in order to maintain order and discipline, use such physical force as is authorized by the correction law.
3. A person responsible for the maintenance of order in a common carrier of passengers, or a person acting under his direction, may use physical force when and to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to maintain order, but he may use deadly physical force only when he reasonably believes it necessary to prevent death or serious physical injury.
4. A person acting under a reasonable belief that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon himself may use physical force upon such person to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to thwart such result.
5. A duly licensed physician, or a person acting under a physician's direction, may use physical force for the purpose of administering a recognized form of treatment which he or she reasonably believes to be adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of the patient if (a) the treatment is administered with the consent of the patient or, if the patient is under the age of eighteen years or an incompetent person, with the consent of the parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the patient's care and supervision, or (b) the treatment is administered in an emergency when the physician reasonably believes that no one competent to consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare of the patient, would consent.
6. A person may, pursuant to the ensuing provisions of this article, use physical force upon another person in self-defense or defense of a third person, or in defense of premises, or in order to prevent larceny of or criminal mischief to property, or in order to effect an arrest or prevent an escape from custody. Whenever a person is authorized by any such provision to use deadly physical force in any given circumstance, nothing contained in any other such provision may be deemed to negate or qualify such authorization.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1968, c. 73, § 3; L.1974, c. 930, §§ 1, 2; L.2004, c. 511, § 1, eff. Sept. 28, 2004.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 35.15
Effective: September 28, 2004
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 35. Defense of Justification (Refs & Annos)
§ 35.15 Justification; use of physical force in defense of a person
1. A person may, subject to the provisions of subdivision two, use physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself, herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such other person, unless:
(a) The latter's conduct was provoked by the actor with intent to cause physical injury to another person; or
(b) The actor was the initial aggressor; except that in such case the use of physical force is nevertheless justifiable if the actor has withdrawn from the encounter and effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in continuing the incident by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force; or
(c) The physical force involved is the product of a combat by agreement not specifically authorized by law.
2. A person may not use deadly physical force upon another person under circumstances specified in subdivision one unless:
(a) The actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly physical force. Even in such case, however, the actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating; except that the actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is:
(i) in his or her dwelling and not the initial aggressor; or
(ii) a police officer or peace officer or a person assisting a police officer or a peace officer at the latter's direction, acting pursuant to section 35.30; or
(b) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible criminal sexual act or robbery; or
(c) He or she reasonably believes that such other person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary, and the circumstances are such that the use of deadly physical force is authorized by subdivision three of section 35.20.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1968, c. 73, § 4. Amended L.1980, c. 843, § 30; L.2003, c. 264, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2004, c. 511, § 2, eff. Sept. 28, 2004.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 35.20
Effective: September 28, 2004
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 35. Defense of Justification (Refs & Annos)
§ 35.20 Justification; use of physical force in defense of premises and in defense of a person in the course of burglary
1. Any person may use physical force upon another person when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of a crime involving damage to premises. Such person may use any degree of physical force, other than deadly physical force, which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose, and may use deadly physical force if he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of arson.
2. A person in possession or control of any premises, or a person licensed or privileged to be thereon or therein, may use physical force upon another person when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of a criminal trespass upon such premises. Such person may use any degree of physical force, other than deadly physical force, which he or she reasonably believes to be necessary for such purpose, and may use deadly physical force in order to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of arson, as prescribed in subdivision one, or in the course of a burglary or attempted burglary, as prescribed in subdivision three.
3. A person in possession or control of, or licensed or privileged to be in, a dwelling or an occupied building, who reasonably believes that another person is committing or attempting to commit a burglary of such dwelling or building, may use deadly physical force upon such other person when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of such burglary.
4. As used in this section, the following terms have the following meanings:
(a) The terms “premises,” “building” and “dwelling” have the meanings prescribed in section 140.00;
(b) Persons “licensed or privileged” to be in buildings or upon other premises include, but are not limited to:
(i) police officers or peace officers acting in the performance of their duties; and
(ii) security personnel or employees of nuclear powered electric generating facilities located within the state who are employed as part of any security plan approved by the federal operating license agencies acting in the performance of their duties at such generating facilities. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term “nuclear powered electric generating facility” shall mean a facility that generates electricity using nuclear power for sale, directly or indirectly, to the public, including the land upon which the facility is located and the safety and security zones as defined under federal regulations.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1968, c. 73, § 5. Amended L.1980, c. 843, § 31; L.2004, c. 393, § 1, eff. Aug. 17, 2004; L.2004, c. 511, § 3, eff. Sept. 28, 2004.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 35.25
Effective: September 28, 2004
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 35. Defense of Justification (Refs & Annos)
§ 35.25 Justification; use of physical force to prevent or terminate larceny or criminal mischief.
A person may use physical force, other than deadly physical force, upon another person when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission by such other person of larceny or of criminal mischief with respect to property other than premises.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1968, c. 73, § 6; L.2004, c. 511, § 4, eff. Sept. 28, 2004.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 35.27
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 35. Defense of Justification (Refs & Annos)
§ 35.27 Justification; use of physical force in resisting arrest prohibited
A person may not use physical force to resist an arrest, whether authorized or unauthorized, which is being effected or attempted by a police officer or peace officer when it would reasonably appear that the latter is a police officer or peace officer.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1968, c. 73, § 7. Amended L.1980, c. 843, § 32.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 35.30
Effective: September 28, 2004
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 35. Defense of Justification (Refs & Annos)
§ 35.30 Justification; use of physical force in making an arrest or in preventing an escape
1. A police officer or a peace officer, in the course of effecting or attempting to effect an arrest, or of preventing or attempting to prevent the escape from custody, of a person whom he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense, may use physical force when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect the arrest, or to prevent the escape from custody, or in self-defense or to defend a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of physical force; except that deadly physical force may be used for such purposes only when he or she reasonably believes that:
(a) The offense committed by such person was:
(i) a felony or an attempt to commit a felony involving the use or attempted use or threatened imminent use of physical force against a person; or
(ii) kidnapping, arson, escape in the first degree, burglary in the first degree or any attempt to commit such a crime; or
(b) The offense committed or attempted by such person was a felony and that, in the course of resisting arrest therefor or attempting to escape from custody, such person is armed with a firearm or deadly weapon; or
(c) Regardless of the particular offense which is the subject of the arrest or attempted escape, the use of deadly physical force is necessary to defend the police officer or peace officer or another person from what the officer reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force.
2. The fact that a police officer or a peace officer is justified in using deadly physical force under circumstances prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subdivision one does not constitute justification for reckless conduct by such police officer or peace officer amounting to an offense against or with respect to innocent persons whom he or she is not seeking to arrest or retain in custody.
3. A person who has been directed by a police officer or a peace officer to assist such police officer or peace officer to effect an arrest or to prevent an escape from custody may use physical force, other than deadly physical force, when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to carry out such police officer's or peace officer's direction, unless he or she knows that the arrest or prospective arrest is not or was not authorized and may use deadly physical force under such circumstances when:
(a) He or she reasonably believes such to be necessary for self-defense or to defend a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or
(b) He or she is directed or authorized by such police officer or peace officer to use deadly physical force unless he or she knows that the police officer or peace officer is not authorized to use deadly physical force under the circumstances.
4. A private person acting on his or her own account may use physical force, other than deadly physical force, upon another person when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to effect an arrest or to prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he or she reasonably believes to have committed an offense and who in fact has committed such offense; and may use deadly physical force for such purpose when he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to:
(a) Defend himself, herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of deadly physical force; or
(b) Effect the arrest of a person who has committed murder, manslaughter in the first degree, robbery, forcible rape or forcible criminal sexual act and who is in immediate flight therefrom.
5. A guard, police officer or peace officer who is charged with the duty of guarding prisoners in a detention facility, as that term is defined in section 205.00, or while in transit to or from a detention facility, may use physical force when and to the extent that he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner from a detention facility or from custody while in transit thereto or therefrom.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1968, c. 73, § 8. Amended L.1972, c. 598, § 1; L.1973, c. 676, § 27; L.1975, c. 667, § 32; L.1980, c. 471, § 16; L.1980, c. 843, §§ 33 to 37; L.2003, c. 264, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2004, c. 511, § 5, eff. Sept. 28, 2004.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 35.35
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 35. Defense of Justification (Refs & Annos)
[§§ 35.35 to 35.45. Renumbered Penal Law §§ 40.00 to 40.10 by L.1968, c. 73, § 11]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 35.40
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 35. Defense of Justification (Refs & Annos)
[§§ 35.35 to 35.45. Renumbered Penal Law §§ 40.00 to 40.10 by L.1968, c. 73, § 11]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 35.45
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 35. Defense of Justification (Refs & Annos)
[§§ 35.35 to 35.45. Renumbered Penal Law §§ 40.00 to 40.10 by L.1968, c. 73, § 11]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. ONE, T. C, Art. 40, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 40. Other Defenses Involving Lack of Culpability
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 40.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 40. Other Defenses Involving Lack of Culpability (Refs & Annos)
§ 40.00 Duress
1. In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
2. The defense of duress as defined in subdivision one of this section is not available when a person intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030, formerly § 35.35. Renumbered 40.00, L.1968, c. 73, § 11.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 40.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 40. Other Defenses Involving Lack of Culpability (Refs & Annos)
§ 40.05 Entrapment
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a public servant, or by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, seeking to obtain evidence against him for purpose of criminal prosecution, and when the methods used to obtain such evidence were such as to create a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. Inducement or encouragement to commit an offense means active inducement or encouragement. Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030, formerly § 35.40. Renumbered 40.05, L.1968, c. 73, § 11.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 40.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 40. Other Defenses Involving Lack of Culpability (Refs & Annos)
§ 40.10 Renunciation
1. In any prosecution for an offense, other than an attempt to commit a crime, in which the defendant's guilt depends upon his criminal liability for the conduct of another person pursuant to section 20.00, it is an affirmative defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, the defendant withdrew from participation in such offense prior to the commission thereof and made a substantial effort to prevent the commission thereof.
2. In any prosecution for criminal facilitation pursuant to article one hundred fifteen, it is an affirmative defense that, prior to the commission of the felony which he facilitated, the defendant made a substantial effort to prevent the commission of such felony.
3. In any prosecution pursuant to section 110.00 for an attempt to commit a crime, it is an affirmative defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, the defendant avoided the commission of the crime attempted by abandoning his criminal effort and, if mere abandonment was insufficient to accomplish such avoidance, by taking further and affirmative steps which prevented the commission thereof.
4. In any prosecution for criminal solicitation pursuant to article one hundred or for conspiracy pursuant to article one hundred five in which the crime solicited or the crime contemplated by the conspiracy was not in fact committed, it is an affirmative defense that, under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose, the defendant prevented the commission of such crime.
5. A renunciation is not “voluntary and complete” within the meaning of this section if it is motivated in whole or in part by (a) a belief that circumstances exist which increase the probability of detection or apprehension of the defendant or another participant in the criminal enterprise, or which render more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose, or (b) a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another time or to transfer the criminal effort to another victim or another but similar objective.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030, formerly § 35.45. Renumbered 40.10, L.1968, c. 73, § 11.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 40.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part One. General Provisions
Title C. Defenses
Article 40. Other Defenses Involving Lack of Culpability (Refs & Annos)
§ 40.15 Mental disease or defect
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that when the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct, he lacked criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect. Such lack of criminal responsibility means that at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate either:
1. The nature and consequences of such conduct; or
2. That such conduct was wrong.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1984, c. 668, § 3.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. TWO, T. E, Art. 55, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 55. Classification and Designation of Offenses
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 55.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 55. Classification and Designation of Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 55.00 Applicability of article
The provisions of this article govern the classification and designation of every offense, whether defined within or outside of this chapter.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1967, c. 791, § 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1967.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 55.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 55. Classification and Designation of Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 55.05 Classifications of felonies and misdemeanors
1. Felonies. Felonies are classified, for the purpose of sentence, into five categories as follows:
(a) Class A felonies;
(b) Class B felonies;
(c) Class C felonies;
(d) Class D felonies; and
(e) Class E felonies.
Class A felonies are subclassified, for the purpose of sentence, into two categories as follows: subclass I and subclass II, to be known as class A-I and class A-II felonies, respectively.
2. Misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are classified, for the purpose of sentence, into three categories as follows:
(a) Class A misdemeanors;
(b) Class B misdemeanors; and
(c) Unclassified misdemeanors.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1973, c. 276, § 1; L.1979, c. 410, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 55.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 55. Classification and Designation of Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 55.10 Designation of offenses
1. Felonies.
(a) The particular classification or subclassification of each felony defined in this chapter is expressly designated in the section or article defining it.
(b) Any offense defined outside this chapter which is declared by law to be a felony without specification of the classification thereof, or for which a law outside this chapter provides a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year, shall be deemed a class E felony.
2. Misdemeanors.
(a) Each misdemeanor defined in this chapter is either a class A misdemeanor or a class B misdemeanor, as expressly designated in the section or article defining it.
(b) Any offense defined outside this chapter which is declared by law to be a misdemeanor without specification of the classification thereof or of the sentence therefor shall be deemed a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of subdivision three, where an offense is defined outside this chapter and a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen days but not in excess of one year is provided in the law or ordinance defining it, such offense shall be deemed an unclassified misdemeanor.
3. Violations. Every violation defined in this chapter is expressly designated as such. Any offense defined outside this chapter which is not expressly designated a violation shall be deemed a violation if:
(a) Notwithstanding any other designation specified in the law or ordinance defining it, a sentence to a term of imprisonment which is not in excess of fifteen days is provided therein, or the only sentence provided therein is a fine; or
(b) A sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen days is provided for such offense in a law or ordinance enacted prior to the effective date of this chapter but the offense was not a crime prior to that date.
4. Traffic infraction. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an offense which is defined as a “traffic infraction” shall not be deemed a violation or a misdemeanor by virtue of the sentence prescribed therefor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, §§ 4, 5; L.1973, c. 276, § 2; L.1978, c. 104, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. TWO, T. E, Art. 60, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.00 Applicability of provisions
1. The sentences prescribed by this article shall apply in the case of every offense, whether defined within or outside of this chapter.
2. The sole provision of this article that shall apply in the case of an offense committed by a juvenile offender is section 60.10 of this article and no other provisions of this article shall be deemed or construed to apply in any such case.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1967, c. 791, § 6. Amended L.1978, c. 481, § 29.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.01
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.01 Authorized dispositions; generally
1. Applicability. Except as otherwise specified in this article, when the court imposes sentence upon a person convicted of an offense, the court must impose a sentence prescribed by this section.
2. Revocable dispositions.
(a) The court may impose a revocable sentence as herein specified:
(i) the court, where authorized by article sixty-five, may sentence a person to a period of probation or to a period of conditional discharge as provided in that article; or
(ii) the court, where authorized by article eighty-five, may sentence a person to a term of intermittent imprisonment as provided in that article.
(b) A revocable sentence shall be deemed a tentative one to the extent that it may be altered or revoked in accordance with the provisions of the article under which it was imposed, but for all other purposes shall be deemed to be a final judgment of conviction.
(c) In any case where the court imposes a sentence of probation, conditional discharge, or a sentence of intermittent imprisonment, it may also impose a fine authorized by article eighty.
(d) In any case where the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment not in excess of sixty days, for a misdemeanor or not in excess of six months for a felony or in the case of a sentence of intermittent imprisonment not in excess of four months, it may also impose a sentence of probation or conditional discharge provided that the term of probation or conditional discharge together with the term of imprisonment shall not exceed the term of probation or conditional discharge authorized by article sixty-five of this chapter. The sentence of imprisonment shall be a condition of and run concurrently with the sentence of probation or conditional discharge.
3. Other dispositions. When a person is not sentenced as specified in subdivision two, or when a sentence specified in subdivision two is revoked, the sentence of the court must be as follows:
(a) A term of imprisonment; or
(b) A fine authorized by article eighty, provided, however, that when the conviction is of a class B felony or of any felony defined in article two hundred twenty, the sentence shall not consist solely of a fine; or
(c) Both imprisonment and a fine; or
(d) Where authorized by section 65.20, unconditional discharge as provided in that section; or
(e) Following revocation of a sentence of conditional discharge imposed pursuant to section 65.05 of this chapter or paragraph (d) of subdivision two of this section, probation as provided in section 65.00 of this chapter or to the sentence of imprisonment and probation as provided for in paragraph (d) of subdivision two of this section.
4. In any case where a person has been sentenced to a period of probation imposed pursuant to section 65.00 of this chapter, if the part of the sentence that provides for probation is revoked, the court must sentence such person to imprisonment or to the sentence of imprisonment and probation as provided for in paragraph (d) of subdivision two of this section.
CREDIT(S)
(Formerly § 60.10, added L.1967, c. 791, § 6. Amended L.1970, c. 477, § 2; L.1972, c. 157, § 1. Renumbered 60.01 and amended L.1973, c. 276, § 3. Amended L.1973, c. 277, § 1; L.1974, c. 652, § 2; L.1974, c. 835, § 1; L.1978, c. 274, § 1; L.1980, c. 86, § 1; L.1982, c. 65, § 1; L.1984, c. 548, §§ 1, 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.02
Effective: February 16, 2005
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.02 Authorized disposition; youthful offender
When a person is to be sentenced upon a youthful offender finding, the court must impose a sentence as follows:
(1) If the sentence is to be imposed upon a youthful offender finding which has been substituted for a conviction of an offense other than a felony, the court must impose a sentence authorized for the offense for which the youthful offender finding was substituted, except that if the youthful offender finding was entered pursuant to paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 720.20 of the criminal procedure law, the court must not impose a definite or intermittent sentence of imprisonment with a term of more than six months; or
(2) If the sentence is to be imposed upon a youthful offender finding which has been substituted for a conviction for any felony, the court must impose a sentence authorized to be imposed upon a person convicted of a class E felony provided, however, that the court must not impose a sentence of conditional discharge or unconditional discharge if the youthful offender finding was substituted for a conviction of a felony defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter.
(3) The provisions of section 60.35 of this article shall apply to a sentence imposed upon a youthful offender finding and the amount of the mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee which shall be levied at sentencing shall be equal to the amount specified in such section for the offense of conviction for which the youthful offender finding was substituted; provided, however that the court shall not impose the sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee, as defined in subparagraphs (iv) and (v) of paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 60.35 of this article, for an offense in which the conviction was substituted with a youthful offender finding.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1979, c. 411, § 22. Amended L.1980, c. 471, § 17; L.2004, c. 56, pt. F, § 1, eff. Feb. 16, 2005; L.2008, c. 56, pt. Y, § 1, eff. April 23, 2008, deemed eff. Feb. 16, 2005.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.03
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
[§ 60.03. Repealed by L.1980, c. 471, § 18, eff. July 23, 1980]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.04
Effective: March 31, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.04 Authorized disposition; controlled substances and marihuana felony offenses
1. Applicability. Notwithstanding the provisions of any law, this section shall govern the dispositions authorized when a person is to be sentenced upon a conviction of a felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter or when a person is to be sentenced upon a conviction of such a felony as a multiple felony offender as defined in subdivision five of this section.
2. Class A felony. Every person convicted of a class A felony must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with section 70.71 of this title, unless such person is convicted of a class A-II felony and is sentenced to probation for life in accordance with section 65.00 of this title.
3. Class B felonies. Every person convicted of a class B felony must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with the applicable provisions of section 70.70 of this chapter, a definite sentence of imprisonment with a term of one year or less or probation in accordance with section 65.00 of this chapter provided, however, a person convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance to a child as defined in section 220.48 of this chapter must be sentenced to a determinate sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the applicable provisions of section 70.70 of this chapter or to a sentence of probation in accordance with the opening paragraph of paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 65.00 of this chapter.
4. Alternative sentence. Where a sentence of imprisonment or a sentence of probation as an alternative to imprisonment is not required to be imposed pursuant to subdivision two, three or five of this section, the court may impose any other sentence authorized by section 60.01 of this article, provided that when the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment, such sentence must be in accordance with section 70.70 of this title. Where the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment in accordance with this section, the court may also impose a fine authorized by article eighty of this title and in such case the sentence shall be both imprisonment and a fine.
5. Multiple felony offender. Where the court imposes a sentence pursuant to subdivision three of section 70.70 of this chapter upon a second felony drug offender, as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.70 of this chapter, it must sentence such offender to imprisonment in accordance with the applicable provisions of section 70.70 of this chapter, a definite sentence of imprisonment with a term of one year or less, or probation in accordance with section 65.00 of this chapter, provided, however, that where the court imposes a sentence upon a class B second felony drug offender, it must sentence such offender to a determinate sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the applicable provisions of section 70.70 of this chapter or to a sentence of probation in accordance with the opening paragraph of paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 65.00 of this chapter. When the court imposes sentence on a second felony drug offender pursuant to subdivision four of section 70.70 of this chapter, it must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment in accordance with such subdivision.
6. Substance abuse treatment. When the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment which requires a commitment to the state department of corrections and community supervision upon a person who stands convicted of a controlled substance or marihuana offense, the court may, upon motion of the defendant in its discretion, issue an order directing that the department of corrections and community supervision enroll the defendant in the comprehensive alcohol and substance abuse treatment program in an alcohol and substance abuse correctional annex as defined in subdivision eighteen of section two of the correction law, provided that the defendant will satisfy the statutory eligibility criteria for participation in such program. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this subdivision, any defendant to be enrolled in such program pursuant to this subdivision shall be governed by the same rules and regulations promulgated by the department of corrections and community supervision, including without limitation those rules and regulations establishing requirements for completion and those rules and regulations governing discipline and removal from the program. No such period of court ordered corrections based drug abuse treatment pursuant to this subdivision shall be required to extend beyond the defendant's conditional release date.
7. a. Shock incarceration participation. When the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment which requires a commitment to the department of corrections and community supervision upon a person who stands convicted of a controlled substance or marihuana offense, upon motion of the defendant, the court may issue an order directing that the department of corrections and community supervision enroll the defendant in the shock incarceration program as defined in article twenty-six-A of the correction law, provided that the defendant is an eligible inmate, as described in subdivision one of section eight hundred sixty-five of the correction law. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this subdivision, any defendant to be enrolled in such program pursuant to this subdivision shall be governed by the same rules and regulations promulgated by the department of corrections and community supervision, including without limitation those rules and regulations establishing requirements for completion and such rules and regulations governing discipline and removal from the program.
b. (i) In the event that an inmate designated by court order for enrollment in the shock incarceration program requires a degree of medical care or mental health care that cannot be provided at a shock incarceration facility, the department, in writing, shall notify the inmate, provide a proposal describing a proposed alternative-to-shock-incarceration program, and notify him or her that he or she may object in writing to placement in such alternative-to-shock-incarceration program. If the inmate objects in writing to placement in such alternative-to-shock-incarceration program, the department of corrections and community supervision shall notify the sentencing court, provide such proposal to the court, and arrange for the inmate's prompt appearance before the court. The court shall provide the proposal and notice of a court appearance to the people, the inmate and the appropriate defense attorney. After considering the proposal and any submissions by the parties, and after a reasonable opportunity for the people, the inmate and counsel to be heard, the court may modify its sentencing order accordingly, notwithstanding the provisions of section 430.10 of the criminal procedure law.
(ii) An inmate who successfully completes an alternative-to-shock-incarceration program within the department of corrections and community supervision shall be treated in the same manner as a person who has successfully completed the shock incarceration program, as set forth in subdivision four of section eight hundred sixty-seven of the correction law.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2004, c. 738, § 20, eff. Jan. 13, 2005; L.2009, c. 56, pt. AAA, §§ 17, 18, eff. April 7, 2009. Amended L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 120, eff. March 31, 2011.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.05
Effective: November 11, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.05 Authorized dispositions; other class A, B, certain C and D felonies and multiple felony offenders
1. Applicability. Except as provided in section 60.04 of this article governing the authorized dispositions applicable to felony offenses defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter or in section 60.13 of this article governing the authorized dispositions applicable to felony sex offenses defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 70.80 of this title, this section shall govern the dispositions authorized when a person is to be sentenced upon a conviction of a class A felony, a class B felony or a class C, class D or class E felony specified herein, or when a person is to be sentenced upon a conviction of a felony as a multiple felony offender.
2. Class A felony. Except as provided in subdivisions three and four of section 70.06 of this chapter, every person convicted of a class A felony must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with section 70.00 of this title, unless such person is convicted of murder in the first degree and is sentenced in accordance with section 60.06 of this article.
3. Class B felony. Except as provided in subdivision six of this section, every person convicted of a class B violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of this title, must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with such section 70.02; and, except as provided in subdivision six of this section, every person convicted of any other class B felony must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with section 70.00 of this title.
4. Certain class C felonies. Except as provided in subdivision six, every person convicted of a class C violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of this title, must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with section 70.02 of this title; and, except as provided in subdivision six of this section, every person convicted of the class C felonies of: attempt to commit any of the class B felonies of bribery in the first degree as defined in section 200.04, bribe receiving in the first degree as defined in section 200.12, conspiracy in the second degree as defined in section 105.15 and criminal mischief in the first degree as defined in section 145.12; criminal usury in the first degree as defined in section 190.42, rewarding official misconduct in the first degree as defined in section 200.22, receiving reward for official misconduct in the first degree as defined in section 200.27, attempt to promote prostitution in the first degree as defined in section 230.32, promoting prostitution in the second degree as defined in section 230.30, arson in the third degree as defined in section 150.10 of this chapter, must be sentenced to imprisonment in accordance with section 70.00 of this title.
5. Certain class D felonies. Except as provided in subdivision six of this section, every person convicted of the class D felonies of assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.05, strangulation in the second degree as defined in section 121.12 or attempt to commit a class C felony as defined in section 230.30 of this chapter, must be sentenced in accordance with section 70.00 or 85.00 of this title.
6. Multiple felony offender. When the court imposes sentence upon a second violent felony offender, as defined in section 70.04, or a second felony offender, as defined in section 70.06, the court must impose a sentence of imprisonment in accordance with section 70.04 or 70.06, as the case may be, unless it imposes a sentence of imprisonment in accordance with section 70.08 or 70.10.
7. Fines. Where the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment in accordance with this section, the court also may impose a fine authorized by article eighty and in such case the sentence shall be both imprisonment and a fine.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1973, c. 277, § 4. Amended L.1973, c. 278, § 1; L.1973, c. 1051, § 1; L.1974, c. 367, § 1; L.1974, c. 1041, § 9; L.1976, c. 424, § 3; L.1977, c. 22, § 1; L.1978, c. 481, § 1; L.1978, c. 627, § 6; L.1979, c. 410, § 2; L.1980, c. 233, § 1; L.1981, c. 711, § 9; L.1995, c. 1, § 1; L.2004, c. 738, § 24, eff. Jan. 13, 2005; L.2007, c. 7, § 35, eff. April 13, 2007; L.2010, c. 405, § 12, eff. Nov. 11, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.06
Effective: October 9, 2009
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.06 Authorized disposition; murder in the first degree offenders; aggravated murder offenders; certain murder in the second degree offenders; certain terrorism offenders; criminal possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon offenders; criminal use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon offenders
When a defendant is convicted of murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of this chapter, the court shall, in accordance with the provisions of section 400.27 of the criminal procedure law, sentence the defendant to death, to life imprisonment without parole in accordance with subdivision five of section 70.00 of this title, or to a term of imprisonment for a class A-I felony other than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, in accordance with subdivisions one through three of section 70.00 of this title. When a person is convicted of murder in the second degree as defined in subdivision five of section 125.25 of this chapter or of the crime of aggravated murder as defined in subdivision one of section 125.26 of this chapter, the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole in accordance with subdivision five of section 70.00 of this title. When a defendant is convicted of the crime of terrorism as defined in section 490.25 of this chapter, and the specified offense the defendant committed is a class A-I felony offense, or when a defendant is convicted of the crime of criminal possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the first degree as defined in section 490.45 of this chapter, or when a defendant is convicted of the crime of criminal use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the first degree as defined in section 490.55 of this chapter, the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole in accordance with subdivision five of section 70.00 of this title; provided, however, that nothing in this section shall preclude or prevent a sentence of death when the defendant is also convicted of murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of this chapter. When a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder as defined in subdivision two of section 125.26 of this chapter, the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole or to a term of imprisonment for a class A-I felony other than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, in accordance with subdivisions one through three of section 70.00 of this title.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1974, c. 367, § 2. Amended L.1995, c. 1, § 2; L.2004, c. 1, pt. A, § 4, eff. July 23, 2004; L.2004, c. 459, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2004; L.2005, c. 765, § 12, eff. Dec. 21, 2005; L.2006, c. 93, § 1, eff. June 7, 2006; L.2009, c. 482, § 3, eff. Oct. 9, 2009.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.07
Effective: November 1, 2000
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.07 Authorized disposition; criminal attack on operators of for-hire vehicles
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, when a court has found, pursuant to the provisions of section 200.61 of the criminal procedure law, both that a person has been convicted of a specified offense as defined in subdivision two of this section and the victim of such offense was operating a for-hire vehicle in the course of providing for-hire vehicle services at the time of the commission of such offense, the sentence of imprisonment imposed upon conviction for such offense shall be the sentence authorized by the applicable provisions of article seventy of this chapter, provided, however, that the minimum term of an indeterminate sentence or minimum determinate sentence shall be not less than three years nor more than five years greater than the minimum term or sentence otherwise required to be imposed pursuant to such provisions. The provisions of this subdivision shall not apply where the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history and character of the defendant, finds on the record that such additional term or sentence would be unduly harsh and that not imposing such additional term or sentence would be consistent with the public safety and would not deprecate the seriousness of the crime.
2. For purposes of this section:
(a) the term “specified offense” shall mean an attempt to commit murder in the second degree as defined in section 125.25 of this chapter, gang assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.07 of this chapter, gang assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.06 of this chapter, assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.10 of this chapter, manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.20 of this chapter, manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.15 of this chapter, robbery in the first degree as defined in section 160.15 of this chapter, robbery in the second degree as defined in section 160.10 of this chapter, or the attempted commission of any of the following offenses: gang assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.07, assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.10, manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.20 or robbery in the first degree as defined in section 160.15;
(b) the term “for-hire vehicle” shall mean a vehicle designed to carry not more than five passengers for compensation and such vehicle is a taxicab, as defined in section one hundred forty-eight-a of the vehicle and traffic law, a livery, as such term is defined in section one hundred twenty-one-e of the vehicle and traffic law, or a “black car”, as such term is defined in paragraph (g) of this subdivision;
(c) the term “livery car base” shall mean a central facility, wherever located, that dispatches a livery operator to both pick-up and discharge passengers in the state;
(d) “for-hire vehicle services” shall mean:
(i) with respect to a taxicab, the transport of passengers pursuant to a license or permit issued by a local authority by a person duly authorized to operate such taxicab;
(ii) with respect to a livery, the transport of passengers by a livery operator while affiliated with a livery car base; or
(iii) with respect to a “black car”, the transport of passengers by a “black car operator” pursuant to dispatches from or by a central dispatch facility regardless of where the pick-up and discharge occurs, and, with respect to dispatches from or by a central dispatch facility located outside the state, all dispatches involving a pick-up in the state, regardless of where the discharge occurs.
(e) “livery operator” shall mean the registered owner of a livery, as such term is defined in section one hundred twenty-one-e of the vehicle and traffic law, or a driver designated by such registered owner to operate the registered owner's livery as the registered owner's authorized designee, where such registered owner or driver provides services while affiliated with a livery car base;
(f) “black car operator” shall mean the registered owner of a “black car” or a driver designated by such registered owner to operate the registered owner's black car as the registered owner's authorized designee; and
(g) “black car” shall mean a for-hire vehicle dispatched from a central facility, which has certified to the satisfaction of the department of state pursuant to article six-F of the executive law that more than ninety percent of the central facility's for-hire business is on a payment basis other than direct cash payment by a passenger.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2000, c. 148, § 6, eff. Nov. 1, 2000.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.08
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.08 Authorized dispositions; resentencing of certain controlled substance offenders
Any person convicted of an offense and sentenced to prison for an indeterminate sentence, the minimum of which was at least one year and the maximum of which was life imprisonment, which sentence was imposed pursuant to chapter two hundred seventy-six, two hundred seventy-seven, two hundred seventy-eight, or ten hundred fifty-one of the laws of nineteen hundred seventy-three, and for which such sentence was imposed upon conviction of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree, or criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, and the sole controlled substance involved was methadone, may apply, upon notice to the appropriate district attorney, for resentencing in the court which originally imposed sentence.
Such resentencing shall, unless substantial justice dictates otherwise, be pursuant to the current provisions of the penal law, and shall include credit for any jail time incurred upon the subject conviction as well as credit for any period of incarceration incurred pursuant to the sentence originally imposed.
In cases where the proof before the court is not available or is not sufficiently reliable to determine the amount of methadone present in any preparation, compound, mixture or substance containing methadone, there shall exist a rebuttable presumption that each ounce of the preparation, compound, mixture or substance contained sixty milligrams of methadone.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1975, c. 783, § 1, eff. Aug. 9, 1975.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.09
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.09 Authorized dispositions; resentencing of certain persons convicted of specified controlled substance offenses
a. Any person convicted of an offense as defined in section 115.05, 220.16, 220.18, 220.39 or 220.41 of this chapter or of an attempt thereof, for an act committed on or after September first, nineteen hundred seventy-three but prior to the date on which the provisions of this section become effective, may, upon notice to the appropriate district attorney, apply for resentencing in the court which originally imposed sentence. Such resentencing shall be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision (b) of this section and shall include credit for any jail time incurred upon the subject conviction as well as credit for any period of incarceration incurred pursuant to the sentence originally imposed.
b. A court, upon an application specified in subdivision (a) of this section may resentence a person as follows:
(i) if the conviction was for a class A-III offense the court may impose a new maximum term which shall be no less than three times the amount of the minimum term imposed in the original sentence and no more than twenty-five years;
(ii) if the conviction was for a class A-II offense the court may impose a new minimum term which shall be no less than three years imprisonment and no more than eight and one-third years;
(iii) upon resentence of a person as specified in paragraph (i) of this subdivision the court shall resentence the person to the same minimum term previously imposed;
(iv) upon resentence of a person as specified in paragraph (ii) of this subdivision the court shall impose a maximum term of life imprisonment;
(v) if the conviction was for an offense as specified in section 115.05 of this chapter and the offense which was the object of the criminal facilitation was a class A-III felony then the court shall set aside the conviction and substitute it with a conviction for violation of section 115.01 or 115.00 of this chapter, whichever is appropriate under the facts of the case, and impose a sentence in accordance with those provisions.
c. Upon resentence as provided in this section the court may not impose a sentence greater than the sentence previously imposed.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1979, c. 410, § 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1979.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.10 Authorized disposition; juvenile offender
1. When a juvenile offender is convicted of a crime, the court shall sentence the defendant to imprisonment in accordance with section 70.05 or sentence him upon a youthful offender finding in accordance with section 60.02 of this chapter.
2. Subdivision one of this section shall apply when sentencing a juvenile offender notwithstanding the provisions of any other law that deals with the authorized sentence for persons who are not juvenile offenders. Provided, however, that the limitation prescribed by this section shall not be deemed or construed to bar use of a conviction of a juvenile offender, other than a juvenile offender who has been adjudicated a youthful offender pursuant to section 720.20 of the criminal procedure law, as a previous or predicate felony offender under section 70.04, 70.06, 70.08 or 70.10, when sentencing a person who commits a felony after he has reached the age of sixteen.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 481, § 30. Amended L.1979, c. 411, § 23.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.11
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
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Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.11 Authorized dispositions; criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree
When a person is to be sentenced upon a conviction of the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree as defined in subdivision one of section 265.01 as a result of a plea of guilty entered in satisfaction of an indictment or count thereof charging the defendant with the class D violent felony offense of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision four of section 265.02, the court must sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 70.15.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1980, c. 233, § 5, eff. Aug. 12, 1980.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.11-a
Effective: March 16, 2013
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.11-a Authorized dispositions; certain criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree offenders
When a person is to be sentenced upon conviction of the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision ten of section 265.02 of this chapter, the court must sentence such defendant to a determinate sentence as provided in subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (c) of subdivision three of section 70.02 of this chapter, unless a greater minimum sentence is otherwise required by another provision of this chapter.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2013, c. 1, § 26-a, eff. March 16, 2013.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.12
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.12 Authorized disposition; alternative indeterminate sentence of imprisonment; domestic violence cases
1. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, where a court is imposing sentence pursuant to section 70.02 upon a conviction for an offense enumerated in subdivision one of such section, other than an offense defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter, and is authorized or required pursuant to such section to impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment for such offense, the court, upon a determination following a hearing that (a) the defendant was the victim of physical, sexual or psychological abuse by the victim or intended victim of such offense, (b) such abuse was a factor in causing the defendant to commit such offense and (c) the victim or intended victim of such offense was a member of the same family or household as the defendant as such term is defined in subdivision one of section 530.11 of the criminal procedure law, may, in lieu of imposing such determinate sentence of imprisonment, impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment in accordance with subdivisions two and three of this section.
2. The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence imposed pursuant to subdivision one of this section must be fixed by the court as follows:
(a) For a class B felony, the term must be at least six years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(b) For a class C felony, the term must be at least four and one-half years and must not exceed fifteen years;
(c) For a class D felony, the term must be at least three years and must not exceed seven years; and
(d) For a class E felony, the term must be at least three years and must not exceed four years.
3. The minimum period of imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence imposed pursuant to subdivision one of this section must be fixed by the court at one-half of the maximum term imposed and must be specified in the sentence.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1998, c. 1, § 1, eff. Aug. 6, 1998.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.13
Effective: April 13, 2007
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.13 Authorized dispositions; felony sex offenses
When a person is to be sentenced upon a conviction for any felony defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter, including a sexually motivated felony, or patronizing a prostitute in the first degree as defined in section 230.06 of this chapter, incest in the second degree as defined in section 255.26 of this chapter, or incest in the first degree as defined in section 255.27 of this chapter, or a felony attempt or conspiracy to commit any of these crimes, the court must sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 70.80 of this title.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2007, c. 7, § 34, eff. April 13, 2007.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
[§ 60.15. Repealed by L.1973, c. 676, § 28, eff. Sept. 1, 1973]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.20 Authorized dispositions; traffic infraction
1. When a person is convicted of a traffic infraction, the sentence of the court shall be as follows:
(a) A period of conditional discharge, as provided in article sixty-five; or
(b) Unconditional discharge as provided in section 65.20; or
(c) A fine or a sentence to a term of imprisonment, or both, as prescribed in and authorized by the provision that defines the infraction; or
(d) A sentence of intermittent imprisonment, as provided in article eighty-five.
2. Where a sentence of conditional discharge is imposed for a traffic infraction, all incidents of the sentence shall be the same as would be applicable if the sentence were for a violation.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1967, c. 791, § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1967. Amended L.1970, c. 477, § 3.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.21
Effective: December 18, 2009
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.21 Authorized dispositions; driving while intoxicated or aggravated driving while intoxicated
Notwithstanding paragraph (d) of subdivision two of section 60.01 of this article, when a person is to be sentenced upon a conviction for a violation of subdivision two, two-a or three of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, the court may sentence such person to a period of imprisonment authorized by article seventy of this title and shall sentence such person to a period of probation or conditional discharge in accordance with the provisions of section 65.00 of this title and shall order the installation and maintenance of a functioning ignition interlock device. Such period of probation or conditional discharge shall run consecutively to any period of imprisonment and shall commence immediately upon such person's release from imprisonment.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2009, c. 496, § 13, eff. Dec. 18, 2009.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.25 Authorized dispositions; corporation
When a corporation is convicted of an offense, the sentence of the court shall be as follows:
(a) A fine authorized by section 80.10; or
(b) Where authorized by section 65.05, a period of conditional discharge as provided in that section; or
(c) Where authorized by section 65.20, unconditional discharge as provided in that section.
In any case where a corporation has been sentenced to a period of conditional discharge and such sentence is revoked, the court shall sentence the corporation to pay a fine.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1967, c. 791, § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1967.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.27
Effective: November 1, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.27 Restitution and reparation
1. In addition to any of the dispositions authorized by this article, the court shall consider restitution or reparation to the victim of the crime and may require restitution or reparation as part of the sentence imposed upon a person convicted of an offense, and after providing the district attorney with an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the provisions of this subdivision, require the defendant to make restitution of the fruits of his or her offense or reparation for the actual out-of-pocket loss caused thereby and, in the case of a violation of section 190.78, 190.79, 190.80, 190.82 or 190.83 of this chapter, any costs or losses incurred due to any adverse action taken against the victim. The district attorney shall where appropriate, advise the court at or before the time of sentencing that the victim seeks restitution or reparation, the extent of injury or economic loss or damage of the victim, and the amount of restitution or reparation sought by the victim in accordance with his or her responsibilities under subdivision two of section 390.50 of the criminal procedure law and article twenty-three of the executive law. The court shall hear and consider the information presented by the district attorney in this regard. In that event, or when the victim impact statement reports that the victim seeks restitution or reparation, the court shall require, unless the interests of justice dictate otherwise, in addition to any of the dispositions authorized by this article that the defendant make restitution of the fruits of the offense and reparation for the actual out-of-pocket loss and, in the case of a violation of section 190.78, 190.79, 190.80, 190.82 or 190.83 of this chapter, any costs or losses incurred due to any adverse action, caused thereby to the victim. In the event that restitution or reparation are not ordered, the court shall clearly state its reasons on the record. Adverse action as used in this subdivision shall mean and include actual loss incurred by the victim, including an amount equal to the value of the time reasonably spent by the victim attempting to remediate the harm incurred by the victim from the offense, and the consequential financial losses from such action.
2. Whenever the court requires restitution or reparation to be made, the court must make a finding as to the dollar amount of the fruits of the offense and the actual out-of-pocket loss to the victim caused by the offense. In making this finding, the court must consider any victim impact statement provided to the court. If the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such finding or upon request by the defendant, the court must conduct a hearing upon the issue in accordance with the procedure set forth in section 400.30 of the criminal procedure law.
3. The provisions of sections 420.10, 420.20 and 420.30 of the criminal procedure law shall apply in the collection and remission of restitution and reparation.
4. For purposes of the imposition, determination and collection of restitution or reparation, the following definitions shall apply:
(a) the term “offense” shall include the offense for which a defendant was convicted, as well as any other offense that is part of the same criminal transaction or that is contained in any other accusatory instrument disposed of by any plea of guilty by the defendant to an offense.
(b) the term “victim” shall include the victim of the offense, the representative of a crime victim as defined in subdivision six of section six hundred twenty-one of the executive law, an individual whose identity was assumed or whose personal identifying information was used in violation of section 190.78, 190.79 or 190.80 of this chapter, or any person who has suffered a financial loss as a direct result of the acts of a defendant in violation of section 190.78, 190.79, 190.80, 190.82 or 190.83 of this chapter, a good samaritan as defined in section six hundred twenty-one of the executive law and the office of victim services or other governmental agency that has received an application for or has provided financial assistance or compensation to the victim. A victim shall also mean any owner or lawful producer of a master recording, or a trade association that represents such owner or lawful producer, that has suffered injury as a result of an offense as defined in article two hundred seventy-five of this chapter.
5. (a) Except upon consent of the defendant or as provided in paragraph (b) of this subdivision, or as a condition of probation or conditional discharge as provided in paragraph (g) of subdivision two of section 65.10 of this chapter, the amount of restitution or reparation required by the court shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars in the case of a conviction for a felony, or ten thousand dollars in the case of a conviction for any offense other than a felony. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subdivision, if an officer of a school district is convicted of violating any section of article one hundred fifty-five of this chapter where the victim of such crime is such officer's school district, the court may require an amount of restitution up to the full amount of the fruits of the offense or reparation up to the full amount of the actual out-of-pocket loss suffered by the victim, provided further that in such case the provisions of paragraph (b) of this subdivision shall not apply.
(b) The court in its discretion may impose restitution or reparation in excess of the amounts specified in paragraph (a) of this subdivision, provided however that the amount in excess must be limited to the return of the victim's property, including money, or the equivalent value thereof; and reimbursement for medical expenses actually incurred by the victim prior to sentencing as a result of the offense committed by the defendant.
6. Any payment made as restitution or reparation pursuant to this section shall not limit, preclude or impair any liability for damages in any civil action or proceeding for an amount in excess of such payment.
7. In the event that the court requires restitution or reparation to be made to a person and that person dies prior to the completion of said restitution or reparation, the remaining payments shall be made to the estate of the deceased.
8. The court shall in all cases where restitution or reparation is imposed direct as part of the disposition that the defendant pay a designated surcharge of five percent of the entire amount of a restitution or reparation payment to the official or organization designated pursuant to subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law. The designated surcharge shall not exceed five percent of the amount actually collected. Upon the filing of an affidavit of the official or organization designated pursuant to subdivision eight of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law demonstrating that the actual cost of the collection and administration of restitution or reparation in a particular case exceeds five percent of the entire amount of the payment or the amount actually collected, as the case may be, the court shall direct that the defendant pay an additional surcharge of not more than five percent of the entire amount of a restitution or reparation payment to such official or organization, or the actual cost of collection or administration, whichever is less unless, upon application of the defendant, the court determines that imposition of such additional surcharge would cause undue hardship to the defendant, or any other person who is financially supported by the defendant, or would otherwise not be in the interest of justice. Such additional surcharge, when added to the initial five percent surcharge, shall not exceed ten percent of the amount actually collected.
9. If the offense of which a person is convicted is a class A, class B, class C, or class D felony involving the sale of a controlled substance, as defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter, and no other victim who is a person is seeking restitution in the case, the term “victim” as used in this section, in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall mean any law enforcement agency of the state of New York or of any subdivision thereof which has expended funds in the purchase of any controlled substance from such person or his agent as part of the investigation leading to such conviction. Any restitution which may be required to be made to a law enforcement agency pursuant to this section shall be limited to the amount of funds expended in the actual purchase of such controlled substance by such law enforcement agency, less the amount of any funds which have been or will be recovered from any other source, and shall not include a designated surcharge pursuant to subdivision eight of this section. Any law enforcement agency seeking restitution pursuant to this section shall file with the court and the district attorney an affidavit stating that funds expended in the actual purchase of a controlled substance for which restitution is being sought have not been and will not be recovered from any other source or in any other civil or criminal proceeding. Any law enforcement agency receiving restitution pursuant to this section shall promptly transmit to the commissioner of the division of criminal justice services a report stating the dollar amount of the restitution received.
10. If the offense of which a person is convicted is defined in section 150.10, 150.15 or 150.20 of this chapter, and no other victim who is a person is seeking restitution in the case, the term “victim” as used in this section, in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall mean any municipality which has expended funds or will expend funds for the purpose of restoration, rehabilitation or clean-up of the site of the arson. Any restitution which may be required to be made to a municipality pursuant to this section shall be limited to the amount of funds reasonably expended or to be expended for the purpose of restoration, rehabilitation or clean-up of the site of the arson, less the amount of any funds which have been or will be recovered from any other source, and shall not include a designated surcharge pursuant to subdivision eight of this section. Any municipality seeking restitution pursuant to this section shall file with the court, district attorney and defense counsel an affidavit stating that the funds reasonably expended or to be expended for which restitution is being sought have not been and will not be recovered from any other source or in any other civil or criminal proceeding.
11. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, when a person is convicted of harming an animal trained to aid a person with a disability in the second degree as defined in section 195.11 of this chapter, or harming an animal trained to aid a person with a disability in the first degree as defined in section 195.12 of this chapter, the court, in addition to any other sentence, shall order the payment of restitution to the person with a disability who was aided by such animal.
12. If the offense of which a person is convicted is defined in section 155.25,
155.30, 155.35, 155.40 or 155.42 of this chapter, and the property taken is
timber, the court may upon conviction, in addition to any other sentence, direct
the defendant to pay the rightful owner of such timber an amount equal to treble
the stumpage value of the timber stolen as defined in section 71-0703 of the
environmental conservation law and for any permanent and substantial damage
caused to the land or the improvements thereon as a result of such violation. Such reparations shall be of such kind, nature and extent as will reasonably
restore the lands affected by the violation to their condition immediately
before the violation and may be made by physical restoration of such lands
and/
13. If the offense of which a person is convicted is defined in section 240.50, subdivision one or two of section 240.55, section 240.60, section 240.61, section 240.62 or section 240.63 of this chapter, and no other victim who is a person is seeking restitution in the case, the term “victim” as used in this subdivision, in addition to the ordinary meaning, shall mean any school, municipality, fire district, fire company, fire corporation, ambulance association, ambulance corporation, or other legal or public entity engaged in providing emergency services which has expended funds for the purpose of responding to a false report of an incident or false bomb as defined in section 240.50, subdivision one or two of section 240.55, section 240.60, section 240.61, section 240.62, or section 240.63 of this chapter. Any restitution which may be required to be made to a victim pursuant to this subdivision shall be limited to the amount of funds reasonably expended for the purpose of responding to such false report of incident or false bomb, less the amount of any funds which have been or will be recovered from any other source and shall not include a designated surcharge pursuant to subdivision eight of this section. Any victim seeking restitution pursuant to this subdivision shall file with the court, district attorney and defense counsel an affidavit stating that the funds reasonably expended for which restitution is being sought have not been and will not be recovered from any other source or in any other civil or criminal proceeding, except as provided for by section 3-112 of the general obligations law.
