PROCEDURE, POLITICS AND POWER: THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

Stephen B. Burbank*

INTRODUCTION

It is a privilege and a source of great personal satisfaction to participate in a festschrift honoring David Shapiro, whose influence on the fields of federal courts and civil procedure—through his scholarship, teaching, and colleagueship—has been pronounced, enduring, and thoroughly constructive. Equipped with a penetrating intelligence and a wry sense of humor, David is a brilliant scholar, a thoughtful and subtle critic, a generous colleague, and a loyal friend.

David seems always to bring out the best in those around him, encouraging the search for truth, gently deflating pretension, and, by force of luminous example, demonstrating that the path to progress lies neither in raw power, intellectual or political, nor in situational expedience, but rather in hard work, in good faith, for the common weal. His is the voice of sweet reason. David’s quiet and courageous example in confronting and mastering health problems has inspired those who regard him as a mentor, as I do, reminding us how fortunate we are to hear that voice and how important it is to listen.

It may seem odd to dedicate an article about procedure, politics and

© 2004 Stephen B. Burbank

* David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This Article elaborates presentations made at a June 2003 Conference on Civil Procedure sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools and at an Ad Hoc Faculty Workshop of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. I particularly appreciate the comments and suggestions of Morris Arnold, Lawrence Baum, Edward Becker, Charles Geyh, Nathaniel Persily, Louis Pollak, Judith Resnik, Kim Scheppele, Anthony Scirica, Catherine Struve, and Stephen Subrin. Peter McCabe, John Rabiej and James Ishida of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts provided generous assistance and patiently responded to numerous questions. Andrew Bradt, Harvard Law School class of 2005, provided excellent research assistance.
power to a scholar so prominently associated with great traditions of legal scholarship—and in that sense, so old-fashioned—as David Shapiro. Yet, the opportunity to write on this subject in his honor seemed to me a fine way to emphasize what is wrong with the picture of procedural lawmaking for the federal courts that emerges from this work. To be sure, my approach is not, or at least not exclusively, old-fashioned in the above sense, since I attempt to deploy the insights of disciplines in addition to law. At the end of the day, however, my conclusions resonate with the lessons of David’s life in the academy: neither unvarnished power nor unvarnished reason is the answer to our current dilemmas, and if we sincerely desire progress in the public interest, rather than personal, partisan, or institutional advantage, we must proceed with respect for others and for our traditions, and with humility.

If one is to reckon with power, it is necessary to know where it lies and to take its measure. For that reason, in Part I of this Article, I seek to identify the seats of power with respect to federal procedural law and to do so without romance. A clear-eyed view that is informed by precedent and history leaves little doubt that Congress holds the cards and that the questions of moment are, therefore, whether, when, and after what process of consultation it should play them.

I turn in Part II to a brief history of the congressional role in fashioning procedural law for the federal courts, hoping thereby to tap its power in helping us to understand the past and to navigate the future. A broad historical view—one that does not proceed as if history began in 1934 and ended in 1973—confirms the analysis in Part I and, by revealing the changes that have taken place over the long run, lays the groundwork for a better understanding of the causal influences and normative implications of those changes.

With these preludes to the main event, I devote most of my effort, in Part III, to trying to tease out what has changed, and why, in the relationship between Congress, the federal courts, and the federal judiciary in the regulation of procedure. I perceive important changes in (1) the ways in which procedure is viewed by the bar, the academy and the public, affecting the jurisprudential and political landscapes of which Congress and the federal judiciary (and also the Executive Branch) are a part and to which they respond; (2) the rulemakers, their identity and interests, and the rulemaking process; and (3) Congress’s ability and incentives to monitor procedural lawmaking by the judiciary and to make such law itself. Intersecting with, and at critical points contributing to, all of these changes are others that I also discuss, including changes in the bar and in the federal judiciary as an institution.

Much as I admire David and have benefited from his scholarship and counsel, there is no mistaking our personalities or our scholarly voices. We
have forged different paths, and in different ways, to our respective visions of the truth. I am mindful, therefore, that he will not agree with some of what is set down here. Particularly because this is a work in progress, part of an ongoing project on procedure and power, I can only hope to be worthy of his continuing counsel, as I know I will be blessed with his continuing friendship.

I. THE SEATS OF POWER

Careful consideration of judicial independence from an interdisciplinary perspective has prompted recognition of the weakness of the federal judiciary’s defenses against congressional determination to control or influence its decisions. Life tenure subject only to removal from office through the impeachment process, protection against diminution of compensation while in office, and the other protections of Article III, such as they are, leave Congress free, were it so inclined, to use a host of other methods to work its will: from court stripping, to court packing, to jurisdiction stripping or other jurisdictional regulation, to refusal to authorize (or fill) judgeships required to keep pace with a growing workload, to slow budgetary starvation.

Fortunately, over the years since the Founding, Congress has rarely used the blunt instruments that are available, and when it has done so, there has usually been widespread agreement that such use was a mistake. Indeed, it seems plausible that, as Professor Geyh has argued, there have developed constitutional customs or norms against the use of most of these instruments of power—customs or norms that, on a realistic view, may be

---


Apart from habeas corpus and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which have special status under the Constitution, if we accept the inviolability of a final federal judgment in a particular case, on the one hand, and Congress’ power to change substantive federal law prospectively, on the other, the scope of debate regarding changes in the jurisdiction or powers of the federal courts that would implicate core federal judicial independence should be confined to (1) the judicial power to interpret and implement the Constitution, and (2) the irreducible powers of federal courts to act as such.

Id. (footnotes omitted). For a recent decision falling between the two hands, and upholding congressional power to impose an automatic stay of prospective injunctive relief in prison conditions litigation, see Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).

more important to the actual health of federal judicial independence than the formal protections the Constitution affords. It also seems plausible that the practical unavailability of blunt instruments to control or influence the federal judiciary is one reason for the greater perceived importance of the appointment process for federal court judges, as to which a custom or norm of senatorial acquiescence in presidential nominations has never developed.

The same careful consideration of the seats of power is important when the subject is not federal judicial independence but the regulation of procedure in the federal courts. Indeed, the two subjects may be thought to be related. Moreover, just as understanding judicial independence requires careful unpacking, so, in considering the status and relationship of the respective powers of Congress, the federal courts, and the federal judiciary in the regulation of procedure, precise analysis requires numerous distinctions. The inability to perceive (or acknowledge the importance of) such distinctions is one reason why some discussions of the question, and in particular of the role of the inherent powers of federal courts, are so thoroughly unsatisfactory. Another reason may be the incentive of any

---


institution (and/or of those who champion that institution) to prefer ambiguity when clarity might diminish its power or prestige.7

The critically important distinctions for these purposes are those (1) between procedure fashioned (or applied as precedent) in decisional law and that provided prospectively in court rules, (2) between local court rules (for the regulation of proceedings in the promulgating court) and supervisory court rules (for the regulation of procedure in inferior courts), and (3) between inherent power in the weak sense (the power to act in the absence of congressional authorization) and inherent power in the strong sense (the power to act in contravention of congressional prescription).

The lawmaking powers of Congress under Article I, including its powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause in aid of its own powers and of the Article III judicial power, enable Congress to make prospective law throughout the broad field of procedure.8 This has been the consistently held and oft-articulated view of the Supreme Court since at least 1825,9 which means that, even if the Court’s statements are, as a scholar has claimed, dicta,10 they are very old and tenacious dicta. They are also surely correct as a matter of constitutional law. Indeed, the puzzle

---

7 See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628 (2002) (arguing that while ambiguity serves a legislative purpose, it frustrates the efforts of judges and scholars to “extract functional meaning”).

8 “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The “foregoing Powers” include, in turn, the powers both to enact rules of substantive law in areas of federal competence and to “constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.” Id. Note, moreover, that some statutory procedural provisions can be justified without reference to the Necessary and Proper Clause. For a recent decision upholding a statutory ban on the discovery or admissibility of certain information as a proper exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power, see Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129 (2003). The Court found that it was not necessary to reach the question whether the provisions in question “could also be a proper exercise of Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Id. at 147 n.9.


10 See Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1327–28.
is not where Congress gets its power, but rather, particularly in the case of supervisory court rules, how the exercise of a power to promulgate prospective, legislation-like rules can be squared with the grant of judicial power in Article III.11

This probably helps to explain why, although (as of 1982) the Supreme Court had “never satisfactorily explained... the place of court rulemaking in our constitutional framework,”12 it had consistently espoused the view that Congress may delegate its legislative power over procedure, and that Congress did so in the various enabling acts granting rulemaking power to federal courts.

[The theory of delegated legislative power] has not easily won acceptance in the literature. During the campaign for the uniform federal procedure bill and the national movement for court rulemaking, arguments were increasingly made that courts possessed the inherent power to regulate procedure by court rules and to do so even in the teeth of contrary legislative direction. To be sure, such arguments often reflected the passion of the reformer more than the detachment of the scholar, ignoring distinctions between local and supervisory rules of court and between rules of court promulgated in a legislative vacuum and rules of court contravening statutes; but they were, and are persistent.13

11 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 44–55 (1977). Note that this discussion concerns prospective procedural lawmaking, not procedure fashioned (or applied as precedent) in the context of deciding a case.


The Supreme Court has never satisfactorily explained—indeed it has hardly discussed—the place of court rulemaking in our constitutional framework. The early cases, starting with Wayman v. Southard, in which the sources and limits of the rulemaking power were treated, set a pattern of ambiguity that has not been departed from. Not even the power of federal courts to regulate procedure by court rules in the absence of legislative authorization, power assumed to exist in the 1926 Senate Report [on the bill that became the Rules Enabling Act of 1934], is made clear in those cases, and it has not been made clear since.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

13 Id. at 1116 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 1021 n.19 (listing articles discussing whether the Supreme Court has inherent power to promulgate procedural rules for lower courts). Perhaps this is not surprising, given the controversy surrounding legislative delegation more generally.

The reader should recall that those who framed our system of government adopted no explicit limitations on the scope and manner of legislative delegation. Madison and his contemporaries foresaw little danger from congressmen giving up too much of their power.... Dangers arising from the natural inclinations of legislatures understandably received attention, whereas those arising from legislatures acting contrary to their supposed natural inclinations were ignored.
The intervening twenty years since these words were written have witnessed a major decision exploring (and, one would have thought, clarifying) the constitutional landscape of rulemaking, but that has not weakened the resistance of some to the evident implications of the dominant theory of court rulemaking when the existence of power has been more than a theoretical question. Alas, the passage of time also has not improved the quality or detachment of the arguments against the traditional theory.