14. Where a transfer of probation has occurred pursuant to section 410.80 of the criminal procedure law and the probationer is subject to a restitution condition, the department of probation in the county in which the order of restitution was imposed shall notify the appropriate district attorney. Upon notification by the department of probation, such district attorney shall file a certified copy of the judgment with the clerk of the county in the receiving jurisdiction for purposes of establishing a first lien and to permit institution of civil proceedings pursuant to the provisions of subdivision six of section 420.10 of the criminal procedure law.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1980, c. 290, § 1. Amended L.1983, c. 397, § 2; L.1983, c. 468, § 1; L.1984, c. 335, § 1; L.1984, c. 965, § 4; L.1985, c. 14, § 6; L.1985, c. 187, § 1; L.1985, c. 233, § 7; L.1985, c. 506, § 2; L.1986, c. 615, § 1; L.1991, c. 363, § 1; L.1991, c. 545, § 1; L.1992, c. 618, §§ 12, 13, 16; L.1996, c. 310, § 1; L.1999, c. 160, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1999; L.1999, c. 207, § 2, eff. July 6, 1999; L.2002, c. 619, §§ 1, 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2002; L.2003, c. 602, § 14, eff. March 1, 2004; L.2005, c. 499, § 2, eff. Aug. 16, 2005; L.2007, c. 519, § 1, eff. Aug. 15, 2007; L.2008, c. 279, § 7, eff. Jan. 3, 2009; L.2010, c. 56, pt. A-1, § 41, eff. June 22, 2010; L.2010, c. 56, pt. D, § 7, eff. Sept. 20, 2010; L.2011, c. 313, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2011.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.28
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.28 Authorized disposition; making graffiti and possession of graffiti instruments
When a person is convicted of an offense defined in section 145.60 or 145.65 of this chapter, or of an attempt to commit such offense, and the sentence imposed by the court for such conviction includes a sentence of probation or conditional discharge, the court shall, where appropriate, include as a condition of such sentence the defendant's successful participation in a graffiti removal program pursuant to paragraph (h) of subdivision two of section 65.10 of this chapter.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 536, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1995.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.29
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.29 Authorized disposition; cemetery desecration
When a person is convicted of an offense defined in section 145.22 or 145.23 of this chapter or of an attempt to commit such an offense, and the sentence imposed by the court for such conviction includes a sentence of probation or conditional discharge, such sentence shall, where appropriate, be in accordance with paragraph (h) of subdivision two of section 65.10 of this article as such section relates to cemetery crime.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1997, c. 165, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 1997.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.30
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.30 Civil penalties
This article does not deprive the court of any authority conferred by law to decree a forfeiture of property, suspend or cancel a license, remove a person from office, or impose any other civil penalty and any appropriate order exercising such authority may be included as part of the judgment of conviction.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1967, c. 791, § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1967.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.35
Effective: March 31, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.35 Mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee, supplemental sex offender victim fee and crime victim assistance fee required in certain cases
1. (a) Except as provided in section eighteen hundred nine of the vehicle and traffic law and section 27.12 of the parks, recreation and historic preservation law, whenever proceedings in an administrative tribunal or a court of this state result in a conviction for a felony, a misdemeanor, or a violation, as these terms are defined in section 10.00 of this chapter, there shall be levied at sentencing a mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee and a crime victim assistance fee in addition to any sentence required or permitted by law, in accordance with the following schedule:
(i) a person convicted of a felony shall pay a mandatory surcharge of three hundred dollars and a crime victim assistance fee of twenty-five dollars;
(ii) a person convicted of a misdemeanor shall pay a mandatory surcharge of one hundred seventy-five dollars and a crime victim assistance fee of twenty-five dollars;
(iii) a person convicted of a violation shall pay a mandatory surcharge of ninety-five dollars and a crime victim assistance fee of twenty-five dollars;
(iv) a person convicted of a sex offense as defined by subdivision two of section one hundred sixty-eight-a of the correction law or a sexually violent offense as defined by subdivision three of section one hundred sixty-eight-a of the correction law shall, in addition to a mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee, pay a sex offender registration fee of fifty dollars.
(v) a person convicted of a designated offense as defined by subdivision seven of section nine hundred ninety-five of the executive law shall, in addition to a mandatory surcharge and crime victim assistance fee, pay a DNA databank fee of fifty dollars.
(b) When the felony or misdemeanor conviction in subparagraphs (i), (ii) or (iv) of paragraph (a) of this subdivision results from an offense contained in article one hundred thirty of this chapter, incest in the third, second or first degree as defined in sections 255.25, 255.26 and 255.27 of this chapter or an offense contained in article two hundred sixty-three of this chapter, the person convicted shall pay a supplemental sex offender victim fee of one thousand dollars in addition to the mandatory surcharge and any other fee.
2. Where a person is convicted of two or more crimes or violations committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the crimes or violations and also was a material element of the other, the court shall impose a mandatory surcharge and a crime victim assistance fee, and where appropriate a supplemental sex offender victim fee, in accordance with the provisions of this section for the crime or violation which carries the highest classification, and no other sentence to pay a mandatory surcharge, crime victim assistance fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee required by this section shall be imposed. Where a person is convicted of two or more sex offenses or sexually violent offenses, as defined by subdivisions two and three of section one hundred sixty-eight-a of the correction law, committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other, the court shall impose only one sex offender registration fee. Where a person is convicted of two or more designated offenses, as defined by subdivision seven of section nine hundred ninety-five of the executive law, committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other, the court shall impose only one DNA databank fee.
3. The mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee, and supplemental sex offender victim fee provided for in subdivision one of this section shall be paid to the clerk of the court or administrative tribunal that rendered the conviction. Within the first ten days of the month following collection of the mandatory surcharge, crime victim assistance fee, and supplemental sex offender victim fee, the collecting authority shall determine the amount of mandatory surcharge, crime victim assistance fee, and supplemental sex offender victim fee collected and, if it is an administrative tribunal, or a town or village justice court, it shall then pay such money to the state comptroller who shall deposit such money in the state treasury pursuant to section one hundred twenty-one of the state finance law to the credit of the criminal justice improvement account established by section ninety-seven-bb of the state finance law. Within the first ten days of the month following collection of the sex offender registration fee and DNA databank fee, the collecting authority shall determine the amount of the sex offender registration fee and DNA databank fee collected and, if it is an administrative tribunal, or a town or village justice court, it shall then pay such money to the state comptroller who shall deposit such money in the state treasury pursuant to section one hundred twenty-one of the state finance law to the credit of the general fund. If such collecting authority is any other court of the unified court system, it shall, within such period, pay such money attributable to the mandatory surcharge or crime victim assistance fee to the state commissioner of taxation and finance to the credit of the criminal justice improvement account established by section ninety-seven-bb of the state finance law. If such collecting authority is any other court of the unified court system, it shall, within such period, pay such money attributable to the sex offender registration fee and the DNA databank fee to the state commissioner of taxation and finance to the credit of the general fund.
4. Any person who has paid a mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee, a crime victim assistance fee or a supplemental sex offender victim fee under the authority of this section based upon a conviction that is subsequently reversed or who paid a mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee, a crime victim assistance fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee under the authority of this section which is ultimately determined not to be required by this section shall be entitled to a refund of such mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee upon application to the state comptroller. The state comptroller shall require such proof as is necessary in order to determine whether a refund is required by law.
5. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74(h). See, also, subd. 5, below.] (a) When a person who is convicted of a crime or violation and sentenced to a term of imprisonment has failed to pay the mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee required by this section, the clerk of the court that rendered the conviction shall notify the superintendent or the municipal official of the facility where the person is confined. The superintendent or the municipal official shall cause any amount owing to be collected from such person during his or her term of imprisonment from moneys to the credit of an inmates' fund or such moneys as may be earned by a person in a work release program pursuant to section eight hundred sixty of the correction law. Such moneys attributable to the mandatory surcharge or crime victim assistance fee shall be paid over to the state comptroller to the credit of the criminal justice improvement account established by section ninety-seven-bb of the state finance law and such moneys attributable to the sex offender registration fee or DNA databank fee shall be paid over to the state comptroller to the credit of the general fund, except that any such moneys collected which are surcharges, sex offender registration fees, DNA databank fees, crime victim assistance fees or supplemental sex offender victim fees levied in relation to convictions obtained in a town or village justice court shall be paid within thirty days after the receipt thereof by the superintendent or municipal official of the facility to the justice of the court in which the conviction was obtained. For the purposes of collecting such mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee, and supplemental sex offender victim fee, the state shall be legally entitled to the money to the credit of an inmates' fund or money which is earned by an inmate in a work release program. For purposes of this subdivision, the term “inmates' fund” shall mean moneys in the possession of an inmate at the time of his or her admission into such facility, funds earned by him or her as provided for in section one hundred eighty-seven of the correction law and any other funds received by him or her or on his or her behalf and deposited with such superintendent or municipal official.
(b) The incarceration fee provided for in subdivision two of section one hundred eighty-nine of the correction law shall not be assessed or collected if any order of restitution or reparation, fine, mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee remains unpaid. In such circumstances, any monies which may lawfully be withheld from the compensation paid to a prisoner for work performed while housed in a general confinement facility in satisfaction of such an obligation shall first be applied toward satisfaction of such obligation.
5. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74(h). See, also, subd. 5, above.] When a person who is convicted of a crime or violation and sentenced to a term of imprisonment has failed to pay the mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee required by this section, the clerk of the court that rendered the conviction shall notify the superintendent or the municipal official of the facility where the person is confined. The superintendent or the municipal official shall cause any amount owing to be collected from such person during his or her term of imprisonment from moneys to the credit of an inmates' fund or such moneys as may be earned by a person in a work release program pursuant to section eight hundred sixty of the correction law. Such moneys attributable to the mandatory surcharge or crime victim assistance fee shall be paid over to the state comptroller to the credit of the criminal justice improvement account established by section ninety-seven-bb of the state finance law and such moneys attributable to the sex offender registration fee or DNA databank fee shall be paid over to the state comptroller to the credit of the general fund, except that any such moneys collected which are surcharges, sex offender registration fees, DNA databank fees, crime victim assistance fees or supplemental sex offender victim fees levied in relation to convictions obtained in a town or village justice court shall be paid within thirty days after the receipt thereof by the superintendent or municipal official of the facility to the justice of the court in which the conviction was obtained. For the purposes of collecting such mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee and supplemental sex offender victim fee, the state shall be legally entitled to the money to the credit of an inmates' fund or money which is earned by an inmate in a work release program. For purposes of this subdivision, the term “inmates' fund” shall mean moneys in the possession of an inmate at the time of his or her admission into such facility, funds earned by him or her as provided for in section one hundred eighty-seven of the correction law and any other funds received by him or her or on his or her behalf and deposited with such superintendent or municipal official.
6. Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, where a person has made restitution or reparation pursuant to section 60.27 of this article, such person shall not be required to pay a mandatory surcharge or a crime victim assistance fee.
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision one of section 60.00 of this article, the provisions of subdivision one of this section shall not apply to a violation under any law other than this chapter.
8. Subdivision one of section 130.10 of the criminal procedure law notwithstanding, at the time that the mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee or DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee is imposed a town or village court may, and all other courts shall, issue and cause to be served upon the person required to pay the mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee or DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee, a summons directing that such person appear before the court regarding the payment of the mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee or DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee, if after sixty days from the date it was imposed it remains unpaid. The designated date of appearance on the summons shall be set for the first day court is in session falling after the sixtieth day from the imposition of the mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee or DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee. The summons shall contain the information required by subdivision two of section 130.10 of the criminal procedure law except that in substitution for the requirement of paragraph (c) of such subdivision the summons shall state that the person served must appear at a date, time and specific location specified in the summons if after sixty days from the date of issuance the mandatory surcharge, sex offender registration fee or DNA databank fee, crime victim assistance fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee remains unpaid. The court shall not issue a summons under this subdivision to a person who is being sentenced to a term of confinement in excess of sixty days in jail or in the department of corrections and community supervision. The mandatory surcharges, sex offender registration fee and DNA databank fees, crime victim assistance fees and supplemental sex offender victim fees for those persons shall be governed by the provisions of section 60.30 of this article.
9. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision one of this section, in the event a proceeding is in a town or village court, such court shall add an additional five dollars to the surcharges imposed by such subdivision one.
10. The provisions of this section shall apply to sentences imposed upon a youthful offender finding; provided, however that the court shall not impose the sex offender registration fee, DNA databank fee or supplemental sex offender victim fee, as defined in subparagraphs (iv) and (v) of paragraph (a) and paragraph (b) of subdivision one of this section, for an offense in which the conviction was substituted with a youthful offender finding.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1982, c. 55, § 81. Amended L.1983, c. 15, § 2; L.1983, c. 16, § 1; L.1985, c. 59, § 1; L.1989, c. 62, § 84; L.1990, c. 190, § 319; L.1991, c. 166, § 370; L.1992, c. 55, § 354; L.1995, c. 3, §§ 56, 71; L.1997, c. 452, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1998; L.1999, c. 385, § 2, eff. July 27, 1999; L.1999, c. 385, § 3; L.2000, c. 57, pt. L, § 1, eff. May 15, 2000, deemed eff. April 1, 2000; L.2003, c. 62, pt. F, §§ 1, 2, eff. May 15, 2003; L.2003, c. 62, pt. M, § 1, eff. Nov. 11, 2003; L.2004, c. 56, pt. E, § 1, eff. Aug. 20, 2004, deemed eff. April 1, 2004; L.2004, c. 56, pt. E, § 2; L.2004, c. 56, pt. F. § 2, eff. Feb. 16, 2005; L.2006, c. 320, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2006; L.2008, c. 56, pt. Y, § 2, eff. April 23, 2008, deemed eff. Feb. 16, 2005; L.2008, c. 56, pt. DD, § 1, eff. July 1, 2008; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 121, eff. March 31, 2011.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.36
Effective: December 18, 2009
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.36 Authorized dispositions; driving while intoxicated offenses
Where a court is imposing a sentence for a violation of subdivision two, two-a, or three of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law pursuant to sections 65.00 or 65.05 of this title and, as a condition of such sentence, orders the installation and maintenance of an ignition interlock device, the court may impose any other penalty authorized pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-three of the vehicle and traffic law.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2009, c. 496, § 12, eff. Dec. 18, 2009.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 60.37
Effective: May 20, 2012
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 60. Authorized Dispositions of Offenders (Refs & Annos)
§ 60.37. Authorized disposition; certain offenses
When a person has been charged with an offense and the elements of such offense meet the criteria of an “eligible offense” and such person qualifies as an “eligible person” as such terms are defined in section four hundred fifty-eight-l of the social services law, the court may, as a condition of adjournment in contemplation of dismissal in accordance with section 170.55 of the criminal procedure law, or a condition of probation or a conditional discharge, direct that the defendant participate in an education reform program pursuant to subdivision two of section four hundred fifty-eight-l of the social services law.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2011, c. 535, § 6. Amended L.2012, c. 55, pt. V, § 6, eff. May 20, 2012.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. TWO, T. E, Art. 65, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 65. Sentences of Probation, Conditional Discharge and Unconditional Discharge
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 65.00
Effective: April 7, 2009
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 65. Sentences of Probation, Conditional Discharge and Unconditional Discharge (Refs & Annos)
§ 65.00 Sentence of probation
1. Criteria. (a) Except as otherwise required by section 60.04 or 60.05 of this title, and except as provided by paragraph (b) hereof, the court may sentence a person to a period of probation upon conviction of any crime if the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history, character and condition of the defendant, is of the opinion that:
(i) Institutional confinement for the term authorized by law of the defendant is or may not be necessary for the protection of the public;
(ii) the defendant is in need of guidance, training or other assistance which, in his case, can be effectively administered through probation supervision; and
(iii) such disposition is not inconsistent with the ends of justice.
(b) The court, with the concurrence of either the administrative judge of the court or of the judicial district within which the court is situated or such administrative judge as the presiding justice of the appropriate appellate division shall designate, may sentence a person to a period of probation upon conviction of a class A-II felony defined in article two hundred twenty, the class B felony defined in section 220.48 of this chapter or any other class B felony defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter where the person is a second felony drug offender as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.70 of this chapter, if the prosecutor either orally on the record or in a writing filed with the indictment recommends that the court sentence such person to a period of probation upon the ground that such person has or is providing material assistance in the investigation, apprehension or prosecution of any person for a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or the attempt or the conspiracy to commit any such felony, and if the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history, character and condition of the defendant is of the opinion that:
(i) Institutional confinement of the defendant is not necessary for the protection of the public;
(ii) The defendant is in need of guidance, training or other assistance which, in his case, can be effectively administered through probation supervision;
(iii) The defendant has or is providing material assistance in the investigation, apprehension or prosecution of a person for a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or the attempt or conspiracy to commit any such felony; and
(iv) Such disposition is not inconsistent with the ends of justice.
[Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, par. d. See, also, closing par. below.] Provided, however, that the court shall not, except to the extent authorized by paragraph (d) of subdivision two of section 60.01 of this chapter, impose a sentence of probation in any case where it sentences a defendant for more than one crime and imposes a sentence of imprisonment for any one of the crimes, or where the defendant is subject to an undischarged indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment which was imposed at a previous time by a court of this state and has more than one year to run.
[Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, closing par. above.] Provided, however, that the court shall not, except to the extent authorized by paragraph (d) of subdivision two of section 60.01 of this chapter, impose a sentence of probation in any case where it sentences a defendant for more than one crime and imposes a sentence of imprisonment for any one of the crimes, or where the defendant is subject to an undischarged indeterminate or reformatory sentence of imprisonment which was imposed at a previous time by a court of this state and has more than one year to run.
2. Sentence. When a person is sentenced to a period of probation the court shall, except to the extent authorized by paragraph (d) of subdivision two of section 60.01 of this chapter, impose the period authorized by subdivision three of this section and shall specify, in accordance with section 65.10, the conditions to be complied with. The court may modify or enlarge the conditions or, if the defendant commits an additional offense or violates a condition, revoke the sentence at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the period of probation.
3. Periods of probation. Unless terminated sooner in accordance with the criminal procedure law, the period of probation shall be as follows:
(a)(i) For a felony, other than a class A-II felony defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter or the class B felony defined in section 220.48 of this chapter, or any other class B felony defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter committed by a second felony drug offender, or a sexual assault, the period of probation shall be five years;
(ii) For a class A-II felony drug offender as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 70.71 of this chapter as described in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of this section, or a class B felony committed by a second felony drug offender described in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of this section, the period of probation shall be life and for a class B felony defined in section 220.48 of this chapter, the period of probation shall be twenty-five years;
(iii) For a felony sexual assault, the period of probation shall be ten years.
(b) (i) For a class A misdemeanor, other than a sexual assault, the period of probation shall be three years;
(ii) For a class A misdemeanor sexual assault, the period of probation shall be six years.
(c) For a class B misdemeanor, the period of probation shall be one year, except the period of probation shall be no less than one year and no more than three years for the class B misdemeanor of public lewdness as defined in section 245.00 of this chapter;
(d) For an unclassified misdemeanor, the period of probation shall be three years if the authorized sentence of imprisonment is in excess of three months, otherwise the period of probation shall be one year.
For the purposes of this section, the term “sexual assault” means an offense defined in article one hundred thirty or two hundred sixty-three, or in section 255.25, 255.26 or 255.27 of this chapter, or an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
4. In any case where a court pursuant to its authority under subdivision four of section 60.01 of this chapter revokes probation and sentences such person to imprisonment and probation, as provided in paragraph (d) of subdivision two of section 60.01 of this chapter, the period of probation shall be the remaining period of the original probation sentence or one year whichever is greater.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1971, c. 1097, § 73; L.1973, c. 276, § 7; L.1973, c. 277, § 5; L.1973, c. 278, §§ 2, 3; L.1973, c. 676, § 29; L.1973, c. 1051, § 2; L.1974, c. 835, § 2; L.1979, c. 410, §§ 4, 5; L.1980, c. 471, §§ 19, 20; L.1985, c. 79, § 1; L.1995, c. 3, § 1-a; L.2000, c. 1, § 10, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2003, c. 264, § 5, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2004, c. 568, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2004; L.2004, c. 738, § 25, eff. Jan. 13, 2005; L.2004, c. 738, § 26, eff. Dec. 27, 2004; L.2006, c. 320, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 2006; L.2009, c. 56, pt. AAA, §§ 19, 20, eff. April 7, 2009.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 65.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 65. Sentences of Probation, Conditional Discharge and Unconditional Discharge (Refs & Annos)
§ 65.05 Sentence of conditional discharge
1. Criteria. (a) Except as otherwise required by section 60.05, the court may impose a sentence of conditional discharge for an offense if the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and to the history, character and condition of the defendant, is of the opinion that neither the public interest nor the ends of justice would be served by a sentence of imprisonment and that probation supervision is not appropriate.
(b) When a sentence of conditional discharge is imposed for a felony, the court shall set forth in the record the reasons for its action.
2. Sentence. Except to the extent authorized by paragraph (d) of subdivision two of section 60.01 of this chapter, when the court imposes a sentence of conditional discharge the defendant shall be released with respect to the conviction for which the sentence is imposed without imprisonment or probation supervision but subject, during the period of conditional discharge, to such conditions as the court may determine. The court shall impose the period of conditional discharge authorized by subdivision three of this section and shall specify, in accordance with section 65.10, the conditions to be complied with. If a defendant is sentenced pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision two of section 65.10 of this chapter, the court shall require the administrator of the program to provide written notice to the court of any violation of program participation by the defendant. The court may modify or enlarge the conditions or, if the defendant commits an additional offense or violates a condition, revoke the sentence at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the period of conditional discharge.
3. Periods of conditional discharge. Unless terminated sooner in accordance with the criminal procedure law, the period of conditional discharge shall be as follows:
(a) Three years in the case of a felony; and
(b) One year in the case of a misdemeanor or a violation.
Where the court has required, as a condition of the sentence, that the defendant make restitution of the fruits of his or her offense or make reparation for the loss caused thereby and such condition has not been satisfied, the court, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the period of conditional discharge, may impose an additional period. The length of the additional period shall be fixed by the court at the time it is imposed and shall not be more than two years. All of the incidents of the original sentence, including the authority of the court to modify or enlarge the conditions, shall continue to apply during such additional period.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1971, c. 1097, § 74; L.1972, c. 157, § 2; L.1973, c. 276, § 8; L.1973, c. 277, § 6; L.1973, c. 1051, § 20; L.1974, c. 835, § 3; L.1980, c. 471, § 21; L.1981, c. 742, §§ 1, 2; L.1992, c. 618, § 14.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 65.10
Effective: September 20, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 65. Sentences of Probation, Conditional Discharge and Unconditional Discharge (Refs & Annos)
§ 65.10 Conditions of probation and of conditional discharge
1. In general. The conditions of probation and of conditional discharge shall be such as the court, in its discretion, deems reasonably necessary to insure that the defendant will lead a law-abiding life or to assist him to do so.
2. Conditions relating to conduct and rehabilitation. When imposing a sentence of probation or of conditional discharge, the court shall, as a condition of the sentence, consider restitution or reparation and may, as a condition of the sentence, require that the defendant:
(a) Avoid injurious or vicious habits;
(b) Refrain from frequenting unlawful or disreputable places or consorting with disreputable persons;
(c) Work faithfully at a suitable employment or faithfully pursue a course of study or of vocational training that will equip him for suitable employment;
(d) Undergo available medical or psychiatric treatment and remain in a specified institution, when required for that purpose;
(e) Participate in an alcohol or substance abuse program or an intervention program approved by the court after consultation with the local probation department having jurisdiction, or such other public or private agency as the court determines to be appropriate;
(e-1) Participate in a motor vehicle accident prevention course. The court may require such condition where a person has been convicted of a traffic infraction for a violation of article twenty-six of the vehicle and traffic law where the commission of such violation caused the serious physical injury or death of another person. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “motor vehicle accident prevention course” shall mean a motor vehicle accident prevention course approved by the department of motor vehicles pursuant to article twelve-B of the vehicle and traffic law;
(f) Support his dependents and meet other family responsibilities;
(g) Make restitution of the fruits of his or her offense or make reparation, in an amount he can afford to pay, for the actual out-of-pocket loss caused thereby. When restitution or reparation is a condition of the sentence, the court shall fix the amount thereof, the manner of performance, specifically state the date when restitution is to be paid in full prior to the expiration of the sentence of probation and may establish provisions for the early termination of a sentence of probation or conditional discharge pursuant to the provisions of subdivision three of section 410.90 of the criminal procedure law after the restitution and reparation part of a sentence of probation or conditional discharge has been satisfied. The court shall provide that in the event the person to whom restitution or reparation is to be made dies prior to the completion of said restitution or reparation, the remaining payments shall be made to the estate of the deceased. [FN1]
(g-1) Reimburse a consumer credit reporting agency for the amount of the fee or fees that could have been charged by such agency to a domestic violence victim, as defined in section three hundred eighty-t of the general business law, had such victim not been eligible to receive security freeze services without charge pursuant to subdivision (n) of such section;
(h) Perform services for a public or not-for-profit corporation, association, institution or agency, including but not limited to services for the division of substance abuse services, services in an appropriate community program for removal of graffiti from public or private property, including any property damaged in the underlying offense, or services for the maintenance and repair of real or personal property maintained as a cemetery plot, grave, burial place or other place of interment of human remains. Provided however, that the performance of any such services shall not result in the displacement of employed workers or in the impairment of existing contracts for services, nor shall the performance of any such services be required or permitted in any establishment involved in any labor strike or lockout. The court may establish provisions for the early termination of a sentence of probation or conditional discharge pursuant to the provisions of subdivision three of section 410.90 of the criminal procedure law after such services have been completed. Such sentence may only be imposed upon conviction of a misdemeanor, violation, or class D or class E felony, or a youthful offender finding replacing any such conviction, where the defendant has consented to the amount and conditions of such service;
(i) If a person under the age of twenty-one years, (i) resides with his parents or in a suitable foster home or hostel as referred to in section two hundred forty-four of the executive law, (ii) attends school, (iii) spends such part of the period of the sentence as the court may direct, but not exceeding two years, in a facility made available by the division for youth pursuant to article nineteen-G of the executive law, provided that admission to such facility may be made only with the prior consent of the division for youth, (iv) attend a non-residential program for such hours and pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the court as suitable for a program of rehabilitation of youth, (v) contribute to his own support in any home, foster home or hostel;
(j) Post a bond or other security for the performance of any or all conditions imposed;
(k) Observe certain specified conditions of conduct as set forth in an order of protection issued pursuant to section 530.12 or 530.13 of the criminal procedure law.
(k-1) Install and maintain a functioning ignition interlock device, as that term is defined in section one hundred nineteen-a of the vehicle and traffic law, in any vehicle owned or operated by the defendant if the court in its discretion determines that such a condition is necessary to ensure the public safety. The court may require such condition only where a person has been convicted of a violation of subdivision two, two-a or three of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, or any crime defined by the vehicle and traffic law or this chapter of which an alcohol-related violation of any provision of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law is an essential element. The offender shall be required to install and operate the ignition interlock device only in accordance with section eleven hundred ninety-eight of the vehicle and traffic law.
(l) Satisfy any other conditions reasonably related to his rehabilitation.
3. Conditions relating to supervision. When imposing a sentence of probation the court, in addition to any conditions imposed pursuant to subdivision two of this section, shall require as conditions of the sentence, that the defendant:
(a) Report to a probation officer as directed by the court or the probation officer and permit the probation officer to visit him at his place of abode or elsewhere;
(b) Remain within the jurisdiction of the court unless granted permission to leave by the court or the probation officer. Where a defendant is granted permission to move or travel outside the jurisdiction of the court, the defendant shall sign a written waiver of extradition agreeing to waive extradition proceedings where such proceedings are the result of the issuance of a warrant by the court pursuant to subdivision two of section 410.40 of the criminal procedure law based on an alleged violation of probation. Where any county or the city of New York incurs costs associated with the return of any probationer based on the issuance of a warrant by the court pursuant to subdivision two of section 410.40 of the criminal procedure law, the jurisdiction may collect the reasonable and necessary expenses involved in connection with his or her transport, from the probationer; provided that where the sentence of probation is not revoked pursuant to section 410.70 of the criminal procedure law no such expenses may be collected.
(c) Answer all reasonable inquiries by the probation officer and notify the probation officer prior to any change in address or employment.
4. Electronic monitoring. When imposing a sentence of probation the court may, in
addition to any conditions imposed pursuant to subdivisions two and three of
this section, require the defendant to submit to the use of an electronic
monitoring device and/
4-a. Mandatory conditions for sex offenders. (a) When imposing a sentence of probation or conditional discharge upon a person convicted of an offense defined in article one hundred thirty, two hundred thirty-five or two hundred sixty-three of this chapter, or section 255.25, 255.26 or 255.27 of this chapter, and the victim of such offense was under the age of eighteen at the time of such offense or such person has been designated a level three sex offender pursuant to subdivision six of section 168-l of the correction law, the court shall require, as a mandatory condition of such sentence, that such sentenced offender shall refrain from knowingly entering into or upon any school grounds, as that term is defined in subdivision fourteen of section 220.00 of this chapter, or any other facility or institution primarily used for the care or treatment of persons under the age of eighteen while one or more of such persons under the age of eighteen are present, provided however, that when such sentenced offender is a registered student or participant or an employee of such facility or institution or entity contracting therewith or has a family member enrolled in such facility or institution, such sentenced offender may, with the written authorization of his or her probation officer or the court and the superintendent or chief administrator of such facility, institution or grounds, enter such facility, institution or upon such grounds for the limited purposes authorized by the probation officer or the court and superintendent or chief officer. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as restricting any lawful condition of supervision that may be imposed on such sentenced offender.
(b) When imposing a sentence of probation or conditional discharge upon a person convicted of an offense for which registration as a sex offender is required pursuant to subdivision two or three of section one hundred sixty-eight-a of the correction law, and the victim of such offense was under the age of eighteen at the time of such offense or such person has been designated a level three sex offender pursuant to subdivision six of section one hundred sixty-eight-l of the correction law or the internet was used to facilitate the commission of the crime, the court shall require, as mandatory conditions of such sentence, that such sentenced offender be prohibited from using the internet to access pornographic material, access a commercial social networking website, communicate with other individuals or groups for the purpose of promoting sexual relations with persons under the age of eighteen, and communicate with a person under the age of eighteen when such offender is over the age of eighteen, provided that the court may permit an offender to use the internet to communicate with a person under the age of eighteen when such offender is the parent of a minor child and is not otherwise prohibited from communicating with such child. Nothing in this subdivision shall be construed as restricting any other lawful condition of supervision that may be imposed on such sentenced offender. As used in this subdivision, a “commercial social networking website” shall mean any business, organization or other entity operating a website that permits persons under eighteen years of age to be registered users for the purpose of establishing personal relationships with other users, where such persons under eighteen years of age may: (i) create web pages or profiles that provide information about themselves where such web pages or profiles are available to the public or to other users; (ii) engage in direct or real time communication with other users, such as a chat room or instant messenger; and (iii) communicate with persons over eighteen years of age; provided, however, that, for purposes of this subdivision, a commercial social networking website shall not include a website that permits users to engage in such other activities as are not enumerated herein.
5. Other conditions. When imposing a sentence of probation the court may, in addition to any conditions imposed pursuant to subdivisions two, three and four of this section, require that the defendant comply with any other reasonable condition as the court shall determine to be necessary or appropriate to ameliorate the conduct which gave rise to the offense or to prevent the incarceration of the defendant.
5-a. Other conditions for sex offenders. When imposing a sentence of probation upon a person convicted of an offense for which registration as a sex offender is required pursuant to subdivision two or three of section one hundred sixty-eight-a of the correction law, in addition to any conditions required under subdivisions two, three, four, four-a and five of this section, the court may require that the defendant comply with a reasonable limitation on his or her use of the internet that the court determines to be necessary or appropriate to ameliorate the conduct which gave rise to the offense or to protect public safety, provided that the court shall not prohibit such sentenced offender from using the internet in connection with education, lawful employment or search for lawful employment.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1973, c. 676, § 30; L.1974, c. 930, § 3; L.1975, c. 667, § 35; L.1978, c. 500, § 1; L.1980, c. 270, § 1; L.1980, c. 284, § 1; L.1980, c. 471, § 22; L.1980, c. 530, § 16; L.1981, c. 583, § 1; L.1981, c. 742, § 3; L.1982, c. 782, §§ 1, 2; L.1984, c. 335, § 2; L.1984, c. 417, § 1; L.1985, c. 672, §§ 1, 2; L.1986, c. 552, § 1; L.1989, c. 443, § 1; L.1992, c. 465, § 51; L.1992, c. 618, § 15; L.1995, c. 536, § 2; L.1996, c. 186, § 1; L.1996, c. 653, § 1; L.1997, c. 181, § 1, eff. July 8, 1997; L.2000, c. 1, § 7, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2001, c. 508, § 1, eff. Jan. 20, 2002; L.2005, c. 544, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2005; L.2006, c. 320, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 2006; L.2006, c. 571, § 6, eff. Nov. 1, 2006; L.2007, c. 669, § 1, eff. Oct. 27, 2007; L.2008, c. 67, §§ 7, 8, eff. April 28, 2008; L.2008, c. 406, § 2, eff. Aug. 5, 2008; L.2010, c. 56, pt. A, § 46, eff. June 22, 2010; L.2010, c. 56, pt. D, § 8, eff. Sept. 20, 2010.)
[FN1] So in original. Probably should be a semicolon.
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 65.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 65. Sentences of Probation, Conditional Discharge and Unconditional Discharge (Refs & Annos)
§ 65.15 Calculation of periods of probation and of conditional discharge
1. A period of probation or a period or additional period of conditional discharge commences on the day it is imposed. Multiple periods, whether imposed at the same or at different times, shall run concurrently.
2. When a person has violated the conditions of his probation or conditional discharge and is declared delinquent by the court, the declaration of delinquency shall interrupt the period of the sentence as of the date of the delinquency and such interruption shall continue until a final determination as to the delinquency has been made by the court pursuant to a hearing held in accordance with the provisions of the criminal procedure law.
3. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, par. d. See, also, subd. 3 below.] In any case where a person who is under a sentence of probation or of conditional discharge is also under an indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment, imposed for some other offense by a court of this state the service of the sentence of imprisonment shall satisfy the sentence of probation or of conditional discharge unless the sentence of probation or of conditional discharge is revoked prior to the next to occur of parole or conditional release under, or satisfaction of, the sentence of imprisonment. Provided, however, that the service of an indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment shall not satisfy a sentence of probation if the sentence of probation was imposed at a time when the sentence of imprisonment had one year or less to run.
3. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, subd. 3 above.] In any case where a person who is under a sentence of probation or of conditional discharge is also under an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, or a reformatory sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 75.00, [FN1] imposed for some other offense by a court of this state the service of the sentence of imprisonment shall satisfy the sentence of probation or of conditional discharge unless the sentence of probation or of conditional discharge is revoked prior to the next to occur of parole or conditional release under, or satisfaction of, the sentence of imprisonment. Provided, however, that the service of an indeterminate or a reformatory sentence of imprisonment shall not satisfy a sentence of probation if the sentence of probation was imposed at a time when the sentence of imprisonment had one year or less to run.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1971, c. 1097, § 75; L.1995, c. 3, § 1-b.)
[FN1] Repealed.
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 65.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 65. Sentences of Probation, Conditional Discharge and Unconditional Discharge (Refs & Annos)
§ 65.20 Sentence of unconditional discharge
1. Criteria. The court may impose a sentence of unconditional discharge in any case where it is authorized to impose a sentence of conditional discharge under section 65.05 if the court is of the opinion that no proper purpose would be served by imposing any condition upon the defendant's release.
When a sentence of unconditional discharge is imposed for a felony, the court shall set forth in the record the reasons for its action.
2. Sentence. When the court imposes a sentence of unconditional discharge, the defendant shall be released with respect to the conviction for which the sentence is imposed without imprisonment, fine or probation supervision. A sentence of unconditional discharge is for all purposes a final judgment of conviction.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. TWO, T. E, Art. 70, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.00
Effective: October 9, 2009
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.00 Sentence of imprisonment for felony
1. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, subd. 1 below.] Indeterminate sentence. Except as provided in subdivisions four, five and six of this section or section 70.80 of this article, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony, other than a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, shall be an indeterminate sentence. When such a sentence is imposed, the court shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the provisions of subdivision two of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment shall be as provided in subdivision three of this section.
1. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, subd. 1, above.] Indeterminate sentence. Except as provided in subdivisions four and five of this section or section 70.80 of this article, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony, other than a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, shall be an indeterminate sentence. When such a sentence is imposed, the court shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the provisions of subdivision two of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment shall be as provided in subdivision three of this section.
2. Maximum term of sentence. The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be at least three years and the term shall be fixed as follows:
(a) For a class A felony, the term shall be life imprisonment;
(b) For a class B felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed twenty-five years;
(c) For a class C felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed fifteen years;
(d) For a class D felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed seven years; and
(e) For a class E felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed four years.
3. Minimum period of imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence shall be at least one year and shall be fixed as follows:
(a) In the case of a class A felony, the minimum period shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence.
(i) For a class A-I felony, such minimum period shall not be less than fifteen years nor more than twenty-five years; provided, however, that (A) where a sentence, other than a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole, is imposed upon a defendant convicted of murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of this chapter such minimum period shall be not less than twenty years nor more than twenty-five years, and, (B) where a sentence is imposed upon a defendant convicted of murder in the second degree as defined in subdivision five of section 125.25 of this chapter or convicted of aggravated murder as defined in section 125.26 of this chapter, the sentence shall be life imprisonment without parole, and, (C) where a sentence is imposed upon a defendant convicted of attempted murder in the first degree as defined in article one hundred ten of this chapter and subparagraph (i), (ii) or (iii) of paragraph (a) of subdivision one and paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 125.27 of this chapter or attempted aggravated murder as defined in article one hundred ten of this chapter and section 125.26 of this chapter such minimum period shall be not less than twenty years nor more than forty years.
(ii) For a class A-II felony, such minimum period shall not be less than three years nor more than eight years four months, except that for the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault as defined in section 130.95 of this chapter or the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault against a child as defined in section 130.96 of this chapter, such minimum period shall be not less than ten years nor more than twenty-five years.
(b) For any other felony, the minimum period shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence and shall be not less than one year nor more than one-third of the maximum term imposed.
4. Alternative definite sentence for class D and E felonies. When a person, other than a second or persistent felony offender, is sentenced for a class D or class E felony, and the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, is of the opinion that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that it would be unduly harsh to impose an indeterminate or determinate sentence, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less.
5. Life imprisonment without parole. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment without parole shall not be or become eligible for parole or conditional release. For purposes of commitment and custody, other than parole and conditional release, such sentence shall be deemed to be an indeterminate sentence. A defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole upon conviction for the crime of murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of this chapter and in accordance with the procedures provided by law for imposing a sentence for such crime. A defendant must be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole upon conviction for the crime of terrorism as defined in section 490.25 of this chapter, where the specified offense the defendant committed is a class A-I felony; the crime of criminal possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the first degree as defined in section 490.45 of this chapter; or the crime of criminal use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the first degree as defined in section 490.55 of this chapter; provided, however, that nothing in this subdivision shall preclude or prevent a sentence of death when the defendant is also convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of this chapter. A defendant must be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole upon conviction for the crime of murder in the second degree as defined in subdivision five of section 125.25 of this chapter or for the crime of aggravated murder as defined in subdivision one of section 125.26 of this chapter. A defendant may be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole upon conviction for the crime of aggravated murder as defined in subdivision two of section 125.26 of this chapter.
6. [Deemed repealed Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d.] Determinate sentence. Except as provided in subdivision four of this section and subdivisions two and four of section 70.02, when a person is sentenced as a violent felony offender pursuant to section 70.02 or as a second violent felony offender pursuant to section 70.04 or as a second felony offender on a conviction for a violent felony offense pursuant to section 70.06, the court must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of such sections and such sentence shall include, as a part thereof, a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1973, c. 276, § 9; L.1973, c. 277, §§ 7, 8; L.1976, c. 480, § 5; L.1978, c. 481, § 2; L.1979, c. 410, § 6; L.1980, c. 873, §§ 1, 2; L.1983, c. 238, § 1; L.1986, c. 280, §§ 1, 2; L.1995, c. 1, §§ 3 to 5; L.1995, c. 3, §§ 1-c to 3; L.1998, c. 1, §§ 2 to 4, eff. Aug. 6, 1998; L.2004, c. 1, pt. A, § 5, eff. July 23, 2004; L.2004, c. 459, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 2004; L.2004, c. 738, § 28, eff. Dec. 12, 2004; L.2004, c. 738, § 29; L.2005, c. 765, §§ 2, 3, eff. Dec. 21, 2005; L.2006, c. 107, § 3, eff. June 23, 2006; L.2006, c. 746, § 3, eff. Dec. 15, 2006; L.2007, c. 7, § 36, eff. April 13, 2007; L.2007, c. 7, § 37; L.2009, c. 482, § 2, eff. Oct. 9, 2009.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.02
Effective: March 16, 2013
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.02 Sentence of imprisonment for a violent felony offense
1. Definition of a violent felony offense. A violent felony offense is a class B violent felony offense, a class C violent felony offense, a class D violent felony offense, or a class E violent felony offense, defined as follows:
(a) Class B violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit the class A-I felonies of murder in the second degree as defined in section 125.25, kidnapping in the first degree as defined in section 135.25, and arson in the first degree as defined in section 150.20; manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.20, aggravated manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.22, rape in the first degree as defined in section 130.35, criminal sexual act in the first degree as defined in section 130.50, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree as defined in section 130.70, course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree as defined in section 130.75; assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.10, kidnapping in the second degree as defined in section 135.20, burglary in the first degree as defined in section 140.30, arson in the second degree as defined in section 150.15, robbery in the first degree as defined in section 160.15, incest in the first degree as defined in section 255.27, criminal possession of a weapon in the first degree as defined in section 265.04, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree as defined in section 265.09, criminal sale of a firearm in the first degree as defined in section 265.13, aggravated assault upon a police officer or a peace officer as defined in section 120.11, gang assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.07, intimidating a victim or witness in the first degree as defined in section 215.17, hindering prosecution of terrorism in the first degree as defined in section 490.35, criminal possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the second degree as defined in section 490.40, and criminal use of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the third degree as defined in section 490.47.
(b) Class C violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the class B felonies set forth in paragraph (a) of this subdivision; aggravated criminally negligent homicide as defined in section 125.11, aggravated manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.21, aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree as defined in section 130.67, assault on a peace officer, police officer, fireman or emergency medical services professional as defined in section 120.08, assault on a judge as defined in section 120.09, gang assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.06, strangulation in the first degree as defined in section 121.13, burglary in the second degree as defined in section 140.25, robbery in the second degree as defined in section 160.10, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree as defined in section 265.03, criminal use of a firearm in the second degree as defined in section 265.08, criminal sale of a firearm in the second degree as defined in section 265.12, criminal sale of a firearm with the aid of a minor as defined in section 265.14, aggravated criminal possession of a weapon as defined in section 265.19, soliciting or providing support for an act of terrorism in the first degree as defined in section 490.15, hindering prosecution of terrorism in the second degree as defined in section 490.30, and criminal possession of a chemical weapon or biological weapon in the third degree as defined in section 490.37.
(c) Class D violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the class C felonies set forth in paragraph (b); reckless assault of a child as defined in section 120.02, assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.05, menacing a police officer or peace officer as defined in section 120.18, stalking in the first degree, as defined in subdivision one of section 120.60, strangulation in the second degree as defined in section 121.12, rape in the second degree as defined in section 130.30, criminal sexual act in the second degree as defined in section 130.45, sexual abuse in the first degree as defined in section 130.65, course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree as defined in section 130.80, aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree as defined in section 130.66, facilitating a sex offense with a controlled substance as defined in section 130.90, criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision five, six, seven, eight, nine or ten of section 265.02, criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree as defined in section 265.11, intimidating a victim or witness in the second degree as defined in section 215.16, soliciting or providing support for an act of terrorism in the second degree as defined in section 490.10, and making a terroristic threat as defined in section 490.20, falsely reporting an incident in the first degree as defined in section 240.60, placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the first degree as defined in section 240.62, placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in a sports stadium or arena, mass transportation facility or enclosed shopping mall as defined in section 240.63, and aggravated unpermitted use of indoor pyrotechnics in the first degree as defined in section 405.18.
(d) Class E violent felony offenses: an attempt to commit any of the felonies of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision five, six, seven or eight of section 265.02 as a lesser included offense of that section as defined in section 220.20 of the criminal procedure law, persistent sexual abuse as defined in section 130.53, aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree as defined in section 130.65-a, falsely reporting an incident in the second degree as defined in section 240.55 and placing a false bomb or hazardous substance in the second degree as defined in section 240.61.
2. Authorized sentence.
(a) [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, par. d. See, also, par. (a) below.] Except as provided in subdivision six of section 60.05, the sentence imposed upon a person who stands convicted of a class B or class C violent felony offense must be a determinate sentence of imprisonment which shall be in whole or half years. The term of such sentence must be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of this section.
(a) [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, par. (a) above.] The sentence imposed upon a person who stands convicted of a class B or class C violent felony offense must be an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. Except as provided in subdivision five [FN1] of section 60.05, the maximum term of such sentence must be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment under such sentence must be in accordance with subdivision four of this section.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (b-1) of this subdivision, subdivision six of section 60.05 and subdivision four of this section, the sentence imposed upon a person who stands convicted of a class D violent felony offense, other than the offense of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision five, seven or eight of section 265.02 or criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree as defined in section 265.11, must be in accordance with the applicable provisions of this chapter relating to sentencing for class D felonies provided, however, that where a sentence of imprisonment is imposed which requires a commitment to the state department of corrections and community supervision, such sentence shall be a determinate sentence in accordance with paragraph (c) of subdivision three of this section.
(b-1) Except as provided in subdivision six of section 60.05, the sentence imposed upon a person who stands convicted of the class D violent felony offense of menacing a police officer or peace officer as defined in section 120.18 of this chapter must be a determinate sentence of imprisonment.
(c) Except as provided in subdivision six of section 60.05, the sentence imposed upon a person who stands convicted of the class D violent felony offenses of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision five, seven, eight or nine of section 265.02, criminal sale of a firearm in the third degree as defined in section 265.11 or the class E violent felonies of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision five, seven, eight or nine of section 265.02 must be a sentence to a determinate period of imprisonment, or, in the alternative, a definite sentence of imprisonment for a period of no less than one year, except that:
(i) the court may impose any other sentence authorized by law upon a person who has not been previously convicted in the five years immediately preceding the commission of the offense for a class A misdemeanor defined in this chapter, if the court having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, finds on the record that such sentence would be unduly harsh and that the alternative sentence would be consistent with public safety and does not deprecate the seriousness of the crime; and
(ii) the court may apply the provisions of paragraphs (b) and (c) of subdivision four of this section when imposing a sentence upon a person who has previously been convicted of a class A misdemeanor defined in this chapter in the five years immediately preceding the commission of the offense.