Whatever else one may think about the Court’s decision in *Mistretta v. United States*, it would appear to make legally untenable the notion that court rulemaking is an inherent judicial power. To the contrary, the Court was at pains to justify court rulemaking as not “inherently nonjudicial,” and thus as capable of being delegated to the judiciary. “[R]ulemaking power,” the Court acknowledged, “originates in the Legislative Branch and becomes an executive function only when delegated by the Legislature to the Executive Branch.” By parity of reasoning, it becomes a judicial function only when delegated by the legislature to the judicial branch.

Undeterred, in a series of articles in the 1990s Professor Mullenix argued that the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) both authorized unconstitutional rulemaking and was itself an unconstitutional abridgment of separation of powers. These articles manifest virtually total blindness...
to the light of history, or at least history before 1934. Thus, Senator Thomas Walsh, who for twenty years successfully opposed the bill that ultimately became the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, would not be alone in being astonished to learn that the bill he opposed (and that was ultimately enacted) “governs and limits congressional rulemaking” or that it contains a “central prohibitive feature... that Congress may enact substantive laws, but that the judicial branch promulgates procedural rules.”

and inconsistency of her previous articles concerning the CJRA, the author backtracked but tried to hold her ground. Thus, she was forced to acknowledge that local advisory groups established pursuant to the CJRA did not, as she had seemed to claim, have de jure rulemaking power, but she argued that they had de facto power. See Mullenix, supra note 5, at 748–50. In addition, she indignantly rejected the notion (fairly derived from statements such as those quoted in the text infra accompanying notes 22–23) that she (or anyone) had claimed exclusive procedural rulemaking power for the courts. See id. at 745, 746 n.57. In the footnote, Professor Mullenix rediscovered and relied on the congressional review provision that she had earlier said was eliminated in 1988. See infra note 24. Finally, by way of example, Professor Mullenix entirely missed Professor Redish’s point about “preemptive” congressional action—which goes to the type of “inherent power” involved. Compare Mullenix, supra note 5, at 750, with Redish, supra, at 727–28. Instead, she tried to hide behind a substance/procedure dichotomy that is, for these purposes, irrelevant. Fixation on that dichotomy explains her earlier citation of Mistretta for the proposition that “[p]rior to the [CJRA], the crucial conceptual distinction relating to the allocation of rulemaking authority was between substantive and procedural matters.” Mullenix, supra, at 429. But see Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1312 (“The Court in Mistretta nowhere acknowledges the central prohibitive feature of the Rules Enabling Act: that Congress may enact substantive laws, but that the judicial branch promulgates procedural rules.”).

20 See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 5, at 745–46.

21 Senator Walsh’s “expressed doubts about the validity of supervisory rules of court even when authorized by Congress remained a threat to the entire enterprise throughout.” Burbank, supra note 12, at 1117.

22 Mullenix, supra note 19, at 427.

23 Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1312. See id. at 1330 (arguing that the Enabling Act codifies a constitutional limitation “that prevents Congress from compromising the constitutional independence of the judiciary by invading the inherent power of the judiciary to create rules of practice and procedure for the courts”). But see Lauren Robel, Fractured Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1447, 1472–83 (1994) (arguing that the CJRA does not violate separation of powers or statutory limits on congressional rulemaking). For an account of the legislative process yielding the CJRA that is radically different from that offered by Professor Mullenix (and in my view much more accurate), see John Burritt McArthur, Inter-Branch Politics and the Judicial Resistance to Federal Civil Justice Reform, 33 U.S.F. L. Rev. 551 (1999); and see also Christopher E. Smith, Judicial Self-Interest: Federal Judges and Court Administration 23–39 (1995) (documenting the process that led to the Judicial Improvements Act); and McArthur, supra, at 555 (“Yet one of the CJRA’s most striking features is how often Congress deferred to the courts.”).
The supporters of the bill would also be astonished. The heart of the difficulty with these articles, however, is their failure to draw the distinctions referred to earlier, and to do so in the light of history.

Congress’s power to prescribe procedure for the federal courts is shared with the federal courts to the extent that it covers matters subject to the power of the latter to make law when deciding cases, which is the only power that can without difficulty be deemed inherently judicial for these purposes under Article III. Moreover, Congress not only may choose to delegate its power to make prospective procedural law to the judiciary; it may choose to eschew both statutory procedural law and delegations to fashion court rules in favor of, and to displace federal common law (judge-made) procedure with, state law, borrowed as federal law. Congress has done both at various times since the Founding. Perhaps most important for present purposes, (1) I am not aware that the federal courts have ever promulgated either local or supervisory court rules for civil cases without legislative authorization; (2) the Supreme Court never exercised its delegated power to promulgate supervisory court rules for actions at law,

24 See S. REP. NO. 69-1174, at 7 (1926):
But the bill proposed will not deprive Congress of the power, if an occasion should arise, to regulate court practice, for it is not predicated upon the theory that the courts have inherent power to make rules of practice beyond the power of Congress to amend or repeal. On the contrary, Congress may revise the rules made by the Supreme Court, or by legislation may modify or entirely withdraw the delegation of power to that body. In that sense the bill is experimental. It gives to the court the power to initiate a reformed Federal procedure without the surrender of the legislative power to correct an unsatisfactory exercise of that power.

Id. (emphasis added); see Burbank, supra note 12, at 1117; Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 851 n.79 (1993). For a strange interpretation of this passage (which the author selectively quotes), see Mullenix, supra note 19, at 427–28.

In addition, most law students would be astonished to learn that, in the 1988 amendments to the Rules Enabling Acts, “Congress deleted all references to congressional oversight of the judicial rulemaking process.” Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1331. Professor Mullenix appears not to have noticed that the “oversight” provision was moved from 28 U.S.C. § 2072 to § 2074. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (2000); infra note 79. In this (and if so, ironically) she may have been misled by Professor Redish, who had made the same mistake. See Redish, supra note 14, at 316 n.88. She appears later to have realized the problem. See Mullenix, supra note 5, at 746 n.57 (“Congress has always retained ultimate authority under the Rules Enabling Act to overrule specific rules promulgated by the Court.”). Of course, if supervisory court rulemaking were an inherent judicial power, such congressional oversight might be unconstitutional. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 343 (2000).

25 See Burbank, supra note 12, at 1036–40. This is not to say that court rules have never exceeded the authority conferred.
first conferred in 1792, prior to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934;\textsuperscript{26} and (3) for more than sixty years, federal courts hearing actions at law were required to apply state procedural law, “any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding,”\textsuperscript{27} unless a federal statute provided a pertinent rule.\textsuperscript{28}

More generally, unlike the judiciaries of some states,\textsuperscript{29} the federal courts have very little inherent judicial power in the strong sense—power that prevails as against a conflicting legislative prescription. In order to qualify as such for a federal court the power must be “necessary to the exercise of all others.”\textsuperscript{30} The federal courts do have substantial inherent power in the weak sense—power to make procedural law and “to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties”\textsuperscript{31} in the course of deciding cases, in the absence of

\textsuperscript{26} See id. at 1039–40.

\textsuperscript{27} Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197. This provision co-existed, however, with continuing statutory authority to fashion local rules “in any manner not inconsistent with any law of the United States . . . .” Rev. Stat., ch. 18, § 918 (1878). See Shepard v. Adams, 168 U.S. 618, 625 (1898). According to Professor Dobie,

the broad rule to be deduced from the cases . . . seems to be that the District Courts cannot by rules set at naught the Conformity Act as to the important substance and broad general methods of state practice, but that, as to what are deemed minor details and comparatively unimportant phases of procedure, the District Courts may make valid rules, when this seems necessary for the prevention of delay or the substantial administration of justice.

\textsuperscript{28} See, e.g., Amy v. Watertown, 130 U.S. 301, 304 (1889).


\textsuperscript{30} United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). See Young v. United States \textit{ex rel.} Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 799 (1987) (“However, while the exercise of the contempt power is subject to reasonable regulation, ‘the attributes which inhere in that power and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative.’”); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ex parte} Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312–14 (1920) (recognizing an inherent power to appoint an auditor in absence of congressional authorization or prohibition). See also, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–33 (1962) (recognizing an inherent power of court to dismiss sua sponte for failure to prosecute). Much as I admire the care, and much as I am in sympathy with the general tenor, of Professor Pushaw’s analysis of inherent power, see Pushaw, \textit{supra} note 6, I am not sure that he adequately treats for these purposes the difference between rules formulated in the context of a case and prospective rulemaking, whether local or supervisory. I am also skeptical about his analysis of nonindispensable (beneficial) powers. See id. at 848–49. Functionally, our difference of view disappears the
congressional authorization. And it is true that one can find scattered assertions of inherent power to make procedural law by court rules, local and supervisory. Inevitably, however, one finds that those assertions are toothless, both because they described a power in fact conferred by statute, and in any event because they never purported to describe a power to proceed in the teeth of a statute. One may even find that what appears to be an assertion of inherent power is merely an unattributed quotation from statutory authority.

It is thus difficult, in light of history and doctrine, to justify federal local court rulemaking in civil cases as an exercise of inherent power even in the weak sense, both because court rulemaking ill fits within the category of judicial power to resolve cases or controversies under Article

more generally one defines what he calls implied indispensable powers, and his definition seems very broad indeed. See id. at 847. In any event, one benefit of my approach is that it avoids line drawing that, perhaps inescapably, has the odor of essentialism. See id. at 855 n.620.  

32 This power is cabined by supervisory court rules for the district courts and the courts of appeals. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 83; Fed. R. App. P. 47. Cf. Link, 370 U.S. at 631–32 (“It would require a much clearer expression of purpose than Rule 41 (b) provides for us to assume that it was intended to abrogate so well-acknowledged a proposition.”).

33 See, e.g., Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500, 505 (1938) (dictum) (“Equity Rule 38 . . . was adopted in the exercise of the authority conferred on this Court by R.S. § 913, and of its own inherent power to regulate by rules ‘the modes of proceeding in suits of equity.’”); In re Hien, 166 U.S. 432, 436–37 (1897) (dictum) (“The general rule undoubtedly is that courts of justice possess the inherent power to make and frame reasonable rules not conflicting with express statute; but apart from that we think it is clear that the Court of Appeals was duly authorized by . . . the act creating the court . . . to make rules limiting the time of taking appeals . . . .”); Burbank, supra note 12, at 1115 n.455.