3. Term of sentence. The term of a determinate sentence for a violent felony offense must be fixed by the court as follows:
(a) For a class B felony, the term must be at least five years and must not exceed twenty-five years, provided, however, that the term must be: (i) at least ten years and must not exceed thirty years where the sentence is for the crime of aggravated assault upon a police officer or peace officer as defined in section 120.11 of this chapter; and (ii) at least ten years and must not exceed thirty years where the sentence is for the crime of aggravated manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.22 of this chapter;
(b) For a class C felony, the term must be at least three and one-half years and must not exceed fifteen years, provided, however, that the term must be: (i) at least seven years and must not exceed twenty years where the sentence is for the crime of aggravated manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.21 of this chapter; (ii) at least seven years and must not exceed twenty years where the sentence is for the crime of attempted aggravated assault upon a police officer or peace officer as defined in section 120.11 of this chapter; (iii) at least three and one-half years and must not exceed twenty years where the sentence is for the crime of aggravated criminally negligent homicide as defined in section 125.11 of this chapter; and (iv) at least five years and must not exceed fifteen years where the sentence is imposed for the crime of aggravated criminal possession of a weapon as defined in section 265.19 of this chapter;
(c) For a class D felony, the term must be at least two years and must not exceed seven years, provided, however, that the term must be: (i) at least two years and must not exceed eight years where the sentence is for the crime of menacing a police officer or peace officer as defined in section 120.18 of this chapter; and (ii) at least three and one-half years and must not exceed seven years where the sentence is imposed for the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision ten of section 265.02 of this chapter;
(d) For a class E felony, the term must be at least one and one-half years and must not exceed four years.
4. (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subdivision, where a plea of guilty to a class D violent felony offense is entered pursuant to section 220.10 or 220.30 of the criminal procedure law in satisfaction of an indictment charging the defendant with an armed felony, as defined in subdivision forty-one of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law, the court must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment.
(b) In any case in which the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subdivision or the provisions of subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (c) of subdivision two of this section apply, the court may impose a sentence other than a determinate sentence of imprisonment, or a definite sentence of imprisonment for a period of no less than one year, if it finds that the alternate sentence is consistent with public safety and does not deprecate the seriousness of the crime and that one or more of the following factors exist:
(i) mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed; or
(ii) where the defendant was not the sole participant in the crime, the defendant's participation was relatively minor although not so minor as to constitute a defense to the prosecution; or
(iii) possible deficiencies in proof of the defendant's commission of an armed felony.
(c) The defendant and the district attorney shall have an opportunity to present relevant information to assist the court in making a determination pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subdivision, and the court may, in its discretion, conduct a hearing with respect to any issue bearing upon such determination. If the court determines that a determinate sentence of imprisonment should not be imposed pursuant to the provisions of such paragraph (b), it shall make a statement on the record of the facts and circumstances upon which such determination is based. A transcript of the court's statement, which shall set forth the recommendation of the district attorney, shall be forwarded to the state division of criminal justice services along with a copy of the accusatory instrument.
5. Renumbered.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 481, § 3. Amended L.1980, c. 233, § 2; L.1980, c. 234, §§ 1, 2; L.1980, c. 583, § 1; L.1981, c. 175, § 1; L.1986, c. 124, § 1; L.1988, c. 450, § 3; L.1991, c. 496, § 4; L.1991, c. 521, § 1; L.1993, c. 291, §§ 1, 2; L.1995, c. 3, § 4; L.1996, c. 122, § 2; L.1996, c. 181, § 1; L.1996, c. 632, § 1; L.1996, c. 646, § 1; L.1996, c. 647, § 1; L.1998, c. 1, §§ 5 to 9, eff. Aug. 6, 1998; L.1998, c. 378, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 1998; L.1999, c. 33, §§ 1 to 4, eff. Nov. 1, 1999; L.1999, c. 635, § 10, eff. Dec. 1, 1999; L.2000, c. 189, §§ 6, 7, eff. Nov. 1, 2000; L.2001, c. 300, § 2, eff. Sept. 17, 2001; L.2001, c. 301, § 8, eff. Sept. 17, 2001; L.2003, c. 264, § 6, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2003, c. 584, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2004, c. 1, pt. A, § 6, eff. July 23, 2004; L.2005, c. 764, § 1, eff. Dec. 21, 2005; L.2005, c. 765, §§ 4 to 6, eff. Dec. 21, 2005; L.2006, c. 110, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2006; L.2006, c. 320, § 5, eff. Nov. 1, 2006; L.2007, c. 7, § 32, eff. April 13, 2007; L.2010, c. 405, § 1, eff. Nov. 11, 2010; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 122, eff. March 31, 2011; L.2011, c. 148, § 2, eff. Nov. 17, 2011; L.2013, c. 1, §§ 27 to 30, eff. March 16, 2013.)
[FN1] Now subd. 6.
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.04
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.04 Sentence of imprisonment for second violent felony offender
1. Definition of second violent felony offender.
(a) A second violent felony offender is a person who stands convicted of a violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 after having previously been subjected to a predicate violent felony conviction as defined in paragraph (b) of this subdivision.
(b) For the purpose of determining whether a prior conviction is a predicate violent felony conviction the following criteria shall apply:
(i) The conviction must have been in this state of a class A felony (other than one defined in article two hundred twenty) or of a violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02, or of an offense defined by the penal law in effect prior to September first, nineteen hundred sixty-seven, which includes all of the essential elements of any such felony, or in any other jurisdiction of an offense which includes all of the essential elements of any such felony for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year or a sentence of death was authorized and is authorized in this state irrespective of whether such sentence was imposed;
(ii) Sentence upon such prior conviction must have been imposed before commission of the present felony;
(iii) Suspended sentence, suspended execution of sentence, a sentence of probation, a sentence of conditional discharge or of unconditional discharge, and a sentence of certification to the care and custody of the division of substance abuse services, shall be deemed to be a sentence;
(iv) Except as provided in subparagraph (v) of this paragraph, sentence must have been imposed not more than ten years before commission of the felony of which the defendant presently stands convicted;
(v) In calculating the ten year period under subparagraph (iv), any period of time during which the person was incarcerated for any reason between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony shall be excluded and such ten year period shall be extended by a period or periods equal to the time served under such incarceration;
(vi) An offense for which the defendant has been pardoned on the ground of innocence shall not be deemed a predicate violent felony conviction.
2. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, as amended by L.1995, c. 3, § 74, par. d. See, also, subd. 2 below.] Authorized sentence. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a second violent felony offender the court must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment which shall be in whole or half years. Except where sentence is imposed in accordance with the provisions of section 70.10, the term of such sentence must be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of this section.
2. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, subd. 2 above.] Authorized sentence. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a second violent felony offender the court must impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. Except where sentence is imposed in accordance with the provisions of section 70.10, the maximum term of such sentence must be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment under such sentence must be in accordance with subdivision four of this section.
3. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, par. d. See, also, subd. 3 below.] Term of sentence. The term of a determinate sentence for a second violent felony offender must be fixed by the court as follows:
(a) For a class B felony, the term must be at least ten years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(b) For a class C felony, the term must be at least seven years and must not exceed fifteen years; and
(c) For a class D felony, the term must be at least five years and must not exceed seven years.
(d) For a class E felony, the term must be at least three years and must not exceed four years.
3. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, subd. 3 above.] Maximum term of sentence. The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence for a second violent felony offender must be fixed by the court as follows:
(a) For a class B felony, the term must be at least twelve years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(b) For a class C felony, the term must be at least eight years and must not exceed fifteen years; and
(c) For a class D felony, the term must be at least five years and must not exceed seven years.
(d) For a class E felony, the term must be at least four years.
4. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, par. d.] Minimum period of imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence for a second violent felony offender must be fixed by the court at one-half of the maximum term imposed and must be specified in the sentence.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 481, § 4. Amended L.1980, c. 233, § 3; L.1980, c. 471, § 23; L.1995, c. 3, § 5.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.05
Effective: November 1, 2003
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.05 Sentence of imprisonment for juvenile offender
1. Indeterminate sentence. A sentence of imprisonment for a felony committed by a juvenile offender shall be an indeterminate sentence. When such a sentence is imposed, the court shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the provisions of subdivision two of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment shall be as provided in subdivision three of this section. The court shall further provide that where a juvenile offender is under placement pursuant to article three of the family court act, any sentence imposed pursuant to this section which is to be served consecutively with such placement shall be served in a facility designated pursuant to subdivision four of section 70.20 of this article prior to service of the placement in any previously designated facility.
2. Maximum term of sentence. The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence for a juvenile offender shall be at least three years and the term shall be fixed as follows:
(a) For the class A felony of murder in the second degree, the term shall be life imprisonment;
(b) For the class A felony of arson in the first degree, or for the class A felony of kidnapping in the first degree the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall be at least twelve years but shall not exceed fifteen years;
(c) For a class B felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed ten years;
(d) For a class C felony, the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed seven years; and
(e) For a class D felony, the term shall be fixed by the court and shall not exceed four years.
3. Minimum period of imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence for a juvenile offender shall be specified in the sentence as follows:
(a) For the class A felony of murder in the second degree, the minimum period of imprisonment shall be fixed by the court and shall be not less than five years but shall not exceed nine years provided, however, that where the sentence is for an offense specified in subdivision one or two of section 125.25 of this chapter and the defendant was fourteen or fifteen years old at the time of such offense, the minimum period of imprisonment shall be not less than seven and one-half years but shall not exceed fifteen years;
(b) For the class A felony of arson in the first degree, or for the class A felony of kidnapping in the first degree, the minimum period of imprisonment shall be fixed by the court and shall be not less than four years but shall not exceed six years; and
(c) For a class B, C or D felony, the minimum period of imprisonment shall be fixed by the court at one-third of the maximum term imposed.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 481, § 31. Amended L.1981, c. 303, § 1; L.1984, c. 615, § 1; L.1998, c. 435, §§ 5, 6, eff. Nov. 1, 1998; L.2003, c. 174, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2003.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.06
Effective: March 31, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.06 Sentence of imprisonment for second felony offender
1. Definition of second felony offender.
(a) A second felony offender is a person, other than a second violent felony offender as defined in section 70.04, who stands convicted of a felony defined in this chapter, other than a class A-I felony, after having previously been subjected to one or more predicate felony convictions as defined in paragraph (b) of this subdivision.
(b) For the purpose of determining whether a prior conviction is a predicate felony conviction the following criteria shall apply:
(i) The conviction must have been in this state of a felony, or in any other jurisdiction of an offense for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year or a sentence of death was authorized and is authorized in this state irrespective of whether such sentence was imposed;
(ii) Sentence upon such prior conviction must have been imposed before commission of the present felony;
(iii) Suspended sentence, suspended execution of sentence, a sentence of probation, a sentence of conditional discharge or of unconditional discharge, and a sentence of certification to the care and custody of the division of substance abuse services, shall be deemed to be a sentence;
(iv) Except as provided in subparagraph (v) of this paragraph, sentence must have been imposed not more than ten years before commission of the felony of which the defendant presently stands convicted;
(v) In calculating the ten year period under subparagraph (iv), any period of time during which the person was incarcerated for any reason between the time of commission of the previous felony and the time of commission of the present felony shall be excluded and such ten year period shall be extended by a period or periods equal to the time served under such incarceration;
(vi) An offense for which the defendant has been pardoned on the ground of innocence shall not be deemed a predicate felony conviction.
2. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, par. d. See, also, subd. 2 below.] Authorized sentence. Except as provided in subdivision five or six of this section, or as provided in subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article, when the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a second felony offender the court must impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. The maximum term of such sentence must be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment under such sentence must be in accordance with subdivision four of this section.
2. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, subd. 2 above.] Authorized sentence. Except as provided in subdivision five of this section, or as provided in subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article, when the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a second felony offender the court must impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment. The maximum term of such sentence must be in accordance with the provisions of subdivision three of this section and the minimum period of imprisonment under such sentence must be in accordance with subdivision four of this section.
3. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, subd. 3 below.] Maximum term of sentence. Except as provided in subdivision five or six of this section, or as provided in subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article, the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence for a second felony offender must be fixed by the court as follows:
(a) For a class A-II felony, the term must be life imprisonment;
(b) For a class B felony, the term must be at least nine years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(c) For a class C felony, the term must be at least six years and must not exceed fifteen years;
(d) For a class D felony, the term must be at least four years and must not exceed seven years; and
(e) For a class E felony, the term must be at least three years and must not exceed four years; provided, however, that where the sentence is for the class E felony offense specified in section 240.32 of this chapter, the maximum term must be at least three years and must not exceed five years.
3. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, subd. 3 above.] Maximum term of sentence. Except as provided in subdivision five of this section, or as provided in subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article, the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence for a second felony offender must be fixed by the court as follows:
(a) For a class A-II felony, the term must be life imprisonment;
(b) For a class B felony, the term must be at least nine years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(c) For a class C felony, the term must be at least six years and must not exceed fifteen years;
(d) For a class D felony, the term must be at least four years and must not exceed seven years; and
(e) For a class E felony, the term must be at least three years and must not exceed four years.
4. Minimum period of imprisonment. (a) The minimum period of imprisonment for a second felony offender convicted of a class A-II felony must be fixed by the court at no less than six years and not to exceed twelve and one-half years and must be specified in the sentence, except that for the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault as defined in section 130.95 of this chapter or the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault against a child as defined in section 130.96 of this chapter, such minimum period shall be not less than ten years nor more than twenty-five years.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (a), the minimum period of imprisonment under an indeterminate sentence for a second felony offender must be fixed by the court at one-half of the maximum term imposed and must be specified in the sentence.
5. Repealed by L.2004, c. 738, § 31, eff. Dec. 27, 2004.
6. [Deemed repealed Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d.] Determinate sentence. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a second felony offender and the sentence to be imposed on such person is for a violent felony offense, as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02, the court must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment the term of which must be fixed by the court as follows:
(a) For a class B violent felony offense, the term must be at least eight years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(b) For a class C violent felony offense, the term must be at least five years and must not exceed fifteen years;
(c) For a class D violent felony offense, the term must be at least three years and must not exceed seven years; and
(d) For a class E violent felony offense, the term must be at least two years and must not exceed four years.
7. [Deemed repealed Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d.] Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the case of a person sentenced for a specified offense or offenses as defined in subdivision five of section 410.91 of the criminal procedure law, who stands convicted of no other felony offense, who has not previously been convicted of either a violent felony offense as defined in section 70.02 of this article, a class A felony offense or a class B felony offense, and is not under the jurisdiction of or awaiting delivery to the department of corrections and community supervision, the court may direct that such sentence be executed as a parole supervision sentence as defined in and pursuant to the procedures prescribed in section 410.91 of the criminal procedure law.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1973, c. 277, § 9. Amended L.1973, c. 278, § 8; L.1973, c. 1051, § 3; L.1975, c. 667, § 36; L.1975, c. 784, § 1; L.1978, c. 481, § 5; L.1979, c. 410, §§ 7 to 9; L.1980, c. 471, § 24; L.1995, c. 3, §§ 6, 7; L.1996, c. 92, § 1; L.2004, c. 738, § 31, eff. Dec. 27, 2004; L.2004, c. 738, § 32, eff. Dec. 14, 2004; L.2006, c. 107, § 4, eff. June 23, 2006; L.2007, c. 7, § 38, eff. April 13, 2007; L.2007, c. 7, § 39; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 123, eff. March 31, 2011.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.07
Effective: June 23, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.07 Sentence of imprisonment for second child sexual assault felony offender
1. A person who stands convicted of a felony offense for a sexual assault against a child, having been subjected to a predicate felony conviction for a sexual assault against a child, must be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of subdivision four or five of this section.
2. A “sexual assault against a child” means a felony offense, other than persistent sexual abuse as defined in section 130.53 of this chapter, (a) the essential elements of which include the commission or attempted commission of sexual conduct, as defined in subdivision ten of section 130.00 of this chapter, (b) committed or attempted to be committed against a child less than fifteen years old.
3. For purposes of determining whether a person has been subjected to a predicate felony conviction under this section, the criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.06 shall apply provided however that for purposes of this subdivision, the terms “ten year” or “ten years”, as provided in subparagraphs (iv) and (v) of paragraph (b) of subdivision one of such section 70.06, shall be “fifteen year” or “fifteen years”. The provisions of section 400.19 of the criminal procedure law shall govern the procedures that must be followed to determine whether a person who stands convicted of a sexual assault against a child has been previously subjected to a predicate felony conviction for such a sexual assault and whether such offender was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the predicate felony.
4. Where the court has found pursuant to subdivision three of this section that a person who stands convicted of a felony offense defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter for the commission or attempted commission of a sexual assault against a child has been subjected to a predicate felony conviction for a sexual assault against a child, the court shall sentence the defendant as follows:
(a) where the defendant stands convicted of such sexual assault against a child and such conviction is for a class A-II or class B felony offense, and the predicate conviction for such sexual assault against a child is for a class A-II, class B or class C felony offense, the court shall impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, the maximum term of which shall be life and the minimum period of which shall be at least fifteen years and no more than twenty-five years;
(b) where the defendant stands convicted of such sexual assault against a child and the conviction is for a class C felony offense, and the predicate conviction for such sexual assault against a child is for a class A-II, class B or class C felony offense, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be at least twelve years and must not exceed thirty years; provided however, that if the court determines that a longer sentence is warranted, the court shall set forth on the record the reasons for such determination and, in lieu of imposing such sentence of imprisonment, may impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, the maximum term of which shall be life and the minimum period of which shall be at least fifteen years and no more than twenty-five years;
(c) where the defendant stands convicted of such sexual assault against a child and the conviction is for a class B felony offense, and the predicate conviction for such sexual assault against a child is for a class D or class E felony offense, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be at least twelve years and must not exceed thirty years;
(d) where the defendant stands convicted of such sexual assault against a child and the conviction is for a class C felony offense, and the predicate conviction for such sexual assault against a child is for a class D or class E felony offense, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be at least ten years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(e) where the defendant stands convicted of such sexual assault against a child and the conviction is for a class D felony offense, and the predicate conviction for such sexual assault against a child is for a felony offense, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be at least five years and must not exceed fifteen years; and
(f) where the defendant stands convicted of such sexual assault against a child and the conviction is for a class E felony offense, and the predicate conviction for such sexual assault against a child is for a felony offense, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be at least four years and must not exceed twelve years.
5. Notwithstanding subdivision four of this section, where the court has found pursuant to subdivision three of this section that a person: (a) stands convicted of a felony offense defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter for the commission or attempted commission of a sexual assault against a child; and (b) has been subjected to a predicate felony conviction for sexual assault against a child as defined in subdivision two of this section; and (c) who was under the age of eighteen years at the time of the commission of such predicate felony offense, then the court may, in lieu of the sentence authorized by subdivision four of this section, sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment in accordance with the sentence authorized for the instant felony offense pursuant to subdivision three of section 70.04 of this article. The court shall set forth on the record the reasons for such determination.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2000, c. 1, § 50, eff. Feb. 1, 2001. Amended L.2003, c. 264, §§ 7 to 9, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2006, c. 107, § 5, eff. June 23, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.08
Effective: June 23, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.08 Sentence of imprisonment for persistent violent felony offender; criteria
1. Definition of persistent violent felony offender.
(a) A persistent violent felony offender is a person who stands convicted of a violent felony offense as defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 or the offense of predatory sexual assault as defined in section 130.95 of this chapter or the offense of predatory sexual assault against a child as defined in section 130.96 of this chapter, after having previously been subjected to two or more predicate violent felony convictions as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.04 of this article.
(b) For the purpose of determining whether a person has two or more predicate violent felony convictions, the criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.04 shall apply.
2. Authorized sentence. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a persistent violent felony offender the court must impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment, the maximum term of which shall be life imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment under such sentence must be in accordance with subdivision three of this section.
3. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, par. d. See, also, subd. 3 below.] Minimum period of imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment under an indeterminate life sentence for a persistent violent felony offender must be fixed by the court as follows:
(a) For the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault as defined in section 130.95 of this chapter or the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault against a child as defined in section 130.96 of this chapter, the minimum period must be twenty-five years;
(a-1) For a class B felony, the minimum period must be at least twenty years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(b) For a class C felony, the minimum period must be at least sixteen years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(c) For a class D felony, the minimum period must be at least twelve years and must not exceed twenty-five years.
3. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, subd. 3 above.] Minimum period of imprisonment. The minimum period of imprisonment under an indeterminate life sentence for a persistent violent felony offender must be fixed by the court as follows:
(a) For the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault as defined in section 130.95 of this chapter or the class A-II felony of predatory sexual assault against a child as defined in section 130.96 of this chapter, the minimum period must be twenty-five years;
(a-1) For a class B felony, the minimum period must be at least ten years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(b) For a class C felony, the minimum period must be at least eight years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(c) For a class D felony, the minimum period must be at least six years and must not exceed twenty-five years.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 481, § 6. Amended L.1995, c. 3, § 8; L.2006, c. 107, §§ 6, 7, eff. June 23, 2006; L.2006, c. 107, § 8.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.10
Effective: April 13, 2007
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.10 Sentence of imprisonment for persistent felony offender
1. Definition of persistent felony offender.
(a) A persistent felony offender is a person, other than a persistent violent felony offender as defined in section 70.08, who stands convicted of a felony after having previously been convicted of two or more felonies, as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this subdivision.
(b) A previous felony conviction within the meaning of paragraph (a) of this subdivision is a conviction of a felony in this state, or of a crime in any other jurisdiction, provided:
(i) that a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year, or a sentence to death, was imposed therefor; and
(ii) that the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for such conviction prior to the commission of the present felony; and
(iii) that the defendant was not pardoned on the ground of innocence; and
(iv) that such conviction was for a felony offense other than persistent sexual abuse, as defined in section 130.53 of this chapter.
(c) For the purpose of determining whether a person has two or more previous felony convictions, two or more convictions of crimes that were committed prior to the time the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for any of such convictions shall be deemed to be only one conviction.
2. Authorized sentence. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a persistent felony offender, and when it is of the opinion that the history and character of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct indicate that extended incarceration and life-time supervision will best serve the public interest, the court, in lieu of imposing the sentence of imprisonment authorized by section 70.00, 70.02, 70.04, 70.06 or subdivision five of section 70.80 for the crime of which such person presently stands convicted, may impose the sentence of imprisonment authorized by that section for a class A-I felony. In such event the reasons for the court's opinion shall be set forth in the record.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1971, c. 1097, § 76; L.1973, c. 277, § 10; L.1973, c. 1051, § 4; L.1978, c. 481, § 7; L.2003, c. 264, §§ 69, 70, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2007, c. 7, § 39-a, eff. April 13, 2007.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.15 Sentences of imprisonment for misdemeanors and violation
1. Class A misdemeanor. A sentence of imprisonment for a class A misdemeanor shall be a definite sentence. When such a sentence is imposed the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed one year; provided, however, that a sentence of imprisonment imposed upon a conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree as defined in subdivision one of section 265.01 must be for a period of no less than one year when the conviction was the result of a plea of guilty entered in satisfaction of an indictment or any count thereof charging the defendant with the class D violent felony offense of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree as defined in subdivision four of section 265.02, except that the court may impose any other sentence authorized by law upon a person who has not been previously convicted in the five years immediately preceding the commission of the offense for a felony or a class A misdemeanor defined in this chapter, if the court having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, finds on the record that such sentence would be unduly harsh and that the alternative sentence would be consistent with public safety and does not deprecate the seriousness of the crime.
2. Class B misdemeanor. A sentence of imprisonment for a class B misdemeanor shall be a definite sentence. When such a sentence is imposed the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed three months.
3. Unclassified misdemeanor. A sentence of imprisonment for an unclassified misdemeanor shall be a definite sentence. When such a sentence is imposed the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall be in accordance with the sentence specified in the law or ordinance that defines the crime.
4. Violation. A sentence of imprisonment for a violation shall be a definite sentence. When such a sentence is imposed the term shall be fixed by the court, and shall not exceed fifteen days.
In the case of a violation defined outside this chapter, if the sentence is expressly specified in the law or ordinance that defines the offense and consists solely of a fine, no term of imprisonment shall be imposed.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1980, c. 233, § 4; L.1981, c. 175, § 2; L.1984, c. 673, § 1; L.1993, c. 291, § 3.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.20
Effective: March 31, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.20. Place of imprisonment
1. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, subd. 1 below.] (a) Indeterminate or determinate sentence. Except as provided in subdivision four of this section, when an indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the state department of corrections and community supervision for the term of his or her sentence and until released in accordance with the law; provided, however, that a defendant sentenced pursuant to subdivision seven of section 70.06 shall be committed to the custody of the state department of corrections and community supervision for immediate delivery to a reception center operated by the department.
(b) The court in committing a defendant who is not yet eighteen years of age to the department of corrections and community supervision shall inquire as to whether the parents or legal guardian of the defendant, if present, will grant to the minor the capacity to consent to routine medical, dental and mental health services and treatment.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (b) of this subdivision, where the court commits a defendant who is not yet eighteen years of age to the custody of the department of corrections and community supervision in accordance with this section and no medical consent has been obtained prior to said commitment, the commitment order shall be deemed to grant the capacity to consent to routine medical, dental and mental health services and treatment to the person so committed.
(d) Nothing in this subdivision shall preclude a parent or legal guardian of an inmate who is not yet eighteen years of age from making a motion on notice to the department of corrections and community supervision pursuant to article twenty-two of the civil practice law and rules and section one hundred forty of the correction law, objecting to routine medical, dental or mental health services and treatment being provided to such inmate under the provisions of paragraph (b) of this subdivision.
(e) Nothing in this section shall require that consent be obtained from the parent or legal guardian, where no consent is necessary or where the defendant is authorized by law to consent on his or her own behalf to any medical, dental, and mental health service or treatment.
1. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, subd. 1 above.] (a) Indeterminate sentence. Except as provided in subdivision four of this section, when an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment is imposed, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the state department of corrections and community supervision for the term of his or her sentence and until released in accordance with the law.
(b) The court in committing a defendant who is not yet eighteen years of age to the department of corrections and community supervision shall inquire as to whether the parents or legal guardian of the defendant, if present, will grant to the minor the capacity to consent to routine medical, dental and mental health services and treatment.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (b) of this subdivision, where the court commits a defendant who is not yet eighteen years of age to the custody of the department of corrections and community supervision in accordance with this section and no medical consent has been obtained prior to said commitment, the commitment order shall be deemed to grant the capacity to consent to routine medical, dental and mental health services and treatment to the person so committed.
(d) Nothing in this subdivision shall preclude a parent or legal guardian of an inmate who is not yet eighteen years of age from making a motion on notice to the department of corrections and community supervision pursuant to article twenty-two of the civil practice law and rules and section one hundred forty of the correction law, objecting to routine medical, dental or mental health services and treatment being provided to such inmate under the provisions of paragraph (b) of this subdivision.
(e) Nothing in this section shall require that consent be obtained from the parent or legal guardian, where no consent is necessary or where the defendant is authorized by law to consent on his or her own behalf to any medical, dental, and mental health service or treatment.
2. Definite sentence. Except as provided in subdivision four of this section, when a definite sentence of imprisonment is imposed, the court shall commit the defendant to the county or regional correctional institution for the term of his sentence and until released in accordance with the law.
2-a. Sentence of life imprisonment without parole. When a sentence of life imprisonment without parole is imposed, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the state department of corrections and community supervision for the remainder of the life of the defendant.
3. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, subd. 3 below.] Undischarged imprisonment in other jurisdiction. When a defendant who is subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, imposed at a previous time by a court of another jurisdiction, is sentenced to an additional term or terms of imprisonment by a court of this state to run concurrently with such undischarged term, as provided in subdivision four of section 70.25, the return of the defendant to the custody of the appropriate official of the other jurisdiction shall be deemed a commitment for such portion of the term or terms of the sentence imposed by the court of this state as shall not exceed the said undischarged term. The defendant shall be committed to the custody of the state department of corrections and community supervision if the additional term or terms are indeterminate or determinate or to the appropriate county or regional correctional institution if the said term or terms are definite for such portion of the term or terms of the sentence imposed as shall exceed such undischarged term or until released in accordance with law. If such additional term or terms imposed shall run consecutively to the said undischarged term, the defendant shall be committed as provided in subdivisions one and two of this section.
3. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, subd. 3 above.] Undischarged imprisonment in other jurisdiction. When a defendant who is subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, imposed at a previous time by a court of another jurisdiction, is sentenced to an additional term or terms of imprisonment by a court of this state to run concurrently with such undischarged term, as provided in subdivision four of section 70.25, the return of the defendant to the custody of the appropriate official of the other jurisdiction shall be deemed a commitment for such portion of the term or terms of the sentence imposed by the court of this state as shall not exceed the said undischarged term. The defendant shall be committed to the custody of the state department of corrections and community supervision if the additional term or terms are indeterminate or to the appropriate county or regional correctional institution if the said term or terms are definite for such portion of the term or terms of the sentence imposed as shall exceed such undischarged term or until released in accordance with law. If such additional term or terms imposed shall run consecutively to the said undischarged term, the defendant shall be committed as provided in subdivisions one and two of this section.
4. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, a juvenile offender, or a juvenile offender who is adjudicated a youthful offender and given an indeterminate or a definite sentence, shall be committed to the custody of the commissioner of the office of children and family services who shall arrange for the confinement of such offender in secure facilities of the office. The release or transfer of such offenders from the office of children and family services shall be governed by section five hundred eight of the executive law.
(b) The court in committing a juvenile offender and youthful offender to the custody of the office of children and family services shall inquire as to whether the parents or legal guardian of the youth, if present, will consent for the office of children and family services to provide routine medical, dental and mental health services and treatment.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (b) of this subdivision, where the court commits an offender to the custody of the office of children and family services in accordance with this section and no medical consent has been obtained prior to said commitment, the commitment order shall be deemed to grant consent for the office of children and family services to provide for routine medical, dental and mental health services and treatment to the offender so committed.
(d) Nothing in this subdivision shall preclude a parent or legal guardian of an offender who is not yet eighteen years of age from making a motion on notice to the office of children and family services pursuant to article twenty-two of the civil practice law and rules objecting to routine medical, dental or mental health services and treatment being provided to such offender under the provisions of paragraph (b) of this subdivision.
(e) Nothing in this section shall require that consent be obtained from the parent or legal guardian, where no consent is necessary or where the offender is authorized by law to consent on his or her own behalf to any medical, dental and mental health service or treatment.
5. Subject to regulations of the department of health, routine medical, dental and mental health services and treatment is defined for the purposes of this section to mean any routine diagnosis or treatment, including without limitation the administration of medications or nutrition, the extraction of bodily fluids for analysis, and dental care performed with a local anesthetic. Routine mental health treatment shall not include psychiatric administration of medication unless it is part of an ongoing mental health plan or unless it is otherwise authorized by law.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1975, c. 782, § 1; L.1978, c. 268, § 1; L.1981, c. 303, § 2; L.1992, c. 465, § 52; L.1992, c. 479, § 3; L.1995, c. 1, § 6; L.1995, c. 3, § 9; L.1995, c. 516, §§ 2, 3; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 124, eff. March 31, 2011; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 125.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.25
Effective: November 16, 2009
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.25 Concurrent and consecutive terms of imprisonment
1. Except as provided in subdivisions two, two-a and five of this section, when multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a person at the same time, or when a person who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time by a court of this state is sentenced to an additional term of imprisonment, the sentence or sentences imposed by the court shall run either concurrently or consecutively with respect to each other and the undischarged term or terms in such manner as the court directs at the time of sentence. If the court does not specify the manner in which a sentence imposed by it is to run, the sentence shall run as follows:
(a) [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, par. (a) below.] An indeterminate or determinate sentence shall run concurrently with all other terms; and
(a) [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, par. (a) above.] An indeterminate sentence shall run concurrently with all other terms; and
(b) A definite sentence shall run concurrently with any sentence imposed at the same time and shall be consecutive to any other term.
2. When more than one sentence of imprisonment is imposed on a person for two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other, the sentences, except if one or more of such sentences is for a violation of section 270.20 of this chapter, must run concurrently.
2-a. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, subd. 2-a below.] When an indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to section 70.04, 70.06, 70.07, 70.08, 70.10, subdivision three or four of section 70.70, subdivision three or four of section 70.71 or subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article, or is imposed for a class A-I felony pursuant to section 70.00 of this article, and such person is subject to an undischarged indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment imposed prior to the date on which the present crime was committed, the court must impose a sentence to run consecutively with respect to such undischarged sentence.
2-a. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, subd. 2-a above.] When an indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to section 70.04, 70.06, 70.07, 70.08, 70.10, subdivision three or four of section 70.70, subdivision three or four of section 70.71 or subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article, or is imposed for a class A-I felony pursuant to section 70.00 of this article, and such person is subject to an undischarged indeterminate sentence of imprisonment imposed prior to the date on which the present crime was committed, the court must impose a sentence to run consecutively with respect to such undischarged sentence.
2-b. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, subd. 2-b below.] When a person is convicted of a violent felony offense committed after arraignment and while released on recognizance or bail, but committed prior to the imposition of sentence on a pending felony charge, and if an indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed in each case, such sentences shall run consecutively. Provided, however, that the court may, in the interest of justice, order a sentence to run concurrently in a situation where consecutive sentences are required by this subdivision if it finds either mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed or, where the defendant was not the sole participant in the crime, the defendant's participation was relatively minor although not so minor as to constitute a defense to the prosecution. The defendant and the district attorney shall have an opportunity to present relevant information to assist the court in making this determination and the court may, in its discretion, conduct a hearing with respect to any issue bearing upon such determination. If the court determines that consecutive sentences should not be ordered, it shall make a statement on the record of the facts and circumstances upon which such determination is based.
2-b. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, subd. 2-b above.] When a person is convicted of a violent felony offense committed after arraignment and while released on recognizance or bail, but committed prior to the imposition of sentence on a pending felony charge, and if an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment is imposed in each case, such sentences shall run consecutively. Provided, however, that the court may, in the interest of justice, order a sentence to run concurrently in a situation where consecutive sentences are required by this subdivision if it finds either mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed or, where the defendant was not the sole participant in the crime, the defendant's participation was relatively minor although not so minor as to constitute a defense to the prosecution. The defendant and the district attorney shall have an opportunity to present relevant information to assist the court in making this determination and the court may, in its discretion, conduct a hearing with respect to any issue bearing upon such determination. If the court determines that consecutive sentences should not be ordered, it shall make a statement on the record of the facts and circumstances upon which such determination is based.
2-c. When a person is convicted of bail jumping in the second degree as defined in section 215.56 or bail jumping in the first degree as defined in section 215.57 committed after arraignment and while released on recognizance or bail in connection with a pending indictment or information charging one or more felonies, at least one of which he is subsequently convicted, and if an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment is imposed in each case, such sentences shall run consecutively. Provided, however, that the court may, in the interest of justice, order a sentence to run concurrently in a situation where consecutive sentences are required by this subdivision if it finds mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed. The defendant and the district attorney shall have an opportunity to present relevant information to assist the court in making this determination and the court may, in its discretion, conduct a hearing with respect to any issue bearing upon such determination. If the court determines that consecutive sentences should not be ordered, it shall make a statement on the record of the facts and circumstances upon which such determination is based.
2-d. When a person is convicted of escape in the second degree as defined in section 205.10 or escape in the first degree as defined in section 205.15 committed after issuance of a securing order, as defined in subdivision five of section 500.10 of the criminal procedure law, in connection with a pending indictment or information charging one or more felonies, at least one of which he is subsequently convicted, and if an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment is imposed in each case, such sentences shall run consecutively. Provided, however, that the court may, in the interest of justice, order a sentence to run concurrently in a situation where consecutive sentences are required by this subdivision if it finds mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which the crime was committed. The defendant and the district attorney shall have an opportunity to present relevant information to assist the court in making this determination and the court may, in its discretion, conduct a hearing with respect to any issue bearing upon such determination. If the court determines that consecutive sentences should not be ordered, it shall make a statement on the record of the facts and circumstances upon which such determination is based.
2-e. Whenever a person is convicted of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree as defined in section 130.75 or course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree as defined in section 130.80 and any other crime under article one hundred thirty committed against the same child and within the period charged under section 130.75 or 130.80, the sentences must run concurrently.
2-f. Whenever a person is convicted of facilitating a sex offense with a controlled substance as defined in section 130.90 of this chapter, the sentence imposed by the court for such offense may be ordered to run consecutively to any sentence imposed upon conviction of an offense defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter arising from the same criminal transaction.
2-g. Whenever a person is convicted of unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine in the third degree as defined in section 220.73 of this chapter, unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine in the second degree as defined in section 220.74 of this chapter, or unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine in the first degree as defined in section 220.75 of this chapter, or any attempt to commit any of such offenses, and such person is also convicted, with respect to such unlawful methamphetamine laboratory, of unlawful disposal of methamphetamine laboratory material as defined in section 220.76 of this chapter, the sentences must run concurrently.
3. Where consecutive definite sentences of imprisonment are not prohibited by subdivision two of this section and are imposed on a person for offenses which were committed as parts of a single incident or transaction, the aggregate of the terms of such sentences shall not exceed one year.
4. When a person, who is subject to any undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time by a court of another jurisdiction, is sentenced to an additional term or terms of imprisonment by a court of this state, the sentence or sentences imposed by the court of this state, subject to the provisions of subdivisions one, two and three of this section, shall run either concurrently or consecutively with respect to such undischarged term in such manner as the court directs at the time of sentence. If the court of this state does not specify the manner in which a sentence imposed by it is to run, the sentence or sentences shall run consecutively.
5. (a) [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, par. (a) below.] Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subdivision, when a person is convicted of assault in the second degree, as defined in subdivision seven of section 120.05 of this chapter, any definite, indeterminate or determinate term of imprisonment which may be imposed as a sentence upon such conviction shall run consecutively to any undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant was subject and for which he was confined at the time of the assault.
5. (a) [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, par. (a) above.] Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subdivision, when a person is convicted of assault in the second degree, as defined in subdivision seven of section 120.05 of this chapter, any definite or indeterminate term of imprisonment which may be imposed as a sentence upon such conviction shall run consecutively to any undischarged term of imprisonment to which the defendant was subject and for which he was confined at the time of the assault.
(b) [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, par. (b) below.] Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subdivision, when a person is convicted of assault in the second degree, as defined in subdivision seven of section 120.05 of this chapter, any definite, indeterminate or determinate term of imprisonment which may be imposed as a sentence upon such conviction shall run consecutively to any term of imprisonment which was previously imposed or which may be prospectively imposed where the person was confined within a detention facility at the time of the assault upon a charge which culminated in such sentence of imprisonment.
(b) [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, par. (b) above.] Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subdivision, when a person is convicted of assault in the second degree, as defined in subdivision seven of section 120.05 of this chapter, any definite or indeterminate term of imprisonment which may be imposed as a sentence upon such conviction shall run consecutively to any term of imprisonment which was previously imposed or which may be prospectively imposed where the person was confined within a detention facility at the time of the assault upon a charge which culminated in such sentence of imprisonment.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subdivision, a term of imprisonment imposed upon a conviction to assault in the second degree as defined in subdivision seven of section 120.05 of this chapter may run concurrently to any other term of imprisonment, in the interest of justice, provided the court sets forth in the record its reasons for imposing a concurrent sentence. Nothing in this section shall require the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment where it is not otherwise required by law.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1975, c. 782, § 2; L.1978, c. 481, §§ 22, 23; L.1981, c. 372, §§ 1, 2; L.1982, c. 559, § 1; L.1984, c. 56, § 2; L.1986, c. 795, § 1; L.1995, c. 3, §§ 10 to 12; L.1996, c. 122, § 3; L.2000, c. 1, § 52, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2004, c. 738, § 33, eff. Jan. 13, 2005; L.2004, c. 738, § 34; L.2005, c. 394, § 5, eff. Oct. 1, 2005; L.2007, c. 7, § 40, eff. April 13, 2007; L.2007, c. 7, § 41; L.2009, c. 495, § 1, eff. Nov. 16, 2009; L.2009, c. 495, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.30
Effective: March 31, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.30 Calculation of terms of imprisonment
1. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also subd. 1 below.] An indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in an institution under the jurisdiction of the state department of corrections and community supervision. Where a person is under more than one indeterminate or determinate sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows:
(a) If the sentences run concurrently, the time served under imprisonment on any of the sentences shall be credited against the minimum periods of all the concurrent indeterminate sentences and against the terms of all the concurrent determinate sentences. The maximum term or terms of the indeterminate sentences and the term or terms of the determinate sentences shall merge in and be satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest unexpired time to run;
(b) If the defendant is serving two or more indeterminate sentences which run consecutively, the minimum periods of imprisonment are added to arrive at an aggregate minimum period of imprisonment equal to the sum of all the minimum periods, and the maximum terms are added to arrive at an aggregate maximum term equal to the sum of all the maximum terms, provided, however, that both the aggregate maximum term and the aggregate minimum period of imprisonment shall be subject to the limitations set forth in paragraphs (e) and (f) of this subdivision, where applicable;
(c) If the defendant is serving two or more determinate sentences of imprisonment which run consecutively, the terms of the determinate sentences are added to arrive at an aggregate maximum term of imprisonment, provided, however, that the aggregate maximum term of imprisonment shall be subject to the limitations set forth in paragraphs (e) and (f) of this subdivision, where applicable.
(d) If the defendant is serving one or more indeterminate sentences of imprisonment and one or more determinate sentence of imprisonment which run consecutively, the minimum term or terms of the indeterminate sentence or sentences and the term or terms of the determinate sentence or sentences are added to arrive at an aggregate maximum term of imprisonment, provided, however, (i) that in no event shall the aggregate maximum so calculated be less than the term or maximum term of imprisonment of the sentence which has the longest unexpired time to run; and (ii) that the aggregate maximum term of imprisonment shall be subject to the limitations set forth in paragraphs (e) and (f) of this subdivision, where applicable.
(e)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi) or (vii) of this paragraph, the aggregate maximum term of consecutive sentences, all of which are indeterminate sentences or all of which are determinate sentences, imposed for two or more crimes, other than two or more crimes that include a class A felony, committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under any of such sentences shall, if it exceeds twenty years, be deemed to be twenty years, unless one of the sentences was imposed for a class B felony, in which case the aggregate maximum term shall, if it exceeds thirty years, be deemed to be thirty years. Where the aggregate maximum term of two or more indeterminate consecutive sentences is reduced by calculation made pursuant to this paragraph, the aggregate minimum period of imprisonment, if it exceeds one-half of the aggregate maximum term as so reduced, shall be deemed to be one-half of the aggregate maximum term as so reduced;
(ii) Where the aggregate maximum term of two or more consecutive sentences, one or more of which is a determinate sentence and one or more of which is an indeterminate sentence, imposed for two or more crimes, other than two or more crimes that include a class A felony, committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under any of such sentences, exceeds twenty years, and none of the sentences was imposed for a class B felony, the following rules shall apply:
(A) if the aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences exceeds twenty years, the defendant shall be deemed to be serving to [FN1] a determinate sentence of twenty years.
(B) if the aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences is less than twenty years, the defendant shall be deemed to be serving an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be deemed to be twenty years. In such instances, the minimum sentence shall be deemed to be ten years or six-sevenths of the term or aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences, whichever is greater.
(iii) Where the aggregate maximum term of two or more consecutive sentences, one or more of which is a determinate sentence and one or more of which is an indeterminate sentence, imposed for two or more crimes, other than two or more crimes that include a class A felony, commmitted [FN2] prior to the time the person was imprisoned under any of such sentences, exceeds thirty years, and one of the sentences was imposed for a class B felony, the following rules shall apply:
(A) if the aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences exceeds thirty years, the defendant shall be deemed to be serving a determinate sentence of thirty years;
(B) if the aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences is less than thirty years, the defendant shall be deemed to be serving an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be deemed to be thirty years. In such instances, the minimum sentence shall be deemed to be fifteen years or six-sevenths of the term or aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences, whichever is greater.
(iv) Notwithstanding subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, the aggregate maximum term of consecutive sentences, all of which are indeterminate sentences or all of which are determinate sentences, imposed for the conviction of two violent felony offenses committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under any of such sentences and one of which is a class B violent felony offense, shall, if it exceeds forty years, be deemed to be forty years
(v) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of this paragraph, where the aggregate maximum term of two or more consecutive sentences, one or more of which is a determinate sentence and one or more of which is an indeterminate sentence, and where such sentences are imposed for the conviction of two violent felony offenses committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under any such sentences and where one of which is a class B violent felony offense, the following rules shall apply:
(A) if the aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences exceeds forty years, the defendant shall be deemed to be serving a determinate sentence of forty years;
(B) if the aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences is less than forty years, the defendant shall be deemed to be serving an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be deemed to be forty years. In such instances, the minimum sentence shall be deemed to be twenty years or six-sevenths of the term or aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences, whichever is greater.
(vi) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (i) and (iv) of this paragraph, the aggregate maximum term of consecutive sentences, all of which are indeterminate or all of which are determinate sentences, imposed for the conviction of three or more violent felony offenses committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under any of such sentences and one of which is a class B violent felony offense, shall, if it exceeds fifty years, be deemed to be fifty years;
(vii) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (ii), (iii) and (v) of this paragraph, where the aggregate maximum term of two or more consecutive sentences, one or more of which is a determinate sentence and one or more of which is an indeterminate sentence, and where such sentences are imposed for the conviction of three or more violent felony offenses committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under any such sentences and one of which is a class B violent felony offense, the following rules shall apply:
(A) if the aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences exceeds fifty years, the defendant shall be deemed to be serving a determinate sentence of fifty years.
(B) if the aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences is less than fifty years, the defendant shall be deemed to be serving an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be deemed to be fifty years. In such instances, the minimum sentence shall be deemed to be twenty-five years or six-sevenths of the term or aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences, whichever is greater.
(viii) Notwithstanding any provision of this subdivision to the contrary where a person is serving two or more consecutive sentences, one or more of which is an indeterminate sentence and one or more of which is a determinate sentence, and if he would be eligible for a reduction provision pursuant to this subdivision if the maximum term or aggregate maximum term of the indeterminate sentence or sentences were added to the term or aggregate maximum term of the determinate sentence or sentences, the person shall be deemed to be eligible for the applicable reduction provision and the rules set forth in this subdivision shall apply.
(f) The aggregate maximum term of consecutive sentences imposed upon a juvenile offender for two or more crimes, not including a class A felony, committed before he has reached the age of sixteen, shall, if it exceeds ten years, be deemed to be ten years. If consecutive indeterminate sentences imposed upon a juvenile offender include a sentence for the class A felony of arson in the first degree or for the class A felony of kidnapping in the first degree, then the aggregate maximum term of such sentences shall, if it exceeds fifteen years, be deemed to be fifteen years. Where the aggregate maximum term of two or more consecutive sentences is reduced by a calculation made pursuant to this paragraph, the aggregate minimum period of imprisonment, if it exceeds one-half of the aggregate maximum term as so reduced, shall be deemed to be one-half of the aggregate maximum term as so reduced.
1. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also subd. 1 above.] An indeterminate sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in an institution under the jurisdiction of the state department of corrections and community supervision. Where a person is under more than one indeterminate sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows:
(a) If the sentences run concurrently, the time served under imprisonment on any of the sentences shall be credited against the minimum periods of all the concurrent sentences, and the maximum terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest unexpired time to run;
(b) If the sentences run consecutively, the minimum periods of imprisonment are added to arrive at an aggregate minimum period of imprisonment equal to the sum of all the minimum periods, and the maximum terms are added to arrive at an aggregate maximum term equal to the sum of all the maximum terms, provided, however, that both the aggregate maximum term and the aggregate minimum period of imprisonment shall be subject to the limitations set forth in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this subdivision, where applicable;
(c)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) or (iii) of this paragraph, the aggregate maximum term of consecutive sentences imposed for two or more crimes, other than two or more crimes that include a class A felony, committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under any of such sentences shall, if it exceeds twenty years, be deemed to be twenty years, unless one of the sentences was imposed for a class B felony, in which case the aggregate maximum term shall, if it exceeds thirty years, be deemed to be thirty years. Where the aggregate maximum term of two or more consecutive sentences is reduced by calculation made pursuant to this paragraph, the aggregate minimum period of imprisonment, if it exceeds one-half of the aggregate maximum term as so reduced, shall be deemed to be one-half of the aggregate maximum term as so reduced;
(ii) Notwithstanding subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, the aggregate maximum term of consecutive sentences imposed for the conviction of two violent felony offenses committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under any of such sentences and one of which is a class B violent felony offense, shall, if it exceeds forty years, be deemed to be forty years;
(iii) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of this paragraph, the aggregate maximum term of consecutive sentences imposed for the conviction of three or more violent felony offenses committed prior to the time the person was imprisoned under any of such sentences and one of which is a class B violent felony offense, shall, if it exceeds fifty years, be deemed to be fifty years;
(d) The aggregate maximum term of consecutive sentences imposed upon a juvenile offender for two or more crimes, not including a class A felony, committed before he has reached the age of sixteen, shall, if it exceeds ten years, be deemed to be ten years. If consecutive indeterminate sentences imposed upon a juvenile offender include a sentence for the class A felony of arson in the first degree or for the class A felony of kidnapping in the first degree, then the aggregate maximum term of such sentences shall, if it exceeds fifteen years, be deemed to be fifteen years. Where the aggregate maximum term of two or more consecutive sentences is reduced by a calculation made pursuant to this paragraph, the aggregate minimum period of imprisonment, if it exceeds one-half of the aggregate maximum term as so reduced, shall be deemed to be one-half of the aggregate maximum term as so reduced.
2. Definite sentences. A definite sentence of imprisonment commences when the prisoner is received in the institution named in the commitment. Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall be calculated as follows:
(a) If the sentences run concurrently and are to be served in a single institution, the terms merge in and are satisfied by discharge of the term which has the longest unexpired time to run;
(b) If the sentences run consecutively and are to be served in a single institution, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term, or by service of two years imprisonment plus any term imposed for an offense committed while the person is under the sentences, whichever is less;
(c) If the sentences run concurrently and are to be served in more than one institution, the term of each such sentence shall be credited with the portion of any concurrent term served after that sentence was imposed;
(d) If the sentences run consecutively and are to be served in more than one institution, the aggregate of the time served in all of the institutions shall not exceed two years plus any term imposed for an offense committed while the person is under the sentences.
2-a. Undischarged imprisonment in other jurisdiction. Where a person who is subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment imposed at a previous time by a court of another jurisdiction is sentenced to an additional term or terms of imprisonment by a court of this state, to run concurrently with such undischarged term, such additional term or terms shall be deemed to commence when the said person is returned to the custody of the appropriate official of such other jurisdiction where the undischarged term of imprisonment is being served. If the additional term or terms imposed shall run consecutively to the said undischarged term, such additional term or terms shall commence when the prisoner is received in the appropriate institution as provided in subdivisions one and two of this section. The term or terms of such imprisonment shall be calculated and such other pertinent provisions of this section applied in the same manner as where a person is under more than one sentence in this state as provided in this section.
3. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, subd. 3 below.] Jail time. The term of a definite sentence, a determinate sentence, or the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence imposed on a person shall be credited with and diminished by the amount of time the person spent in custody prior to the commencement of such sentence as a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence. In the case of an indeterminate sentence, if the minimum period of imprisonment has been fixed by the court or by the board of parole, the credit shall also be applied against the minimum period. The credit herein provided shall be calculated from the date custody under the charge commenced to the date the sentence commences and shall not include any time that is credited against the term or maximum term of any previously imposed sentence or period of post-release supervision to which the person is subject. Where the charge or charges culminate in more than one sentence, the credit shall be applied as follows:
(a) If the sentences run concurrently, the credit shall be applied against each such sentence;
(b) If the sentences run consecutively, the credit shall be applied against the aggregate term or aggregate maximum term of the sentences and against the aggregate minimum period of imprisonment.
In any case where a person has been in custody due to a charge that culminated in a dismissal or an acquittal, the amount of time that would have been credited against a sentence for such charge, had one been imposed, shall be credited against any sentence that is based on a charge for which a warrant or commitment was lodged during the pendency of such custody.
3. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, subd. 3 above.] Jail time. The term of a definite sentence or the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence imposed on a person shall be credited with and diminished by the amount of time the person spent in custody prior to the commencement of such sentence as a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence. In the case of an indeterminate sentence, if the minimum period of imprisonment has been fixed by the court or by the board of parole, the credit shall also be applied against the minimum period. The credit herein provided shall be calculated from the date custody under the charge commenced to the date the sentence commences and shall not include any time that is credited against the term or maximum term of any previously imposed sentence or period of post-release supervision to which the person is subject. Where the charge or charges culminate in more than one sentence, the credit shall be applied as follows:
(a) If the sentences run concurrently, the credit shall be applied against each such sentence;
(b) If the sentences run consecutively, the credit shall be applied against the aggregate term or aggregate maximum term of the sentences and against the aggregate minimum period of imprisonment.
In any case where a person has been in custody due to a charge that culminated in a dismissal or an acquittal, the amount of time that would have been credited against a sentence for such charge, had one been imposed, shall be credited against any sentence that is based on a charge for which a warrant or commitment was lodged during the pendency of such custody.
4. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, subd. 4 below.] Good behavior time. Time allowances earned for good behavior, pursuant to the provisions of the correction law, shall be computed and applied as follows:
(a) In the case of a person serving an indeterminate or determinate sentence, the total of such allowances shall be calculated as provided in section eight hundred three of the correction law and the allowances shall be applied as provided in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.40;
(b) In the case of a person serving a definite sentence, the total of such allowances shall not exceed one-third of his term or aggregate term and the allowances shall be applied as a credit against such term.
4. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013. See, also, subd. 4 above.] Good behavior time. Time allowances earned for good behavior, pursuant to the provisions of the correction law, shall be computed and applied as follows:
(a) In the case of a person serving an indeterminate sentence, the total of such allowances shall not exceed one-third of his maximum or aggregate maximum term and the allowances shall be applied as provided in subdivision one (b) of section 70.40;
(b) In the case of a person serving a definite sentence, the total of such allowances shall not exceed one-third of his term or aggregate term and the allowances shall be applied as a credit against such term.
5. Time served under vacated sentence. When a sentence of imprisonment that has been imposed on a person is vacated and a new sentence is imposed on such person for the same offense, or for an offense based upon the same act, the new sentence shall be calculated as if it had commenced at the time the vacated sentence commenced, and all time credited against the vacated sentence shall be credited against the new sentence. In any case where a vacated sentence also includes a period of post-release supervision, all time credited against the period of post-release supervision shall be credited against the period of post-release supervision included with the new sentence. In the event a period of post-release supervision is not included with the new sentence, such period shall be credited against the new sentence.
6. Escape. When a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment escapes from custody, the escape shall interrupt the sentence and such interruption shall continue until the return of the person to the institution in which the sentence was being served or, if the sentence was being served in an institution under the jurisdiction of the state department of corrections and community supervision, to an institution under the jurisdiction of that department. Any time spent by such person in custody from the date of escape to the date the sentence resumes shall be credited against the term or maximum term of the interrupted sentence, provided:
(a) That such custody was due to an arrest or surrender based upon the escape; or
(b) That such custody arose from an arrest on another charge which culminated in a dismissal or an acquittal; or
(c) That such custody arose from an arrest on another charge which culminated in a conviction, but in such case, if a sentence of imprisonment was imposed, the credit allowed shall be limited to the portion of the time spent in custody that exceeds the period, term or maximum term of imprisonment imposed for such conviction.
7. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1972, c. 339, § 10.] Absconding from temporary release or furlough program. When a person who is serving a sentence of imprisonment is permitted to leave an institution to participate in a program of work release or furlough program as such term is defined in section six hundred thirty-one of the correction law, or in the case of an institution under the jurisdiction of the state department of corrections and community supervision or a facility under the jurisdiction of the state office of children and family services to participate in a program of temporary release, fails to return to the institution or facility at or before the time prescribed for his or her return, such failure shall interrupt the sentence and such interruption shall continue until the return of the person to the institution in which the sentence was being served or, if the sentence was being served in an institution under the jurisdiction of the state department of corrections and community supervision or a facility under the jurisdiction of the state office of children and family services to an institution under the jurisdiction of that department or a facility under the jurisdiction of that office. Any time spent by such person in an institution from the date of his or her failure to return to the date his or her sentence resumes shall be credited against the term or maximum term of the interrupted sentence, provided:
(a) That such incarceration was due to an arrest or surrender based upon the failure to return; or
(b) That such incarceration arose from an arrest on another charge which culminated in a dismissal or an acquittal; or
(c) That such custody arose from an arrest on another charge which culminated in a conviction, but in such case, if a sentence of imprisonment was imposed, the credit allowed shall be limited to the portion of the time spent in custody that exceeds the period, term or maximum term of imprisonment imposed for such conviction.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1972, c. 339, § 9; L.1974, c. 465, §§ 1, 2; L.1975, c. 782, § 3; L.1976, c. 21, § 1; L.1976, c. 145, § 2; L.1978, c. 481, §§ 24, 25; L.1979, c. 648, § 1; L.1980, c. 176, § 1; L.1983, c. 199, § 1; L.1983, c. 460, § 1; L.1988, c. 392, § 1; L.1995, c. 3, §§ 13 to 16; L.1998, c. 1, §§ 10, 11, eff. Aug. 6, 1998; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 126, eff. March 31, 2011; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 127.)
[FN1] So in original. Probably should be “serving a”.
[FN2] So in original ("commmitted" probably should be "committed").
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.35
Effective: March 31, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.35. Merger of certain definite and indeterminate or determinate sentences
<[Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, § 70.35, post.]>
The service of an indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment shall satisfy any definite sentence of imprisonment imposed on a person for an offense committed prior to the time the indeterminate or determinate sentence was imposed, except as provided in paragraph (b) of subdivision five of section 70.25 of this article. A person who is serving a definite sentence at the time an indeterminate or determinate sentence is imposed shall be delivered to the custody of the state department of corrections and community supervision to commence service of the indeterminate or determinate sentence immediately unless the person is serving a definite sentence pursuant to paragraph (b) of subdivision five of section 70.25 of this article. In any case where the indeterminate or determinate sentence is revoked or vacated, the person shall receive credit against the definite sentence for each day spent in the custody of the state department of corrections and community supervision.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1981, c. 372, § 3; L.1989, c. 527, § 1; L.1995, c. 3, § 17; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 127-a, eff. March 31, 2011.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.35
Effective: September 1, 2013
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.35. Merger of certain definite and indeterminate sentences
<[Eff. Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, § 70.35, ante.]>
The service of an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment shall satisfy any definite sentence of imprisonment imposed on a person for an offense committed prior to the time the indeterminate sentence was imposed, except as provided in paragraph (b) of subdivision five of section 70.25 of this article. A person who is serving a definite sentence at the time an indeterminate sentence is imposed shall be delivered to the custody of the state department of corrections and community supervision to commence service of the indeterminate sentence immediately unless the person is serving a definite sentence pursuant to paragraph (b) of subdivision five of section 70.25 of this article. In any case where the indeterminate sentence is revoked or vacated, the person shall receive credit against the definite sentence for each day spent in the custody of the state department of corrections and community supervision.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1981, c. 372, § 3; L.1989, c. 527, § 1; L.1995, c. 3, § 17; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 127-a, eff. March 31, 2011; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 127-b.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.40
Effective: March 31, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.40 Release on parole; conditional release; presumptive release
1. Indeterminate sentence.
(a) [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, par. (a) below.] Release on parole shall be in the discretion of the state board of parole, and such person shall continue service of his or her sentence or sentences while on parole, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the executive law and the correction law.
(i) [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1997, c. 435, § 76, subd. 6, par. a.] A person who is serving one or more than one indeterminate sentence of imprisonment may be paroled from the institution in which he or she is confined at any time after the expiration of the minimum or the aggregate minimum period of the sentence or sentences or, where applicable, the minimum or aggregate minimum period reduced by the merit time allowance granted pursuant to paragraph (d) of subdivision one of section eight hundred three of the correction law.
(ii) A person who is serving one or more than one determinate sentence of imprisonment shall be ineligible for discretionary release on parole.
(iii) A person who is serving one or more than one indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and one or more than one determinate sentence of imprisonment, which run concurrently may be paroled at any time after the expiration of the minimum period of imprisonment of the indeterminate sentence or sentences, or upon the expiration of six-sevenths of the term of imprisonment of the determinate sentence or sentences, whichever is later.
(iv) A person who is serving one or more than one indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and one or more than one determinate sentence of imprisonment which run consecutively may be paroled at any time after the expiration of the sum of the minimum or aggregate minimum period of the indeterminate sentence or sentences and six-sevenths of the term or aggregate term of imprisonment of the determinate sentence or sentences.
(v) Notwithstanding any other subparagraph of this paragraph, a person may be paroled from the institution in which he or she is confined at any time on medical parole pursuant to section two hundred fifty-nine-r or section two hundred fifty-nine-s of the executive law or for deportation pursuant to paragraph (d) of subdivision two of section two hundred fifty-nine-i of the executive law or after the successful completion of a shock incarceration program pursuant to article twenty-six-A of the correction law.
(a) [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, par. (a) above.] (i) A person who is serving one or more than one indeterminate sentence of imprisonment may be paroled from the institution in which he or she is confined at any time after the expiration of the minimum or the aggregate minimum period of imprisonment of the sentence or sentences or after the successful completion of a shock incarceration program, as defined in article twenty-six-A of the correction law, whichever is sooner. Release on parole shall be in the discretion of the state board of parole, and such person shall continue service of his or her sentence or sentences while on parole, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of the executive law and the correction law.
(ii) A person who is serving one or more than one indeterminate sentence of imprisonment may be paroled from the institution in which he or she is confined at any time after the expiration of the minimum or the aggregate minimum period of the sentence or sentences.
(b) [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, par. (b) below.] A person who is serving one or more than one indeterminate or determinate sentence of imprisonment shall, if he or she so requests, be conditionally released from the institution in which he or she is confined when the total good behavior time allowed to him or her, pursuant to the provisions of the correction law, is equal to the unserved portion of his or her term, maximum term or aggregate maximum term; provided, however, that (i) in no event shall a person serving one or more indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and one or more determinate sentence of imprisonment which run concurrently be conditionally released until serving at least six-sevenths of the determinate term of imprisonment which has the longest unexpired time to run and (ii) in no event shall a person be conditionally released prior to the date on which such person is first eligible for discretionary parole release. The conditions of release, including those governing post-release supervision, shall be such as may be imposed by the state board of parole in accordance with the provisions of the executive law.
Every person so released shall be under the supervision of the state department of corrections and community supervision for a period equal to the unserved portion of the term, maximum term, aggregate maximum term, or period of post-release supervision.
(b) [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, par. (b) above.] A person who is serving one or more than one indeterminate sentence of imprisonment shall, if he or she so requests, be conditionally released from the institution in which he or she is confined when the total good behavior time allowed to him or her, pursuant to the provisions of the correction law, is equal to the unserved portion of his or her maximum or aggregate maximum term. The conditions of release, including those governing post-release supervision, shall be such as may be imposed by the state board of parole in accordance with the provisions of the executive law.
Every person so released shall be under the supervision of the department of corrections and community supervision for a period equal to the unserved portion of the maximum, aggregate maximum term, or period of post-release supervision.
(c) [Repealed Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1997, c. 435, § 76, subd. 6.] A person who is serving one or more than one indeterminate sentence of imprisonment shall, if he or she so requests, be released from the institution in which he or she is confined if granted presumptive release pursuant to section eight hundred six of the correction law. The conditions of release shall be such as may be imposed by the state board of parole in accordance with the provisions of the executive law. Every person so released shall be under the supervision of the department of corrections and community supervision for a period equal to the unserved portion of his or her maximum or aggregate maximum term unless discharged in accordance with law.
2. Definite sentence. A person who is serving one or more than one definite sentence of imprisonment with a term or aggregate term in excess of ninety days, and is eligible for release according to the criteria set forth in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subdivision one of section two hundred seventy-three of the correction law, may, if he or she so requests, be conditionally released from the institution in which he or she is confined at any time after service of sixty days of that term, exclusive of credits allowed under subdivisions four and six of section 70.30. In computing service of sixty days, the credit allowed for jail time under subdivision three of section 70.30 shall be calculated as time served. Conditional release from such institution shall be in the discretion of the parole board, or a local conditional release commission established pursuant to article twelve of the correction law, provided, however that where such release is by a local conditional release commission, the person must be serving a definite sentence with a term in excess of one hundred twenty days and may only be released after service of ninety days of such term. In computing service of ninety days, the credit allowed for jail time under subdivision three of section 70.30 of this article shall be calculated as time served. A conditional release granted under this subdivision shall be upon such conditions as may be imposed by the parole board, in accordance with the provisions of the executive law, or a local conditional release commission in accordance with the provisions of the correction law.
Conditional release shall interrupt service of the sentence or sentences and the remaining portion of the term or aggregate term shall be held in abeyance. Every person so released shall be under the supervision of the department of corrections and community supervision or a local probation department and in the custody of the local conditional release commission in accordance with article twelve of the correction law, for a period of one year. The local probation department shall cause complete records to be kept of every person released to its supervision pursuant to this subdivision. The department of corrections and community supervision may supply to a local probation department and the local conditional release commission custody information and records maintained on persons under the supervision of such local probation department to aid in the performance of its supervision responsibilities. Compliance with the conditions of release during the period of supervision shall satisfy the portion of the term or aggregate term that has been held in abeyance.
3. Delinquency.
(a) When a person is alleged to have violated the terms of presumptive release or parole and the state board of parole has declared such person to be delinquent, the declaration of delinquency shall interrupt the person's sentence as of the date of the delinquency and such interruption shall continue until the return of the person to an institution under the jurisdiction of the state department of corrections and community supervision.
(b) When a person is alleged to have violated the terms of his or her conditional release or post-release supervision and has been declared delinquent by the parole board or the local conditional release commission having supervision over such person, the declaration of delinquency shall interrupt the period of supervision or post-release supervision as of the date of the delinquency. For a conditional release, such interruption shall continue until the return of the person to the institution from which he or she was released or, if he or she was released from an institution under the jurisdiction of the state department of corrections and community supervision, to an institution under the jurisdiction of that department. Upon such return, the person shall resume service of his or her sentence. For a person released to post-release supervision, the provisions of section 70.45 shall apply.
(c) Any time spent by a person in custody from the time of delinquency to the time service of the sentence resumes shall be credited against the term or maximum term of the interrupted sentence, provided:
(i) that such custody was due to an arrest or surrender based upon the delinquency; or
(ii) that such custody arose from an arrest on another charge which culminated in a dismissal or an acquittal; or
(iii) that such custody arose from an arrest on another charge which culminated in a conviction, but in such case, if a sentence of imprisonment was imposed, the credit allowed shall be limited to the portion of the time spent in custody that exceeds the period, term or maximum term of imprisonment imposed for such conviction.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 324, § 3; L.1971, c. 425, § 1; L.1972, c. 295, § 1; L.1973, c. 468, §§ 1, 2; L.1973, c. 478, § 1; L.1975, c. 148, § 1; L.1978, c. 481, § 26; L.1979, c. 467, §§ 1, 2; L.1987, c. 261, § 6; L.1989, c. 79, §§ 5, 6; L.1992, c. 55, § 286; L.1995, c. 3, §§ 18, 19; L.1997, c. 435, § 45, eff. Aug. 20, 1997; L.1998, c. 1, §§ 12 to 14, eff. Aug. 6, 1998; L.2003, c. 62, pt. E, §§ 12 to 14, eff. May 15, 2003, deemed eff. April 1, 2003; L.2009, c. 56, pt. J, § 7, eff. April 7, 2009; L.2009, c. 56, pt. SS, §§ 4, 5, eff. April 7, 2009; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, §§ 127-c, 127-d-1, 127-f to 127-h, eff. March 31, 2011; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, §§ 127-d, 127-e.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.45
Effective: March 31, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.45 Determinate sentence; post-release supervision
1. In general. When a court imposes a determinate sentence it shall in each case state not only the term of imprisonment, but also an additional period of post-release supervision as determined pursuant to this article. Such period shall commence as provided in subdivision five of this section and a violation of any condition of supervision occurring at any time during such period of post-release supervision shall subject the defendant to a further period of imprisonment up to the balance of the remaining period of post-release supervision, not to exceed five years; provided, however, that a defendant serving a term of post-release supervision for a conviction of a felony sex offense, as defined in section 70.80 of this article, may be subject to a further period of imprisonment up to the balance of the remaining period of post-release supervision. Such maximum limits shall not preclude a longer period of further imprisonment for a violation where the defendant is subject to indeterminate and determinate sentences.
1-a. When, following a final hearing, a time assessment has been imposed upon a person convicted of a felony sex offense who owes three years or more on a period of post-release supervision, imposed pursuant to subdivision two-a of this section, such defendant, after serving three years of the time assessment, shall be reviewed by the board of parole and may be re-released to post-release supervision only upon a determination by the board of parole made in accordance with subdivision two of section two hundred fifty-nine-i of the executive law. If re-release is not granted, the board shall specify a date not more than twenty-four months from such determination for reconsideration, and the procedures to be followed upon reconsideration shall be the same. If a time assessment of less than three years is imposed upon such a defendant, the defendant shall be released upon the expiration of such time assessment, unless he or she is subject to further imprisonment or confinement under any provision of law.
2. Period of post-release supervision for other than felony sex offenses. The period of post-release supervision for a determinate sentence, other than a determinate sentence imposed for a felony sex offense as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 70.80 of this article, shall be five years except that:
(a) such period shall be one year whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to subdivision two of section 70.70 of this article upon a conviction of a class D or class E felony offense;
(b) such period shall be not less than one year nor more than two years whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to subdivision two of section 70.70 of this article upon a conviction of a class B or class C felony offense;
(c) such period shall be not less than one year nor more than two years whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to subdivision three or four of section 70.70 of this article upon conviction of a class D or class E felony offense;
(d) such period shall be not less than one and one-half years nor more than three years whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to subdivision three or four of section 70.70 of this article upon conviction of a class B felony or class C felony offense;
(e) such period shall be not less than one and one-half years nor more than three years whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to subdivision three of section 70.02 of this article upon a conviction of a class D or class E violent felony offense;
(f) such period shall be not less than two and one-half years nor more than five years whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to subdivision three of section 70.02 of this article upon a conviction of a class B or class C violent felony offense.
2-a. Periods of post-release supervision for felony sex offenses. The period of post-release supervision for a determinate sentence imposed for a felony sex offense as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 70.80 of this article shall be as follows:
(a) not less than three years nor more than ten years whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to subdivision four of section 70.80 of this article upon a conviction of a class D or class E felony sex offense;
(b) not less than five years nor more than fifteen years whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to subdivision four of section 70.80 of this article upon a conviction of a class C felony sex offense;
(c) not less than five years nor more than twenty years whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to subdivision four of section 70.80 of this article upon a conviction of a class B felony sex offense;
(d) not less than three years nor more than ten years whenever a determinate sentence is imposed pursuant to subdivision three of section 70.02 of this article upon a conviction of a class D or class E violent felony sex offense as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 70.80 of this article;
(e) not less than five years nor more than fifteen years whenever a determinate sentence is imposed pursuant to subdivision three of section 70.02 of this article upon a conviction of a class C violent felony sex offense as defined in section 70.80 of this article;
(f) not less than five years nor more than twenty years whenever a determinate sentence is imposed pursuant to subdivision three of section 70.02 of this article upon a conviction of a class B violent felony sex offense as defined in section 70.80 of this article;
(g) not less than five years nor more than fifteen years whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to either section 70.04, section 70.06, or subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article upon a conviction of a class D or class E violent or non-violent felony sex offense as defined in section 70.80 of this article;
(h) not less than seven years nor more than twenty years whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to either section 70.04, section 70.06, or subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article upon a conviction of a class C violent or non-violent felony sex offense as defined in section 70.80 of this article;
(i) such period shall be not less than ten years nor more than twenty-five years whenever a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to either section 70.04, section 70.06, or subdivision five of section 70.80 of this article upon a conviction of a class B violent or non-violent felony sex offense as defined in section 70.80 of this article; and
(j) such period shall be not less than ten years nor more than twenty years whenever any determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed pursuant to subdivision four of section 70.07 of this article.
3. Conditions of post-release supervision. The board of parole shall establish and impose conditions of post-release supervision in the same manner and to the same extent as it may establish and impose conditions in accordance with the executive law upon persons who are granted parole or conditional release; provided that, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the board of parole may impose as a condition of post-release supervision that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from the underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of a residential treatment facility as that term is defined in subdivision six of section two of the correction law. Upon release from the underlying term of imprisonment, the person shall be furnished with a written statement setting forth the conditions of post-release supervision in sufficient detail to provide for the person's conduct and supervision.
4. Revocation of post-release supervision. An alleged violation of any condition of post-release supervision shall be initiated, heard and determined in accordance with the provisions of subdivisions three and four of section two hundred fifty-nine-i of the executive law.
5. Calculation of service of period of post-release supervision. A period or periods of post-release supervision shall be calculated and served as follows:
(a) A period of post-release supervision shall commence upon the person's release from imprisonment to supervision by the department of corrections and community supervision and shall interrupt the running of the determinate sentence or sentences of imprisonment and the indeterminate sentence or sentences of imprisonment, if any. The remaining portion of any maximum or aggregate maximum term shall then be held in abeyance until the successful completion of the period of post-release supervision or the person's return to the custody of the department of corrections and community supervision, whichever occurs first.
(b) Upon the completion of the period of post-release supervision, the running of such sentence or sentences of imprisonment shall resume and only then shall the remaining portion of any maximum or aggregate maximum term previously held in abeyance be credited with and diminished by such period of post-release supervision. The person shall then be under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections and community supervision for the remaining portion of such maximum or aggregate maximum term.
(c) When a person is subject to two or more periods of post-release supervision, such periods shall merge with and be satisfied by discharge of the period of post-release supervision having the longest unexpired time to run; provided, however, any time served upon one period of post-release supervision shall not be credited to any other period of post-release supervision except as provided in subdivision five of section 70.30 of this article.
(d) When a person is alleged to have violated a condition of post-release supervision and the department of corrections and community supervision has declared such person to be delinquent: (i) the declaration of delinquency shall interrupt the period of post-release supervision; (ii) such interruption shall continue until the person is restored to post-release supervision; (iii) if the person is restored to post-release supervision without being returned to the department of corrections and community supervision, any time spent in custody from the date of delinquency until restoration to post-release supervision shall first be credited to the maximum or aggregate maximum term of the sentence or sentences of imprisonment, but only to the extent authorized by subdivision three of section 70.40 of this article. Any time spent in custody solely pursuant to such delinquency after completion of the maximum or aggregate maximum term of the sentence or sentences of imprisonment shall be credited to the period of post-release supervision, if any; and (iv) if the person is ordered returned to the department of corrections and community supervision, the person shall be required to serve the time assessment before being re-released to post-release supervision. In the event the balance of the remaining period of post-release supervision is six months or less, such time assessment may be up to six months unless a longer period is authorized pursuant to subdivision one of this section. The time assessment shall commence upon the issuance of a determination after a final hearing that the person has violated one or more conditions of supervision. While serving such assessment, the person shall not receive any good behavior allowance pursuant to section eight hundred three of the correction law. Any time spent in custody from the date of delinquency until return to the department of corrections and community supervision shall first be credited to the maximum or aggregate maximum term of the sentence or sentences of imprisonment, but only to the extent authorized by subdivision three of section 70.40 of this article. The maximum or aggregate maximum term of the sentence or sentences of imprisonment shall run while the person is serving such time assessment in the custody of the department of corrections and community supervision. Any time spent in custody solely pursuant to such delinquency after completion of the maximum or aggregate maximum term of the sentence or sentences of imprisonment shall be credited to the period of post-release supervision, if any.
(e) Notwithstanding paragraph (d) of this subdivision, in the event a person is sentenced to one or more additional indeterminate or determinate term or terms of imprisonment prior to the completion of the period of post-release supervision, such period of post-release supervision shall be held in abeyance and the person shall be committed to the custody of the department of corrections and community supervision in accordance with the requirements of the prior and additional terms of imprisonment.
(f) When a person serving a period of post-release supervision is returned to the department of corrections and community supervision pursuant to an additional consecutive sentence of imprisonment and without a declaration of delinquency, such period of post-release supervision shall be held in abeyance while the person is in the custody of the department of corrections and community supervision. Such period of post-release supervision shall resume running upon the person's re-release.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1998, c. 1, § 15, eff. Aug. 6, 1998. Amended L.2004, c. 738, § 35, eff. Jan. 13, 2005; L.2007, c. 7, § 33, eff. April 13, 2007; L.2007, c. 56, pt. E, §§ 4, 5, eff. April 9, 2007, deemed eff. April 1, 2007; L.2008, c. 141, § 3, eff. June 30, 2008; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 127-j, eff. March 31, 2011.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.70
Effective: March 31, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.70 Sentence of imprisonment for felony drug offender other than a class A felony
1. For the purposes of this section, the following terms shall mean:
(a) “Felony drug offender” means a defendant who stands convicted of any felony, defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter other than a class A felony.
(b) “Second felony drug offender” means a second felony offender as that term is defined in subdivision one of section 70.06 of this article, who stands convicted of any felony, defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter other than a class A felony.
(c) “Violent felony” shall have the same meaning as that term is defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of this article.
2. Except as provided in subdivision three or four of this section, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony drug offender shall be a determinate sentence as provided in paragraph (a) of this subdivision.
(a) Term of determinate sentence. Except as provided in paragraph (b) or (c) of this subdivision, the court shall impose a determinate term of imprisonment upon a felony drug offender which shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years, which shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45 of this article. The terms of imprisonment authorized for such determinate sentences are as follows:
(i) for a class B felony, the term shall be at least one year and shall not exceed nine years, except that for the class B felony of criminal sale of a controlled substance in or near school grounds as defined in subdivision two of section 220.44 of this chapter or on a school bus as defined in subdivision seventeen of section 220.00 of this chapter or criminal sale of a controlled substance to a child as defined in section 220.48 of this chapter, the term shall be at least two years and shall not exceed nine years;
(ii) for a class C felony, the term shall be at least one year and shall not exceed five and one-half years;
(iii) for a class D felony, the term shall be at least one year and shall not exceed two and one-half years; and
(iv) for a class E felony, the term shall be at least one year and shall not exceed one and one-half years.
(b) Probation. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may sentence a defendant convicted of a class B, class C, class D or class E felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter to probation in accordance with the provisions of sections 60.04 and 65.00 of this chapter.
(c) Alternative definite sentence for class B, class C, class D, and class E felonies. If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, is of the opinion that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that it would be unduly harsh to impose a determinate sentence upon a person convicted of a class C, class D or class E felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, or a class B felony defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter, other than the class B felony defined in section 220.48 of this chapter, as added by a chapter of the laws of two thousand nine the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less.
(d) The court may direct that a determinate sentence imposed on a defendant convicted of a class B felony, other than the class B felony defined in section 220.48 of this chapter, pursuant to this subdivision be executed as a sentence of parole supervision in accordance with section 410.91 of the criminal procedure law.
3. Sentence of imprisonment for second felony drug offender.
(a) Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a second felony drug offender whose prior felony conviction was not a violent felony.
(b) Authorized sentence. Except as provided in paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of this subdivision, when the court has found pursuant to the provisions of section 400.21 of the criminal procedure law that a defendant is a second felony drug offender who stands convicted of a class B, class C, class D or class E felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment. Such determinate sentence shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45 of this article. The terms of such determinate sentence shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years as follows:
(i) for a class B felony, the term shall be at least two years and shall not exceed twelve years;
(ii) for a class C felony, the term shall be at least one and one-half years and shall not exceed eight years;
(iii) for a class D felony, the term shall be at least one and one-half years and shall not exceed four years; and
(iv) for a class E felony, the term shall be at least one and one-half years and shall not exceed two years.
(c) Probation. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may sentence a second felony drug offender convicted of a class B felony to lifetime probation in accordance with the provisions of section 65.00 of this chapter and may sentence a second felony drug offender convicted of a class C, class D or class E felony to probation in accordance with the provisions of section 65.00 of this chapter.
(d) Sentence of parole supervision. In the case of a person sentenced for a specified offense or offenses as defined in subdivision five of section 410.91 of the criminal procedure law, who stands convicted of no other felony offense, who has not previously been convicted of either a violent felony offense as defined in section 70.02 of this article, a class A felony offense or a class B felony offense, and is not under the jurisdiction of or awaiting delivery to the department of corrections and community supervision, the court may direct that a determinate sentence imposed pursuant to this subdivision shall be executed as a parole supervision sentence as defined in and pursuant to the procedures prescribed in section 410.91 of the criminal procedure law.
(e) Alternate definite sentence for class C, class D and class E felonies. If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, is of the opinion that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that it would be unduly harsh to impose a determinate sentence upon a person convicted of a class C, class D or class E felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less.
4. Sentence of imprisonment for second felony drug offender previously convicted of a violent felony.
(a) Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a second felony drug offender whose prior felony conviction was a violent felony.
(b) Authorized sentence. When the court has found pursuant to the provisions of section 400.21 of the criminal procedure law that a defendant is a second felony drug offender whose prior felony conviction was a violent felony, who stands convicted of a class B, class C, class D or class E felony offense defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment. Such determinate sentence shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45 of this article. The terms of such determinate sentence shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years as follows:
(i) for a class B felony, the term shall be at least six years and shall not exceed fifteen years;
(ii) for a class C felony, the term shall be at least three and one-half years and shall not exceed nine years;
(iii) for a class D felony, the term shall be at least two and one-half years and shall not exceed four and one-half years; and
(iv) for a class E felony, the term shall be at least two years and shall not exceed two and one-half years.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2004, c. 738, § 36, eff. Jan. 13, 2005. Amended L.2006, c. 436, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2006; L.2009, c. 56, pt. AAA, §§ 21 to 25, eff. April 7, 2009; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 127-k, eff. March 31, 2011.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.71
Effective: November 1, 2009
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.71 Sentence of imprisonment for a class A felony drug offender
1. For the purposes of this section, the following terms shall mean:
(a) “Felony drug offender” means a defendant who stands convicted of any class A felony as defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter.
(b) “Second felony drug offender” means a second felony offender as that term is defined in subdivision one of section 70.06 of this article, who stands convicted of and is to be sentenced for any class A felony as defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter.
(c) “Violent felony offense” shall have the same meaning as that term is defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of this article.
2. Sentence of imprisonment for a first felony drug offender.
(a) Applicability. Except as provided in subdivision three, four or five of this section, this subdivision shall apply to a person convicted of a class A felony as defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter.
(b) Authorized sentence. The court shall impose a determinate term of imprisonment which shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years and which shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45 of this article. The terms authorized for such determinate sentences are as follows:
(i) for a class A-I felony, the term shall be at least eight years and shall not exceed twenty years;
(ii) for a class A-II felony, the term shall be at least three years and shall not exceed ten years.
(c) Lifetime probation. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may sentence a defendant convicted of a class A-II felony defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter to lifetime probation in accordance with the provisions of section 65.00 of this chapter.
3. Sentence of imprisonment for a second felony drug offender.
(a) Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a second felony drug offender whose prior felony conviction or convictions did not include one or more violent felony offenses.
(b) Authorized sentence. When the court has found pursuant to the provisions of section 400.21 of the criminal procedure law that a defendant is a second felony drug offender who stands convicted of a class A felony as defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment. Such determinate sentence shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45 of this article. Such determinate sentence shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years as follows:
(i) for a class A-I felony, the term shall be at least twelve years and shall not exceed twenty-four years;
(ii) for a class A-II felony, the term shall be at least six years and shall not exceed fourteen years.
(c) Lifetime probation. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may sentence a defendant convicted of a class A-II felony defined in article two hundred twenty of this chapter to lifetime probation in accordance with the provisions of section 65.00 of this chapter.
4. Sentence of imprisonment for a second felony drug offender previously convicted of a violent felony offense.
(a) Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a second felony drug offender whose prior felony conviction was a violent felony.
(b) Authorized sentence. When the court has found pursuant to the provisions of section 400.21 of the criminal procedure law that a defendant is a second felony drug offender whose prior felony conviction was a violent felony, who stands convicted of a class A felony as defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, the court shall impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment. Such determinate sentence shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with section 70.45 of this article. Such determinate sentence shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years as follows:
(i) for a class A-I felony, the term shall be at least fifteen years and shall not exceed thirty years;
(ii) for a class A-II felony, the term shall be at least eight years and shall not exceed seventeen years.
5. [Eff. Nov. 1, 2009.] Sentence of imprisonment for operating as a major trafficker.
(a) Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a person convicted of the class A-I felony of operating as a major trafficker as defined in section 220.77 of this chapter.
(b) Authorized sentence. Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subdivision, the court shall impose an indeterminate term of imprisonment for an A-I felony, in accordance with the provisions of section 70.00 of this article.
(c) Alternative determinate sentence. If a defendant stands convicted of violating section 220.77 of this chapter, and if the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history and character of the defendant, is of the opinion that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that it would be unduly harsh to impose the indeterminate sentence for a class A-I felony specified under section 70.00 of this article, the court may instead impose the determinate sentence of imprisonment authorized by clause (i) of subparagraph (b) of subdivision two of this section for a class A-I drug felony; in such case, the reasons for the court's opinion shall be set forth on the record.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2004, c. 738, § 36, eff. Jan. 13, 2005. Amended L.2009, c. 56, pt. AAA, § 26, eff. Nov. 1, 2009.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.80
Effective: April 13, 2007
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.80 Sentences of imprisonment for conviction of a felony sex offense
1. Definitions.
(a) For the purposes of this section, a “felony sex offense” means a conviction of any felony defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter, including a sexually motivated felony, or patronizing a prostitute in the first degree as defined in section 230.06 of this chapter, incest in the second degree as defined in section 255.26 of this chapter, or incest in the first degree as defined in section 255.27 of this chapter, or a felony attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the above.
(b) A felony sex offense shall be deemed a “violent felony sex offense” if it is for an offense defined as a violent felony offense in section 70.02 of this article, or for a sexually motivated felony as defined in section 130.91 of this chapter where the specified offense is a violent felony offense as defined in section 70.02 of this article.
(c) For the purposes of this section, a “predicate felony sex offender” means a person who stands convicted of any felony sex offense as defined in paragraph (a) of this subdivision, other than a class A-I felony, after having previously been subjected to one or more predicate felony convictions as defined in subdivision one of section 70.06 or subdivision one of section 70.04 of this article.
(d) For purposes of this section, a “violent felony offense” is any felony defined in subdivision one of section 70.02 of this article, and a “non-violent felony offense” is any felony not defined therein.
2. In imposing a sentence within the authorized statutory range for any felony sex offense, the court may consider all relevant factors set forth in section 1.05 of this chapter, and in particular, may consider the defendant's criminal history, if any, including any history of sex offenses; any mental illness or mental abnormality from which the defendant may suffer; the defendant's ability or inability to control his sexual behavior; and, if the defendant has difficulty controlling such behavior, the extent to which that difficulty may pose a threat to society.
3. Except as provided by subdivision four, five, six, seven or eight of this section, or when a defendant is being sentenced for a conviction of the class A-II felonies of predatory sexual assault and predatory sexual assault against a child as defined in sections 130.95 and 130.96 of this chapter, or for any class A-I sexually motivated felony for which a life sentence or a life without parole sentence must be imposed, a sentence imposed upon a defendant convicted of a felony sex offense shall be a determinate sentence. The determinate sentence shall be imposed by the court in whole or half years, and shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with subdivision two-a of section 70.45 of this article. Persons eligible for sentencing under section 70.07 of this article governing second child sexual assault felonies shall be sentenced under such section and paragraph (j) of subdivision two-a of section 70.45 of this article.
4. (a) Sentences of imprisonment for felony sex offenses. Except as provided in subdivision five, six, seven, or eight of this section, the term of the determinate sentence must be fixed by the court as follows:
(i) for a class B felony, the term must be at least five years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(ii) for a class C felony, the term must be at least three and one-half years and must not exceed fifteen years;
(iii) for a class D felony, the term must be at least two years and must not exceed seven years; and
(iv) for a class E felony, the term must be at least one and one-half years and must not exceed four years.
(b) Probation. The court may sentence a defendant convicted of a class D or class E felony sex offense to probation in accordance with the provisions of section 65.00 of this title.
(c) Alternative definite sentences for class D and class E felony sex offenses. If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and to the history and character of the defendant, is of the opinion that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary but that it would be unduly harsh to impose a determinate sentence upon a person convicted of a class D or class E felony sex offense, the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment and fix a term of one year or less.
5. Sentence of imprisonment for a predicate felony sex offender. (a) Applicability. This subdivision shall apply to a predicate felony sex offender who stands convicted of a non-violent felony sex offense and who was previously convicted of one or more felonies.
(b) Non-violent predicate felony offense. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a predicate felony sex offender, and the person's predicate conviction was for a non-violent felony offense, the court must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be fixed by the court as follows:
(i) for a class B felony, the term must be at least eight years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(ii) for a class C felony, the term must be at least five years and must not exceed fifteen years;
(iii) for a class D felony, the term must be at least three years and must not exceed seven years; and
(iv) for a class E felony, the term must be at least two years and must not exceed four years.
(c) Violent predicate felony offense. When the court has found, pursuant to the provisions of the criminal procedure law, that a person is a predicate felony sex offender, and the person's predicate conviction was for a violent felony offense, the court must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment, the term of which must be fixed by the court as follows:
(i) for a class B felony, the term must be at least nine years and must not exceed twenty-five years;
(ii) for a class C felony, the term must be at least six years and must not exceed fifteen years;
(iii) for a class D felony, the term must be at least four years and must not exceed seven years; and
(iv) for a class E felony, the term must be at least two and one-half years and must not exceed four years.
(d) A defendant who stands convicted of a non-violent felony sex offense, other than a class A-I or class A-II felony, who is adjudicated a persistent felony offender under section 70.10 of this article, shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of section 70.10 or pursuant to this subdivision.
6. Sentence of imprisonment for a violent felony sex offense. Except as provided in subdivisions seven and eight of this section, a defendant who stands convicted of a violent felony sex offense must be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of section 70.02, section 70.04, subdivision six of section 70.06, section 70.08, or section 70.10 of this article, as applicable.
7. Sentence for a class A felony sex offense. When a person stands convicted of a sexually motivated felony pursuant to section 130.91 of this chapter and the specified offense is a class A felony, the court must sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of:
(a) section 60.06 of this chapter and section 70.00 of this article, as applicable, if such offense is a class A-I felony; and
(b) section 70.00, 70.06 or 70.08 of this article, as applicable, if such offense is a class A-II felony.
8. Whenever a juvenile offender stands convicted of a felony sex offense, he or she must be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of sections 60.10 and 70.05 of this chapter.
9. Every determinate sentence for a felony sex offense, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of this section, imposed pursuant to any section of this article, shall include as a part thereof a period of post-release supervision in accordance with subdivision two-a of section 70.45 of this article.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2007, c. 7, § 30, eff. April 13, 2007.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 70.85
Effective: June 30, 2008
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 70. Sentences of Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 70.85 Transitional exception to determinate sentencing laws
This section shall apply only to cases in which a determinate sentence was imposed between September first, nineteen hundred ninety-eight, and the effective date of this section, and was required by law to include a term of post-release supervision, but the court did not explicitly state such a term when pronouncing sentence. When such a case is again before the court pursuant to section six hundred one-d of the correction law or otherwise, for consideration of whether to resentence, the court may, notwithstanding any other provision of law but only on consent of the district attorney, re-impose the originally imposed determinate sentence of imprisonment without any term of post-release supervision, which then shall be deemed a lawful sentence.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2008, c. 141, § 2, eff. June 30, 2008.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.01
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.02
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.03
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.04
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.06
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.07
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.08
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.09
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.11
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.12
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.13
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.14
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
§§ 75.00 to 75.15 Repealed by L.1974, c. 652, § 7, amended L.1974, c. 653, § 7, eff. July 31, 1974
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 75.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 75. Reformatory Sentence of Imprisonment for Young Adults [Repealed]
[§ 75.20 Repealed by L.1971, c. 354, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. TWO, T. E, Art. 80, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 80. Fines
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 80.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 80. Fines (Refs & Annos)
§ 80.00 Fine for felony
1. A sentence to pay a fine for a felony shall be a sentence to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not exceeding the higher of
a. five thousand dollars; or
b. double the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of the crime; or
c. if the conviction is for any felony defined in article two hundred twenty or two hundred twenty-one of this chapter, according to the following schedule:
(i) for A-I felonies, one hundred thousand dollars;
(ii) for A-II felonies, fifty thousand dollars;
(iii) for B felonies, thirty thousand dollars;
(iv) for C felonies, fifteen thousand dollars.
When imposing a fine pursuant to the provisions of this paragraph, the court shall consider the profit gained by defendant's conduct, whether the amount of the fine is disproportionate to the conduct in which defendant engaged, its impact on any victims, and defendant's economic circumstances, including the defendant's ability to pay, the effect of the fine upon his or her immediate family or any other persons to whom the defendant owes an obligation of support.
2. As used in this section the term “gain” means the amount of money or the value of property derived from the commission of the crime, less the amount of money or the value of property returned to the victim of the crime or seized by or surrendered to lawful authority prior to the time sentence is imposed.
3. When the court imposes a fine for a felony pursuant to paragraph b of subdivision one of this section, the court shall make a finding as to the amount of the defendant's gain from the crime. If the record does not contain sufficient evidence to support such a finding or to permit adequate consideration of the matters specified in paragraph c of subdivision one of this section, the court may conduct a hearing upon such issues.
4. Exception. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a corporation.
5. All moneys in excess of five thousand dollars received or collected in payment of a fine imposed pursuant to paragraph c of subdivision one of this section are the property of the state and the state comptroller shall deposit all such fines to the rehabilitative alcohol and substance treatment fund established pursuant to section ninety-seven-cc of the state finance law.
6. Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of subdivision one of this section a sentence to pay a fine for a felony set forth in the vehicle and traffic law shall be a sentence to pay an amount fixed by the court in accordance with the provisions of the law that defines the crime.
7. When the court imposes a fine pursuant to section 145.22 or 145.23 of this chapter, the court shall direct that no less than ten percent of such fine be credited to the state cemetery vandalism restoration and administration fund created pursuant to section ninety-seven-r of the state finance law.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1977, c. 352, § 1; L.1989, c. 338, § 17; L.1990, c. 892, § 2; L.1997, c. 165, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 1997.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 80.05
Effective: November 1, 1999
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 80. Fines (Refs & Annos)
§ 80.05 Fines for misdemeanors and violation
1. Class A misdemeanor. A sentence to pay a fine for a class A misdemeanor shall be a sentence to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not exceeding one thousand dollars, provided, however, that a sentence imposed for a violation of section 215.80 of this chapter may include a fine in an amount equivalent to double the value of the property unlawfully disposed of in the commission of the crime.
2. Class B misdemeanor. A sentence to pay a fine for a class B misdemeanor shall be a sentence to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not exceeding five hundred dollars.
3. Unclassified misdemeanor. A sentence to pay a fine for an unclassified misdemeanor shall be a sentence to pay an amount, fixed by the court, in accordance with the provisions of the law or ordinance that defines the crime.
4. Violation. A sentence to pay a fine for a violation shall be a sentence to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.
In the case of a violation defined outside this chapter, if the amount of the fine is expressly specified in the law or ordinance that defines the offense, the amount of the fine shall be fixed in accordance with that law or ordinance.
5. Alternative sentence. If a person has gained money or property through the commission of any misdemeanor or violation then upon conviction thereof, the court, in lieu of imposing the fine authorized for the offense under one of the above subdivisions, may sentence the defendant to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not exceeding double the amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of the offense; provided, however, that the amount fixed by the court pursuant to this subdivision upon a conviction under section 11-1904 of the environmental conservation law shall not exceed five thousand dollars. In such event the provisions of subdivisions two and three of section 80.00 shall be applicable to the sentence.
6. Exception. The provisions of this section shall not apply to a corporation.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1977, c. 352, § 2; L.1984, c. 669, § 2; L.1999, c. 208, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1999.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 80.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 80. Fines (Refs & Annos)
§ 80.10 Fines for corporations
1. In general. A sentence to pay a fine, when imposed on a corporation for an offense defined in this chapter or for an offense defined outside this chapter for which no special corporate fine is specified, shall be a sentence to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not exceeding:
(a) Ten thousand dollars, when the conviction is of a felony;
(b) Five thousand dollars, when the conviction is of a class A misdemeanor or of an unclassified misdemeanor for which a term of imprisonment in excess of three months is authorized;
(c) Two thousand dollars, when the conviction is of a class B misdemeanor or of an unclassified misdemeanor for which the authorized term of imprisonment is not in excess of three months;
(d) Five hundred dollars, when the conviction is of a violation;
(e) Any higher amount not exceeding double the amount of the corporation's gain from the commission of the offense.
2. Exception. In the case of an offense defined outside this chapter, if a special fine for a corporation is expressly specified in the law or ordinance that defines the offense, the fine fixed by the court shall be as follows:
(a) An amount within the limits specified in the law or ordinance that defines the offense; or
(b) Any higher amount not exceeding double the amount of the corporation's gain from the commission of the offense.