Take, for instance, Hecker [sic] v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123 (1865) . . . where the Court stated, “Circuit courts, as well as all other Federal courts, have authority to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States.” Id. at 128 (emphasis added). The case is cited for the proposition that the federal courts possess inherent power to make rules. . . . Of course, even if the Court had been asserting inherent power, it was power subject to congressional override. But the Court was not asserting any inherent power at all. Rather, it was, in the italicized language, directly quoting the Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83.  

Id. Professor Mullenix asserts that “[f]ederal courts have thus recognized a variety of powers as inherent, including the power to . . . promulgate rules of practice.” Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1321. In the footnote she cites Heckers and secondary literature relying on it, while noting in a parenthetical to a “but see” citation of the above article that I “refut[ed] [the] proposition that Heckers supports inherent rulemaking power in the federal courts,” and without assimilating the information I provided (elided from the above quotation) as to the correct name and date of decision of the case. Id. at 1321 n.187.
III, and because there have always been statutory authorizations when the federal courts have exercised such power. It is at least as difficult, but it has also never been necessary, to bring within that protection supervisory court rulemaking.\textsuperscript{35} It is quite impossible to carry an argument that either local or supervisory court rulemaking represents an exercise of inherent power in the strong sense and thus trumps a contrary legislative direction. To conclude otherwise is to ignore not only almost two centuries of Supreme Court precedent but also more than sixty years of experience under the Conformity Act of 1872. It is, moreover, to suggest that those who struggled so long and hard for the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 were wasting their time because the Court could have proceeded without congressional authorization and in the teeth of the Conformity Act. Professor Wigmore, who suggested as much,\textsuperscript{36} should have stuck to evidence, and Professor Mullenix has moved on to other matters where her considerable talents are better displayed.

If Congress chooses to exercise its power, it has the last word on matters of procedure, subject only to the specific limitations of the Constitution (i.e., in the Bill of Rights) and to a limitation that, although difficult to phrase precisely, prevents Congress, as a matter of separation of powers, from depriving the federal courts of powers that are necessary for them to act as such under Article III when deciding cases.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{35} But see James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1602 (2001) (“Apart from the powers that inhere in the nature of courts as such, Article III may contemplate a special role for the Supreme Court of the United States as the constitutionally mandated leader of a hierarchical judicial department.”). Professor Pfander acknowledges that “[o]ne can hardly defend the promulgation of such rules [under the Enabling Act] as an instance of adjudication that fits within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.” Id. at 1602–03. “But,” he continues, “we have long grown accustomed to the idea that the Court’s judicial power embraces authority to fashion such rules, particularly pursuant to congressional delegation.” Id. at 1603. There are two problems with the latter formulation. First, the Court itself has been at pains, consistently since at least 1825, to disclaim any such theory of court rulemaking, including supervisory court rulemaking. See supra text accompanying notes 12–17. Second, as Professor Pfander elsewhere acknowledges, the Court has had statutory authority for its rulemaking from the beginning, see Pfander, supra, at 1601 n.365, which renders peculiar his use of the word, “particularly.” That usage would also be peculiar if the only point were that supervisory court rulemaking is not so “nonjudicial” as to render Congress’s delegations unconstitutional, the point that the Court was anxious to establish in Mistretta. See supra text accompanying note 15. Note, however, that this (very small) part of Professor Pfander’s article is avowedly speculative, and disagreement on this point does not detract from my admiration for the whole, which rescues Marbury from many of its critics by close attention to text and history.

\textsuperscript{36} See John H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928).

\textsuperscript{37} See supra text accompanying note 30. A bill introduced in the House in February
The fact that an actor has power does not mean that it should be exercised. Yet progress is not well served by accounts of either legal or political arrangements that obscure reality in wishful thinking or that confuse what is deemed normatively appropriate with that which the law or other instruments of social ordering provide or permit.\textsuperscript{38} Such accounts are not only analytically unsatisfying; they may encourage reliance by those whose power is in question and hence lead to confrontation, with potentially serious consequences for the polity.\textsuperscript{39} Ambiguity can be useful in connection with the ordering of institutional power as it can in the construction (in both sense of that word) of statutes.\textsuperscript{40} It is not a scholar’s job, however, to create ambiguity where none exists. If realism about procedure and power suggests inadequate defenses against improvident lawmaking, the answer lies in custom, dialogue, compromise, and statesmanship; it lies, in a word, in politics.\textsuperscript{41}

\textit{2003} that would directly amend Appellate Rule 49 to require written opinions in certain cases, H.R. 700, 108th Cong. (2003), would present an interesting test of this limitation. \textit{Cf.} Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 350 (2000) (“[W]e have no occasion to consider whether there could be a time constraint [on judicial decisionmaking] that was so severe that it implicated these structural separation of powers concerns.”). Like most bills that would directly affect the judiciary’s powers and prerogatives, however, it is unlikely to go anywhere (there has been no reported action since it was referred to a subcommittee in March 2003). \textit{See infra} text accompanying note 95.

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Cf. Burbank, supra} note 2, at 333 (“[I]t simply will not do to read into constitutions protections that are not there or to pretend that informal norms will last forever.”).