3. Determination of amount or value. When the court imposes the fine authorized by paragraph (e) of subdivision one or paragraph (b) of subdivision two for any offense the provisions of subdivision three of section 80.00 shall be applicable to the sentence.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 80.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 80. Fines (Refs & Annos)
§ 80.15 Multiple offenses
Where a person is convicted of two or more offenses committed through a single act or omission, or through an act or omission which in itself constituted one of the offenses and also was a material element of the other, and the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment or a fine or both for one of the offenses, a fine shall not be imposed for the other. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any offense or offenses set forth in the vehicle and traffic law.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1990, c. 892, § 3.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. TWO, T. E, Art. 85, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 85. Sentence of Intermittent Imprisonment
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 85.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 85. Sentence of Intermittent Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 85.00 Sentence of intermittent imprisonment
1. Definition. A sentence of intermittent imprisonment is a revocable sentence of imprisonment to be served on days or during certain periods of days, or both, specified by the court as part of the sentence. A person who receives a sentence of intermittent imprisonment shall be incarcerated in the institution to which he is committed at such times as are specified by the court in the sentence.
2. Authorization for use of sentence. The court may impose a sentence of intermittent imprisonment in any case where:
(a) the court is imposing sentence, upon a person other than a second or persistent felony offender, for a class D or class E felony or for any offense that is not a felony; and
(b) the court is not imposing any other sentence of imprisonment upon the defendant at the same time; and
(c) the defendant is not under any other sentence of imprisonment with a term in excess of fifteen days imposed by any other court; and
(d) Repealed
3. Duration of sentence. A sentence of intermittent imprisonment may be for any term that could be imposed as a definite sentence of imprisonment for the offense for which such sentence is imposed. The term of the sentence shall commence on the day it is imposed and shall be calculated upon the basis of the duration of its term, rather than upon the basis of the days spent in confinement, so that no person shall be subject to any such sentence for a period that is longer than a period that commences on the date the sentence is imposed and ends on the date the term of the longest definite sentence for the offense would have expired, after deducting the credit that would have been applicable to a definite sentence for jail time but without regard to any credit authorized to be allowed against the term of a definite sentence for good behavior. The provisions of section five hundred-l of the correction law shall not be applicable to a sentence of intermittent imprisonment.
4. Imposition of sentence. (a) When the court imposes a sentence of intermittent imprisonment the court shall specify in the sentence:
(i) that the court is imposing a sentence of intermittent imprisonment;
(ii) the term of such sentence;
(iii) the days or parts of days on which the sentence is to be served, but except as provided in paragraph (iv) hereof such specification need not include the dates on which such days fall; and
(iv) the first and last dates on which the defendant is to be incarcerated under the sentence.
(b) The court, in its discretion, may specify any day or days or parts thereof on which the defendant shall be confined and may specify a period to commence at the commencement of the sentence and not to exceed fifteen days during which the defendant is to be continuously confined.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1970, c. 477, § 1. Amended L.1973, c. 277, § 11; L.1973, c. 523, § 1; L.1987, c. 304, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 85.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 85. Sentence of Intermittent Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 85.05 Modification and revocation of sentences of intermittent imprisonment
1. Authorization. A sentence of intermittent imprisonment may be modified by the court in its discretion upon application of the defendant; and the court on its own motion may modify or revoke any such sentence if:
(a) the court is satisfied during the term of the sentence that the defendant has committed another offense during such term;
(b) the defendant has failed to report to the institution to which he has been committed, or to the institution designated by the head of the agency to which he has been committed, on a day or dates specified in the commitment and is unable or unwilling to furnish a reasonable and acceptable explanation for such failure; or
(c) the defendant has violated a rule or regulation of the institution or agency to which he has been committed and the head of such institution or agency or someone delegated by him has reported such violation in writing to the court.
2. Interruption of sentence. In any case where the defendant fails to report to the institution or to an institution of the agency to which he has been committed, the term of the sentence shall be interrupted and such interruption shall continue until the defendant either reports to such institution or appears before the court that imposed the sentence, whichever occurs first. If the defendant reports to the institution before he appears before the court, he shall be brought before the court.
3. Action by court. The court shall not modify or revoke a sentence of intermittent imprisonment unless the defendant has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. Any modification of a sentence of intermittent imprisonment:
(a) may provide (i) for different or additional or fewer days or parts of days on which the defendant is to be confined, or (ii) where the defendant has failed to report as specified in the sentence, an extension of the term of the sentence for the period during which it was interrupted, or (iii) for both; and
(b) shall be by written order of the court and shall be delivered and filed in the same manner as the original sentence, as specified in subdivision two of section 85.10 of this article.
4. Jail time. Where a sentence of intermittent imprisonment is revoked and a sentence of imprisonment is imposed in its place for the same offense, time spent in confinement under the sentence of intermittent imprisonment shall be calculated as jail time under subdivision three of section 70.30 of this chapter and shall be added to any jail time accrued against such sentence prior to imposition thereof.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1970, c. 477, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 85.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 85. Sentence of Intermittent Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 85.10 Commitment; notifications; warrants
1. Commitment. Commitment under a sentence of intermittent imprisonment and execution of the judgment shall be in accordance with the procedure applicable to a definite sentence of imprisonment, except that: (a) detention of the defendant under the judgment shall be executed during the times specified in the sentence; and (b) the court may provide that the defendant is to report to a specified institution on a specified date at a specified time to commence service of the sentence and in such case the defendant need not be taken into or retained in custody when sentence is imposed.
2. Notifications. A written copy of the sentence imposed by the court signed by the judge who imposed the sentence shall be delivered to the defendant and shall be annexed to the commitment and to each copy of the commitment required to be delivered or filed. When the defendant is not taken into or retained in custody at the time sentence is imposed, the commitment and copy of the sentence shall forthwith be delivered to the person whose duty it is to execute the judgment. If at any time the defendant fails to report for confinement as provided in the sentence the officer in charge of the institution or department to which such commitment is made or someone designated by such officer shall forthwith notify the court in writing of such failure to report.
3. Warrants. Upon receipt of any such notification the court may issue a warrant to an appropriate police officer or peace officer directing him to take the defendant into custody and bring him before the court. The court may then commit such person to custody or fix bail or release him on his own recognizance for future appearance before the court.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1970, c. 477, § 1. Amended L.1980, c. 843, § 38.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 85.15
Effective: March 31, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 85. Sentence of Intermittent Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
§ 85.15 Subsequent sentences
1. [Eff. until Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, subd. 1 below.] Indeterminate and determinate sentences. The service of an indeterminate or a determinate sentence of imprisonment shall satisfy any sentence of intermittent imprisonment imposed on a person for an offense committed prior to the time the indeterminate or determinate sentence was imposed. A person who is serving a sentence of intermittent imprisonment at the time an indeterminate or a determinate sentence of imprisonment is imposed shall be delivered to the custody of the state department of corrections and community supervision to commence service of the indeterminate or determinate sentence immediately.
1. [Eff. Sept. 1, 2013, pursuant to L.1995, c. 3, § 74, subd. d. See, also, subd. 1 above.] Indeterminate and reformatory sentences. The service of an indeterminate or a reformatory sentence of imprisonment shall satisfy any sentence of intermittent imprisonment imposed on a person for an offense committed prior to the time the indeterminate or reformatory sentence was imposed. A person who is serving a sentence of intermittent imprisonment at the time an indeterminate or a reformatory sentence of imprisonment is imposed shall be delivered to the custody of the state department of corrections and community supervision to commence service of the indeterminate or reformatory sentence immediately.
2. Definite sentences. If a definite sentence of imprisonment is imposed on a person who is under a previously imposed sentence of intermittent imprisonment, such person shall commence service of the definite sentence immediately. Where such definite sentence is for a term in excess of thirty days, the service of such sentence shall satisfy the sentence of intermittent imprisonment unless the sentence of intermittent imprisonment is revoked, or a warrant is issued pursuant to subdivision three of section 85.10 of this article and prior to satisfaction of, or conditional release under, such definite sentence of imprisonment.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1970, c. 477, § 1. Amended L.1995, c. 3, § 20; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 127-l, eff. March 31, 2011; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 127-m.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 85.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Two. Sentences
Title E. Sentences
Article 85. Sentence of Intermittent Imprisonment (Refs & Annos)
[§ 85.20. Repealed. L.1973, c. 523, § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1973]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. G, Art. 100, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 100. Criminal Solicitation
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 100.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 100. Criminal Solicitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 100.00 Criminal solicitation in the fifth degree
A person is guilty of criminal solicitation in the fifth degree when, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a crime, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.
Criminal solicitation in the fifth degree is a violation.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1930. Amended L.1978, c. 422, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 100.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 100. Criminal Solicitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 100.05 Criminal solicitation in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of criminal solicitation in the fourth degree when:
1. with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a felony, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct; or
2. being over eighteen years of age, with intent that another person under sixteen years of age engage in conduct that would constitute a crime, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.
Criminal solicitation in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1978, c. 422, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 100.08
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 100. Criminal Solicitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 100.08 Criminal solicitation in the third degree
A person is guilty of criminal solicitation in the third degree when, being over eighteen years of age, with intent that another person under sixteen years of age engage in conduct that would constitute a felony, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.
Criminal solicitation in the third degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 422, § 3.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 100.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 100. Criminal Solicitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 100.10 Criminal solicitation in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal solicitation in the second degree when, with intent that another person engage in conduct constituting a class A felony, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.
Criminal solicitation in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1972, c. 292, § 1; L.1978, c. 422, § 4.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 100.13
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 100. Criminal Solicitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 100.13 Criminal solicitation in the first degree
A person is guilty of criminal solicitation in the first degree when, being over eighteen years of age, with intent that another person under sixteen years of age engage in conduct that would constitute a class A felony, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes or otherwise attempts to cause such other person to engage in such conduct.
Criminal solicitation in the first degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 422, § 5.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 100.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 100. Criminal Solicitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 100.15 Criminal solicitation; no defense
It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal solicitation that the person solicited could not be guilty of the crime solicited owing to criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or to unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct solicited or of the defendant's criminal purpose or to other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of the crime in question.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 100.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 100. Criminal Solicitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 100.20 Criminal solicitation; exemption
A person is not guilty of criminal solicitation when his solicitation constitutes conduct of a kind that is necessarily incidental to the commission of the crime solicited. When under such circumstances the solicitation constitutes an offense other than criminal solicitation which is related to but separate from the crime solicited, the actor is guilty of such related and separate offense only and not of criminal solicitation.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. G, Art. 105, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 105. Conspiracy
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 105.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 105. Conspiracy (Refs & Annos)
§ 105.00 Conspiracy in the sixth degree
A person is guilty of conspiracy in the sixth degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.
Conspiracy in the sixth degree is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1973, c. 1051, § 5. Amended L.1978, c. 422, § 6.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 105.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 105. Conspiracy (Refs & Annos)
§ 105.05 Conspiracy in the fifth degree
A person is guilty of conspiracy in the fifth degree when, with intent that conduct constituting:
1. a felony be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct; or
2. a crime be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.
Conspiracy in the fifth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1973, c. 1051, § 5. Amended L.1978, c. 422, § 6.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 105.10
Effective: November 1, 2000
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 105. Conspiracy (Refs & Annos)
§ 105.10 Conspiracy in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of conspiracy in the fourth degree when, with intent that conduct constituting:
1. a class B or class C felony be performed, he or she agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct; or
2. a felony be performed, he or she, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct; or
3. the felony of money laundering in the third degree as defined in section 470.10 of this chapter, be performed, he or she agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.
Conspiracy in the fourth degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1973, c. 1051, § 5. Amended L.1978, c. 422, § 6; L.2000, c. 489, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2000.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 105.13
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 105. Conspiracy (Refs & Annos)
§ 105.13 Conspiracy in the third degree
A person is guilty of conspiracy in the third degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a class B or a class C felony be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.
Conspiracy in the third degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 422, § 7.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 105.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 105. Conspiracy (Refs & Annos)
§ 105.15 Conspiracy in the second degree
A person is guilty of conspiracy in the second degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a class A felony be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.
Conspiracy in the second degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1973, c. 1051, § 5. Amended L.1978, c. 422, § 8.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 105.17
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 105. Conspiracy (Refs & Annos)
§ 105.17 Conspiracy in the first degree
A person is guilty of conspiracy in the first degree when, with intent that conduct constituting a class A felony be performed, he, being over eighteen years of age, agrees with one or more persons under sixteen years of age to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.
Conspiracy in the first degree is a class A-I felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 422, § 9.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 105.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 105. Conspiracy (Refs & Annos)
§ 105.20 Conspiracy; pleading and proof; necessity of overt act
A person shall not be convicted of conspiracy unless an overt act is alleged and proved to have been committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 105.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 105. Conspiracy (Refs & Annos)
§ 105.25 Conspiracy; jurisdiction and venue
1. A person may be prosecuted for conspiracy in the county in which he entered into such conspiracy or in any county in which an overt act in furtherance thereof was committed.
2. An agreement made within this state to engage in or cause the performance of conduct in another jurisdiction is punishable herein as a conspiracy only when such conduct would constitute a crime both under the laws of this state if performed herein and under the laws of the other jurisdiction if performed therein.
3. An agreement made in another jurisdiction to engage in or cause the performance of conduct within this state, which would constitute a crime herein, is punishable herein only when an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy is committed within this state. Under such circumstances, it is no defense to a prosecution for conspiracy that the conduct which is the objective of the conspiracy would not constitute a crime under the laws of the other jurisdiction if performed therein.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 105.30
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 105. Conspiracy (Refs & Annos)
§ 105.30 Conspiracy; no defense
It is no defense to a prosecution for conspiracy that, owing to criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or to unawareness of the criminal nature of the agreement or the object conduct or of the defendant's criminal purpose or to other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of conspiracy or the object crime, one or more of the defendant's co-conspirators could not be guilty of conspiracy or the object crime.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 105.35
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 105. Conspiracy (Refs & Annos)
§ 105.35 Conspiracy; enterprise corruption: applicability
For purposes of this article, conspiracy to commit the crime of enterprise corruption in violation of section 460.20 of this chapter shall not constitute an offense.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 516, § 3.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. G, Art. 110, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 110. Attempt
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 110.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 110. Attempt (Refs & Annos)
§ 110.00 Attempt to commit a crime
A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 110.05
Effective: June 7, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 110. Attempt (Refs & Annos)
§ 110.05 Attempt to commit a crime; punishment
An attempt to commit a crime is a:
1. Class A-I felony when the crime attempted is the A-I felony of murder in the first degree, aggravated murder as defined in subdivision one of section 125.26 of this chapter, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, criminal sale of a controlled substance in the first degree, criminal possession of a chemical or biological weapon in the first degree or criminal use of a chemical or biological weapon in the first degree;
2. Class A-II felony when the crime attempted is a class A-II felony;
3. Class B felony when the crime attempted is a class A-I felony except as provided in subdivision one hereof;
4. Class C felony when the crime attempted is a class B felony;
5. Class D felony when the crime attempted is a class C felony;
6. Class E felony when the crime attempted is a class D felony;
7. Class A misdemeanor when the crime attempted is a class E felony;
8. Class B misdemeanor when the crime attempted is a misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1970, c. 112, § 1; L.1972, c. 292, § 3; L.1973, c. 276, § 12; L.1974, c. 367, § 3; L.1979, c. 410, § 10; L.2004, c. 1, pt. A, § 11, eff. July 23, 2004; L.2006, c. 93, § 2, eff. June 7, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 110.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 110. Attempt (Refs & Annos)
§ 110.10 Attempt to commit a crime; no defense
If the conduct in which a person engages otherwise constitutes an attempt to commit a crime pursuant to section 110.00, it is no defense to a prosecution for such attempt that the crime charged to have been attempted was, under the attendant circumstances, factually or legally impossible of commission, if such crime could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as such person believed them to be.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. G, Art. 115, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 115. Criminal Facilitation
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 115.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 115. Criminal Facilitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 115.00 Criminal facilitation in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation in the fourth degree when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid:
1. to a person who intends to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a felony; or
2. to a person under sixteen years of age who intends to engage in conduct which would constitute a crime, he, being over eighteen years of age, engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a crime.
Criminal facilitation in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1978, c. 422, § 10.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 115.01
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 115. Criminal Facilitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 115.01 Criminal facilitation in the third degree
A person guilty of criminal facilitation in the third degree, when believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person under sixteen years of age who intends to engage in conduct that would constitute a felony, he, being over eighteen years of age, engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit a felony.
Criminal facilitation in the third degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 422, § 11.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 115.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 115. Criminal Facilitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 115.05 Criminal facilitation in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation in the second degree when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person who intends to commit a class A felony, he engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit such class A felony.
Criminal facilitation in the second degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1972, c. 292, § 4; L.1978, c. 422, § 12.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 115.08
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 115. Criminal Facilitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 115.08 Criminal facilitation in the first degree
A person is guilty of criminal facilitation in the first degree when, believing it probable that he is rendering aid to a person under sixteen years of age who intends to engage in conduct that would constitute a class A felony, he, being over eighteen years of age, engages in conduct which provides such person with means or opportunity for the commission thereof and which in fact aids such person to commit such a class A felony.
Criminal facilitation in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 422, § 13.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 115.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 115. Criminal Facilitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 115.10 Criminal facilitation; no defense
It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal facilitation that:
1. The person facilitated was not guilty of the underlying felony owing to criminal irresponsibility or other legal incapacity or exemption, or to unawareness of the criminal nature of the conduct in question or to other factors precluding the mental state required for the commission of such felony; or
2. The person facilitated has not been prosecuted for or convicted of the underlying felony, or has previously been acquitted thereof; or
3. The defendant himself is not guilty of the felony which he facilitated because he did not act with the intent or other culpable mental state required for the commission thereof.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 115.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 115. Criminal Facilitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 115.15 Criminal facilitation; corroboration
A person shall not be convicted of criminal facilitation upon the testimony of a person who has committed the felony charged to have been facilitated unless such testimony be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with such facilitation.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 115.20
Effective: March 16, 2013
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title G. Anticipatory Offenses
Article 115. Criminal Facilitation (Refs & Annos)
§ 115.20 Criminal facilitation; definitions and construction
For purposes of this article, such conduct shall include, but not be limited to, making available, selling, exchanging, giving or disposing of a community gun, which in fact, aids a person to commit a crime. “Community gun” shall mean a firearm that is actually shared, made available, sold, exchanged, given or disposed of among or between two or more persons, at least one of whom is not authorized pursuant to law to possess such firearm. “Dispose of” shall have the same meaning as that term is defined in section 265.00 of this chapter. “Share” and “make available” shall, in the case of a firearm, be construed to include knowingly placing such firearm at a location accessible and known to one or more other persons.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2013, c. 1, § 31, eff. March 16, 2013.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. H, Art. 120, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.00 Assault in the third degree
A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when:
1. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or
2. He recklessly causes physical injury to another person; or
3. With criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.
Assault in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.01
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.01 Reckless assault of a child by a child day care provider
A person is guilty of reckless assault of a child when, being a child day care provider or an employee thereof, he or she recklessly causes serious physical injury to a child under the care of such provider or employee who is less than eleven years of age.
Reckless assault of a child by a child day care provider is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1998, c. 600, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 1998.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.02
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.02 Reckless assault of a child
1. A person is guilty of reckless assault of a child when, being eighteen years of age or more, such person recklessly causes serious physical injury to the brain of a child less than five years old by shaking the child, or by slamming or throwing the child so as to impact the child's head on a hard surface or object.
2. For purposes of subdivision one of this section, the following shall constitute “serious physical injury”:
a. “serious physical injury” as defined in subdivision ten of section 10.00 of this chapter; or
b. extreme rotational cranial acceleration and deceleration and one or more of the following: (i) subdural hemorrhaging; (ii) intracranial hemorrhaging; or (iii) retinal hemorrhaging.
Reckless assault of a child is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2006, c. 110, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.03
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.03 Vehicular assault in the second degree
A person is guilty of vehicular assault in the second degree when he or she causes serious physical injury to another person, and either:
(1) operates a motor vehicle in violation of subdivision two, three, four or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law or operates a vessel or public vessel in violation of paragraph (b), (c), (d) or (e) of subdivision two of section forty-nine-a of the navigation law, and as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates such motor vehicle, vessel or public vessel in a manner that causes such serious physical injury to such other person, or
(2) operates a motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than eighteen thousand pounds which contains flammable gas, radioactive materials or explosives in violation of subdivision one of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, and such flammable gas, radioactive materials or explosives is the cause of such serious physical injury, and as a result of such impairment by the use of alcohol, operates such motor vehicle in a manner that causes such serious physical injury to such other person, or
(3) operates a snowmobile in violation of paragraph (b), (c) or (d) of subdivision one of section 25.24 of the parks, recreation and historic preservation law or operates an all terrain vehicle as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section twenty-two hundred eighty-one of the vehicle and traffic law and in violation of subdivision two, three, four, or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, and as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates such snowmobile or all terrain vehicle in a manner that causes such serious physical injury to such other person.
If it is established that the person operating such motor vehicle, vessel, public vessel, snowmobile or all terrain vehicle caused such serious physical injury while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol or a drug, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, such person operated the motor vehicle, vessel, public vessel, snowmobile or all terrain vehicle in a manner that caused such serious physical injury, as required by this section.
Vehicular assault in the second degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1983, c. 298, § 1. Amended L.1985, c. 507, § 1; L.1989, c. 393, § 1; L.1990, c. 173, § 81; L.1990, c. 452, § 2; L.1992, c. 427, § 3; L.1992, c. 805, § 47; L.1998, c. 629, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 1999; L.2005, c. 39, § 2, eff. June 8, 2005; L.2006, c. 732, § 21, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.04
Effective: December 18, 2009
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.04 Vehicular assault in the first degree
A person is guilty of vehicular assault in the first degree when he or she commits the crime of vehicular assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.03 of this article, and either:
(1) commits such crime while operating a motor vehicle while such person has .18 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in such person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or saliva made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law;
(2) commits such crime while knowing or having reason to know that: (a) his or her license or his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in another state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle in another state is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation is based upon a conviction in such other state for an offense which would, if committed in this state, constitute a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law; or (b) his or her license or his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in the state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license issued by the commissioner of motor vehicles is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation is based upon either a refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law or following a conviction for a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law;
(3) has previously been convicted of violating any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law within the preceding ten years, provided that, for the purposes of this subdivision, a conviction in any other state or jurisdiction for an offense which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, shall be treated as a violation of such law;
(4) causes serious physical injury to more than one other person;
(5) has previously been convicted of violating any provision of this article or article one hundred twenty-five of this title involving the operation of a motor vehicle, or was convicted in any other state or jurisdiction of an offense involving the operation of a motor vehicle which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of this article or article one hundred twenty-five of this title; or
(6) commits such crime while operating a motor vehicle while a child who is fifteen years of age or less is a passenger in such motor vehicle and causes serious physical injury to such child.
If it is established that the person operating such motor vehicle caused such serious physical injury or injuries while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, such person operated the motor vehicle in a manner that caused such serious physical injury or injuries, as required by this section and section 120.03 of this article.
Vehicular assault in the first degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1985, c. 507, § 2. Amended L.1996, c. 528, § 1; L.2005, c. 39, § 3, eff. June 8, 2005; L.2006, c. 245, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2006; L.2006, c. 732, § 21, eff. Nov. 1, 2006; L.2006, c. 746, § 4, eff. Dec. 15, 2006; L.2009, c. 496, § 7, eff. Dec. 18, 2009.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.04-a
Effective: December 18, 2009
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.04-a Aggravated vehicular assault
A person is guilty of aggravated vehicular assault when he or she engages in reckless driving as defined by section twelve hundred twelve of the vehicle and traffic law, and commits the crime of vehicular assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.03 of this article, and either:
(1) commits such crimes while operating a motor vehicle while such person has .18 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in such person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or saliva made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law;
(2) commits such crimes while knowing or having reason to know that: (a) his or her license or his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in another state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle in another state is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation is based upon a conviction in such other state for an offense which would, if committed in this state, constitute a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law; or (b) his or her license or his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in this state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license issued by the commissioner of motor vehicles is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation is based upon either a refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law or following a conviction for a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law;
(3) has previously been convicted of violating any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law within the preceding ten years, provided that, for the purposes of this subdivision, a conviction in any other state or jurisdiction for an offense which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, shall be treated as a violation of such law;
(4) causes serious physical injury to more than one other person;
(5) has previously been convicted of violating any provision of this article or article one hundred twenty-five of this title involving the operation of a motor vehicle, or was convicted in any other state or jurisdiction of an offense involving the operation of a motor vehicle which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of this article or article one hundred twenty-five of this title; or
(6) commits such crime while operating a motor vehicle while a child who is fifteen years of age or less is a passenger in such motor vehicle and causes serious physical injury to such child.
If it is established that the person operating such motor vehicle caused such serious physical injury or injuries while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, such person operated the motor vehicle in a manner that caused such serious physical injury or injuries, as required by this section and section 120.03 of this article.
Aggravated vehicular assault is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2007, c. 345, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2007. Amended L.2009, c. 496, § 8, eff. Dec. 18, 2009.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.05
Effective: March 16, 2013
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.05 Assault in the second degree
A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or
2. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
3. With intent to prevent a peace officer, a police officer, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, sanitation enforcement agent, New York city sanitation worker, a firefighter, including a firefighter acting as a paramedic or emergency medical technician administering first aid in the course of performance of duty as such firefighter, an emergency medical service paramedic or emergency medical service technician, or medical or related personnel in a hospital emergency department, a city marshal, a traffic enforcement officer or traffic enforcement agent, from performing a lawful duty, by means including releasing or failing to control an animal under circumstances evincing the actor's intent that the animal obstruct the lawful activity of such peace officer, police officer, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, sanitation enforcement agent, New York city sanitation worker, firefighter, paramedic, technician, city marshal, traffic enforcement officer or traffic enforcement agent, he or she causes physical injury to such peace officer, police officer, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, sanitation enforcement agent, New York city sanitation worker, firefighter, paramedic, technician or medical or related personnel in a hospital emergency department, city marshal, traffic enforcement officer or traffic enforcement agent; or
3-a. With intent to prevent an employee of a local social services district directly involved in investigation of or response to alleged abuse or neglect of a child, a vulnerable elderly person or an incompetent or physically disabled person, from performing such investigation or response, the actor, not being such child, vulnerable elderly person or incompetent or physically disabled person, or with intent to prevent an employee of a local social services district directly involved in providing public assistance and care from performing his or her job, causes physical injury to such employee including by means of releasing or failing to control an animal under circumstances evincing the actor's intent that the animal obstruct the lawful activities of such employee; or
4. He recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
4-a. He recklessly causes physical injury to another person who is a child under the age of eighteen by intentional discharge of a firearm, rifle or shotgun; or
5. For a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness or other physical impairment or injury to another person by administering to him, without his consent, a drug, substance or preparation capable of producing the same; or
6. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony, other than a felony defined in article one hundred thirty which requires corroboration for conviction, or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any, causes physical injury to a person other than one of the participants; or
7. Having been charged with or convicted of a crime and while confined in a correctional facility, as defined in subdivision three of section forty of the correction law, pursuant to such charge or conviction, with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or
8. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical injury to a person less than eleven years old, the defendant recklessly causes serious physical injury to such person; or
9. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical injury to a person less than seven years old, the defendant causes such injury to such person; or
10. Acting at a place the person knows, or reasonably should know, is on school grounds and with intent to cause physical injury, he or she:
(a) causes such injury to an employee of a school or public school district; or
(b) not being a student of such school or public school district, causes physical injury to another, and such other person is a student of such school who is attending or present for educational purposes. For purposes of this subdivision the term “school grounds” shall have the meaning set forth in subdivision fourteen of section 220.00 of this chapter.
11. With intent to cause physical injury to a train operator, ticket inspector, conductor, signalperson, bus operator or station agent employed by any transit agency, authority or company, public or private, whose operation is authorized by New York state or any of its political subdivisions, a city marshal, a traffic enforcement officer, traffic enforcement agent, sanitation enforcement agent, New York city sanitation worker, registered nurse or licensed practical nurse he or she causes physical injury to such train operator, ticket inspector, conductor, signalperson, bus operator or station agent, city marshal, traffic enforcement officer, traffic enforcement agent, registered nurse or licensed practical nurse, sanitation enforcement agent or New York city sanitation worker, while such employee is performing an assigned duty on, or directly related to, the operation of a train or bus, or such city marshal, traffic enforcement officer, traffic enforcement agent, registered nurse or licensed practical nurse, sanitation enforcement agent or New York city sanitation worker, is performing an assigned duty.
11-a. With intent to cause physical injury to an employee of a local social services district directly involved in investigation of or response to alleged abuse or neglect of a child, vulnerable elderly person or an incompetent or physically disabled person, the actor, not being such child, vulnerable elderly person or incompetent or physically disabled person, or with intent to prevent an employee of a local social services district directly involved in providing public assistance and care from performing his or her job, causes physical injury to such employee; or
12. With intent to cause physical injury to a person who is sixty-five years of age or older, he or she causes such injury to such person, and the actor is more than ten years younger than such person.
Assault in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 7; L.1968, c. 37, § 1; L.1972, c. 598, § 2; L.1974, c. 239, § 1; L.1974, c. 660, § 1; L.1975, c. 134, § 1; L.1975, c. 667, § 37; L.1980, c. 471, § 25; L.1980, c. 843, § 39; L.1981, c. 372, §§ 4, 5; L.1984, c. 284, § 1; L.1985, c. 262, § 1; L.1990, c. 477, § 2; L.1996, c. 122, § 4; L.1998, c. 269, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1998; L.1998, c. 287, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1998; L.2000, c. 181, § 13, eff. Nov. 1, 2000; L.2002, c. 598, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2002; L.2003, c. 607, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2006, c. 100, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2006; L.2008, c. 45, § 1, eff. July 22, 2008; L.2008, c. 68, § 1, eff. June 29, 2008; L.2010, c. 318, §§ 1, 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2010; L.2010, c. 345, § 1, eff. Sept. 12, 2010; L.2012, c. 377, § 1, eff. Sept. 16, 2012; L.2012, c. 434, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2012; L.2013, c. 1, § 32, eff. March 16, 2013.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.06
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.06 Gang assault in the second degree
A person is guilty of gang assault in the second degree when, with intent to cause physical injury to another person and when aided by two or more other persons actually present, he causes serious physical injury to such person or to a third person.
Gang assault in the second degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1996, c. 647, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.07
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.07 Gang assault in the first degree
A person is guilty of gang assault in the first degree when, with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person and when aided by two or more other persons actually present, he causes serious physical injury to such person or to a third person.
Gang assault in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1996, c. 647, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.08
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.08 Assault on a peace officer, police officer, fireman or emergency medical services professional
A person is guilty of assault on a peace officer, police officer, fireman or emergency medical services professional when, with intent to prevent a peace officer, police officer, a fireman, including a fireman acting as a paramedic or emergency medical technician administering first aid in the course of performance of duty as such fireman, or an emergency medical service paramedic or emergency medical service technician, from performing a lawful duty, he causes serious physical injury to such peace officer, police officer, fireman, paramedic or technician.
Assault on a peace officer, police officer, fireman or emergency medical services professional is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1996, c. 632, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.09
Effective: November 17, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.09. Assault on a judge
A person is guilty of assault on a judge when, with intent to cause serious physical injury and prevent a judge from performing official judicial duties, he or she causes serious physical injury to such judge. For the purposes of this section, the term judge shall mean a judge of a court of record or a justice court.
Assault on a judge is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2011, c. 148, § 1, eff. Nov. 17, 2011.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.10 Assault in the first degree
A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
2. With intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, or to destroy, amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such injury to such person or to a third person; or
3. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person; or
4. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any, causes serious physical injury to a person other than one of the participants.
Assault in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 8; L.1996, c. 646, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.11
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.11 Aggravated assault upon a police officer or a peace officer
A person is guilty of aggravated assault upon a police officer or a peace officer when, with intent to cause serious physical injury to a person whom he knows or reasonably should know to be a police officer or a peace officer engaged in the course of performing his official duties, he causes such injury by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.
Aggravated assault upon a police officer or a peace officer is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1980, c. 233, § 6. Amended L.1981, c. 175, § 3; L.1993, c. 283, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.12
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.12 Aggravated assault upon a person less than eleven years old
A person is guilty of aggravated assault upon a person less than eleven years old when being eighteen years old or more the defendant commits the crime of assault in the third degree as defined in section 120.00 of this article upon a person less than eleven years old and has been previously convicted of such crime upon a person less than eleven years old within the preceding three years.
Aggravated assault upon a person less than eleven years old is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1990, c. 477, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.13
Effective: December 21, 2005
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.13 Menacing in the first degree
A person is guilty of menacing in the first degree when he or she commits the crime of menacing in the second degree and has been previously convicted of the crime of menacing in the second degree or the crime of menacing a police officer or peace officer within the preceding ten years.
Menacing in the first degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1992, c. 345, § 1. Amended L.2005, c. 765, § 8, eff. Dec. 21, 2005.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.14
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.14 Menacing in the second degree
A person is guilty of menacing in the second degree when:
1. He or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death by displaying a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument or what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; or
2. He or she repeatedly follows a person or engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts over a period of time intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death; or
3. He or she commits the crime of menacing in the third degree in violation of that part of a duly served order of protection, or such order which the defendant has actual knowledge of because he or she was present in court when such order was issued, pursuant to article eight of the family court act, section 530.12 of the criminal procedure law, or an order of protection issued by a court of competent jurisdiction in another state, territorial or tribal jurisdiction, which directed the respondent or defendant to stay away from the person or persons on whose behalf the order was issued.
Menacing in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1992, c. 345, § 1. Amended L.1994, c. 222, § 46; L.1998, c. 597, § 14, eff. Dec. 22, 1998.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.15 Menacing in the third degree
A person is guilty of menacing in the third degree when, by physical menace, he or she intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of death, imminent serious physical injury or physical injury.
Menacing in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1992, c. 345, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.16
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.16 Hazing in the first degree
A person is guilty of hazing in the first degree when, in the course of another person's initiation into or affiliation with any organization, he intentionally or recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such other person or a third person and thereby causes such injury.
Hazing in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1983, c. 716, § 1. Amended L.1988, c. 86, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.17
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.17 Hazing in the second degree
A person is guilty of hazing in the second degree when, in the course of another person's initiation or affiliation with any organization, he intentionally or recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such other person or a third person.
Hazing in the second degree is a violation.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1988, c. 86, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.18
Effective: December 21, 2005
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.18 Menacing a police officer or peace officer
A person is guilty of menacing a police officer or peace officer when he or she intentionally places or attempts to place a police officer or peace officer in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death by displaying a deadly weapon, knife, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm, whether operable or not, where such officer was in the course of performing his or her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a police officer or peace officer.
Menacing a police officer or peace officer is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2005, c. 765, § 7, eff. Dec. 21, 2005.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.20 Reckless endangerment in the second degree
A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person.
Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.25 Reckless endangerment in the first degree
A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.
Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.30
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.30 Promoting a suicide attempt
A person is guilty of promoting a suicide attempt when he intentionally causes or aids another person to attempt suicide.
Promoting a suicide attempt is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.35
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.35 Promoting a suicide attempt; when punishable as attempt to commit murder
A person who engages in conduct constituting both the offense of promoting a suicide attempt and the offense of attempt to commit murder may not be convicted of attempt to commit murder unless he causes or aids the suicide attempt by the use of duress or deception.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.40
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.40 Definitions
For purposes of sections 120.45, 120.50, 120.55 and 120.60 of this article:
1. “Kidnapping” shall mean a kidnapping crime defined in article one hundred thirty-five of this chapter.
2. “Unlawful imprisonment” shall mean an unlawful imprisonment felony crime defined in article one hundred thirty-five of this chapter.
3. “Sex offense” shall mean a felony defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter, sexual misconduct, as defined in section 130.20 of this chapter, sexual abuse in the third degree as defined in section 130.55 of this chapter or sexual abuse in the second degree as defined in section 130.60 of this chapter.
4. “Immediate family” means the spouse, former spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person who regularly resides or has regularly resided in the household of a person.
5. “Specified predicate crime” means:
a. a violent felony offense;
b. a crime defined in section 130.20, 130.25, 130.30, 130.40, 130.45, 130.55, 130.60, 130.70, 255.25, 255.26 or 255.27;
c. assault in the third degree, as defined in section 120.00; menacing in the first degree, as defined in section 120.13; menacing in the second degree, as defined in section 120.14; coercion in the first degree, as defined in section 135.65; coercion in the second degree, as defined in section 135.60; aggravated harassment in the second degree, as defined in section 240.30; harassment in the first degree, as defined in section 240.25; menacing in the third degree, as defined in section 120.15; criminal mischief in the third degree, as defined in section 145.05; criminal mischief in the second degree, as defined in section 145.10, criminal mischief in the first degree, as defined in section 145.12; criminal tampering in the first degree, as defined in section 145.20; arson in the fourth degree, as defined in section 150.05; arson in the third degree, as defined in section 150.10; criminal contempt in the first degree, as defined in section 215.51; endangering the welfare of a child, as defined in section 260.10; or
d. stalking in the fourth degree, as defined in section 120.45; stalking in the third degree, as defined in section 120.50; stalking in the second degree, as defined in section 120.55; or
e. an offense in any other jurisdiction which includes all of the essential elements of any such crime for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year or a sentence of death was authorized and is authorized in this state irrespective of whether such sentence was imposed.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1999, c. 635, § 13, eff. Dec. 1, 1999. Amended L.2006, c. 320, § 6, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.45
Effective: December 1, 1999
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.45 Stalking in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of stalking in the fourth degree when he or she intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and knows or reasonably should know that such conduct:
1. is likely to cause reasonable fear of material harm to the physical health, safety or property of such person, a member of such person's immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted; or
2. causes material harm to the mental or emotional health of such person, where such conduct consists of following, telephoning or initiating communication or contact with such person, a member of such person's immediate family or a third party with whom such person is acquainted, and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct; or
3. is likely to cause such person to reasonably fear that his or her employment, business or career is threatened, where such conduct consists of appearing, telephoning or initiating communication or contact at such person's place of employment or business, and the actor was previously clearly informed to cease that conduct.
Stalking in the fourth degree is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1999, c. 635, § 13, eff. Dec. 1, 1999.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.50
Effective: December 1, 1999
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.50 Stalking in the third degree
A person is guilty of stalking in the third degree when he or she:
1. Commits the crime of stalking in the fourth degree in violation of section 120.45 of this article against three or more persons, in three or more separate transactions, for which the actor has not been previously convicted; or
2. Commits the crime of stalking in the fourth degree in violation of section 120.45 of this article against any person, and has previously been convicted, within the preceding ten years of a specified predicate crime, as defined in subdivision five of section 120.40 of this article, and the victim of such specified predicate crime is the victim, or an immediate family member of the victim, of the present offense; or
3. With intent to harass, annoy or alarm a specific person, intentionally engages in a course of conduct directed at such person which is likely to cause such person to reasonably fear physical injury or serious physical injury, the commission of a sex offense against, or the kidnapping, unlawful imprisonment or death of such person or a member of such person's immediate family; or
4. Commits the crime of stalking in the fourth degree and has previously been convicted within the preceding ten years of stalking in the fourth degree.
Stalking in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1999, c. 635, § 13, eff. Dec. 1, 1999.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.55
Effective: November 1, 2008
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.55 Stalking in the second degree
A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when he or she:
1. Commits the crime of stalking in the third degree as defined in subdivision three of section 120.50 of this article and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission of such offense: (i) displays, or possesses and threatens the use of, a firearm, pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, electronic dart gun, electronic stun gun, cane sword, billy, blackjack, bludgeon, plastic knuckles, metal knuckles, chuka stick, sand bag, sandclub, slingshot, slungshot, shirken, “Kung Fu Star”, dagger, dangerous knife, dirk, razor, stiletto, imitation pistol, dangerous instrument, deadly instrument or deadly weapon; or (ii) displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; or
2. Commits the crime of stalking in the third degree in violation of subdivision three of section 120.50 of this article against any person, and has previously been convicted, within the preceding five years, of a specified predicate crime as defined in subdivision five of section 120.40 of this article, and the victim of such specified predicate crime is the victim, or an immediate family member of the victim, of the present offense; or
3. Commits the crime of stalking in the fourth degree and has previously been convicted of stalking in the third degree as defined in subdivision four of section 120.50 of this article against any person; or
4. Being twenty-one years of age or older, repeatedly follows a person under the age of fourteen or engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts over a period of time intentionally placing or attempting to place such person who is under the age of fourteen in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury or death; or
5. Commits the crime of stalking in the third degree, as defined in subdivision three of section 120.50 of this article, against ten or more persons, in ten or more separate transactions, for which the actor has not been previously convicted.
Stalking in the second degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1999, c. 635, § 13, eff. Dec. 1, 1999. Amended L.2000, c. 434, § 4, eff. Oct. 20, 2000; L.2003, c. 598, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2008, c. 257, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2008.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.60
Effective: October 20, 2000
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.60 Stalking in the first degree
A person is guilty of stalking in the first degree when he or she commits the crime of stalking in the third degree as defined in subdivision three of section 120.50 or stalking in the second degree as defined in section 120.55 of this article and, in the course and furtherance thereof, he or she:
1. intentionally or recklessly causes physical injury to the victim of such crime; or
2. commits a class A misdemeanor defined in article one hundred thirty of this chapter, or a class E felony defined in section 130.25, 130.40 or 130.85 of this chapter, or a class D felony defined in section 130.30 or 130.45 of this chapter.
Stalking in the first degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1999, c. 635, § 13, eff. Dec. 1, 1999. Amended L.2000, c. 434, § 5, eff. Oct. 20, 2000.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 120.70
Effective: October 4, 2008
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 120. Assault and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 120.70 Luring a child
1. A person is guilty of luring a child when he or she lures a child into a motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, isolated area, building, or part thereof, for the purpose of committing against such child any of the following offenses: an offense as defined in section 70.02 of this chapter; an offense as defined in section 125.25 or 125.27 of this chapter; a felony offense that is a violation of article one hundred thirty of this chapter; an offense as defined in section 135.25 of this chapter; an offense as defined in sections 230.30, 230.33 or 230.34 of this chapter; an offense as defined in sections 255.25, 255.26, or 255.27 of this chapter; or an offense as defined in sections 263.05, 263.10, or 263.15 of this chapter. For purposes of this subdivision “child” means a person less than seventeen years of age. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence warrants, a conviction for the commission or attempted commission of any crime, including but not limited to a crime defined in article one hundred thirty-five of this chapter.
2. Luring a child is a class E felony, provided, however, that if the underlying offense the actor intended to commit against such child constituted a class A or a class B felony, then the offense of luring a child in violation of this section shall be deemed respectively, a class C felony or class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2008, c. 405, § 1, eff. Oct. 4, 2008.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 121.11
Effective: November 11, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 121. Strangulation and Related Offenses
§ 121.11 Criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation
A person is guilty of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation when, with intent to impede the normal breathing or circulation of the blood of another person, he or she:
a. applies pressure on the throat or neck of such person; or
b. blocks the nose or mouth of such person.
Criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2010, c. 405, § 2, eff. Nov. 11, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 121.12
Effective: November 11, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 121. Strangulation and Related Offenses
§ 121.12 Strangulation in the second degree
A person is guilty of strangulation in the second degree when he or she commits the crime of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, as defined in section 121.11 of this article, and thereby causes stupor, loss of consciousness for any period of time, or any other physical injury or impairment.
Strangulation in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2010, c. 405, § 2, eff. Nov. 11, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 121.13
Effective: November 11, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 121. Strangulation and Related Offenses
§ 121.13 Strangulation in the first degree
A person is guilty of strangulation in the first degree when he or she commits the crime of criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, as defined in section 121.11 of this article, and thereby causes serious physical injury to such other person.
Strangulation in the first degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2010, c. 405, § 2, eff. Nov. 11, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 121.14
Effective: November 11, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 121. Strangulation and Related Offenses
§ 121.14 Medical or dental purpose
For purposes of sections 121.11, 121.12 and 121.13 of this article, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant performed such conduct for a valid medical or dental purpose.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2010, c. 405, § 2, eff. Nov. 11, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. H, Art. 125, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.00 Homicide defined
Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a person or an unborn child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks under circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, abortion in the first degree or self-abortion in the first degree.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.05 Homicide, abortion and related offenses; definitions of terms
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. “Person,” when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who has been born and is alive.
2. “Abortional act” means an act committed upon or with respect to a female, whether by another person or by the female herself, whether she is pregnant or not, whether directly upon her body or by the administering, taking or prescription of drugs or in any other manner, with intent to cause a miscarriage of such female.
3. “Justifiable abortional act.” An abortional act is justifiable when committed upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed physician acting (a) under a reasonable belief that such is necessary to preserve her life, or, (b) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. A pregnant female's commission of an abortional act upon herself is justifiable when she acts upon the advice of a duly licensed physician (1) that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, (2) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. The submission by a female to an abortional act is justifiable when she believes that it is being committed by a duly licensed physician, acting under a reasonable belief that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1970, c. 127, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.10 Criminally negligent homicide
A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person.
Criminally negligent homicide is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.11
Effective: December 21, 2005
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.11 Aggravated criminally negligent homicide
A person is guilty of aggravated criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of a police officer or peace officer where such officer was in the course of performing his or her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a police officer or peace officer.
Aggravated criminally negligent homicide is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2005, c. 765, § 9, eff. Dec. 21, 2005.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.12
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.12 Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree
A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree when he or she causes the death of another person, and either:
(1) operates a motor vehicle in violation of subdivision two, three, four or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law or operates a vessel or public vessel in violation of paragraph (b), (c), (d) or (e) of subdivision two of section forty-nine-a of the navigation law, and as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates such motor vehicle, vessel or public vessel in a manner that causes the death of such other person, or
(2) operates a motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than eighteen thousand pounds which contains flammable gas, radioactive materials or explosives in violation of subdivision one of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, and such flammable gas, radioactive materials or explosives is the cause of such death, and as a result of such impairment by the use of alcohol, operates such motor vehicle in a manner that causes the death of such other person, or
(3) operates a snowmobile in violation of paragraph (b), (c) or (d) of subdivision one of section 25.24 of the parks, recreation and historic preservation law or operates an all terrain vehicle as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section twenty-two hundred eighty-one of the vehicle and traffic law in violation of subdivision two, three, four, or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, and as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates such snowmobile or all terrain vehicle in a manner that causes the death of such other person.
If it is established that the person operating such motor vehicle, vessel, public vessel, snowmobile or all terrain vehicle caused such death while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol or a drug, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, such person operated the motor vehicle, vessel, public vessel, snowmobile or all terrain vehicle in a manner that caused such death, as required by this section.
Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1983, c. 298, § 2. Amended L.1985, c. 507, § 3; L.1989, c. 393, § 2; L.1990, c. 173, § 82; L.1990, c. 452, § 3; L.1992, c. 427, § 3; L.1992, c. 805, § 47; L.1998, c. 629, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 1999; L.2005, c. 39, § 4, eff. June 8, 2005; L.2006, c. 732, § 22, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.13
Effective: December 18, 2009
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.13 Vehicular manslaughter in the first degree
A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree when he or she commits the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.12 of this article, and either:
(1) commits such crime while operating a motor vehicle while such person has .18 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in such person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or saliva made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law;
(2) commits such crime while knowing or having reason to know that: (a) his or her license or his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in another state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle in another state is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation is based upon a conviction in such other state for an offense which would, if committed in this state, constitute a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law; or (b) his or her license or his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in the state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license issued by the commissioner of motor vehicles is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation is based upon either a refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law or following a conviction for a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law;
(3) has previously been convicted of violating any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law within the preceding ten years, provided that, for the purposes of this subdivision, a conviction in any other state or jurisdiction for an offense which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, shall be treated as a violation of such law;
(4) causes the death of more than one other person;
(5) has previously been convicted of violating any provision of this article or article one hundred twenty of this title involving the operation of a motor vehicle, or was convicted in any other state or jurisdiction of an offense involving the operation of a motor vehicle which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of this article or article one hundred twenty of this title; or
(6) commits such crime while operating a motor vehicle while a child who is fifteen years of age or less is a passenger in such motor vehicle and causes the death of such child.
If it is established that the person operating such motor vehicle caused such death or deaths while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, such person operated the motor vehicle in a manner that caused such death or deaths, as required by this section and section 125.12 of this article.
Vehicular manslaughter in the first degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1985, c. 507, § 4. Amended L.1993, c. 678, § 1; L.1996, c. 528, § 2; L.2005, c. 39, § 5, eff. June 8, 2005; L.2006, c. 245, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 2006; L.2006, c. 732, § 22, eff. Nov. 1, 2006; L.2006, c. 746, § 5, eff. Dec. 15, 2006; L.2009, c. 496, § 9, eff. Dec. 18, 2009.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.14
Effective: December 18, 2009
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.14 Aggravated vehicular homicide
A person is guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide when he or she engages in reckless driving as defined by section twelve hundred twelve of the vehicle and traffic law, and commits the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.12 of this article, and either:
(1) commits such crimes while operating a motor vehicle while such person has .18 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in such person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or saliva made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law;
(2) commits such crimes while knowing or having reason to know that: (a) his or her license or his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in another state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle in another state is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation is based upon a conviction in such other state for an offense which would, if committed in this state, constitute a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law; or (b) his or her license or his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in this state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license issued by the commissioner of motor vehicles is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation is based upon either a refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law or following a conviction for a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law;
(3) has previously been convicted of violating any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law within the preceding ten years, provided that, for the purposes of this subdivision, a conviction in any other state or jurisdiction for an offense which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, shall be treated as a violation of such law;
(4) causes the death of more than one other person;
(5) causes the death of one person and the serious physical injury of at least one other person;
(6) has previously been convicted of violating any provision of this article or article one hundred twenty of this title involving the operation of a motor vehicle, or was convicted in any other state or jurisdiction of an offense involving the operation of a motor vehicle which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of this article or article one hundred twenty of this title; or
(7) commits such crime while operating a motor vehicle while a child who is fifteen years of age or less is a passenger in such motor vehicle and causes the death of such child.
If it is established that the person operating such motor vehicle caused such death or deaths while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, such person operated the motor vehicle in a manner that caused such death or deaths, as required by this section and section 125.12 of this article.
Aggravated vehicular homicide is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2007, c. 345, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2007. Amended L.2009, c. 496, § 10, eff. Dec. 18, 2009.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.15 Manslaughter in the second degree
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when:
1. He recklessly causes the death of another person; or
2. He commits upon a female an abortional act which causes her death, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05; or
3. He intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide.
Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.20 Manslaughter in the first degree
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or
2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision; or
3. He commits upon a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks an abortional act which causes her death, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05; or
4. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical injury to a person less than eleven years old, the defendant recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury to such person and thereby causes the death of such person.
Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1990, c. 477, § 3.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.21
Effective: December 21, 2005
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.21 Aggravated manslaughter in the second degree
A person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter in the second degree when he or she recklessly causes the death of a police officer or peace officer where such officer was in the course of performing his or her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a police officer or peace officer.
Aggravated manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2005, c. 765, § 10, eff. Dec. 21, 2005.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.22
Effective: December 21, 2005
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.22 Aggravated manslaughter in the first degree
A person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter in the first degree when:
1. with intent to cause serious physical injury to a police officer or peace officer, where such officer was in the course of performing his or her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a police officer or a peace officer, he or she causes the death of such officer or another police officer or peace officer; or
2. with intent to cause the death of a police officer or peace officer, where such officer was in the course of performing his or her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a police officer or peace officer, he or she causes the death of such officer or another police officer or peace officer under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he or she acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to aggravated manslaughter in the first degree or manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision.
Aggravated manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2005, c. 765, § 10, eff. Dec. 21, 2005.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.25
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.25 Murder in the second degree
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime; or
(b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime; or
2. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person; or
3. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if there be any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:
(a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and
(b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and
(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and
(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury; or
4. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, and being eighteen years old or more the defendant recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury or death to another person less than eleven years old and thereby causes the death of such person; or
5. Being eighteen years old or more, while in the course of committing rape in the first, second or third degree, criminal sexual act in the first, second or third degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first, second, third or fourth degree, or incest in the first, second or third degree, against a person less than fourteen years old, he or she intentionally causes the death of such person.
Murder in the second degree is a class A-I felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 9; L.1973, c. 276, § 13; L.1974, c. 367, § 4; L.1984, c. 210, § 1; L.1990, c. 477, § 4; L.2003, c. 264, § 10, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2004, c. 459, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 2004; L.2006, c. 320, § 7, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.26
Effective: March 16, 2013
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.26 Aggravated murder
A person is guilty of aggravated murder when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person, or of a third person who was a person described in subparagraph (i), (ii), (ii-a) or (iii) of paragraph (a) of this subdivision engaged at the time of the killing in the course of performing his or her official duties; and
(a) Either:
(i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision thirty-four of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his or her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a police officer; or
(ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his or her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was such a uniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee of the division for youth; or
(ii-a) the intended victim was a firefighter, emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or registered nurse involved in a first response team, or any other individual who, in the course of official duties, performs emergency response activities and was engaged in such activities at the time of killing and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such firefighter, emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or registered nurse; or
(iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his or her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was an employee of a state correctional institution or a local correctional facility; and
(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime; or
2. (a) With intent to cause the death of a person less than fourteen years old, he or she causes the death of such person, and the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death. As used in this subdivision, “torture” means the intentional and depraved infliction of extreme physical pain that is separate and apart from the pain which otherwise would have been associated with such cause of death; and
(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
3. In any prosecution under subdivision one or two of this section, it is an affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, aggravated manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree; or
(b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, aggravated manslaughter in the second degree, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.
Aggravated murder is a class A-I felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2005, c. 765, § 13, eff. Dec. 21, 2005. Amended L.2009, c. 482, § 1, eff. Oct. 9, 2009; L.2013, c. 1, §§ 34, 35, eff. March 16, 2013.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.27
Effective: March 16, 2013
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.27 Murder in the first degree
A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; and
(a) Either:
(i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision 34 of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was a police officer; or
(ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such a uniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee of the division for youth; or
(ii-a) the intended victim was a firefighter, emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or registered nurse involved in a first response team, or any other individual who, in the course of official duties, performs emergency response activities and was engaged in such activities at the time of killing and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such firefighter, emergency medical technician, ambulance driver, paramedic, physician or registered nurse; or
(iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional institution or a local correctional facility; or
(iv) at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant was confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise in custody upon a sentence for the term of his natural life, or upon a sentence commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an indeterminate term the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the maximum of which was natural life, or at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant had escaped from such confinement or custody while serving such a sentence and had not yet been returned to such confinement or custody; or
(v) the intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the death was caused for the purpose of preventing the intended victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether or not such action or proceeding had been commenced, or the intended victim had previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for such prior testimony, or the intended victim was an immediate family member of a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the killing was committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the testimony of such witness, or the intended victim was an immediate family member of a witness who had previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution upon such witness for such prior testimony. As used in this subparagraph “immediate family member” means a husband, wife, father, mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent, grandparent, stepchild or grandchild; or
(vi) the defendant committed the killing or procured commission of the killing pursuant to an agreement with a person other than the intended victim to commit the same for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement or from a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction of a party to such agreement; or
(vii) the victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of committing or attempting to commit and in furtherance of robbery, burglary in the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in the first degree, arson in the first degree or second degree, rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree or escape in the first degree, or in the course of and furtherance of immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit any such crime or in the course of and furtherance of immediate flight after attempting to commit the crime of murder in the second degree; provided however, the victim is not a participant in one of the aforementioned crimes and, provided further that, unless the defendant's criminal liability under this subparagraph is based upon the defendant having commanded another person to cause the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter, this subparagraph shall not apply where the defendant's criminal liability is based upon the conduct of another pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter; or
(viii) as part of the same criminal transaction, the defendant, with intent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an additional person or persons, causes the death of an additional person or persons; provided, however, the victim is not a participant in the criminal transaction; or
(ix) prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been convicted of murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this article, or had been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of either of such sections; or
(x) the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death. As used in this subparagraph, “torture” means the intentional and depraved infliction of extreme physical pain; “depraved” means the defendant relished the infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim evidencing debasement or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain; or
(xi) the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more additional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions within a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan; or
(xii) the intended victim was a judge as defined in subdivision twenty-three of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law and the defendant killed such victim because such victim was, at the time of the killing, a judge; or
(xiii) the victim was killed in furtherance of an act of terrorism, as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 490.05 of this chapter; and
(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
2. In any prosecution under subdivision one, it is an affirmative defense that:
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree; or
(b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.
Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1974, c. 367, § 5. Amended L.1995, c. 1, § 7; L.2001, c. 300, § 3, eff. Sept. 17, 2001; L.2003, c. 264, § 11, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2013, c. 1, § 36, eff. March 16, 2013.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.30
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
[§§ 125.30, 125.35. Repealed. L.1974, c. 367, § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1974]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.35
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
[§§ 125.30, 125.35. Repealed. L.1974, c. 367, § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1974]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.40
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.40 Abortion in the second degree
A person is guilty of abortion in the second degree when he commits an abortional act upon a female, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.
Abortion in the second degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.45
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.45 Abortion in the first degree
A person is guilty of abortion in the first degree when he commits upon a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks an abortional act which causes the miscarriage of such female, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.
Abortion in the first degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.50
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.50 Self-abortion in the second degree
A female is guilty of self-abortion in the second degree when, being pregnant, she commits or submits to an abortional act upon herself, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.
Self-abortion in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.55
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.55 Self-abortion in the first degree
A female is guilty of self-abortion in the first degree when, being pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks, she commits or submits to an abortional act upon herself which causes her miscarriage, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.
Self-abortion in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 125.60
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 125. Homicide, Abortion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 125.60 Issuing abortional articles
A person is guilty of issuing abortional articles when he manufactures, sells or delivers any instrument, article, medicine, drug or substance with intent that the same be used in unlawfully procuring the miscarriage of a female.
Issuing abortional articles is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. H, Art. 130, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.00
Effective: October 13, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.00 Sex offenses; definitions of terms
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. “Sexual intercourse” has its ordinary meaning and occurs upon any penetration, however slight.
2. (a) “Oral sexual conduct” means conduct between persons consisting of contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the anus, or the mouth and the vulva or vagina.
(b) “Anal sexual conduct” means conduct between persons consisting of contact between the penis and anus.
3. “Sexual contact” means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. It includes the touching of the actor by the victim, as well as the touching of the victim by the actor, whether directly or through clothing, as well as the emission of ejaculate by the actor upon any part of the victim, clothed or unclothed.
4. For the purposes of this article “married” means the existence of the relationship between the actor and the victim as spouses which is recognized by law at the time the actor commits an offense proscribed by this article against the victim.
5. “Mentally disabled” means that a person suffers from a mental disease or defect which renders him or her incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct.
6. “Mentally incapacitated” means that a person is rendered temporarily incapable of appraising or controlling his conduct owing to the influence of a narcotic or intoxicating substance administered to him without his consent, or to any other act committed upon him without his consent.
7. “Physically helpless” means that a person is unconscious or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate unwillingness to an act.
8. “Forcible compulsion” means to compel by either:
a. use of physical force; or
b. a threat, express or implied, which places a person in fear of immediate death or physical injury to himself, herself or another person, or in fear that he, she or another person will immediately be kidnapped.
9. “Foreign object” means any instrument or article which, when inserted in the vagina, urethra, penis, rectum or anus, is capable of causing physical injury.
10. “Sexual conduct” means sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct, anal sexual conduct, aggravated sexual contact, or sexual contact.
11. “Aggravated sexual contact” means inserting, other than for a valid medical purpose, a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis, rectum or anus of a child, thereby causing physical injury to such child.
12. “Health care provider” means any person who is, or is required to be, licensed or registered or holds himself or herself out to be licensed or registered, or provides services as if he or she were licensed or registered in the profession of medicine, chiropractic, dentistry or podiatry under any of the following: article one hundred thirty-one, one hundred thirty-two, one hundred thirty-three, or one hundred forty-one of the education law.
13. “Mental health care provider” shall mean a licensed physician, licensed psychologist, registered professional nurse, licensed clinical social worker or a licensed master social worker under the supervision of a physician, psychologist or licensed clinical social worker.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1977, c. 692, § 2; L.1978, c. 723, § 1; L.1978, c. 735, § 1; L.1981, c. 696, § 1; L.1982, c. 560, § 1; L.1983, c. 449, § 1; L.1984, c. 650, § 1; L.1996, c. 122, § 5; L.2000, c. 1, §§ 1-a, 2, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2003, c. 264, § 12, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2004, c. 230, § 25, eff. July 27, 2004; L.2009, c. 485, §§ 1, 2, eff. Jan. 7, 2010; L.2010, c. 193, § 1, eff. Oct. 13, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.05
Effective: January 16, 2013
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.05 Sex offenses; lack of consent
1. Whether or not specifically stated, it is an element of every offense defined in this article that the sexual act was committed without consent of the victim.
2. Lack of consent results from:
(a) Forcible compulsion; or
(b) Incapacity to consent; or
(c) Where the offense charged is sexual abuse or forcible touching, any circumstances, in addition to forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent, in which the victim does not expressly or impliedly acquiesce in the actor's conduct; or
(d) Where the offense charged is rape in the third degree as defined in subdivision three of section 130.25, or criminal sexual act in the third degree as defined in subdivision three of section 130.40, in addition to forcible compulsion, circumstances under which, at the time of the act of intercourse, oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct, the victim clearly expressed that he or she did not consent to engage in such act, and a reasonable person in the actor's situation would have understood such person's words and acts as an expression of lack of consent to such act under all the circumstances.
3. A person is deemed incapable of consent when he or she is:
(a) less than seventeen years old; or
(b) mentally disabled; or
(c) mentally incapacitated; or
(d) physically helpless; or
(e) committed to the care and custody or supervision of the state department of corrections and community supervision or a hospital, as such term is defined in subdivision two of section four hundred of the correction law, and the actor is an employee who knows or reasonably should know that such person is committed to the care and custody or supervision of such department or hospital. For purposes of this paragraph, “employee” means (i) an employee of the state department of corrections and community supervision who, as part of his or her employment, performs duties: (A) in a state correctional facility in which the victim is confined at the time of the offense consisting of providing custody, medical or mental health services, counseling services, educational programs, vocational training, institutional parole services or direct supervision to inmates; or
(B) of supervising persons released on community supervision and supervises the victim at the time of the offense or has supervised the victim and the victim is still under community supervision at the time of the offense; or
(ii) an employee of the office of mental health who, as part of his or her employment, performs duties in a state correctional facility or hospital, as such term is defined in subdivision two of section four hundred of the correction law in which the inmate is confined at the time of the offense, consisting of providing custody, medical or mental health services, or direct supervision to such inmates; or
(iii) a person, including a volunteer, providing direct services to inmates in a state correctional facility in which the victim is confined at the time of the offense pursuant to a contractual arrangement with the state department of corrections and community supervision or, in the case of a volunteer, a written agreement with such department, provided that the person received written notice concerning the provisions of this paragraph; or
(f) committed to the care and custody of a local correctional facility, as such term is defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, and the actor is an employee, not married to such person, who knows or reasonably should know that such person is committed to the care and custody of such facility. For purposes of this paragraph, “employee” means an employee of the local correctional facility where the person is committed who performs professional duties consisting of providing custody, medical or mental health services, counseling services, educational services, or vocational training for inmates. For purposes of this paragraph, “employee” shall also mean a person, including a volunteer or a government employee of the state department of corrections and community supervision or a local health, education or probation agency, providing direct services to inmates in the local correctional facility in which the victim is confined at the time of the offense pursuant to a contractual arrangement with the local correctional department or, in the case of such a volunteer or government employee, a written agreement with such department, provided that such person received written notice concerning the provisions of this paragraph; or
(g) committed to or placed with the office of children and family services and in residential care, and the actor is an employee, not married to such person, who knows or reasonably should know that such person is committed to or placed with such office of children and family services and in residential care. For purposes of this paragraph, “employee” means an employee of the office of children and family services or of a residential facility in which such person is committed to or placed at the time of the offense who, as part of his or her employment, performs duties consisting of providing custody, medical or mental health services, counseling services, educational services, vocational training, or direct supervision to persons committed to or placed in a residential facility operated by the office of children and family services; or
(h) a client or patient and the actor is a health care provider or mental health care provider charged with rape in the third degree as defined in section 130.25, criminal sexual act in the third degree as defined in section 130.40, aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree as defined in section 130.65-a, or sexual abuse in the third degree as defined in section 130.55, and the act of sexual conduct occurs during a treatment session, consultation, interview, or examination; or
(i) a resident or inpatient of a residential facility operated, licensed or certified by (i) the office of mental health; (ii) the office for people with developmental disabilities; or (iii) the office of alcoholism and substance abuse services, and the actor is an employee of the facility not married to such resident or inpatient. For purposes of this paragraph, “employee” means either: an employee of the agency operating the residential facility, who knows or reasonably should know that such person is a resident or inpatient of such facility and who provides direct care services, case management services, medical or other clinical services, habilitative services or direct supervision of the residents in the facility in which the resident resides; or an officer or other employee, consultant, contractor or volunteer of the residential facility, who knows or reasonably should know that the person is a resident of such facility and who is in direct contact with residents or inpatients; provided, however, that the provisions of this paragraph shall only apply to a consultant, contractor or volunteer providing services pursuant to a contractual arrangement with the agency operating the residential facility or, in the case of a volunteer, a written agreement with such facility, provided that the person received written notice concerning the provisions of this paragraph; provided further, however, “employee” shall not include a person with a developmental disability who is or was receiving services and is also an employee of a service provider and who has sexual contact with another service recipient who is a consenting adult who has consented to such contact.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1965, c. 1038, § 1; L.1996, c. 266, § 1; L.2000, c. 1, §§ 3, 45, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2003, c. 264, §§ 13, 14, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2004, c. 40, § 1, eff. April 20, 2004; L.2007, c. 335, §§ 1, 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2007; L.2011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. B, § 127-q, eff. March 31, 2011; L.2011, c. 205, §§ 1, 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2011; L.2012, c. 501, pt. G, § 2, eff. Jan. 16, 2013.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.10
Effective: November 1, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.10 Sex offenses; limitation; defenses
1. In any prosecution under this article in which the victim's lack of consent is based solely upon his or her incapacity to consent because he or she was mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant, at the time he or she engaged in the conduct constituting the offense, did not know of the facts or conditions responsible for such incapacity to consent.
2. Conduct performed for a valid medical or mental health care purpose shall not constitute a violation of any section of this article in which incapacity to consent is based on the circumstances set forth in paragraph (h) of subdivision three of section 130.05 of this article.
3. In any prosecution for the crime of rape in the third degree as defined in section 130.25, criminal sexual act in the third degree as defined in section 130.40, aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree as defined in section 130.65-a, or sexual abuse in the third degree as defined in section 130.55 in which incapacity to consent is based on the circumstances set forth in paragraph (h) of subdivision three of section 130.05 of this article it shall be an affirmative defense that the client or patient consented to such conduct charged after having been expressly advised by the health care or mental health care provider that such conduct was not performed for a valid medical purpose.
4. In any prosecution under this article in which the victim's lack of consent is based solely on his or her incapacity to consent because he or she was less than seventeen years old, mentally disabled, a client or patient and the actor is a health care provider, or committed to the care and custody or supervision of the state department of corrections and community supervision or a hospital and the actor is an employee, it shall be a defense that the defendant was married to the victim as defined in subdivision four of section 130.00 of this article.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.2000, c. 1, § 4, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2003, c. 264, § 15, eff. Nov. 1, 2003; L.2011, c. 205, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 2011.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
[§ 130.15. Repealed. L.1974, c. 14, § 1, eff. Mar. 21, 1974]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.16
Effective: November 1, 2003
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.16 Sex offenses; corroboration
A person shall not be convicted of any offense defined in this article of which lack of consent is an element but results solely from incapacity to consent because of the victim's mental defect, or mental incapacity, or an attempt to commit the same, solely on the testimony of the victim, unsupported by other evidence tending to:
(a) Establish that an attempt was made to engage the victim in sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct, anal sexual conduct, or sexual contact, as the case may be, at the time of the occurrence; and
(b) Connect the defendant with the commission of the offense or attempted offense.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1974, c. 14, § 1. Amended L.1984, c. 89, § 1; L.2003, c. 264, § 16, eff. Nov. 1, 2003.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.20
Effective: November 1, 2003
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.20 Sexual misconduct
A person is guilty of sexual misconduct when:
1. He or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person without such person's consent; or
2. He or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct with another person without such person's consent; or
3. He or she engages in sexual conduct with an animal or a dead human body.
Sexual misconduct is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.2000, c. 1, § 31, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2003, c. 264, § 17, eff. Nov. 1, 2003.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.25
Effective: February 1, 2001
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.25 Rape in the third degree
A person is guilty of rape in the third degree when:
1. He or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less than seventeen years old;
2. Being twenty-one years old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person less than seventeen years old; or
3. He or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person without such person's consent where such lack of consent is by reason of some factor other than incapacity to consent.
Rape in the third degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1987, c. 510, § 1; L.2000, c. 1, § 32, eff. Feb. 1, 2001.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.30
Effective: February 1, 2001
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.30 Rape in the second degree
A person is guilty of rape in the second degree when:
1. being eighteen years old or more, he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person less than fifteen years old; or
2. he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally disabled or mentally incapacitated.
It shall be an affirmative defense to the crime of rape in the second degree as defined in subdivision one of this section that the defendant was less than four years older than the victim at the time of the act.
Rape in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1987, c. 510, § 2; L.2000, c. 1, § 33, eff. Feb. 1, 2001.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.35
Effective: February 1, 2001
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.35 Rape in the first degree
A person is guilty of rape in the first degree when he or she engages in sexual intercourse with another person:
1. By forcible compulsion; or
2. Who is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or
3. Who is less than eleven years old; or
4. Who is less than thirteen years old and the actor is eighteen years old or more.
Rape in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.2000, c. 1, § 34, eff. Feb. 1, 2001.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.38
Effective: February 1, 2001
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
[§ 130.38. Repealed by L.2000, c. 1, § 6, eff. Feb. 1, 2001]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.40
Effective: November 1, 2003
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.40 Criminal sexual act in the third degree
A person is guilty of criminal sexual act in the third degree when:
1. He or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct with a person who is incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less than seventeen years old;
2. Being twenty-one years old or more, he or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct with a person less than seventeen years old; or
3. He or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct with another person without such person's consent where such lack of consent is by reason of some factor other than incapacity to consent.
Criminal sexual act in the third degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.2000, c. 1, § 35, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2003, c. 264, § 18, eff. Nov. 1, 2003.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.45
Effective: November 1, 2003
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.45 Criminal sexual act in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal sexual act in the second degree when:
1. being eighteen years old or more, he or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct with another person less than fifteen years old; or
2. he or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct with another person who is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally disabled or mentally incapacitated.
It shall be an affirmative defense to the crime of criminal sexual act in the second degree as defined in subdivision one of this section that the defendant was less than four years older than the victim at the time of the act.
Criminal sexual act in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.2000, c. 1, § 36, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2003, c. 264, § 19, eff. Nov. 1, 2003.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.50
Effective: November 1, 2003
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.50 Criminal sexual act in the first degree
A person is guilty of criminal sexual act in the first degree when he or she engages in oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct with another person:
1. By forcible compulsion; or
2. Who is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or
3. Who is less than eleven years old; or
4. Who is less than thirteen years old and the actor is eighteen years old or more.
Criminal sexual act in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.2000, c. 1, § 37, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2003, c. 264, § 20, eff. Nov. 1, 2003.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.52
Effective: November 1, 2003
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.52 Forcible touching
A person is guilty of forcible touching when such person intentionally, and for no legitimate purpose, forcibly touches the sexual or other intimate parts of another person for the purpose of degrading or abusing such person; or for the purpose of gratifying the actor's sexual desire.
For the purposes of this section, forcible touching includes squeezing, grabbing or pinching.
Forcible touching is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2000, c. 1, § 53, eff. Feb. 1, 2001. Amended L.2003, c. 264, § 21, eff. Nov. 1, 2003.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.53
Effective: November 1, 2003
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.53 Persistent sexual abuse
A person is guilty of persistent sexual abuse when he or she commits the crime of forcible touching, as defined in section 130.52 of this article, sexual abuse in the third degree, as defined in section 130.55 of this article, or sexual abuse in the second degree, as defined in section 130.60 of this article, and, within the previous ten year period, has been convicted two or more times, in separate criminal transactions for which sentence was imposed on separate occasions, of forcible touching, as defined in section 130.52 of this article, sexual abuse in the third degree as defined in section 130.55 of this article, sexual abuse in the second degree, as defined in section 130. 60 of this article, or any offense defined in this article, of which the commission or attempted commission thereof is a felony.
Persistent sexual abuse is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2000, c. 1, § 38, eff. Feb. 1, 2001. Amended L.2003, c. 264, § 22, eff. Nov. 1, 2003.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.55
Effective: February 1, 2001
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.55 Sexual abuse in the third degree
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the third degree when he or she subjects another person to sexual contact without the latter's consent; except that in any prosecution under this section, it is an affirmative defense that (a) such other person's lack of consent was due solely to incapacity to consent by reason of being less than seventeen years old, and (b) such other person was more than fourteen years old, and (c) the defendant was less than five years older than such other person.
Sexual abuse in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.2000, c. 1, § 39, eff. Feb. 1, 2001.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.60
Effective: February 1, 2001
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.60 Sexual abuse in the second degree
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the second degree when he or she subjects another person to sexual contact and when such other person is:
1. Incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less than seventeen years old; or
2. Less than fourteen years old.
Sexual abuse in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.2000, c. 1, § 40, eff. Feb. 1, 2001.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.65
Effective: November 1, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.65 Sexual abuse in the first degree
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree when he or she subjects another person to sexual contact:
1. By forcible compulsion; or
2. When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or
3. When the other person is less than eleven years old; or
4. When the other person is less than thirteen years old and the actor is twenty-one years old or older.
Sexual abuse in the first degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.2000, c. 1, § 41, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2011, c. 26, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2011.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.65-a
Effective: January 7, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.65-a Aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree
1. A person is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree when:
(a) He or she inserts a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis, rectum or anus of another person and the other person is incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less than seventeen years old; or
(b) He or she inserts a finger in the vagina, urethra, penis, rectum or anus of another person causing physical injury to such person and such person is incapable of consent by reason of some factor other than being less than seventeen years old.
2. Conduct performed for a valid medical purpose does not violate the provisions of this section.
Aggravated sexual abuse in the fourth degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2000, c. 1, § 42, eff. Feb. 1, 2001. Amended L.2009, c. 485, § 3, eff. Jan. 7, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.66
Effective: January 7, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.66 Aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree
1. A person is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree when he or she inserts a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis, rectum or anus of another person:
(a) By forcible compulsion; or
(b) When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or
(c) When the other person is less than eleven years old.
2. A person is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree when he or she inserts a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis, rectum or anus of another person causing physical injury to such person and such person is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally disabled or mentally incapacitated.
3. Conduct performed for a valid medical purpose does not violate the provisions of this section.
Aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1996, c. 181, § 2. Amended L.2000, c. 1, § 43, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2009, c. 485, § 4, eff. Jan. 7, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.67
Effective: January 7, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.67 Aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree
1. A person is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree when he or she inserts a finger in the vagina, urethra, penis, rectum or anus of another person causing physical injury to such person:
(a) By forcible compulsion; or
(b) When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or
(c) When the other person is less than eleven years old.
2. Conduct performed for a valid medical purpose does not violate the provisions of this section.
Aggravated sexual abuse in the second degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1988, c. 450, § 1. Amended L.2009, c. 485, § 5, eff. Jan. 7, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.70
Effective: January 7, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.70 Aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree
1. A person is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree when he or she inserts a foreign object in the vagina, urethra, penis, rectum or anus of another person causing physical injury to such person:
(a) By forcible compulsion; or
(b) When the other person is incapable of consent by reason of being physically helpless; or
(c) When the other person is less than eleven years old.
2. Conduct performed for a valid medical purpose does not violate the provisions of this section.
Aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 723, § 2. Amended L.1981, c. 696, § 2; L.1988, c. 450, § 2; L.2009, c. 485, § 6, eff. Jan. 7, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.75
Effective: November 1, 2003
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.75 Course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree
1. A person is guilty of course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree when, over a period of time not less than three months in duration:
(a) he or she engages in two or more acts of sexual conduct, which includes at least one act of sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct, anal sexual conduct or aggravated sexual contact, with a child less than eleven years old; or
(b) he or she, being eighteen years old or more, engages in two or more acts of sexual conduct, which include at least one act of sexual intercourse, oral sexual conduct, anal sexual conduct or aggravated sexual contact, with a child less than thirteen years old.
2. A person may not be subsequently prosecuted for any other sexual offense involving the same victim unless the other charged offense occurred outside the time period charged under this section.
Course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1996, c. 122, § 6. Amended L.2000, c. 1, § 44, eff. Feb. 1, 2001; L.2003, c. 264, § 23, eff. Nov. 1, 2003.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.80
Effective: February 1, 2001
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.80 Course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree
1. A person is guilty of course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree when, over a period of time not less than three months in duration:
(a) he or she engages in two or more acts of sexual conduct with a child less than eleven years old; or
(b) he or she, being eighteen years old or more, engages in two or more acts of sexual conduct with a child less than thirteen years old.
2. A person may not be subsequently prosecuted for any other sexual offense involving the same victim unless the other charged offense occurred outside the time period charged under this section.
Course of sexual conduct against a child in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1996, c. 122, § 6. Amended L.2000, c. 1, § 44, eff. Feb. 1, 2001.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.85
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.85 Female genital mutilation
1. A person is guilty of female genital mutilation when:
(a) a person knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of another person who has not reached eighteen years of age; or
(b) being a parent, guardian or other person legally responsible and charged with the care or custody of a child less than eighteen years old, he or she knowingly consents to the circumcision, excision or infibulation of whole or part of such child's labia majora or labia minora or clitoris.
2. Such circumcision, excision, or infibulation is not a violation of this section if such act is:
(a) necessary to the health of the person on whom it is performed, and is performed by a person licensed in the place of its performance as a medical practitioner; or
(b) performed on a person in labor or who has just given birth and is performed for medical purposes connected with that labor or birth by a person licensed in the place it is performed as a medical practitioner, midwife, or person in training to become such a practitioner or midwife.
3. For the purposes of paragraph (a) of subdivision two of this section, no account shall be taken of the effect on the person on whom such procedure is to be performed of any belief on the part of that or any other person that such procedure is required as a matter of custom or ritual.
Female genital mutilation is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1997, c. 618, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 1997.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.90
Effective: November 1, 2003
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.90 Facilitating a sex offense with a controlled substance
A person is guilty of facilitating a sex offense with a controlled substance when he or she:
1. knowingly and unlawfully possesses a controlled substance or any preparation, compound, mixture or substance that requires a prescription to obtain and administers such substance or preparation, compound, mixture or substance that requires a prescription to obtain to another person without such person's consent and with intent to commit against such person conduct constituting a felony defined in this article; and
2. commits or attempts to commit such conduct constituting a felony defined in this article.
Facilitating a sex offense with a controlled substance is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2000, c. 1, § 49, eff. Feb. 1, 2001. Amended L.2003, c. 264, § 24, eff. Nov. 1, 2003.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.91
Effective: November 11, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.91 Sexually motivated felony
1. A person commits a sexually motivated felony when he or she commits a specified offense for the purpose, in whole or substantial part, of his or her own direct sexual gratification.
2. A “specified offense” is a felony offense defined by any of the following provisions of this chapter: assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.05, assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.10, gang assault in the second degree as defined in section 120.06, gang assault in the first degree as defined in section 120.07, stalking in the first degree as defined in section 120.60, strangulation in the second degree as defined in section 121.12, strangulation in the first degree as defined in section 121.13, manslaughter in the second degree as defined in subdivision one of section 125.15, manslaughter in the first degree as defined in section 125.20, murder in the second degree as defined in section 125.25, aggravated murder as defined in section 125.26, murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27, kidnapping in the second degree as defined in section 135.20, kidnapping in the first degree as defined in section 135.25, burglary in the third degree as defined in section 140.20, burglary in the second degree as defined in section 140.25, burglary in the first degree as defined in section 140.30, arson in the second degree as defined in section 150.15, arson in the first degree as defined in section 150.20, robbery in the third degree as defined in section 160.05, robbery in the second degree as defined in section 160.10, robbery in the first degree as defined in section 160.15, promoting prostitution in the second degree as defined in section 230.30, promoting prostitution in the first degree as defined in section 230.32, compelling prostitution as defined in section 230.33, disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree as defined in section 235.22, use of a child in a sexual performance as defined in section 263.05, promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child as defined in section 263.10, promoting a sexual performance by a child as defined in section 263.15, or any felony attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2007, c. 7, § 29, eff. April 13, 2007. Amended L.2010, c. 405, § 14, eff. Nov. 11, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.92
Effective: April 13, 2007
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.92 Sentencing
1. When a person is convicted of a sexually motivated felony pursuant to this article, and the specified felony is a violent felony offense, as defined in section 70.02 of this chapter, the sexually motivated felony shall be deemed a violent felony offense.
2. When a person is convicted of a sexually motivated felony pursuant to this article, the sexually motivated felony shall be deemed to be the same offense level as the specified offense the defendant committed.
3. Persons convicted of a sexually motivated felony as defined in section 130.91 of this article, must be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of section 70.80 of this chapter.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2007, c. 7, § 29, eff. April 13, 2007.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.95
Effective: June 23, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.95. Predatory sexual assault
A person is guilty of predatory sexual assault when he or she commits the crime of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree, or course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, as defined in this article, and when:
1. In the course of the commission of the crime or the immediate flight therefrom, he or she:
(a) Causes serious physical injury to the victim of such crime; or
(b) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument; or
2. He or she has engaged in conduct constituting the crime of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree, or course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, as defined in this article, against one or more additional persons; or
3. He or she has previously been subjected to a conviction for a felony defined in this article, incest as defined in section 255.25 of this chapter or use of a child in a sexual performance as defined in section 263.05 of this chapter.
Predatory sexual assault is a class A-II felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2006, c. 107, § 1, eff. June 23, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 130.96
Effective: June 23, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 130. Sex Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 130.96. Predatory sexual assault against a child
A person is guilty of predatory sexual assault against a child when, being eighteen years old or more, he or she commits the crime of rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree, or course of sexual conduct against a child in the first degree, as defined in this article, and the victim is less than thirteen years old.
Predatory sexual assault against a child is a class A-II felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2006, c. 107, § 2, eff. June 23, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. H, Art. 135, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.00 Unlawful imprisonment, kidnapping and custodial interference; definitions of terms
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. “Restrain” means to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent and with knowledge that the restriction is unlawful. A person is so moved or confined “without consent” when such is accomplished by (a) physical force, intimidation or deception, or (b) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement.
2. “Abduct” means to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either (a) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (b) using or threatening to use deadly physical force.
3. “Relative” means a parent, ancestor, brother, sister, uncle or aunt.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.05 Unlawful imprisonment in the second degree
A person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment in the second degree when he restrains another person.
Unlawful imprisonment in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.10 Unlawful imprisonment in the first degree
A person is guilty of unlawful imprisonment in the first degree when he restrains another person under circumstances which expose the latter to a risk of serious physical injury.
Unlawful imprisonment in the first degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.15 Unlawful imprisonment; defense
In any prosecution for unlawful imprisonment, it is an affirmative defense that (a) the person restrained was a child less than sixteen years old, and (b) the defendant was a relative of such child, and (c) his sole purpose was to assume control of such child.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.20 Kidnapping in the second degree
A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts another person.
Kidnapping in the second degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.25 Kidnapping in the first degree
A person is guilty of kidnapping in the first degree when he abducts another person and when:
1. His intent is to compel a third person to pay or deliver money or property as ransom, or to engage in other particular conduct, or to refrain from engaging in particular conduct; or
2. He restrains the person abducted for a period of more than twelve hours with intent to:
(a) Inflict physical injury upon him or violate or abuse him sexually; or
(b) Accomplish or advance the commission of a felony; or
(c) Terrorize him or a third person; or
(d) Interfere with the performance of a governmental or political function; or
3. The person abducted dies during the abduction or before he is able to return or to be returned to safety. Such death shall be presumed, in a case where such person was less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person at the time of the abduction, from evidence that his parents, guardians or other lawful custodians did not see or hear from him following the termination of the abduction and prior to trial and received no reliable information during such period persuasively indicating that he was alive. In all other cases, such death shall be presumed from evidence that a person whom the person abducted would have been extremely likely to visit or communicate with during the specified period were he alive and free to do so did not see or hear from him during such period and received no reliable information during such period persuasively indicating that he was alive.
Kidnapping in the first degree is a class A-I felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 12; L.1973, c. 276, § 14.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.30
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.30 Kidnapping; defense
In any prosecution for kidnapping, it is an affirmative defense that (a) the defendant was a relative of the person abducted, and (b) his sole purpose was to assume control of such person.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.35
Effective: November 1, 2007
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.35 Labor trafficking
A person is guilty of labor trafficking if he or she compels or induces another to engage in labor or recruits, entices, harbors, or transports such other person by means of intentionally:
1. unlawfully providing a controlled substance to such person with intent to impair said person's judgment;
2. requiring that the labor be performed to retire, repay, or service a real or purported debt that the actor has caused by a systematic ongoing course of conduct with intent to defraud such person;
3. withholding, destroying, or confiscating any actual or purported passport, immigration document, or any other actual or purported government identification document, of another person with intent to impair said person's freedom of movement; provided, however, that this subdivision shall not apply to an attempt to correct a social security administration record or immigration agency record in accordance with any local, state, or federal agency requirement, where such attempt is not made for the purpose of any express or implied threat;
4. using force or engaging in any scheme, plan or pattern to compel or induce such person to engage in or continue to engage in labor activity by means of instilling a fear in such person that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another will do one or more of the following:
(a) cause physical injury, serious physical injury, or death to a person; or
(b) cause damage to property, other than the property of the actor; or
(c) engage in other conduct constituting a felony or unlawful imprisonment in the second degree in violation of section 135.05 of this chapter; or
(d) accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges or deportation proceedings to be instituted against such person; provided, however, that it shall be an affirmative defense to this subdivision that the defendant reasonably believed the threatened charge to be true and that his or her sole purpose was to compel or induce the victim to take reasonable action to make good the wrong which was the subject of such threatened charge; or
(e) expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or
(f) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or
(g) use or abuse his or her position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his or her official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely.
Labor trafficking is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2007, c. 74, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 2007.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.36
Effective: November 1, 2007
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.36 Labor trafficking; accomplice
In a prosecution for labor trafficking, a person who has been compelled or induced or recruited, enticed, harbored or transported to engage in labor shall not be deemed to be an accomplice.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2007, c. 74, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 2007.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.40
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
[§ 135.40. Repealed. L.1967, c. 791, § 13, eff. Sept. 1, 1967]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.45
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.45 Custodial interference in the second degree
A person is guilty of custodial interference in the second degree when:
1. Being a relative of a child less than sixteen years old, intending to hold such child permanently or for a protracted period, and knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes or entices such child from his lawful custodian; or
2. Knowing that he has no legal right to do so, he takes or entices from lawful custody any incompetent person or other person entrusted by authority of law to the custody of another person or institution.
Custodial interference in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.50
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.50 Custodial interference in the first degree
A person is guilty of custodial interference in the first degree when he commits the crime of custodial interference in the second degree:
1. With intent to permanently remove the victim from this state, he removes such person from the state; or
2. Under circumstances which expose the victim to a risk that his safety will be endangered or his health materially impaired.
It shall be an affirmative defense to a prosecution under subdivision one of this section that the victim had been abandoned or that the taking was necessary in an emergency to protect the victim because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.
Custodial interference in the first degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1981, 785, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.55
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.55 Substitution of children
A person is guilty of substitution of children when, having been temporarily entrusted with a child less than one year old and intending to deceive a parent, guardian or other lawful custodian of such child, he substitutes, produces or returns to such parent, guardian or custodian a child other than the one entrusted.
Substitution of children is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.60
Effective: November 1, 2008
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.60 Coercion in the second degree
A person is guilty of coercion in the second degree when he or she compels or induces a person to engage in conduct which the latter has a legal right to abstain from engaging in, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which he or she has a legal right to engage, or compels or induces a person to join a group, organization or criminal enterprise which such latter person has a right to abstain from joining, by means of instilling in him or her a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another will:
1. Cause physical injury to a person; or
2. Cause damage to property; or
3. Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or
4. Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him or her; or
5. Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or
6. Cause a strike, boycott or other collective labor group action injurious to some person's business; except that such a threat shall not be deemed coercive when the act or omission compelled is for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or
7. Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or
8. Use or abuse his or her position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his or her official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or
9. Perform any other act which would not in itself materially benefit the actor but which is calculated to harm another person materially with respect to his or her health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.
Coercion in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.2008, c. 426, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2008.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.65
Effective: November 1, 2008
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.65 Coercion in the first degree
A person is guilty of coercion in the first degree when he or she commits the crime of coercion in the second degree, and when:
1. He or she commits such crime by instilling in the victim a fear that he or she will cause physical injury to a person or cause damage to property; or
2. He or she thereby compels or induces the victim to:
(a) Commit or attempt to commit a felony; or
(b) Cause or attempt to cause physical injury to a person; or
(c) Violate his or her duty as a public servant.
Coercion in the first degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.2008, c. 426, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2008.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.70
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.70 Coercion; no defense
The crimes of (a) coercion and attempt to commit coercion, and (b) bribe receiving by a labor official as defined in section 180.20, and bribe receiving as defined in section 200.05, are not mutually exclusive, and it is no defense to a prosecution for coercion or an attempt to commit coercion that, by reason of the same conduct, the defendant also committed one of such specified crimes of bribe receiving.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 135.75
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title H. Offenses Against the Person Involving Physical Injury, Sexual Conduct, Restraint and Intimidation
Article 135. Kidnapping, Coercion and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 135.75 Coercion; defense
In any prosecution for coercion committed by instilling in the victim a fear that he or another person would be charged with a crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably believed the threatened charge to be true and that his sole purpose was to compel or induce the victim to take reasonable action to make good the wrong which was the subject of such threatened charge.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. I, Art. 140, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 140. Burglary and Related Offenses
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 140.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 140. Burglary and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 140.00 Criminal trespass and burglary; definitions of terms
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. “Premises” includes the term “building,” as defined herein, and any real property.
2. “Building,” in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any structure, vehicle or watercraft used for overnight lodging of persons, or used by persons for carrying on business therein, or used as an elementary or secondary school, or an inclosed motor truck, or an inclosed motor truck trailer. Where a building consists of two or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed both a separate building in itself and a part of the main building.
3. “Dwelling” means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night.
4. “Night” means the period between thirty minutes after sunset and thirty minutes before sunrise.
5. “Enter or remain unlawfully.” A person “enters or remains unlawfully” in or upon premises when he is not licensed or privileged to do so. A person who, regardless of his intent, enters or remains in or upon premises which are at the time open to the public does so with license and privilege unless he defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, personally communicated to him by the owner of such premises or other authorized person. A license or privilege to enter or remain in a building which is only partly open to the public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain in that part of the building which is not open to the public. A person who enters or remains upon unimproved and apparently unused land, which is neither fenced nor otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, does so with license and privilege unless notice against trespass is personally communicated to him by the owner of such land or other authorized person, or unless such notice is given by posting in a conspicuous manner. A person who enters or remains in or about a school building without written permission from someone authorized to issue such permission or without a legitimate reason which includes a relationship involving custody of or responsibility for a pupil or student enrolled in the school or without legitimate business or a purpose relating to the operation of the school does so without license and privilege.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 14; L.1969, c. 1151, § 1; L.1979, c. 698, §§ 2, 3.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 140.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 140. Burglary and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 140.05 Trespass
A person is guilty of trespass when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises.
Trespass is a violation.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1969, c. 341, § 3; L.1971, c. 307.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 140.10
Effective: January 16, 2012
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 140. Burglary and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 140.10 Criminal trespass in the third degree
A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building or upon real property
(a) which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders; or
(b) where the building is utilized as an elementary or secondary school or a children's overnight camp as defined in section one thousand three hundred ninety-two of the public health law or a summer day camp as defined in section one thousand three hundred ninety-two of the public health law in violation of conspicuously posted rules or regulations governing entry and use thereof; or
(c) located within a city with a population in excess of one million and where the building or real property is utilized as an elementary or secondary school in violation of a personally communicated request to leave the premises from a principal, custodian or other person in charge thereof; or
(d) located outside of a city with a population in excess of one million and where the building or real property is utilized as an elementary or secondary school in violation of a personally communicated request to leave the premises from a principal, custodian, school board member or trustee, or other person in charge thereof; or
(e) where the building is used as a public housing project in violation of conspicuously posted rules or regulations governing entry and use thereof; or
(f) where a building is used as a public housing project in violation of a personally communicated request to leave the premises from a housing police officer or other person in charge thereof; or
(g) where the property consists of a right-of-way or yard of a railroad or rapid transit railroad which has been designated and conspicuously posted as a no-trespass railroad zone.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1969, c. 341, § 4; L.1979, c. 698, § 4; L.1983, c. 813, § 1; L.1987, c. 192, § 1; L.1992, c. 434, § 1; L.1997, c. 338, §§ 2, 3, eff. Nov. 1, 1997; L.2000, c. 533, § 1, eff. Oct. 4, 2000; L.2001, c. 350, § 1, eff. Sept. 19, 2001; L.2011, c. 176, § 1, eff. Jan. 16, 2012.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 140.15
Effective: November 1, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 140. Burglary and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 140.15 Criminal trespass in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree when:
1. he or she knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling; or
2. being a person required to maintain registration under article six-C of the correction law and designated a level two or level three offender pursuant to subdivision six of section one hundred sixty-eight-l of the correction law, he or she enters or remains in a public or private elementary, parochial, intermediate, junior high, vocational or high school knowing that the victim of the offense for which such registration is required attends or formerly attended such school. It shall not be an offense subject to prosecution under this subdivision if: the person is a lawfully registered student at such school; the person is a lawful student participant in a school sponsored event; the person is a parent or a legal guardian of a lawfully registered student at such school and enters the school for the purpose of attending their child's or dependent's event or activity; such school is the person's designated polling place and he or she enters such school building for the limited purpose of voting; or if the person enters such school building for the limited purposes authorized by the superintendent or chief administrator of such school.
Criminal trespass in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1969, c. 341, § 5; L.2010, c. 315, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 140.17
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 140. Burglary and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 140.17 Criminal trespass in the first degree
A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building, and when, in the course of committing such crime, he:
1. Possesses, or knows that another participant in the crime possesses, an explosive or a deadly weapon; or
2. Possesses a firearm, rifle or shotgun, as those terms are defined in section 265.00, and also possesses or has readily accessible a quantity of ammunition which is capable of being discharged from such firearm, rifle or shotgun; or
3. Knows that another participant in the crime possesses a firearm, rifle or shotgun under circumstances described in subdivision two.
Criminal trespass in the first degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1969, c. 341, § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1969.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 140.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 140. Burglary and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 140.20 Burglary in the third degree
A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.
Burglary in the third degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 140.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 140. Burglary and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 140.25 Burglary in the second degree
A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein, and when:
1. In effecting entry or while in the building or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
(a) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(c) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument; or
(d) Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; or
2. The building is a dwelling.
Burglary in the second degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 15; L.1969, c. 1012, § 1; L.1973, c. 374, § 1; L.1981, c. 361, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 140.30
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 140. Burglary and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 140.30 Burglary in the first degree
A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling with intent to commit a crime therein, and when, in effecting entry or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
1. Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or
2. Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
3. Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument; or
4. Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that such pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, could be discharged. Nothing contained in this subdivision shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, burglary in the second degree, burglary in the third degree or any other crime.
Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 16; L.1969, c. 1012, § 2; L.1973, c. 374, § 2; L.1981, c. 361, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 140.35
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 140. Burglary and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 140.35 Possession of burglar's tools
A person is guilty of possession of burglar's tools when he possesses any tool, instrument or other article adapted, designed or commonly used for committing or facilitating offenses involving forcible entry into premises, or offenses involving larceny by a physical taking, or offenses involving theft of services as defined in subdivisions four, five and six of section 165.15, under circumstances evincing an intent to use or knowledge that some person intends to use the same in the commission of an offense of such character.
Possession of burglar's tools is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 140.40
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 140. Burglary and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 140.40 Unlawful possession of radio devices
As used in this section, the term “radio device” means any device capable of receiving a wireless voice transmission on any frequency allocated for police use, or any device capable of transmitting and receiving a wireless voice transmission. A person is guilty of unlawful possession of a radio device when he possesses a radio device with the intent to use that device in the commission of robbery, burglary, larceny, gambling or a violation of any provision of article two hundred twenty of the penal law.
Unlawful possession of a radio device is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1970, c. 754, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1970.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. I, Art. 145, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.00
Effective: July 6, 2008
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.00 Criminal mischief in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the fourth degree when, having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he or she has such right, he or she:
1. Intentionally damages property of another person; or
2. Intentionally participates in the destruction of an abandoned building as defined in section one thousand nine hundred seventy-one-a of the real property actions and proceedings law; or
3. Recklessly damages property of another person in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars; or
4. With intent to prevent a person from communicating a request for emergency assistance, intentionally disables or removes telephonic, TTY or similar communication sending equipment while that person: (a) is attempting to seek or is engaged in the process of seeking emergency assistance from police, law enforcement, fire or emergency medical services personnel; or (b) is attempting to seek or is engaged in the process of seeking emergency assistance from another person or entity in order to protect himself, herself or a third person from imminent physical injury. The fact that the defendant has an ownership interest in such equipment shall not be a defense to a charge pursuant to this subdivision.