Far worse, however, is to tell Congress what it may hear as an assertion that it has no constitutional business concerning itself with matters that, notwithstanding the labels we affix to them, have attracted sustained political interest. In any event, the strategy [of the federal judiciary in opposing the CJRA] backfired, eliciting equally fatuous claims of exclusive legislative power in the Senate Report on the CJRA.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra} note 7. The ambiguity that characterizes most invocations and discussions of “inherent judicial power” is also characteristic of cases and commentary involving the so-called “supervisory power.” \textit{See supra} note 35; Sara Sun Beale, \textit{Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts}, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (1984) (“But the Court has never fully explored the source of and the inherent limitations on either its own supervisory powers or those of the lower federal courts.”).


Fifteen years ago, “law is nothing more than politics” was a common refrain in law schools, and that view remains a staple of political science studies of human behavior. For [Judge Edward] Becker, the refrain is not a counsel of despair because for him, law is equally nothing less than politics: the art of seeking to improve the human condition through intelligence, patience, persuasion, and
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE

It is possible to tell the story of congressional regulation of federal procedure in many different ways. Acknowledging that any attempt to divide that history into discrete periods will inevitably be freighted with premises or assumptions that are disputable, it is probably not seriously misleading, at least for descriptive purposes, to work with three periods. Those periods are 1789 to 1934, 1934 to 1973, and 1973 to the present.42

A. 1789 to 1934

The period from 1789 to 1934 was characterized by statutory directions to the federal courts to apply state procedural law,43 either as of a certain date44 or, after the Conformity Act of 1872,45 dynamically, in civil actions at law, with delegations to the federal courts of the power to vary state procedure by local or supervisory rules.46 The grants of local rulemaking power were circumscribed from time to time in areas of demonstrated friction, such as final remedies,47 and the Supreme Court compromise.

42 Professor Geyh identified the same periods in discussing the judiciary’s role in procedural rule reform. See Charles G. Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1184–91 (1996).

43 See, e.g., Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94; Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.

44 See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 32 (1825) (interpreting the Process Act of 1792 to require static conformity to state procedure as of 1789); Burbank, supra note 12, at 1037. In 1828, subject to the exceptions discussed infra note 47, the basic obligation of static conformity as of 1789 was continued for the original states, with static conformity required as of 1828 for states admitted between 1789 and 1828. See Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278. For states admitted after 1828, see Charles Warren, Federal Process and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. REV. 421, 445 (1930).

45 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197; Burbank, supra note 12, at 1039.

46 See Act of August 23, 1842, ch. 188, § 6, 5 Stat. 516, 518; Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, § 1, 4 Stat. 278, 278; Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 7, 1 Stat. 333, 335; Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276; Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17(b), 1 Stat. 73, 83; Julius Goebel, History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, at 550–51 (1971) (documenting the debate leading to the Act of March 2, 1793); Burbank, supra note 12, at 1037 n.90.

47 See Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197; Act of May 19, 1828, ch. 68, § 3, 4 Stat. 278, 281. The 1828 statute, which responded to the controversy caused by the Court’s decision in Wayman avoiding the application of Kentucky debtor-relief legislation, required conformity to state law on “writs of execution and other final process issued on judgments” as of 1828 (rather than 1789 or the date of admission), with power to conform to (but not to vary) changes made in state law thereafter by court rule. The Conformity Act of 1872 contained a similar provision, applicable to both provisional and final remedies, requiring static conformity as of 1872, but with the federal courts empowered to adopt subsequent state laws in general rules. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
never exercised its power to promulgate supervisory court rules for actions at law. The Conformity Act effectively withdrew most local court rulemaking power for actions at law and “enjoined continued inactivity” by the Supreme Court.

During this first period, Congress authorized the federal courts to fashion procedural law for suits in equity and admiralty, including by local and supervisory court rules. Congress presumably eschewed conformity in equity because, even if it would have been desirable, “in 1789 equity was either non-existent or undeveloped in the courts of many of the states.”

Thus, the Temporary Process Act of 1789 provided that “the forms and modes of proceedings in causes of equity . . . shall be according to the course of the civil law . . . .” Under the Process Act of 1792, process and proceedings in equity were to be “according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity . . . as contradistinguished from courts of common law,” and they were made subject to alteration by both local and supervisory rules. Procedure in federal suits in equity was governed by supervisory court rules promulgated by the Supreme Court from 1822.


See supra text accompanying note 26.

See supra note 12, at 1040. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The lower federal courts were, however, permitted to adopt post-1872 state laws on provisional and final remedies by court rule. See supra note 47. Moreover, the “Court’s authority to promulgate court rules in equity and admiralty was not affected by the Conformity Act of 1872 and was specifically continued by section 917 of the Revised Statutes of 1878.” Burbank, supra note 12, at 1040 n.105. See infra text accompanying notes 50–53.


See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94.

See Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.

See 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) xvii (1822). The Court brought out revised Equity Rules in 1842, see 44 U.S. (3 How.) xli (1842), and again in 1912. See 226 U.S. 627 (1912). For the history of admiralty procedure, see Hart & Wechsler, supra note 50, at 603–04. For supervisory Admiralty Rules, see 254 U.S. 671 (1921); and 44 U.S. (3 How.) ix (1844).

“The 1921 rules, in turn, were frequently amended until in 1966 admiralty procedure was merged with civil procedure.” Hart & Wechsler, supra note 50, at 604 (citing Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1029 (1966)). On bankruptcy procedure, see id. at 604–05.
Finally, the extent of statutory procedural law for the federal courts during the first period is a matter of perspective (as well as definition). Any generalization is hazardous without an independent review of the statute books. Failing that, lists of federal procedural rules trumping or not subject to the obligation of conformity that were compiled before the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 or before the Supreme Court acted thereunder provide one basis for judgment. Yet, those compiling some such lists had an incentive to paint with a broad brush, whether to persuade others of the failure of the Conformity Act or of the need for a comprehensive response to the Enabling Act’s delegation. Writing in 1928, Professor Dobie observed that the Conformity Act “is easily the most important single statute in the field of procedure at law . . . and most of the law in that field turns on the applicability of its provisions. This is true, though numerous federal statutes control various details of that procedure.”

54 The Committee of the American Bar Association that led the campaign for Supreme Court rulemaking in actions at law for twenty years compiled a list of “fifty-odd notable exceptions to conformity . . .” Report of the Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure, 6 A.B.A. J. 509, 514 (1920). Many of these exceptions were judge-made, however, and not required by federal statute. See id. at 525–27 app. E; see also Burbank, supra note 12, at 1041 n.109 (noting that the list became “standard fare in [the Committee’s annual] reports”); id. at 1067–68 (“From 1920 through 1929, the core of the ABA Committee’s annual report remained the same from year to year.”).


Since Congress has legislated upon a large number of matters, such as the disregarding of defects of form and allowance of amendment, consolidation of cases of a like nature, when the right to litigate in forma pauperis exists, when and how service by publication may be had, the time when the defendant in a removed case must plead, and so on in a wide variety of situations, this last exception is a large one. Charles E. Clark, The Challenge of a New Federal Civil Procedure, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 443, 451–52 (1935).

56 The existence of “statutory provisions regulating particular aspects of federal court procedure . . . rendering complete conformity to state law impossible, furnished an arrow in the quiver of those who sought to replace the Conformity Act of 1872 with rulemaking by the Supreme Court.” Stephen B. Burbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for International Civil Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1994, at 103, 106 (footnote omitted).

57 “The power thus granted to the Court affords an unusual opportunity for introducing effective measures of reform in law administration into our most extended court system and of developing a procedure which may properly be a model to all the states.” Clark & Moore, supra note 55, at 387.

58 Dobie, supra note 27, at 584. A review of the chapter of his handbook analyzing procedure at law in the district courts reveals statutory regulation of the following subjects (or in the following areas), among others: process (form, service, and amendment); amendment of pleadings and remedies for defects of form; qualifications, selection, and
B. 1934 to 1973

The second period, from 1934 to 1973, brought the long-sought delegated power to the Supreme Court to promulgate supervisory court rules for actions at law, with authority (that was exercised) to combine them with the pre-existing supervisory rules for suits in equity (the last revision of which, in 1912, both spurred the movement for the Enabling Act and served as the primary model for the Federal Rules ultimately authorized thereby). Congress did not block the originally proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any subsequent amendments to such Rules during this period, and the Supreme Court did not declare invalid any Federal Rule, having come close to doing so in the first case in which it considered the Enabling Act’s limitations.

After the Federal Rules were effective, most previously enacted

waiver of jury; formal requirements of bills of exceptions; mode of proof; motions for new trial, and contempt. See id. at 591–658.


60 For the provenance of section 2 of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, which Chief Justice Taft drafted in 1923, see Burbank, supra note 12, at 1071–76.


63 Burbank, supra note 12, at 1178:

Since the Court [in Sibbach v. Wilson] acknowledged the attacks on Rule 35 in the 1938 House and Senate Hearings on the proposed Rules, its statement that “no effort was made to eliminate it” must be taken to characterize the results of the congressional review process. So viewed, the statement is, at best, misleading. The House Judiciary Committee recommended that the proposed civil rules be permitted to go into effect. In the Senate, on the other hand, a determined effort was made, supported by the Senate Judiciary Committee, not to eliminate one or more of the proposed Rules deemed substantive, but to postpone the effective date of the entire package so that Congress might give it “thorough study and examination.” The effort failed in the Senate, in part, it may be assumed, because it came up in a “late hour of the session,” and in part because the attitude toward the proposed Rules in the House made it unlikely that both bodies would agree.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

statutory procedural law was either superseded (through the Rules Enabling Act’s supersession clause)\textsuperscript{65} or repealed in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code,\textsuperscript{66} or both, and Congress largely abstained from making new statutory procedural law.\textsuperscript{67}

The honeymoon lasted for more than thirty years and produced subsequent grants of rulemaking authority for both criminal\textsuperscript{68} and civil (e.g., appellate rules)\textsuperscript{69} cases, as well as attendant supersession of statutory law.\textsuperscript{70} Moreover, in 1958, two years after the Court discharged the advisory committee on civil rules, Congress gave to the Judicial Conference responsibility to “carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in use as prescribed by the Supreme Court”\textsuperscript{71} and to recommend changes in


\textsuperscript{66} See James Wm. Moore, Moore’s Judicial Code ¶ 0.03(10), at 71–72 (1949). In a 1985 letter to the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, the Chair of the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure stated, “The Conference defers to your view that the supersession clause is probably unnecessary since the Judicial Code of 1948 eliminated the numerous federal procedural statutes which were the principal reason for the clause.” Letter from Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 24, 1985), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 99-422, at 44 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 HOUSE REPORT].