Criminal mischief in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 17; L.1971, c. 961, § 1; L.1983, c. 496, § 3; L.2008, c. 69, § 1, eff. July 6, 2008.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.05
Effective: November 1, 2003
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.05 Criminal mischief in the third degree
A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the third degree when, with intent to damage property of another person, and having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he or she has such right, he or she:
1. damages the motor vehicle of another person, by breaking into such vehicle when it is locked with the intent of stealing property, and within the previous ten year period, has been convicted three or more times, in separate criminal transactions for which sentence was imposed on separate occasions, of criminal mischief in the fourth degree as defined in section 145.00, criminal mischief in the third degree as defined in this section, criminal mischief in the second degree as defined in section 145.10, or criminal mischief in the first degree as defined in section 145.12 of this article; or
2. damages property of another person in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.
Criminal mischief in the third degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1971, c. 961, § 2; L.2003, c. 276, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2003.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.10 Criminal mischief in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the second degree when with intent to damage property of another person, and having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he damages property of another person in an amount exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars.
Criminal mischief in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1971, c. 961, § 3.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.12
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.12 Criminal mischief in the first degree
A person is guilty of criminal mischief in the first degree when with intent to damage property of another person, and having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he damages property of another person by means of an explosive.
Criminal mischief in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1971, c. 961, § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1971.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.13
Effective: May 29, 2009
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.13 Definitions
For the purposes of sections 145.00, 145.05, 145.10 and 145.12 of this article:
“Property of another” shall include all property in which another person has an ownership interest, whether or not a person who damages such property, or any other person, may also have an interest in such property.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2008, c. 601, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2008. Amended L.2009, c. 45, § 1, eff. May 29, 2009.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.14
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.14 Criminal tampering in the third degree
A person is guilty of criminal tampering in the third degree when, having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he tampers with property of another person with intent to cause substantial inconvenience to such person or to a third person.
Criminal tampering in the third degree is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1978, c. 420, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1979.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.15
Effective: August 16, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.15 Criminal tampering in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal tampering in the second degree when, having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he or she tampers or makes connection with property of a gas, electric, sewer, steam or water-works corporation, telephone or telegraph corporation, common carrier, nuclear powered electric generating facility, or public utility operated by a municipality or district; except that in any prosecution under this section, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant did not engage in such conduct for a larcenous or otherwise unlawful or wrongful purpose.
Criminal tampering in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1969, c. 862, § 1; L.1978, c. 420, § 2; L.2006, c. 585, § 1, eff. Aug. 16, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.20
Effective: August 16, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.20 Criminal tampering in the first degree
A person is guilty of criminal tampering in the first degree when, with intent to cause a substantial interruption or impairment of a service rendered to the public, and having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he or she has such right, he or she damages or tampers with property of a gas, electric, sewer, steam or water-works corporation, telephone or telegraph corporation, common carrier, nuclear powered electric generating facility, or public utility operated by a municipality or district, and thereby causes such substantial interruption or impairment of service.
Criminal tampering in the first degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1969, c. 861, § 1; L.2006, c. 585, § 2, eff. Aug. 16, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.22
Effective: July 18, 2007
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.22 Cemetery desecration in the second degree
A person is guilty of cemetery desecration in the second degree when: (a) with intent to damage property of another person, and having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he damages any real or personal property maintained as a cemetery plot, grave, burial place or other place of interment of human remains; or
(b) with intent to steal personal property, he steals personal property which is located at a cemetery plot, grave, burial place or other place of interment of human remains and which property is owned by the person or organization which maintains or owns such place or the estate, next-of-kin or representatives of the deceased person interred there.
Cemetery desecration in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1997, c. 165, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 1997. Amended L.2007, c. 353, § 1, eff. July 18, 2007.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.23
Effective: July 18, 2007
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.23 Cemetery desecration in the first degree
A person is guilty of cemetery desecration in the first degree when with intent to damage property of another person, and having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he:
(a) damages any real or personal property maintained as a cemetery plot, grave, burial place or other place of interment of human remains in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars; or
(b) with intent to steal personal property, he steals personal property, the value of which exceeds two hundred fifty dollars, which is located at a cemetery plot, grave, burial place or other place of interment of human remains and which property is owned by the person or organization which maintains or owns such place or the estate, next-of-kin or representatives of the deceased person interred there; or
(c) commits the crime of cemetery desecration in the second degree as defined in section 145.22 of this article and has been previously convicted of the crime of cemetery desecration in the second degree within the preceding five years.
Cemetery desecration in the first degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1997, c. 165, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 1997. Amended L.2007, c. 353, § 2, eff. July 18, 2007.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.25 Reckless endangerment of property
A person is guilty of reckless endangerment of property when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of damage to the property of another person in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars.
Reckless endangerment of property is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.26
Effective: November 11, 2007
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.26 Aggravated cemetery desecration in the second degree
A person is guilty of aggravated cemetery desecration in the second degree when, having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he or she has such right, he or she opens a casket, crypt, or similar vessel containing a human body or human remains which has been buried or otherwise interred in a cemetery and unlawfully removes therefrom a body, bodily part, any human remains or any object contained in such casket, crypt or similar vessel for the purpose of obtaining unlawful possession of such body, bodily part, human remains or object for such person or a third person.
Aggravated cemetery desecration in the second degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2007, c. 376, § 1, eff. Nov. 11, 2007.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.27
Effective: November 11, 2007
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.27 Aggravated cemetery desecration in the first degree
A person is guilty of aggravated cemetery desecration in the first degree when such person commits the crime of aggravated cemetery desecration in the second degree and has been previously convicted within the past five years of the crime of cemetery desecration in the second degree as defined in section 145.22 of this article, cemetery desecration in the first degree as defined in section 145.23 of this article or aggravated cemetery desecration in the second degree as defined in section 145.26 of this article.
Aggravated cemetery desecration in the first degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2007, c. 376, § 1, eff. Nov. 11, 2007.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.30
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.30 Unlawfully posting advertisements
1. A person is guilty of unlawfully posting advertisements when, having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he posts, paints or otherwise affixes to the property of another person any advertisement, poster, notice or other matter designed to benefit a person other than the owner of the property.
2. Where such matter consists of a commercial advertisement, it shall be presumed that the vendor of the specified product, service or entertainment is a person who placed such advertisement or caused it to be placed upon the property.
Unlawfully posting advertisements is a violation.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.35
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.35 Tampering with a consumer product; consumer product defined
For the purposes of sections 145.40 and 145.45 of this article, “consumer product” means any drug, food, beverage or thing which is displayed or offered for sale to the public, for administration into or ingestion by a human being or for application to any external surface of a human being.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 359, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1986.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.40
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.40 Tampering with a consumer product in the second degree
A person is guilty of tampering with a consumer product in the second degree when, having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, and with intent to cause physical injury to another or with intent to instill in another a fear that he will cause such physical injury, he alters, adulterates or otherwise contaminates a consumer product.
Tampering with a consumer product in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 359, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1986.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.45
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.45 Tampering with a consumer product in the first degree
A person is guilty of tampering with a consumer product in the first degree when, having no right to do so nor any reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, and with intent to cause physical injury to another or with intent to instill in another a fear that he will cause such physical injury, he alters, adulterates or otherwise contaminates a consumer product and thereby creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to one or more persons.
Tampering with a consumer product in the first degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 359, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1986.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.50
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.50 Penalties for littering on railroad tracks and rights-of-way
1. No person shall throw, dump, or cause to be thrown, dumped, deposited or placed upon any railroad tracks, or within the limits of the rights-of-way of any railroad, any refuse, trash, garbage, rubbish, litter or any nauseous or offensive matter.
2. Where a highway or road lies in whole or part within a railroad rights-of-way, nothing in this section shall be construed as prohibiting the use in a reasonable manner of ashes, sand, salt or other material for the purpose of reducing the hazard of, or providing traction on snow, ice or sleet situated on such highway or road.
3. A violation of the provisions of subdivision one of this section shall be
punishable by a fine not to exceed two hundred fifty dollars and/
4. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to a railroad or its employees when matter deposited by them on the railroad tracks or rights-of-way is done pursuant to railroad rules, regulations or procedures.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1987, c. 266, § 1. Amended L.1991, c. 186, § 4.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.60
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.60 Making graffiti
1. For purposes of this section, the term “graffiti” shall mean the etching, painting, covering, drawing upon or otherwise placing of a mark upon public or private property with intent to damage such property.
2. No person shall make graffiti of any type on any building, public or private, or any other property real or personal owned by any person, firm or corporation or any public agency or instrumentality, without the express permission of the owner or operator of said property.
Making graffiti is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1992, c. 458, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 1992.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.65
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.65 Possession of graffiti instruments
A person is guilty of possession of graffiti instruments when he possesses any tool, instrument, article, substance, solution or other compound designed or commonly used to etch, paint, cover, draw upon or otherwise place a mark upon a piece of property which that person has no permission or authority to etch, paint, cover, draw upon or otherwise mark, under circumstances evincing an intent to use same in order to damage such property.
Possession of graffiti instruments is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1992, c. 458, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 1992.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 145.70
Effective: November 9, 1999
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 145. Criminal Mischief and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 145.70 Criminal possession of a taximeter accelerating device
1. For purposes of this section, a “taximeter” means an instrument or device that automatically calculates and displays the charge to a passenger in a vehicle that is licensed to transport members of the public for hire pursuant to local law.
2. For purposes of this section, a “taximeter accelerating device” means an instrument or device that causes a taximeter to increase the charge displayed by such taximeter to an amount greater than the maximum amount permitted by local law.
3. A person is guilty of criminal possession of a taximeter accelerating device when he knowingly possesses, with intent to use unlawfully, a taximeter accelerating device. If such a device is knowingly possessed there is a rebuttable presumption that it is intended to be used unlawfully.
Criminal possession of a taximeter accelerating device is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1999, c. 603, § 1, eff. Nov. 9, 1999.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. I, Art. 150, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 150. Arson
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 150.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 150. Arson (Refs & Annos)
§ 150.00 Arson; definitions
As used in this article, 1. “Building”, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any structure, vehicle or watercraft used for overnight lodging of persons, or used by persons for carrying on business therein. Where a building consists of two or more units separately secured or occupied, each unit shall not be deemed a separate building.
2. “Motor vehicle”, includes every vehicle operated or driven upon a public highway which is propelled by any power other than muscular power, except (a) electrically-driven invalid chairs being operated or driven by an invalid, (b) vehicles which run only upon rails or tracks, and (c) snowmobiles as defined in article forty-seven of the vehicle and traffic law.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1979, c. 225, § 17.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 150.01
Effective: November 1, 2001
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 150. Arson (Refs & Annos)
§ 150.01 Arson in the fifth degree
A person is guilty of arson in the fifth degree when he or she intentionally damages property of another without consent of the owner by intentionally starting a fire or causing an explosion.
Arson in the fifth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2001, c. 224, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2001.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 150.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 150. Arson (Refs & Annos)
§ 150.05 Arson in the fourth degree
1. A person is guilty of arson in the fourth degree when he recklessly damages a building or motor vehicle by intentionally starting a fire or causing an explosion.
2. In any prosecution under this section, it is an affirmative defense that no person other than the defendant had a possessory or proprietary interest in the building or motor vehicle.
Arson in the fourth degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1971, c. 961, § 5; L.1979, c. 225, § 18.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 150.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 150. Arson (Refs & Annos)
§ 150.10 Arson in the third degree
1. A person is guilty of arson in the third degree when he intentionally damages a building or motor vehicle by starting a fire or causing an explosion.
2. In any prosecution under this section, it is an affirmative defense that (a) no person other than the defendant had a possessory or proprietary interest in the building or motor vehicle, or if other persons had such interests, all of them consented to the defendant's conduct, and (b) the defendant's sole intent was to destroy or damage the building or motor vehicle for a lawful and proper purpose, and (c) the defendant had no reasonable ground to believe that his conduct might endanger the life or safety of another person or damage another building or motor vehicle.
Arson in the third degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1971, c. 961, § 6; L.1979, c. 225, § 18.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 150.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 150. Arson (Refs & Annos)
§ 150.15 Arson in the second degree
A person is guilty of arson in the second degree when he intentionally damages a building or motor vehicle by starting a fire, and when (a) another person who is not a participant in the crime is present in such building or motor vehicle at the time, and (b) the defendant knows that fact or the circumstances are such as to render the presence of such a person therein a reasonable possibility.
Arson in the second degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 18; L.1971, c. 961, § 7; L.1979, c. 225, § 18.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 150.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title I. Offenses Involving Damage to and Intrusion Upon Property
Article 150. Arson (Refs & Annos)
§ 150.20 Arson in the first degree
1. A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when he intentionally damages a building or motor vehicle by causing an explosion or a fire and when (a) such explosion or fire is caused by an incendiary device propelled, thrown or placed inside or near such building or motor vehicle; or when such explosion or fire is caused by an explosive; or when such explosion or fire either (i) causes serious physical injury to another person other than a participant, or (ii) the explosion or fire was caused with the expectation or receipt of financial advantage or pecuniary profit by the actor; and when (b) another person who is not a participant in the crime is present in such building or motor vehicle at the time; and (c) the defendant knows that fact or the circumstances are such as to render the presence of such person therein a reasonable possibility.
2. As used in this section, “incendiary device” means a breakable container designed to explode or produce uncontained combustion upon impact, containing flammable liquid and having a wick or a similar device capable of being ignited.
Arson in the first degree is a class A-I felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1980, c. 152, § 1. Amended L.1981, c. 71, § 1; L.1984, c. 950, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. J, Art. 155, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 155.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny (Refs & Annos)
§ 155.00 Larceny; definitions of terms
The following definitions are applicable to this title:
1. “Property” means any money, personal property, real property, computer data, computer program, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or any article, substance or thing of value, including any gas, steam, water or electricity, which is provided for a charge or compensation.
2. “Obtain” includes, but is not limited to, the bringing about of a transfer or purported transfer of property or of a legal interest therein, whether to the obtainer or another.
3. “Deprive.” To “deprive” another of property means (a) to withhold it or cause it to be withheld from him permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is lost to him, or (b) to dispose of the property in such manner or under such circumstances as to render it unlikely that an owner will recover such property.
4. “Appropriate.” To “appropriate” property of another to oneself or a third person means (a) to exercise control over it, or to aid a third person to exercise control over it, permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances as to acquire the major portion of its economic value or benefit, or (b) to dispose of the property for the benefit of oneself or a third person.
5. “Owner.” When property is taken, obtained or withheld by one person from another person, an “owner” thereof means any person who has a right to possession thereof superior to that of the taker, obtainer or withholder.
A person who has obtained possession of property by theft or other illegal means shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person who takes, obtains or withholds it from him by larcenous means.
A joint or common owner of property shall not be deemed to have a right of possession thereto superior to that of any other joint or common owner thereof.
In the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, a person in lawful possession of property shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person having only a security interest therein, even if legal title lies with the holder of the security interest pursuant to a conditional sale contract or other security agreement.
6. “Secret scientific material” means a sample, culture, micro-organism, specimen, record, recording, document, drawing or any other article, material, device or substance which constitutes, represents, evidences, reflects, or records a scientific or technical process, invention or formula or any part or phase thereof, and which is not, and is not intended to be, available to anyone other than the person or persons rightfully in possession thereof or selected persons having access thereto with his or their consent, and when it accords or may accord such rightful possessors an advantage over competitors or other persons who do not have knowledge or the benefit thereof.
7. “Credit card” means any instrument or article defined as a credit card in section five hundred eleven of the general business law.
7-a. “Debit card” means any instrument or article defined as a debit card in section five hundred eleven of the general business law.
7-b. “Public benefit card” means any medical assistance card, food stamp assistance card, public assistance card, or any other identification, authorization card or electronic access device issued by the state or a social services district as defined in subdivision seven of section two of the social services law, which entitles a person to obtain public assistance benefits under a local, state or federal program administered by the state, its political subdivisions or social services districts.
7-c. “Access device” means any telephone calling card number, credit card number, account number, mobile identification number, electronic serial number or personal identification number that can be used to obtain telephone service.
8. “Service” includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional service, a computer service, transportation service, the supplying of hotel accommodations, restaurant services, entertainment, the supplying of equipment for use, and the supplying of commodities of a public utility nature such as gas, electricity, steam and water. A ticket or equivalent instrument which evidences a right to receive a service is not in itself service but constitutes property within the meaning of subdivision one.
9. “Cable television service” means any and all services provided by or through the facilities of any cable television system or closed circuit coaxial cable communications system, or any microwave or similar transmission service used in connection with any cable television system or other similar closed circuit coaxial cable communications system.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, §§ 19, 20; L.1969, c. 115, § 1; L.1975, c. 530, § 1; L.1978, c. 420, § 3; L.1986, c. 514, §§ 2, 3; L.1987, c. 556, § 7; L.1992, c. 41, § 109; L.1992, c. 491, § 1; L.1993, c. 171, § 1; L.1995, c. 81, § 169.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 155.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny (Refs & Annos)
§ 155.05 Larceny; defined
1. A person steals property and commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or to a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner thereof.
2. Larceny includes a wrongful taking, obtaining or withholding of another's property, with the intent prescribed in subdivision one of this section, committed in any of the following ways:
(a) By conduct heretofore defined or known as common law larceny by trespassory taking, common law larceny by trick, embezzlement, or obtaining property by false pretenses;
(b) By acquiring lost property.
A person acquires lost property when he exercises control over property of another which he knows to have been lost or mislaid, or to have been delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or the nature or amount of the property, without taking reasonable measures to return such property to the owner;
(c) By committing the crime of issuing a bad check, as defined in section 190.05;
(d) By false promise.
A person obtains property by false promise when, pursuant to a scheme to defraud, he obtains property of another by means of a representation, express or implied, that he or a third person will in the future engage in particular conduct, and when he does not intend to engage in such conduct or, as the case may be, does not believe that the third person intends to engage in such conduct.
In any prosecution for larceny based upon a false promise, the defendant's intention or belief that the promise would not be performed may not be established by or inferred from the fact alone that such promise was not performed. Such a finding may be based only upon evidence establishing that the facts and circumstances of the case are wholly consistent with guilty intent or belief and wholly inconsistent with innocent intent or belief, and excluding to a moral certainty every hypothesis except that of the defendant's intention or belief that the promise would not be performed;
(e) By extortion.
A person obtains property by extortion when he compels or induces another person to deliver such property to himself or to a third person by means of instilling in him a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or another will:
(i) Cause physical injury to some person in the future; or
(ii) Cause damage to property; or
(iii) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or
(iv) Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against him; or
(v) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule; or
(vi) Cause a strike, boycott or other collective labor group action injurious to some person's business; except that such a threat shall not be deemed extortion when the property is demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act; or
(vii) Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim or defense; or
(viii) Use or abuse his position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or
(ix) Perform any other act which would not in itself materially benefit the actor but which is calculated to harm another person materially with respect to his health, safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation or personal relationships.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 155.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny (Refs & Annos)
§ 155.10 Larceny; no defense
The crimes of (a) larceny committed by means of extortion and an attempt to commit the same, and (b) bribe receiving by a labor official as defined in section 180.20, and bribe receiving as defined in section 200.05, are not mutually exclusive, and it is no defense to a prosecution for larceny committed by means of extortion or for an attempt to commit the same that, by reason of the same conduct, the defendant also committed one of such specified crimes of bribe receiving.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 155.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny (Refs & Annos)
§ 155.15 Larceny; defenses
1. In any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.
2. In any prosecution for larceny by extortion committed by instilling in the victim a fear that he or another person would be charged with a crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant reasonably believed the threatened charge to be true and that his sole purpose was to compel or induce the victim to take reasonable action to make good the wrong which was the subject of such threatened charge.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 155.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny (Refs & Annos)
§ 155.20 Larceny; value of stolen property
For the purposes of this title, the value of property shall be ascertained as follows:
1. Except as otherwise specified in this section, value means the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time after the crime.
2. Whether or not they have been issued or delivered, certain written instruments, not including those having a readily ascertainable market value such as some public and corporate bonds and securities, shall be evaluated as follows:
(a) The value of an instrument constituting an evidence of debt, such as a check, draft or promissory note, shall be deemed the amount due or collectable thereon or thereby, such figure ordinarily being the face amount of the indebtedness less any portion thereof which has been satisfied.
(b) The value of a ticket or equivalent instrument which evidences a right to receive a transportation, entertainment or other service shall be deemed the price stated thereon, if any; and if no price is stated thereon the value shall be deemed the price of such ticket or equivalent instrument which the issuer charges the general public.
(c) The value of any other instrument which creates, releases, discharges or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege or obligation shall be deemed the greatest amount of economic loss which the owner of the instrument might reasonably suffer by virtue of the loss of the instrument.
3. Where the property consists of gas, steam, water or electricity, which is provided for charge or compensation, the value shall be the value of the property stolen in any consecutive twelve-month period.
4. When the value of property cannot be satisfactorily ascertained pursuant to the standards set forth in subdivisions one and two of this section, its value shall be deemed to be an amount less than two hundred fifty dollars.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1969, c. 115, § 2; L.1978, c. 420, § 4.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 155.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny (Refs & Annos)
§ 155.25 Petit larceny
A person is guilty of petit larceny when he steals property.
Petit larceny is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 155.30
Effective: August 30, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny (Refs & Annos)
§ 155.30 Grand Larceny in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of grand larceny in the fourth degree when he steals property and when:
1. The value of the property exceeds one thousand dollars; or
2. The property consists of a public record, writing or instrument kept, filed or deposited according to law with or in the keeping of any public office or public servant; or
3. The property consists of secret scientific material; or
4. The property consists of a credit card or debit card; or
5. The property, regardless of its nature and value, is taken from the person of another; or
6. The property, regardless of its nature and value, is obtained by extortion; or
7. The property consists of one or more firearms, rifles or shotguns, as such terms are defined in section 265.00 of this chapter; or
8. The value of the property exceeds one hundred dollars and the property consists of a motor vehicle, as defined in section one hundred twenty-five of the vehicle and traffic law, other than a motorcycle, as defined in section one hundred twenty-three of such law; or
9. The property consists of a scroll, religious vestment, a vessel, an item comprising a display of religious symbols which forms a representative expression of faith, or other miscellaneous item of property which:
(a) has a value of at least one hundred dollars; and
(b) is kept for or used in connection with religious worship in any building, structure or upon the curtilage of such building or structure used as a place of religious worship by a religious corporation, as incorporated under the religious corporations law or the education law.
10. The property consists of an access device which the person intends to use unlawfully to obtain telephone service.
11. The property consists of anhydrous ammonia or liquified ammonia gas and the actor intends to use, or knows another person intends to use, such anhydrous ammonia or liquified ammonia gas to manufacture methamphetamine.
Grand larceny in the fourth degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 21; L.1969, c. 115, § 3; L.1969, c. 352, § 1; L.1982, c. 234, § 1; L.1986, c. 515, § 1; L.1987, c. 556, § 8; L.1990, c. 450, § 1; L.1992, c. 491, § 2; L.2005, c. 394, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 2005; L.2010, c. 479, § 1, eff. Aug. 30, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 155.35
Effective: November 1, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny (Refs & Annos)
§ 155.35 Grand larceny in the third degree
A person is guilty of grand larceny in the third degree when he or she steals property and:
1. when the value of the property exceeds three thousand dollars, or
2. the property is an automated teller machine or the contents of an automated teller machine.
Grand larceny in the third degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1986, c. 515, § 2; L.2010, c. 464, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 155.40
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny (Refs & Annos)
§ 155.40 Grand larceny in the second degree
A person is guilty of grand larceny in the second degree when he steals property and when:
1. The value of the property exceeds fifty thousand dollars; or
2. The property, regardless of its nature and value, is obtained by extortion committed by instilling in the victim a fear that the actor or another person will (a) cause physical injury to some person in the future, or (b) cause damage to property, or (c) use or abuse his position as a public servant by engaging in conduct within or related to his official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely.
Grand larceny in the second degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1986, c. 515, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 155.42
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny (Refs & Annos)
§ 155.42 Grand larceny in the first degree
A person is guilty of grand larceny in the first degree when he steals property and when the value of the property exceeds one million dollars.
Grand larceny in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 515, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 1986.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 155.43
Effective: November 1, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny (Refs & Annos)
§ 155.43 Aggravated grand larceny of an automated teller machine
A person is guilty of aggravated grand larceny of an automated teller machine when he or she commits the crime of grand larceny in the third degree, as defined in subdivision two of section 155.35 of this article and has been previously convicted of grand larceny in the third degree within the previous five years.
Aggravated grand larceny of an automated teller machine is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2010, c. 464, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 155.45
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 155. Larceny (Refs & Annos)
§ 155.45 Larceny; pleading and proof
1. Where it is an element of the crime charged that property was taken from the person or obtained by extortion, an indictment for larceny must so specify. In all other cases, an indictment, information or complaint for larceny is sufficient if it alleges that the defendant stole property of the nature or value required for the commission of the crime charged without designating the particular way or manner in which such property was stolen or the particular theory of larceny involved.
2. Proof that the defendant engaged in any conduct constituting larceny as defined in section 155.05 is sufficient to support any indictment, information or complaint for larceny other than one charging larceny by extortion. An indictment charging larceny by extortion must be supported by proof establishing larceny by extortion.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. J, Art. 156, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 156. Offenses Involving Computers; Definition of Terms
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 156.00
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 156. Offenses Involving Computers; Definition of Terms (Refs & Annos)
§ 156.00 Offenses involving computers; definition of terms
The following definitions are applicable to this chapter except where different meanings are expressly specified:
1. “Computer” means a device or group of devices which, by manipulation of electronic, magnetic, optical or electrochemical impulses, pursuant to a computer program, can automatically perform arithmetic, logical, storage or retrieval operations with or on computer data, and includes any connected or directly related device, equipment or facility which enables such computer to store, retrieve or communicate to or from a person, another computer or another device the results of computer operations, computer programs or computer data.
2. “Computer program” is property and means an ordered set of data representing coded instructions or statements that, when executed by computer, cause the computer to process data or direct the computer to perform one or more computer operations or both and may be in any form, including magnetic storage media, punched cards, or stored internally in the memory of the computer.
3. “Computer data” is property and means a representation of information, knowledge, facts, concepts or instructions which are being processed, or have been processed in a computer and may be in any form, including magnetic storage media, punched cards, or stored internally in the memory of the computer.
4. “Computer service” means any and all services provided by or through the facilities of any computer communication system allowing the input, output, examination, or transfer, of computer data or computer programs from one computer to another.
5. “Computer material” is property and means any computer data or computer program which:
(a) contains records of the medical history or medical treatment of an identified or readily identifiable individual or individuals. This term shall not apply to the gaining access to or duplication solely of the medical history or medical treatment records of a person by that person or by another specifically authorized by the person whose records are gained access to or duplicated; or
(b) contains records maintained by the state or any political subdivision thereof or any governmental instrumentality within the state which contains any information concerning a person, as defined in subdivision seven of section 10.00 of this chapter, which because of name, number, symbol, mark or other identifier, can be used to identify the person and which is otherwise prohibited by law from being disclosed. This term shall not apply to the gaining access to or duplication solely of records of a person by that person or by another specifically authorized by the person whose records are gained access to or duplicated; or
(c) is not and is not intended to be available to anyone other than the person or persons rightfully in possession thereof or selected persons having access thereto with his, her or their consent and which accords or may accord such rightful possessors an advantage over competitors or other persons who do not have knowledge or the benefit thereof.
6. “Computer network” means the interconnection of hardwire or wireless communication lines with a computer through remote terminals, or a complex consisting of two or more interconnected computers.
7. “Access” means to instruct, communicate with, store data in, retrieve from, or otherwise make use of any resources of a computer, physically, directly or by electronic means.
8. “Without authorization” means to use or to access a computer, computer service or computer network without the permission of the owner or lessor or someone licensed or privileged by the owner or lessor where such person knew that his or her use or access was without permission or after actual notice to such person that such use or access was without permission. It shall also mean the access of a computer service by a person without permission where such person knew that such access was without permission or after actual notice to such person, that such access was without permission.
Proof that such person used or accessed a computer, computer service or computer network through the knowing use of a set of instructions, code or computer program that bypasses, defrauds or otherwise circumvents a security measure installed or used with the user's authorization on the computer, computer service or computer network shall be presumptive evidence that such person used or accessed such computer, computer service or computer network without authorization.
9. “Felony” as used in this article means any felony defined in the laws of this state or any offense defined in the laws of any other jurisdiction for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one year is authorized in this state.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 514, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1986. Amended L.2006, c. 558, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 156.05
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 156. Offenses Involving Computers; Definition of Terms (Refs & Annos)
§ 156.05 Unauthorized use of a computer
A person is guilty of unauthorized use of a computer when he or she knowingly uses, causes to be used, or accesses a computer, computer service, or computer network without authorization.
Unauthorized use of a computer is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 514, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1986. Amended L.2006, c. 558, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 156.10
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 156. Offenses Involving Computers; Definition of Terms (Refs & Annos)
§ 156.10 Computer trespass
A person is guilty of computer trespass when he or she knowingly uses, causes to be used, or accesses a computer, computer service, or computer network without authorization and:
1. he or she does so with an intent to commit or attempt to commit or further the commission of any felony; or
2. he or she thereby knowingly gains access to computer material.
Computer trespass is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 514, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1986. Amended L.2006, c. 558, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 156.20
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 156. Offenses Involving Computers; Definition of Terms (Refs & Annos)
§ 156.20 Computer tampering in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of computer tampering in the fourth degree when he or she uses, causes to be used, or accesses a computer, computer service, or computer network without authorization and he or she intentionally alters in any manner or destroys computer data or a computer program of another person.
Computer tampering in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 514, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1986. Amended L.1993, c. 89, § 1; L.2006, c. 558, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 156.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 156. Offenses Involving Computers; Definition of Terms (Refs & Annos)
§ 156.25 Computer tampering in the third degree
A person is guilty of computer tampering in the third degree when he commits the crime of computer tampering in the fourth degree and:
1. he does so with an intent to commit or attempt to commit or further the commission of any felony; or
2. he has been previously convicted of any crime under this article or subdivision eleven of section 165.15 of this chapter; or
3. he intentionally alters in any manner or destroys computer material; or
4. he intentionally alters in any manner or destroys computer data or a computer program so as to cause damages in an aggregate amount exceeding one thousand dollars.
Computer tampering in the third degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 514, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1986. Amended L.1993, c. 89, § 2; L.1997, c. 376, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1997.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 156.26
Effective: November 1, 2008
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 156. Offenses Involving Computers; Definition of Terms (Refs & Annos)
§ 156.26 Computer tampering in the second degree
A person is guilty of computer tampering in the second degree when he or she commits the crime of computer tampering in the fourth degree and he or she intentionally alters in any manner or destroys:
1. computer data or a computer program so as to cause damages in an aggregate amount exceeding three thousand dollars; or
2. computer material that contains records of the medical history or medical treatment of an identified or readily identifiable individual or individuals and as a result of such alteration or destruction, such individual or individuals suffer serious physical injury, and he or she is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such serious physical injury may occur.
Computer tampering in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1993, c. 89, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 1993. Amended L.2008, c. 590, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2008.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 156.27
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 156. Offenses Involving Computers; Definition of Terms (Refs & Annos)
§ 156.27 Computer tampering in the first degree
A person is guilty of computer tampering in the first degree when he commits the crime of computer tampering in the fourth degree and he intentionally alters in any manner or destroys computer data or a computer program so as to cause damages in an aggregate amount exceeding fifty thousand dollars.
Computer tampering in the first degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1993, c. 89, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 1993.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 156.29
Effective: November 1, 2008
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 156. Offenses Involving Computers; Definition of Terms (Refs & Annos)
§ 156.29 Unlawful duplication of computer related material in the second degree
A person is guilty of unlawful duplication of computer related material in the second degree when having no right to do so, he or she copies, reproduces or duplicates in any manner computer material that contains records of the medical history or medical treatment of an identified or readily identifiable individual or individuals with an intent to commit or further the commission of any crime under this chapter.
Unlawful duplication of computer related material in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2008, c. 590, § 2, eff. Nov. 1, 2008.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 156.30
Effective: November 1, 2008
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 156. Offenses Involving Computers; Definition of Terms (Refs & Annos)
§ 156.30 Unlawful duplication of computer related material in the first degree
A person is guilty of unlawful duplication of computer related [FN1] in the first degree material [FN2] when having no right to do so, he or she copies, reproduces or duplicates in any manner:
1. any computer data or computer program and thereby intentionally and wrongfully deprives or appropriates from an owner thereof an economic value or benefit in excess of two thousand five hundred dollars; or
2. any computer data or computer program with an intent to commit or attempt to commit or further the commission of any felony.
Unlawful duplication of computer related material in the first degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 514, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1986. Amended L.2008, c. 590, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 2008.)
[FN1] So in original (“material” inadvertently omitted).
[FN2] So in original (“material” inadvertently included).
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 156.35
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 156. Offenses Involving Computers; Definition of Terms (Refs & Annos)
§ 156.35 Criminal possession of computer related material
A person is guilty of criminal possession of computer related material when having no right to do so, he knowingly possesses, in any form, any copy, reproduction or duplicate of any computer data or computer program which was copied, reproduced or duplicated in violation of section 156.30 of this article, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof.
Criminal possession of computer related material is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 514, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1986.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 156.50
Effective: November 1, 2008
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 156. Offenses Involving Computers; Definition of Terms (Refs & Annos)
§ 156.50 Offenses involving computers; defenses
In any prosecution:
1. under section 156.05 or 156.10 of this article, it shall be a defense that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that he had authorization to use the computer;
2. under section 156.20, 156.25, 156.26 or 156.27 of this article it shall be a defense that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that he had the right to alter in any manner or destroy the computer data or the computer program;
3. under section 156.29 or 156.30 of this article it shall be a defense that the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that he had the right to copy, reproduce or duplicate in any manner the computer data or the computer program.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 514, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1986. Amended L.1993, c. 89, § 4; L.2008, c. 590, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 2008.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 158.00
Effective: January 1, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 158. Welfare Fraud
§ 158.00 Definitions; presumption; limitation
1. Definitions. The following definitions are applicable to this article:
(a) “Public benefit card” means any medical assistance card, food stamp assistance card, public assistance card, or any other identification, authorization card or electronic access device issued by the state or a social services district, as defined in subdivision seven of section two of the social services law, which entitles a person to obtain public assistance benefits under a local, state, or federal program administered by the state, its political subdivisions, or social services districts.
(b) “Fraudulent welfare act” means knowingly and with intent to defraud, engaging in an act or acts pursuant to which a person:
(1) offers, presents or causes to be presented to the state, any of its political subdivisions or social services districts, or any employee or agent thereof, an oral or written application or request for public assistance benefits or for a public benefit card with knowledge that the application or request contains a false statement or false information, and such statement or information is material, or
(2) holds himself or herself out to be another person, whether real or fictitious, for the purpose of obtaining public assistance benefits, or
(3) makes a false statement or provides false information for the purpose of (i) establishing or maintaining eligibility for public assistance benefits or (ii) increasing or preventing reduction of public assistance benefits, and such statement or information is material.
(c) “Public assistance benefits” means money, property or services provided directly or indirectly through programs of the federal government, the state government or the government of any political subdivision within the state and administered by the department of social services or social services districts.
2. Rebuttable presumption. (a) A person who possesses five or more public benefit cards in a name or names other than his or her own is presumed to possess the same with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another.
(b) The presumption established by this subdivision shall not apply to:
(1) any employee or agent of the department of social services to the extent that he or she possesses such cards in the course of his or her official duties; or
(2) any person to the extent that he [FN1] she possesses a public benefit card or cards issued to a member or members of his or her immediate family or household with the consent of the cardholder; or
(3) any person providing home health services or personal care services pursuant to title eleven of article five of the social services law, or any agent or employee of a congregate care or residential treatment facility or foster care provider, to the extent that in the course of his or her duties, he or she possesses public assistance cards issued to persons under his or her care.
(c) The presumption established by this subdivision is rebuttable by evidence tending to show that the defendant did not possess such public benefit card or cards with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another. In any action tried before a jury, the jury shall be so instructed.
(d) The foregoing presumption shall apply to prosecutions for criminal possession of public benefit cards.
3. Limitation. Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to prohibit a recipient of public assistance benefits from pledging his or her public assistance benefits or using his or her public benefit card as collateral for a loan.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 168, eff. Nov. 1, 1995.)
[FN1] So in original. (Word “or” inadvertently omitted.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 158.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 158. Welfare Fraud
§ 158.05 Welfare fraud in the fifth degree
A person is guilty of welfare fraud in the fifth degree when he or she commits a fraudulent welfare act and thereby takes or obtains public assistance benefits.
Welfare fraud in the fifth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 168, eff. Nov. 1, 1995.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 158.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 158. Welfare Fraud
§ 158.10 Welfare fraud in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of welfare fraud in the fourth degree when he or she commits a fraudulent welfare act and thereby takes or obtains public assistance benefits, and when the value of the public assistance benefits exceeds one thousand dollars.
Welfare fraud in the fourth degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 168, eff. Nov. 1, 1995.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 158.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 158. Welfare Fraud
§ 158.15 Welfare fraud in the third degree
A person is guilty of welfare fraud in the third degree when he or she commits a fraudulent welfare act and thereby takes or obtains public assistance benefits, and when the value of the public assistance benefits exceeds three thousand dollars.
Welfare fraud in the third degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 168, eff. Nov. 1, 1995.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 158.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 158. Welfare Fraud
§ 158.20 Welfare fraud in the second degree
A person is guilty of welfare fraud in the second degree when he or she commits a fraudulent welfare act and thereby takes or obtains public assistance benefits, and when the value of the public assistance benefits exceeds fifty thousand dollars.
Welfare fraud in the second degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 168, eff. Nov. 1, 1995.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 158.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 158. Welfare Fraud
§ 158.25 Welfare fraud in the first degree
A person is guilty of welfare fraud in the first degree when he or she commits a fraudulent welfare act and thereby takes or obtains public assistance benefits, and when the value of the public assistance benefits exceeds one million dollars.
Welfare fraud in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 168, eff. Nov. 1, 1995.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 158.30
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 158. Welfare Fraud
§ 158.30 Criminal use of a public benefit card in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal use of a public benefit card in the second degree when he or she knowingly:
1. Loans money or otherwise provides property or services on credit, and accepts a public benefit card as collateral or security for the repayment of such loan or for the provision of such property or services;
2. Obtains a public benefit card in exchange for a benefit; or
3. Transfers or delivers a public benefit card to another (a) in exchange for money or a controlled substance as defined in subdivision five of section 220.00, or (b) for the purpose of committing an unlawful act.
Criminal use of a public benefit card in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 168, eff. Nov. 1, 1995.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 158.35
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 158. Welfare Fraud
§ 158.35 Criminal use of a public benefit card in the first degree
A person is guilty of criminal use of a public benefit card in the first degree when he or she, pursuant to an act or a series of acts, knowingly (i) obtains three or more public benefit cards from another or others in exchange for a benefit, or (ii) transfers or delivers three or more public benefit cards to another or others in exchange for money or a controlled substance as defined in subdivision five of section 220.00 of this chapter.
Criminal use of a public benefit card in the first degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 168, eff. Nov. 1, 1995.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 158.40
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 158. Welfare Fraud
§ 158.40 Criminal possession of public benefit cards in the third degree
A person is guilty of criminal possession of public benefit cards in the third degree when he or she with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, knowingly possesses five or more public benefit cards in a name or names other than the person's own name.
Criminal possession of public benefit cards in the third degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 168, eff. Nov. 1, 1995.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 158.45
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 158. Welfare Fraud
§ 158.45 Criminal possession of public benefit cards in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal possession of public benefit cards in the second degree when he or she with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, knowingly possesses ten or more public benefit cards in a name or names other than the person's own name.
Criminal possession of public benefit cards in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 168, eff. Nov. 1, 1995.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 158.50
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 158. Welfare Fraud
§ 158.50 Criminal possession of public benefit cards in the first degree
A person is guilty of criminal possession of public benefit cards in the first degree when he or she with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, knowingly possesses twenty-five or more public benefit cards in a name or names other than the person's own name.
Criminal possession of public benefit cards in the first degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 168, eff. Nov. 1, 1995.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. J, Art. 160, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 160. Robbery
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 160.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 160. Robbery (Refs & Annos)
§ 160.00 Robbery; defined
Robbery is forcible stealing. A person forcibly steals property and commits robbery when, in the course of committing a larceny, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person for the purpose of:
1. Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of the property or to the retention thereof immediately after the taking; or
2. Compelling the owner of such property or another person to deliver up the property or to engage in other conduct which aids in the commission of the larceny.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 160.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 160. Robbery (Refs & Annos)
§ 160.05 Robbery in the third degree
A person is guilty of robbery in the third degree when he forcibly steals property.
Robbery in the third degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 160.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 160. Robbery (Refs & Annos)
§ 160.10 Robbery in the second degree
A person is guilty of robbery in the second degree when he forcibly steals property and when:
1. He is aided by another person actually present; or
2. In the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
(a) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
(b) Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; or
3. The property consists of a motor vehicle, as defined in section one hundred twenty-five of the vehicle and traffic law.
Robbery in the second degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1969, c. 1012, § 3; L.1973, c. 374, § 3; L.1995, c. 308, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 160.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 160. Robbery (Refs & Annos)
§ 160.15 Robbery in the first degree
A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree when he forcibly steals property and when, in the course of the commission of the crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
1. Causes serious physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or
2. Is armed with a deadly weapon; or
3. Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instrument; or
4. Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that such pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm was not a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury, could be discharged. Nothing contained in this subdivision shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, robbery in the second degree, robbery in the third degree or any other crime.
Robbery in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 22; L.1969, c. 1012, § 4; L.1973, c. 374, § 4.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. J, Art. 165, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.00 Misapplication of property
1. A person is guilty of misapplication of property when, knowingly possessing personal property of another pursuant to an agreement that the same will be returned to the owner at a future time,
(a) he loans, leases, pledges, pawns or otherwise encumbers such property without the consent of the owner thereof in such manner as to create a risk that the owner will not be able to recover it or will suffer pecuniary loss; or
(b) he intentionally refuses to return personal property valued in excess of one hundred dollars to the owner pursuant to the terms of the rental agreement provided that the owner shall have made a written demand for the return of such personal property in person or by certified mail at an address indicated in the rental agreement and he intentionally refuses to return such personal property for a period of thirty days after such demand has been received or should reasonably have been received by him. Such written demand shall state: (i) the date and time at which the personal property was to have been returned under the rental agreement; (ii) that the owner does not consent to the continued withholding or retaining of such personal property and demands its return; and (iii) that the continued withholding or retaining of the property may constitute a class A misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to one thousand dollars or by a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a period of up to one year or by both such fine and imprisonment.
(c) as used in paragraph (b) of this subdivision and in subdivision three of this section, the terms owner, personal property, and rental agreement shall be defined as in subdivision one of section three hundred ninety-nine-w of the general business law.
2. In any prosecution under paragraph (a) of subdivision one of this section, it is a defense that, at the time the prosecution was commenced, (a) the defendant had recovered possession of the property, unencumbered as a result of the unlawful disposition, and (b) the owner had suffered no material economic loss as a result of the unlawful disposition.
3. In any prosecution under paragraph (b) of subdivision one of this section, it is a defense that at the time the prosecution was commenced, (a) the owner had recovered possession of the personal property and suffered no material economic loss as a result of the unlawful retention; or (b) the defendant is unable to return such personal property because it has been accidentally destroyed or stolen; or (c) the owner failed to comply with the provisions of section three hundred ninety-nine-w of the general business law.
Misapplication of property is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1995, c. 372, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.05 Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree
A person is guilty of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree when:
1. Knowing that he does not have the consent of the owner, he takes, operates, exercises control over, rides in or otherwise uses a vehicle. A person who engages in any such conduct without the consent of the owner is presumed to know that he does not have such consent; or
2. Having custody of a vehicle pursuant to an agreement between himself or another and the owner thereof whereby he or another is to perform for compensation a specific service for the owner involving the maintenance, repair or use of such vehicle, he intentionally uses or operates the same, without the consent of the owner, for his own purposes in a manner constituting a gross deviation from the agreed purpose; or
3. Having custody of a vehicle pursuant to an agreement with the owner thereof whereby such vehicle is to be returned to the owner at a specified time, he intentionally retains or withholds possession thereof, without the consent of the owner, for so lengthy a period beyond the specified time as to render such retention or possession a gross deviation from the agreement.
For purposes of this section “a gross deviation from the agreement” shall consist of, but not be limited to, circumstances wherein a person who having had custody of a vehicle for a period of fifteen days or less pursuant to a written agreement retains possession of such vehicle for at least seven days beyond the period specified in the agreement and continues such possession for a period of more than two days after service or refusal of attempted service of a notice in person or by certified mail at an address indicated in the agreement stating (i) the date and time at which the vehicle was to have been returned under the agreement; (ii) that the owner does not consent to the continued withholding or retaining of such vehicle and demands its return; and that continued withholding or retaining of the vehicle may constitute a class A misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to one thousand dollars or by a sentence to a term of imprisonment for a period of up to one year or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1978, c. 626, § 1; L.1981, c. 602, § 1; L.1982, c. 413, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.06
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.06 Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree
A person is guilty of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree when:
He commits the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree as defined in subdivision one of section 165.05 of this article and has been previously convicted of the crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the third degree as defined in subdivision one of section 165.05 or second degree within the preceding ten years.
Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the second degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1981, c. 602, § 2. Amended L.1982, c. 413, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.07
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.07 Unlawful use of secret scientific material
A person is guilty of unlawful use of secret scientific material when, with intent to appropriate to himself or another the use of secret scientific material, and having no right to do so and no reasonable ground to believe that he has such right, he makes a tangible reproduction or representation of such secret scientific material by means of writing, photographing, drawing, mechanically or electronically reproducing or recording such secret scientific material.
Unlawful use of secret scientific material is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1967, c. 791, § 23, eff. Sept. 1, 1967.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.08
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.08 Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the first degree
A person is guilty of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the first degree when knowing that he does not have the consent of the owner, he takes, operates, exercises control over, rides in or otherwise uses a vehicle with the intent to use the same in the course of or the commission of a class A, class B, class C or class D felony or in the immediate flight therefrom. A person who engages in any such conduct without the consent of the owner is presumed to know he does not have such consent.
Unauthorized use of a vehicle in the first degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1982, c. 413, § 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1982.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.09
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.09 Auto stripping in the third degree
A person is guilty of auto stripping in the third degree when:
1. He or she removes or intentionally destroys or defaces any part of a vehicle, other than an abandoned vehicle, as defined in subdivision one of section one thousand two hundred twenty-four of the vehicle and traffic law, without the permission of the owner; or
2. He or she removes or intentionally destroys or defaces any part of an abandoned vehicle, as defined in subdivision one of section one thousand two hundred twenty-four of the vehicle and traffic law, except that it is a defense to such charge that such person was authorized to do so pursuant to law or by permission of the owner.
Auto stripping in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1984, c. 390, § 1. Amended L.1996, c. 494, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.10 Auto stripping in the second degree
A person is guilty of auto stripping in the second degree when:
1. He or she commits the offense of auto stripping in the third degree and when he or she has been previously convicted within the last five years of having violated the provisions of section 165.09 or this section; or
2. He or she removes or intentionally destroys, defaces, disguises, or alters any part of two or more vehicles, other than abandoned vehicles, as defined in subdivision one of section one thousand two hundred twenty-four of the vehicle and traffic law, without the permission of the owner, and the value of the parts of vehicles removed, destroyed, defaced, disguised, or altered exceeds an aggregate value of one thousand dollars.
Auto stripping in the second degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1984, c. 390, § 1. Amended L.1996, c. 494, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.11
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.11 Auto stripping in the first degree
A person is guilty of auto stripping in the first degree when he or she removes or intentionally destroys, defaces, disguises, or alters any part of three or more vehicles, other than abandoned vehicles, as defined in subdivision one of section one thousand two hundred twenty-four of the vehicle and traffic law, without the permission of the owner, and the value of the parts of vehicles removed, destroyed, defaced, disguised, or altered exceeds an aggregate value of three thousand dollars.
Auto stripping in the first degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1996, c. 494, § 3, eff. Nov. 1, 1996.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.15
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.15 Theft of services
A person is guilty of theft of services when:
1. He obtains or attempts to obtain a service, or induces or attempts to induce the supplier of a rendered service to agree to payment therefor on a credit basis, by the use of a credit card or debit card which he knows to be stolen.
2. With intent to avoid payment for restaurant services rendered, or for services rendered to him as a transient guest at a hotel, motel, inn, tourist cabin, rooming house or comparable establishment, he avoids or attempts to avoid such payment by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay, by stealth, or by any misrepresentation of fact which he knows to be false. A person who fails or refuses to pay for such services is presumed to have intended to avoid payment therefor; or
3. With intent to obtain railroad, subway, bus, air, taxi or any other public transportation service without payment of the lawful charge therefor, or to avoid payment of the lawful charge for such transportation service which has been rendered to him, he obtains or attempts to obtain such service or avoids or attempts to avoid payment therefor by force, intimidation, stealth, deception or mechanical tampering, or by unjustifiable failure or refusal to pay; or
4. With intent to avoid payment by himself or another person of the lawful charge for any telecommunications service, including, without limitation, cable television service, or any gas, steam, sewer, water, electrical, telegraph or telephone service which is provided for a charge or compensation, he obtains or attempts to obtain such service for himself or another person or avoids or attempts to avoid payment therefor by himself or another person by means of (a) tampering or making connection with the equipment of the supplier, whether by mechanical, electrical, acoustical or other means, or (b) offering for sale or otherwise making available, to anyone other than the provider of a telecommunications service for such service provider's own use in the provision of its service, any telecommunications decoder or descrambler, a principal function of which defeats a mechanism of electronic signal encryption, jamming or individually addressed switching imposed by the provider of any such telecommunications service to restrict the delivery of such service, or (c) any misrepresentation of fact which he knows to be false, or (d) any other artifice, trick, deception, code or device. For the purposes of this subdivision the telecommunications decoder or descrambler described in paragraph (b) above or the device described in paragraph (d) above shall not include any non-decoding and non-descrambling channel frequency converter or any television receiver-type accepted by the federal communications commission. In any prosecution under this subdivision, proof that telecommunications equipment, including, without limitation, any cable television converter, descrambler, or related equipment, has been tampered with or otherwise intentionally prevented from performing its functions of control of service delivery without the consent of the supplier of the service, or that telecommunications equipment, including, without limitation, any cable television converter, descrambler, receiver, or related equipment, has been connected to the equipment of the supplier of the service without the consent of the supplier of the service, shall be presumptive evidence that the resident to whom the service which is at the time being furnished by or through such equipment has, with intent to avoid payment by himself or another person for a prospective or already rendered service, created or caused to be created with reference to such equipment, the condition so existing. A person who tampers with such a device or equipment without the consent of the supplier of the service is presumed to do so with intent to avoid, or to enable another to avoid, payment for the service involved. In any prosecution under this subdivision, proof that any telecommunications decoder or descrambler, a principal function of which defeats a mechanism of electronic signal encryption, jamming or individually addressed switching imposed by the provider of any such telecommunications service to restrict the delivery of such service, has been offered for sale or otherwise made available by anyone other than the supplier of such service shall be presumptive evidence that the person offering such equipment for sale or otherwise making it available has, with intent to avoid payment by himself or another person of the lawful charge for such service, obtained or attempted to obtain such service for himself or another person or avoided or attempted to avoid payment therefor by himself or another person; or
5. With intent to avoid payment by himself or another person of the lawful charge for any telephone service which is provided for a charge or compensation he (a) sells, offers for sale or otherwise makes available, without consent, an existing, canceled or revoked access device; or (b) uses, without consent, an existing, canceled or revoked access device; or (c) knowingly obtains any telecommunications service with fraudulent intent by use of an unauthorized, false, or fictitious name, identification, telephone number, or access device. For purposes of this subdivision access device means any telephone calling card number, credit card number, account number, mobile identification number, electronic serial number or personal identification number that can be used to obtain telephone service.
6. With intent to avoid payment by himself or another person for a prospective or already rendered service the charge or compensation for which is measured by a meter or other mechanical device, he tampers with such device or with other equipment related thereto, or in any manner attempts to prevent the meter or device from performing its measuring function, without the consent of the supplier of the service. In any prosecution under this subdivision, proof that a meter or related equipment has been tampered with or otherwise intentionally prevented from performing its measuring function without the consent of the supplier of the service shall be presumptive evidence that the person to whom the service which is at the time being furnished by or through such meter or related equipment has, with intent to avoid payment by himself or another person for a prospective or already rendered service, created or caused to be created with reference to such meter or related equipment, the condition so existing. A person who tampers with such a device or equipment without the consent of the supplier of the service is presumed to do so with intent to avoid, or to enable another to avoid, payment for the service involved; or
7. He knowingly accepts or receives the use and benefit of service, including gas, steam or electricity service, which should pass through a meter but has been diverted therefrom, or which has been prevented from being correctly registered by a meter provided therefor, or which has been diverted from the pipes, wires or conductors of the supplier thereof. In any prosecution under this subdivision proof that service has been intentionally diverted from passing through a meter, or has been intentionally prevented from being correctly registered by a meter provided therefor, or has been intentionally diverted from the pipes, wires or conductors of the supplier thereof, shall be presumptive evidence that the person who accepts or receives the use and benefit of such service has done so with knowledge of the condition so existing; or
8. With intent to obtain, without the consent of the supplier thereof, gas, electricity, water, steam or telephone service, he tampers with any equipment designed to supply or to prevent the supply of such service either to the community in general or to particular premises; or
9. With intent to avoid payment of the lawful charge for admission to any theatre or concert hall, or with intent to avoid payment of the lawful charge for admission to or use of a chair lift, gondola, rope-tow or similar mechanical device utilized in assisting skiers in transportation to a point of ski arrival or departure, he obtains or attempts to obtain such admission without payment of the lawful charge therefor.
10. Obtaining or having control over labor in the employ of another person, or of business, commercial or industrial equipment or facilities of another person, knowing that he is not entitled to the use thereof, and with intent to derive a commercial or other substantial benefit for himself or a third person, he uses or diverts to the use of himself or a third person such labor, equipment or facilities.
11. With intent to avoid payment by himself, herself, or another person of the lawful charge for use of any computer, computer service, or computer network which is provided for a charge or compensation he or she uses, causes to be used, accesses, or attempts to use or access a computer, computer service, or computer network and avoids or attempts to avoid payment therefor. In any prosecution under this subdivision proof that a person overcame or attempted to overcome any device or coding system a function of which is to prevent the unauthorized use of said computer or computer service shall be presumptive evidence of an intent to avoid payment for the computer or computer service.
Theft of services is a class A misdemeanor, provided, however, that theft of cable television service as defined by the provisions of paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) of subdivision four of this section, and having a value not in excess of one hundred dollars by a person who has not been previously convicted of theft of services under subdivision four of this section is a violation, that theft of services under subdivision nine of this section by a person who has not been previously convicted of theft of services under subdivision nine of this section is a violation and provided further, however, that theft of services of any telephone service under paragraph (a) or (b) of subdivision five of this section having a value in excess of one thousand dollars or by a person who has been previously convicted within five years of theft of services under paragraph (a) of subdivision five of this section is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1967, c. 791, § 25; L.1969, c. 115, § 5; L.1975, c. 530, § 2; L.1976, c. 768, §§ 1, 2; L.1978, c. 420, § 5; L.1983, c. 521, §§ 1, 2; L.1983, c. 522, §§ 1, 2; L.1986, c. 15, §§ 1, 2; L.1986, c. 514, § 4; L.1987, c. 556, § 9; L.1987, c. 753, § 1; L.1992, c. 41, § 110; L.1992, c. 491, §§ 3, 4; L.1993, c. 171, § 2; L.1995, c. 81, § 170; L.1996, c. 357, § 2; L.2006, c. 558, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.16
Effective: July 11, 2005
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.16 Unauthorized sale of certain transportation services
1. A person is guilty of unauthorized sale of certain transportation services when, with intent to avoid payment by another person to the metropolitan transportation authority, New York city transit authority or a subsidiary or affiliate of either such authority of the lawful charge for transportation services on a railroad, subway, bus or mass transit service operated by either such authority or a subsidiary or affiliate thereof, he or she, in exchange for value, sells access to such transportation services to such person, without authorization, through the use of an unlimited farecard or doctored farecard. This section shall apply only to such sales that occur in a transportation facility, as such term is defined in subdivision two of section 240.00 of this chapter, operated by such metropolitan transportation authority, New York city transit authority or subsidiary or affiliate of such authority, when public notice of the prohibitions of its section and the exemptions thereto appears on the face of the farecard or is conspicuously posted in transportation facilities operated by such metropolitan transportation authority, New York city transit authority or such subsidiary or affiliate of such authority.
2. It shall be a defense to a prosecution under this section that a person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association: (a) selling a farecard containing value, other than a doctored farecard, relinquished all rights and privileges thereto upon consummation of the sale; or (b) sold access to transportation services through the use of a farecard, other than a doctored farecard, when such sale was made at the request of the purchaser as an accommodation to the purchaser at a time when a farecard was not immediately available to the purchaser, provided, however, that the seller lawfully acquired the farecard and did not, by means of an unlawful act, contribute to the circumstances that caused the purchaser to make such request.
3. For purposes of this section:
(a) “farecard” means a value-based, magnetically encoded card containing stored monetary value from which a specified amount of value is deducted as payment of a fare;
(b) “unlimited farecard” means a farecard that is time-based, magnetically encoded and which permits entrance an unlimited number of times into facilities and conveyances for a specified period of time; and
(c) “doctored farecard” means a farecard that has been bent or manipulated or altered so as to facilitate a person's access to transportation services without paying the lawful charge.
Unauthorized sale of transportation service is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2005, c. 57, pt. T, § 1, eff. July 11, 2005.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.17
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.17 Unlawful use of credit card, debit card or public benefit card
A person is guilty of unlawful use of credit card, debit card or public benefit card when in the course of obtaining or attempting to obtain property or a service, he uses or displays a credit card, debit card or public benefit card which he knows to be revoked or cancelled.
Unlawful use of a credit card, debit card or public benefit card is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1969, c. 115, § 6. Amended L.1987, c. 556, § 10; L.1992, c. 41, § 111; L.1995, c. 81, § 171.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.20 Fraudulently obtaining a signature
A person is guilty of fraudulently obtaining a signature when, with intent to defraud or injure another or to acquire a substantial benefit for himself or a third person, he obtains the signature of a person to a written instrument by means of any misrepresentation of fact which he knows to be false.
Fraudulently obtaining a signature is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.25 Jostling
A person is guilty of jostling when, in a public place, he intentionally and unnecessarily:
1. Places his hand in the proximity of a person's pocket or handbag; or
2. Jostles or crowds another person at a time when a third person's hand is in the proximity of such person's pocket or handbag.
Jostling is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.30
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.30 Fraudulent accosting
1. A person is guilty of fraudulent accosting when he accosts a person in a public place with intent to defraud him of money or other property by means of a trick, swindle or confidence game.
2. A person who, either at the time he accosts another in a public place or at some subsequent time or at some other place, makes statements to him or engages in conduct with respect to him of a kind commonly made or performed in the perpetration of a known type of confidence game, is presumed to intend to defraud such person of money or other property.
Fraudulent accosting is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1971, c. 772, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.35
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.35 Fortune telling
A person is guilty of fortune telling when, for a fee or compensation which he directly or indirectly solicits or receives, he claims or pretends to tell fortunes, or holds himself out as being able, by claimed or pretended use of occult powers, to answer questions or give advice on personal matters or to exorcise, influence or affect evil spirits or curses; except that this section does not apply to a person who engages in the aforedescribed conduct as part of a show or exhibition solely for the purpose of entertainment or amusement.
Fortune telling is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.40
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.40 Criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree
A person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof.
Criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1986, c. 515, § 4.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.45
Effective: October 1, 2005
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.45 Criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof, and when:
1. The value of the property exceeds one thousand dollars; or
2. The property consists of a credit card, debit card or public benefit card; or
3. He is a collateral loan broker or is in the business of buying, selling or otherwise dealing in property; or
4. The property consists of one or more firearms, rifles and shotguns, as such terms are defined in section 265.00 of this chapter; or
5. The value of the property exceeds one hundred dollars and the property consists of a motor vehicle, as defined in section one hundred twenty-five of the vehicle and traffic law, other than a motorcycle, as defined in section one hundred twenty-three of such law; or
6. The property consists of a scroll, religious vestment, vessel or other item of property having a value of at least one hundred dollars kept for or used in connection with religious worship in any building or structure used as a place of religious worship by a religious corporation, as incorporated under the religious corporations law or the education law.
7. The property consists of anhydrous ammonia or liquified ammonia gas and the actor intends to use, or knows another person intends to use, such anhydrous ammonia or liquified ammonia gas to manufacture methamphetamine.
Criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1969, c. 115, § 7; L.1969, c. 354, § 1; L.1979, c. 329, § 1; L.1983, c. 321, § 8; L.1986, c. 515, § 5; L.1987, c. 556, § 11; L.1990, c. 450, § 2; L.1995, c. 81, § 172; L.2005, c. 394, § 2, eff. Oct. 1, 2005.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.50
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.50 Criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree
A person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof, and when the value of the property exceeds three thousand dollars.
Criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1986, c. 515, § 6.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.52
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.52 Criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof, and when the value of the property exceeds fifty thousand dollars.
Criminal possession of stolen property in the second degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 515, § 7, eff. Nov. 1, 1986.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.54
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.54 Criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree
A person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner, and when the value of the property exceeds one million dollars.
Criminal possession of stolen property in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 515, § 7, eff. Nov. 1, 1986.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.55
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.55 Criminal possession of stolen property; presumptions
1. A person who knowingly possesses stolen property is presumed to possess it with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof.
2. A collateral loan broker or a person in the business of buying, selling or otherwise dealing in property who possesses stolen property is presumed to know that such property was stolen if he obtained it without having ascertained by reasonable inquiry that the person from whom he obtained it had a legal right to possess it.
3. A person who possesses two or more stolen credit cards, debit cards or public benefit cards is presumed to know that such credit cards, debit cards or public benefit cards were stolen.
4. A person who possesses three or more tickets or equivalent instrument for air transportation service, which tickets or instruments were stolen by reason of having been obtained from the issuer or agent thereof by the use of one or more stolen or forged credit cards, is presumed to known that such tickets or instruments were stolen.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1969, c. 115, § 8; L.1983, c. 321, § 9; L.1987, c. 556, § 12; L.1995, c. 81, § 173.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.60
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.60 Criminal possession of stolen property; no defense
In any prosecution for criminal possession of stolen property, it is no defense that:
1. The person who stole the property has not been convicted, apprehended or identified; or
2. The defendant stole or participated in the larceny of the property; or
3. The larceny of the property did not occur in this state.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1976, c. 375, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.65
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.65 Criminal possession of stolen property; corroboration
1. A person charged with criminal possession of stolen property who participated in the larceny thereof may not be convicted of criminal possession of such stolen property solely upon the testimony of an accomplice in the larceny unsupported by corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant with such criminal possession.
2. Unless inconsistent with the provisions of subdivision one of this section, a person charged with criminal possession of stolen property may be convicted thereof solely upon the testimony of one from whom he obtained such property or solely upon the testimony of one to whom he disposed of such property.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1971, c. 1097, § 77.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.70
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.70 Definitions
As used in sections 165.71, 165.72, 165.73 and 165.74, the following terms have the following definitions:
1. The term “trademark” means (a) any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof adopted and used by a person to identify goods made by a person and which distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others which is in use and which is registered, filed or recorded under the laws of this state or of any other state or is registered in the principal register of the United States patent and trademark office; or (b) the symbol of the International Olympic Committee, consisting of five interlocking rings; the emblem of the United States Olympic Committee, consisting of an escutcheon having a blue chief and vertically extending red and white bars on the base with five interlocking rings displayed on the chief; any trademark, trade name, sign, symbol, or insignia falsely representing association with, or authorization by, the International Olympic Committee or the United States Olympic Committee; or the words “Olympic”, “Olympiad”, “Citius Altius Fortius”, or any combination thereof tending to cause confusion, to cause mistake, to deceive, or to falsely suggest a connection with the United States Olympic Committee or any International Olympic Committee or United States Olympic Committee activity.
2. The term “counterfeit trademark” means a spurious trademark or an imitation of a trademark that is:
(a) used in connection with trafficking in goods; and
(b) used in connection with the sale, offering for sale or distribution of goods that are identical with or substantially indistinguishable from a trademark as defined in subdivision one of this section.
The term “counterfeit trademark” does not include any mark used in connection with goods for which the person using such mark was authorized to use the trademark for the type of goods so manufactured or produced by the holder of the right to use such mark or designation, whether or not such goods were manufactured or produced in the United States or in another country, and does not include imitations of trade dress or packaging such as color, shape and the like unless those features have been registered as trademarks as defined in subdivision one of this section.
3. The term “traffic” means to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another, as consideration for anything of value, or to obtain control of with intent to so transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of.
4. The term “goods” means any products, services, objects, materials, devices or substances which are identified by the use of a trademark.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1992, c. 490, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1992. Amended L.1993, c. 155, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.71
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.71 Trademark counterfeiting in the third degree
A person is guilty of trademark counterfeiting in the third degree when, with the intent to deceive or defraud some other person or with the intent to evade a lawful restriction on the sale, resale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods, he or she manufactures, distributes, sells, or offers for sale goods which bear a counterfeit trademark, or possesses a trademark knowing it to be counterfeit for the purpose of affixing it to any goods.
Trademark counterfeiting in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1992, c. 490, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1992.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.72
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.72 Trademark counterfeiting in the second degree
A person is guilty of trademark counterfeiting in the second degree when, with the intent to deceive or defraud some other person or with the intent to evade a lawful restriction on the sale, resale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods, he or she manufactures, distributes, sells, or offers for sale goods which bear a counterfeit trademark, or possesses a trademark knowing it to be counterfeit for the purpose of affixing it to any goods, and the retail value of all such goods bearing counterfeit trademarks exceeds one thousand dollars.
Trademark counterfeiting in the second degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1992, c. 490, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1992. Amended L.1995, c. 535, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.73
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.73 Trademark counterfeiting in the first degree
A person is guilty of trademark counterfeiting in the first degree when, with the intent to deceive or defraud some other person, or with the intent to evade a lawful restriction on the sale, resale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods, he or she manufactures, distributes, sells, or offers for sale goods which bear a counterfeit trademark, or possesses a trademark knowing it to be counterfeit for the purpose of affixing it to any goods, and the retail value of all such goods bearing counterfeit trademarks exceeds one hundred thousand dollars.
Trademark counterfeiting in the first degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1992, c. 490, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1992. Amended L.1995, c. 535, § 2.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 165.74
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title J. Offenses Involving Theft
Article 165. Other Offenses Relating to Theft (Refs & Annos)
§ 165.74 Seizure and destruction of goods bearing counterfeit trademarks
Any goods manufactured, sold, offered for sale, distributed or produced in violation of this article may be seized by any police officer. The magistrate must, within forty-eight hours after arraignment of the defendant, determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the goods had been manufactured, sold, offered for sale, distributed or produced in violation of this article, and upon a finding that probable cause exists to believe that the goods had been manufactured, sold, offered for sale, distributed, or produced in violation of this article, the court shall authorize such articles to be retained as evidence pending the trial of the defendant. Upon conviction of the defendant, the articles in respect whereof the defendant stands convicted shall be destroyed. Destruction shall not include auction, sale or distribution of the items in their original form.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1992, c. 490, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1992. Amended L.1995, c. 535, § 3.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. K, Art. 170, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.00 Forgery; definitions of terms
1. “Written instrument” means any instrument or article, including computer data or a computer program, containing written or printed matter or the equivalent thereof, used for the purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying or recording information, or constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right, privilege or identification, which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person.
2. “Complete written instrument” means one which purports to be a genuine written instrument fully drawn with respect to every essential feature thereof. An endorsement, attestation, acknowledgment or other similar signature or statement is deemed both a complete written instrument in itself and a part of the main instrument in which it is contained or to which it attaches.
3. “Incomplete written instrument” means one which contains some matter by way of content or authentication but which requires additional matter in order to render it a complete written instrument.
4. “Falsely make.” A person “falsely makes” a written instrument when he makes or draws a complete written instrument in its entirety, or an incomplete written instrument, which purports to be an authentic creation of its ostensible maker or drawer, but which is not such either because the ostensible maker or drawer is fictitious or because, if real, he did not authorize the making or drawing thereof.
5. “Falsely complete.” A person “falsely completes” a written instrument when, by adding, inserting or changing matter, he transforms an incomplete written instrument into a complete one, without the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, so that such complete instrument appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized by its ostensible maker or drawer.
6. “Falsely alter.” A person “falsely alters” a written instrument when, without the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, he changes a written instrument, whether it be in complete or incomplete form, by means of erasure, obliteration, deletion, insertion of new matter, transposition of matter, or in any other manner, so that such instrument in its thus altered form appears or purports to be in all respects an authentic creation of or fully authorized by its ostensible maker or drawer.
7. “Forged instrument” means a written instrument which has been falsely made, completed or altered.
8. “Electronic access device” means a mobile identification number or electronic serial number that can be used to obtain telephone service.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1986, c. 514, § 5; L.1996, c. 357, § 4.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.05 Forgery in the third degree
A person is guilty of forgery in the third degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument.
Forgery in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.10 Forgery in the second degree
A person is guilty of forgery in the second degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or to represent if completed:
1. A deed, will, codicil, contract, assignment, commercial instrument, credit card, as that term is defined in subdivision seven of section 155.00, or other instrument which does or may evidence, create, transfer, terminate or otherwise affect a legal right, interest, obligation or status; or
2. A public record, or an instrument filed or required or authorized by law to be filed in or with a public office or public servant; or
3. A written instrument officially issued or created by a public office, public servant or governmental instrumentality; or
4. Part of an issue of tokens, public transportation transfers, certificates or other articles manufactured and designed for use as symbols of value usable in place of money for the purchase of property or services; or
5. A prescription of a duly licensed physician or other person authorized to issue the same for any drug or any instrument or device used in the taking or administering of drugs for which a prescription is required by law.
Forgery in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1984, c. 949, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.15 Forgery in the first degree
A person is guilty of forgery in the first degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters a written instrument which is or purports to be, or which is calculated to become or to represent if completed:
1. Part of an issue of money, stamps, securities or other valuable instruments issued by a government or governmental instrumentality; or
2. Part of an issue of stock, bonds or other instruments representing interests in or claims against a corporate or other organization or its property.
Forgery in the first degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.20 Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree when, with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he utters or possesses a forged instrument.
Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.25 Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree when, with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he utters or possesses any forged instrument of a kind specified in section 170.10.
Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.27
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.27 Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree; presumption
A person who possesses two or more forged instruments, each of which purports to be a credit card or debit card, as those terms are defined in subdivisions seven and seven-a of section 155.00, is presumed to possess the same with knowledge that they are forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1969, c. 115, § 9. Amended L.1987, c. 556, § 13).
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.30
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.30 Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree when, with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he utters or possesses any forged instrument of a kind specified in section 170.15.
Criminal possession of a forged instrument in the first degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.35
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.35 Criminal possession of a forged instrument; no defense
In any prosecution for criminal possession of a forged instrument, it is no defense that the defendant forged or participated in the forgery of the instrument in issue; provided that a person may not be convicted of both criminal possession of a forged instrument and forgery with respect to the same instrument.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.40
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.40 Criminal possession of forgery devices
A person is guilty of criminal possession of forgery devices when:
1. He makes or possesses with knowledge of its character any plate, die or other device, apparatus, equipment, or article specifically designed for use in counterfeiting or otherwise forging written instruments; or
2. With intent to use, or to aid or permit another to use, the same for purposes of forgery, he makes or possesses any device, apparatus, equipment or article capable of or adaptable to such use.
Criminal possession of forgery devices is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.45
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.45 Criminal simulation
A person is guilty of criminal simulation when:
1. With intent to defraud, he makes or alters any object in such manner that it appears to have an antiquity, rarity, source or authorship which it does not in fact possess; or
2. With knowledge of its true character and with intent to defraud, he utters or possesses an object so simulated.
Criminal simulation is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.47
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.47 Criminal possession of an anti-security item
A person is guilty of criminal possession of an anti-security item, when with intent to steal property at a retail mercantile establishment as defined in article twelve-B of the general business law, he knowingly possesses in such an establishment an item designed for the purpose of overcoming detection of security markings or attachments placed on property offered for sale at such an establishment.
Criminal possession of an anti-security item is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1983, c. 580, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.50
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.50 Unlawfully using slugs; definitions of terms
The following definitions are applicable to sections 170.55 and 170.60:
1. “Coin machine” means a coin box, turnstile, vending machine or other mechanical or electronic device or receptacle designed (a) to receive a coin or bill or a token made for the purpose, and (b) in return for the insertion or deposit thereof, automatically to offer, to provide, to assist in providing or to permit the acquisition of some property or some service.
2. “Slug” means an object or article which, by virtue of its size, shape or any other quality, is capable of being inserted or deposited in a coin machine as an improper substitute for a genuine coin, bill or token.
3. “Value” of a slug means the value of the coin, bill or token for which it is capable of being substituted.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.55
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.55 Unlawfully using slugs in the second degree
A person is guilty of unlawfully using slugs in the second degree when:
1. With intent to defraud the owner of a coin machine, he inserts or deposits a slug in such machine; or
2. He makes, possesses or disposes of a slug with intent to enable a person to insert or deposit it in a coin machine.
Unlawfully using slugs in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.60
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.60 Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree
A person is guilty of unlawfully using slugs in the first degree when he makes, possesses or disposes of slugs with intent to enable a person to insert or deposit them in a coin machine, and the value of such slugs exceeds one hundred dollars.
Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.65
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.65 Forgery of a vehicle identification number
A person is guilty of forgery of a vehicle identification number when:
(1) He knowingly destroys, covers, defaces, alters or otherwise changes the form or appearance of a vehicle identification number on any vehicle or component part thereof, except tires; or
(2) He removes any such number from a vehicle or component part thereof, except as required by the provisions of the vehicle and traffic law; or
(3) He affixes a vehicle identification number to a vehicle, except in accordance with the provisions of the vehicle and traffic law.
Forgery of a vehicle identification number is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1970, c. 880, § 1. Amended L.1977, c. 488, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.70
Effective: November 1, 2002
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.70 Illegal possession of a vehicle identification number
A person is guilty of illegal possession of a vehicle identification number when:
(1) He knowingly possesses a vehicle identification number label, sticker or plate which has been removed from the vehicle or vehicle part to which such label, sticker or plate was affixed by the manufacturer in accordance with 49 U.S.C. section 32101, et seq. and regulations promulgated thereunder or in accordance with the provisions of the vehicle and traffic law; or
(2) He knowingly possesses a vehicle or vehicle part to which is attached a vehicle identification number label, sticker or plate or on which is stamped or embossed a vehicle identification number which has been destroyed, covered, defaced, altered or otherwise changed, or a vehicle or vehicle part from which a vehicle identification number label, sticker or plate has been removed, which label, sticker or plate was affixed in accordance with 49 U.S.C. section 32101, et seq. or regulations promulgated thereunder, except when he has complied with the provisions of the vehicle and traffic law and regulations promulgated thereunder; or
(3) He knowingly possesses a vehicle, or part of a vehicle to which by law or regulation must be attached a vehicle identification number, either (a) with a vehicle identification number label, sticker, or plate which was not affixed by the manufacturer in accordance with 49 U.S.C. section 32101, et seq. or regulations promulgated thereunder, or in accordance with the provisions of the vehicle and traffic law or regulations promulgated thereunder, or (b) on which is affixed, stamped or embossed a vehicle identification number which was not affixed, stamped or embossed by the manufacturer, or in accordance with 49 U.S.C. section 32101, et seq. or regulations promulgated thereunder or in accordance with the provisions of the vehicle and traffic law or regulations promulgated thereunder.
Illegal possession of a vehicle identification number is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1970, c. 880, § 2. Amended L.1977, c. 488, § 2; L.1981, c. 976, § 6; L.1984, c. 81, § 1; L.1992, c. 317, § 1; L.2001, c. 540, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 2002.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.71
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.71 Illegal possession of a vehicle identification number; presumptions
(1) A person is presumed to knowingly possess a vehicle or vehicle part in violation of subdivision two of section 170.70, when he possesses any combination of five such whole vehicles or individual vehicle parts, none of which are attached to or contained in the same vehicle.
(2) A person is presumed to knowingly possess a vehicle or vehicle part in violation of subdivision three of section 170.70, when he possesses any combination of five such whole vehicles or individual vehicle parts, none of which are attached to or contained in the same vehicle.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1984, c. 81, § 2. Amended L.1984, c. 576, § 1.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 170.75
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 170. Forgery and Related Offenses (Refs & Annos)
§ 170.75 Fraudulent making of an electronic access device in the second degree
A person is guilty of fraudulent making of an electronic access device in the second degree when, with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he falsely makes, completes or alters two or more electronic access devices, as that term is defined in subdivision eight of section 170.00 of this article.
Fraudulent making of an electronic access device in the second degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1996, c. 357, § 5.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. K, Art. 175, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 175.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements (Refs & Annos)
§ 175.00 Definitions of terms
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. “Enterprise” means any entity of one or more persons, corporate or otherwise, public or private, engaged in business, commercial, professional, industrial, eleemosynary, social, political or governmental activity.
2. “Business record” means any writing or article, including computer data or a computer program, kept or maintained by an enterprise for the purpose of evidencing or reflecting its condition or activity.
3. “Written instrument” means any instrument or article, including computer data or a computer program, containing written or printed matter or the equivalent thereof, used for the purpose of reciting, embodying, conveying or recording information, or constituting a symbol or evidence of value, right, privilege or identification, which is capable of being used to the advantage or disadvantage of some person.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1978, c. 233, § 1; L.1986, c. 514, § 6.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 175.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements (Refs & Annos)
§ 175.05 Falsifying business records in the second degree
A person is guilty of falsifying business records in the second degree when, with intent to defraud, he:
1. Makes or causes a false entry in the business records of an enterprise; or
2. Alters, erases, obliterates, deletes, removes or destroys a true entry in the business records of an enterprise; or
3. Omits to make a true entry in the business records of an enterprise in violation of a duty to do so which he knows to be imposed upon him by law or by the nature of his position; or
4. Prevents the making of a true entry or causes the omission thereof in the business records of an enterprise.
Falsifying business records in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 175.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements (Refs & Annos)
§ 175.10 Falsifying business records in the first degree
A person is guilty of falsifying business records in the first degree when he commits the crime of falsifying business records in the second degree, and when his intent to defraud includes an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof.
Falsifying business records in the first degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 175.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements (Refs & Annos)
§ 175.15 Falsifying business records; defense
In any prosecution for falsifying business records, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant was a clerk, bookkeeper or other employee who, without personal benefit, merely executed the orders of his employer or of a superior officer or employee generally authorized to direct his activities.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 175.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements (Refs & Annos)
§ 175.20 Tampering with public records in the second degree
A person is guilty of tampering with public records in the second degree when, knowing that he does not have the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, he knowingly removes, mutilates, destroys, conceals, makes a false entry in or falsely alters any record or other written instrument filed with, deposited in, or otherwise constituting a record of a public office or public servant.
Tampering with public records in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 175.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements (Refs & Annos)
§ 175.25 Tampering with public records in the first degree
A person is guilty of tampering with public records in the first degree when, knowing that he does not have the authority of anyone entitled to grant it, and with intent to defraud, he knowingly removes, mutilates, destroys, conceals, makes a false entry in or falsely alters any record or other written instrument filed with, deposited in, or otherwise constituting a record of a public office or public servant.
Tampering with public records in the first degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 175.30
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements (Refs & Annos)
§ 175.30 Offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree
A person is guilty of offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree when, knowing that a written instrument contains a false statement or false information, he offers or presents it to a public office or public servant with the knowledge or belief that it will be filed with, registered or recorded in or otherwise become a part of the records of such public office or public servant.
Offering a false instrument for filing in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 175.35
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements (Refs & Annos)
§ 175.35 Offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree
A person is guilty of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree when, knowing that a written instrument contains a false statement or false information, and with intent to defraud the state or any political subdivision, public authority or public benefit corporation of the state, he offers or presents it to a public office, public servant, public authority or public benefit corporation with the knowledge or belief that it will be filed with, registered or recorded in or otherwise become a part of the records of such public office, public servant, public authority or public benefit corporation.
Offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030. Amended L.1998, c. 99, § 1, eff. Nov. 1, 1998.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 175.40
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements (Refs & Annos)
§ 175.40 Issuing a false certificate
A person is guilty of issuing a false certificate when, being a public servant authorized by law to make or issue official certificates or other official written instruments, and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another person, he issues such an instrument, or makes the same with intent that it be issued, knowing that it contains a false statement or false information.
Issuing a false certificate is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 175.45
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements (Refs & Annos)
§ 175.45 Issuing a false financial statement
A person is guilty of issuing a false financial statement when, with intent to defraud:
1. He knowingly makes or utters a written instrument which purports to describe the financial condition or ability to pay of some person and which is inaccurate in some material respect; or
2. He represents in writing that a written instrument purporting to describe a person's financial condition or ability to pay as of a prior date is accurate with respect to such person's current financial condition or ability to pay, whereas he knows it is materially inaccurate in that respect.
Issuing a false financial statement is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(L.1965, c. 1030.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 175.50
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements (Refs & Annos)
[§§ 175.50, 175.55. Repealed. L.1981, c. 720, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 1981]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 175.55
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 175. Offenses Involving False Written Statements (Refs & Annos)
[§§ 175.50, 175.55. Repealed. L.1981, c. 720, § 4, eff. Nov. 1, 1981]
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law Ch. 40, Pt. THREE, T. K, Art. 176, Refs & Annos
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.00 Insurance fraud; definition of terms
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. “Insurance policy” has the meaning assigned to insurance contract by subsection (a) of section one thousand one hundred one of the insurance law except it shall include reinsurance contracts, purported insurance policies and purported reinsurance contracts.
2. “Statement” includes, but is not limited to, any notice, proof of loss, bill of lading, invoice, account, estimate of property damages, bill for services, diagnosis, prescription, hospital or doctor records, x-ray, test result, and other evidence of loss, injury or expense.
3. “Person” includes any individual, firm, association or corporation.
4. “Personal insurance” means a policy of insurance insuring a natural person against any of the following contingencies:
(a) loss of or damage to real property used predominantly for residential purposes and which consists of not more than four dwelling units, other than hotels, motels and rooming houses;
(b) loss of or damage to personal property which is not used in the conduct of a business;
(c) losses or liabilities arising out of the ownership, operation, or use of a motor vehicle, predominantly used for non-business purposes;
(d) other liabilities for loss of, damage to, or injury to persons or property, not arising from the conduct of a business;
(e) death, including death by personal injury, or the continuation of life, or personal injury by accident, or sickness, disease or ailment, excluding insurance providing disability benefits pursuant to article nine of the workers' compensation law.
A policy of insurance which insures any of the contingencies listed in paragraphs (a) through (e) of this subdivision as well as other contingencies shall be personal insurance if that portion of the annual premium attributable to the listed contingencies exceeds that portion attributable to other contingencies.
5. “Commercial insurance” means insurance other than personal insurance, and shall also include insurance providing disability benefits pursuant to article nine of the workers' compensation law, insurance providing workers' compensation benefits pursuant to the provisions of the workers' compensation law and any program of self insurance providing similar benefits.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1981, c. 720, § 3. Amended L.1984, c. 805, § 46; L.1996, c. 635, § 24.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.05
Effective: October 3, 2011
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.05 Insurance fraud; defined
A fraudulent insurance act is committed by any person who, knowingly and with intent to defraud presents, causes to be presented, or prepares with knowledge or belief that it will be presented to or by an insurer, self insurer, or purported insurer, or purported self insurer, or any agent thereof:
1. any written statement as part of, or in support of, an application for the issuance of, or the rating of a commercial insurance policy, or certificate or evidence of self insurance for commercial insurance or commercial self insurance, or a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy or self insurance program for commercial or personal insurance that he or she knows to:
(a) contain materially false information concerning any fact material thereto; or
(b) conceal, for the purpose of misleading, information concerning any fact material thereto; or
2. any written statement or other physical evidence as part of, or in support of, an application for the issuance of a health insurance policy, or a policy or contract or other authorization that provides or allows coverage for, membership or enrollment in, or other services of a public or private health plan, or a claim for payment, services or other benefit pursuant to such policy, contract or plan that he or she knows to:
(a) contain materially false information concerning any material fact thereto; or
(b) conceal, for the purpose of misleading, information concerning any fact material thereto.
Such policy or contract or plan or authorization shall include, but not be limited to, those issued or operating pursuant to any public or governmentally-sponsored or supported plan for health care coverage or services or those otherwise issued or operated by entities authorized pursuant to the public health law. For purposes of this subdivision an “application for the issuance of a health insurance policy” shall not include (i) any application for a health insurance policy or contract approved by the superintendent of financial services pursuant to the provisions of sections three thousand two hundred sixteen, four thousand three hundred four, four thousand three hundred twenty-one or four thousand three hundred twenty-two of the insurance law or any other application for a health insurance policy or contract approved by the superintendent of financial services in the individual or direct payment market; or (ii) any application for a certificate evidencing coverage under a self-insured plan or under a group contract approved by the superintendent of financial services.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1981, c. 720, § 3. Amended L.1996, c. 635, § 23; L.1998, c. 2, § 42, eff. Nov. 1, 1998; L.2011, c. 62, pt. A, § 104, eff. Oct. 3, 2011; L.2011, c. 211, § 2, eff. July 20, 2011.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.10 Insurance fraud in the fifth degree
A person is guilty of insurance fraud in the fifth degree when he commits a fraudulent insurance act.
Insurance fraud in the fifth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1981, c. 720, § 3. Amended L.1986, c. 515, § 8.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.15 Insurance fraud in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of insurance fraud in the fourth degree when he commits a fraudulent insurance act and thereby wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds, or attempts to wrongfully take, obtain or withhold property with a value in excess of one thousand dollars.
Insurance fraud in the fourth degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1981, c. 720, § 3. Amended L.1986, c. 515, § 8.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.20 Insurance fraud in the third degree
A person is guilty of insurance fraud in the third degree when he commits a fraudulent insurance act and thereby wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds, or attempts to wrongfully take, obtain or withhold property with a value in excess of three thousand dollars.
Insurance fraud in the third degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1981, c. 720, § 3. Amended L.1986, c. 515, § 8.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.25
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.25 Insurance fraud in the second degree
A person is guilty of insurance fraud in the second degree when he commits a fraudulent insurance act and thereby wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds, or attempts to wrongfully take, obtain or withhold property with a value in excess of fifty thousand dollars.
Insurance fraud in the second degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 515, § 9.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.30
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.30 Insurance fraud in the first degree
A person is guilty of insurance fraud in the first degree when he commits a fraudulent insurance act and thereby wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds, or attempts to wrongfully take, obtain or withhold property with a value in excess of one million dollars.
Insurance fraud in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1986, c. 515, § 9.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.35
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.35 Aggravated insurance fraud
A person is guilty of aggravated insurance fraud in the fourth degree when he commits a fraudulent insurance act, and has been previously convicted within the preceding five years of any offense, an essential element of which is the commission of a fraudulent insurance act.
Aggravated insurance fraud in the fourth degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1996, c. 635, § 21.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.40
Effective: May 18, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.40 Fraudulent life settlement act; defined
A fraudulent life settlement act is committed by any person who, knowingly and with intent to defraud, presents, causes to be presented, or prepares with knowledge or belief that it will be presented to, or by, a life settlement provider, life settlement broker, life settlement intermediary, or any agent thereof, or to any owner any written statement or other physical evidence as part of, or in support of, an application for a life settlement contract, a claim for payment or other benefit under a life settlement contract, which the person knows to:
(1) contain materially false information concerning any material fact thereto; or
(2) conceal, for the purpose of misleading, information concerning any fact material thereto.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2009, c. 499, § 19, eff. May 18, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.45
Effective: May 18, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.45 Life settlement fraud in the fifth degree
A person is guilty of life settlement fraud in the fifth degree when he or she commits a fraudulent life settlement act.
Life settlement fraud in the fifth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2009, c. 499, § 19, eff. May 18, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.50
Effective: May 18, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.50 Life settlement fraud in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of life settlement fraud in the fourth degree when he or she commits a fraudulent life settlement act and thereby wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds, or attempts to wrongfully take, obtain or withhold property with a value in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars.
Life settlement fraud in the fourth degree is a class E felony
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2009, c. 499, § 19, eff. May 18, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.55
Effective: May 18, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.55 Life settlement fraud in the third degree
A person is guilty of life settlement fraud in the third degree when he or she commits a fraudulent life settlement act and thereby wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds, or attempts to wrongfully take, obtain or withhold property with a value in excess of fifty thousand dollars.
Life settlement fraud in the third degree is a class D felony
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2009, c. 499, § 19, eff. May 18, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.60
Effective: May 18, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.60 Life settlement fraud in the second degree
A person is guilty of life settlement fraud in the second degree when he or she commits a fraudulent life settlement act and thereby wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds, or attempts to wrongfully take, obtain or withhold property with a value in excess of one hundred thousand dollars.
Life settlement fraud in the second degree is a class C felony
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2009, c. 499, § 19, eff. May 18, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.65
Effective: May 18, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.65 Life settlement fraud in the first degree
A person is guilty of life settlement fraud in the first degree when he or she commits a fraudulent life settlement act and thereby wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds, or attempts to wrongfully take, obtain or withhold property with a value in excess of one million dollars.
Life settlement fraud in the first degree is a class B felony
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2009, c. 499, § 19, eff. May 18, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 176.70
Effective: May 18, 2010
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 176. Insurance Fraud (Refs & Annos)
§ 176.70 Aggravated life settlement fraud
A person is guilty of aggravated life settlement fraud when he or she commits a fraudulent life settlement act, and has been previously convicted within the preceding five years of any offense, an essential element of which is the commission of a fraudulent life settlement act.
Aggravated life settlement fraud is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2009, c. 499, § 19, eff. May 18, 2010.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 177.00
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 177. Health Care Fraud
§ 177.00 Definitions
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. “Health plan” means any publicly or privately funded health insurance or managed care plan or contract, under which any health care item or service is provided, and through which payment may be made to the person who provided the health care item or service. The state's medical assistance program (Medicaid) shall be considered a single health plan. For purposes of this article, a payment made pursuant to the state's managed care program as defined in paragraph (c) of subdivision one of section three hundred sixty-four-j of the social services law shall be deemed a payment by the state's medical assistance program (Medicaid).
2. “Person” means any individual or entity, other than a recipient of a health care item or service under a health plan unless such recipient acts as an accessory to such an individual or entity.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2006, c. 442, § 9, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 177.05
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 177. Health Care Fraud
§ 177.05 Health care fraud in the fifth degree
A person is guilty of health care fraud in the fifth degree when, with intent to defraud a health plan, he or she knowingly and willfully provides materially false information or omits material information for the purpose of requesting payment from a health plan for a health care item or service and, as a result of such information or omission, he or she or another person receives payment in an amount that he, she or such other person is not entitled to under the circumstances.
Health care fraud in the fifth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2006, c. 442, § 9, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 177.10
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 177. Health Care Fraud
§ 177.10 Health care fraud in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of health care fraud in the fourth degree when such person, on one or more occasions, commits the crime of health care fraud in the fifth degree and the payment or portion of the payment wrongfully received, as the case may be, from a single health plan, in a period of not more than one year, exceeds three thousand dollars in the aggregate.
Health care fraud in the fourth degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2006, c. 442, § 9, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 177.15
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 177. Health Care Fraud
§ 177.15 Health care fraud in the third degree
A person is guilty of health care fraud in the third degree when such person, on one or more occasions, commits the crime of health care fraud in the fifth degree and the payment or portion of the payment wrongfully received, as the case may be, from a single health plan, in a period of not more than one year, exceeds ten thousand dollars in the aggregate.
Health care fraud in the third degree is a class D felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2006, c. 442, § 9, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 177.20
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 177. Health Care Fraud
§ 177.20 Health care fraud in the second degree
A person is guilty of health care fraud in the second degree when such person, on one or more occasions, commits the crime of health care fraud in the fifth degree and the payment or portion of the payment wrongfully received, as the case may be, from a single health plan, in a period of not more than one year, exceeds fifty thousand dollars in the aggregate.
Health care fraud in the second degree is a class C felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2006, c. 442, § 9, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 177.25
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 177. Health Care Fraud
§ 177.25 Health care fraud in the first degree
A person is guilty of health care fraud in the first degree when such person, on one or more occasions, commits the crime of health care fraud in the fifth degree and the payment or portion of the payment wrongfully received, as the case may be, from a single health plan, in a period of not more than one year, exceeds one million dollars in the aggregate.
Health care fraud in the first degree is a class B felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2006, c. 442, § 9, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 177.30
Effective: November 1, 2006
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 177. Health Care Fraud
§ 177.30 Health care fraud; affirmative defense
In any prosecution under this article, it shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant was a clerk, bookkeeper or other employee, other than an employee charged with the active management and control, in an executive capacity, of the affairs of the corporation, who, without personal benefit, merely executed the orders of his or her employer or of a superior employee generally authorized to direct his or her activities.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.2006, c. 442, § 9, eff. Nov. 1, 2006.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 178.00
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 178. Criminal Diversion of Prescription Medications and Prescriptions
§ 178.00 Criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions; definitions
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. “Prescription medication or device” means any article for which a prescription is required in order to be lawfully sold, delivered or distributed by any person authorized by law to engage in the practice of the profession of pharmacy.
2. “Prescription” means a direction or authorization by means of a written prescription form or an oral prescription which permits a person to lawfully obtain a prescription medication or device from any person authorized to dispense such prescription medication or device.
3. “Criminal diversion act” means an act or acts in which a person knowingly:
(a) transfers or delivers, in exchange for anything of pecuniary value, a prescription medication or device with knowledge or reasonable grounds to know that the recipient has no medical need for it; or
(b) receives, in exchange for anything of pecuniary value, a prescription medication or device with knowledge or reasonable grounds to know that the seller or transferor is not authorized by law to sell or transfer such prescription medication or device; or
(c) transfers or delivers a prescription in exchange for anything of pecuniary value; or
(d) receives a prescription in exchange for anything of pecuniary value.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 94.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 178.05
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 178. Criminal Diversion of Prescription Medications and Prescriptions
§ 178.05 Criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions; limitation
1. The provisions of this article shall not apply to:
(a) a duly licensed physician or other person authorized to issue a prescription acting in good faith in the lawful course of his or her profession; or
(b) a duly licensed pharmacist acting in good faith in the lawful course of the practice of pharmacy; or
(c) a person acting in good faith seeking treatment for a medical condition or assisting another person to obtain treatment for a medical condition.
2. No provision of this article relating to the sale of a prescription medication or device shall be deemed to authorize any act prohibited by article thirty-three of the public health law or article two hundred twenty of this chapter.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 94.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 178.10
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 178. Criminal Diversion of Prescription Medications and Prescriptions
§ 178.10 Criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions in the fourth degree
A person is guilty of criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions in the fourth degree when he or she commits a criminal diversion act.
Criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions in the fourth degree is a class A misdemeanor.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 94.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 178.15
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 178. Criminal Diversion of Prescription Medications and Prescriptions
§ 178.15 Criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions in the third degree
A person is guilty of criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions in the third degree when he or she:
1. commits a criminal diversion act, and the value of the benefit exchanged is in excess of one thousand dollars; or
2. commits the crime of criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions in the fourth degree, and has previously been convicted of the crime of criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions in the fourth degree.
Criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions in the third degree is a class E felony.
CREDIT(S)
(Added L.1995, c. 81, § 94.)
Current through L.2013, chapter 28.
McKinney's Penal Law § 178.20
Effective:[See Text Amendments]
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated Currentness
Penal Law (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 40. Of the Consolidated Laws (Refs & Annos)
Part Three. Specific Offenses
Title K. Offenses Involving Fraud
Article 178. Criminal Diversion of Prescription Medications and Prescriptions
§ 178.20 Criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions in the second degree
A person is guilty of criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions in the second degree when he or she commits a criminal diversion act, and the value of the benefit exchanged is in excess of three thousand dollars.
Criminal diversion of prescription medications and prescriptions