\textsuperscript{67} “Since the advent of the rules the result has been quite phenomenal. Notwithstanding many proposals, Congress has withstood all attempts to obtain passage of procedural statutes of any consequence. A search has turned up in the rules area only a single statute, one of no far-reaching import.” Charles E. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 443 (1958) (footnote omitted).

\textsuperscript{68} See Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688. This rulemaking grant enlarged a previous grant, which had included only criminal proceedings after verdict. See Act of Feb. 24, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-371, 47 Stat. 904.

\textsuperscript{69} See Act of Nov. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-773, § 1, 80 Stat. 1323, 1323 (extending rulemaking power under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 to admiralty and maritime cases, appeals in civil actions, proceedings for review of Tax Court decisions, and for judicial review or enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions, or officers). For other rulemaking grants, see Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 63, at 433–35 (5th ed. 1994).

\textsuperscript{70} See Burbank, supra note 65, at 1044.

and additions to those rules to the Court. 72

C. 1973 to the Present

In the third period, starting with the proposed Evidence Rules in 1973, Congress for the first time exercised its power to block and/or revise proposed Federal Rules promulgated by the Court under the Enabling Act, 73 doing so on a number of occasions thereafter, albeit usually proposed Criminal Rules. 74 On other occasions (as in 1983 and 1993) Congress seriously entertained objections to the validity, wisdom or fairness of proposed Rules but did not, for various reasons, block the proposed amendments. 75 Congress has also directly abrogated, amended or added discrete Federal Rules apart from then current proposals promulgated under the Enabling Act. 76

The years after the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective as a
statute in 1975\textsuperscript{77} brought increasing concern in Congress about overreaching by the rulemakers, and more generally about the breakdown of the Enabling Act system (1) of allocating lawmaking responsibility and (2) because of the proliferation of local rules, of uniform federal procedure. Such concerns prompted an effort, led by the House of Representatives,\textsuperscript{78} to revise that system, yielding the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Acts.\textsuperscript{79}

Most of the formal changes in 1988 related to procedures for developing proposals for supervisory rules within the judiciary\textsuperscript{80} and to local rules.\textsuperscript{81} The Senate defeated the House’s attempt to repeal the


\textsuperscript{80} Thus, section 401(a) of the Act both amended 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) and added §§ 2073 and 2074. Section 2073 requires the Judicial Conference to prescribe and publish procedures, requires the appointment of “a standing committee on rules of practice, procedure, and evidence,” authorizes the Conference to appoint other committees to assist it, and requires that all committees appointed “consist of members of the bench and the professional bar, and trial and appellate judges.” 28 U.S.C. § 2073. Section 2073 also requires that, except as specifically permitted otherwise, committee meetings be open, and that minutes be maintained and made available to the public, to whom sufficient prior notice is also required. \textit{See id.} Most of these requirements reflected practices the rulemakers already followed. \textit{See infra} text accompanying note 206. Section 2074 changed the procedure for reporting proposed Federal Rules to Congress, previously contained in § 2072, requiring that any such proposal be transmitted “not later than May 1 of the year in which [it] is to become effective” and that it take effect “no earlier than December 1.” 28 U.S.C. § 2074. For the previous system, see Act of May 10, 1950, ch. 174, § 2, 64 Stat. 158 (1950) (allowing reporting of proposed Federal Rules to Congress not later than May 1 of each year, to become effective ninety days after they were reported) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2072).

\textsuperscript{81} Thus, section 401(b) of the Act extended the requirement that advisory committees be appointed to assist in the review and development of local rules, previously applicable only to courts of appeals, to all courts (other than the Supreme Court) that are authorized to prescribe local rules. \textit{See} 28 U.S.C. § 2077(b). Section 403 required courts (other than the Supreme Court) to give “appropriate public notice and an opportunity for comment” before prescribing local rules. \textit{See} 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b). In addition, provisions in sections 402 and 403 amended the Judicial Code to provide for the review and possible modification or abrogation of local rules, district court rules by the judicial councils of the circuits, see 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4), and court of appeals rules by the Judicial Conference. \textit{See} 28 U.S.C. § 331. Again, most of these requirements reflected practices that the judiciary had already put
supersession clause. Yet, the hearings and legislative history cast a broad shadow, eliciting an assurance of careful attention to the Enabling Act’s limitations, which were formally unchanged, from the Chief Justice, and increasing evidence of the sincerity of those assurances in the work of the rulemakers when considering proposals and of the Court when interpreting Federal Rules.

in place before 1988. See infra note 205 and accompanying text; FED. R. CIV. P. 83.

82 See Burbank, supra note 65, at 1036–46. Under § 2072(b) as amended in 1988, “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).


The Judicial Conference and its committees on rules have participated in the rules promulgation process for over a half century. During this time they have always been keenly aware of the special responsibility they have in the rules process and the duty incumbent upon them not to overreach their charter. The advisory committees should be circumspect in superseding procedural statutes. Id.; see Burbank, supra note 65, at 1038 n.163.


It should also be noted that in 1991, the Court returned certain proposed amendments to the Civil Rules for further consideration following protest by the British Government, see Burbank, supra note 56, at 114, 124, and that in 2002, the Court declined to promulgate proposed amendments to Rule 26(b) of the Criminal Rules because of constitutional doubts. See William H. Rehnquist, Letter of Transmittal (Apr. 29, 2002), reprinted in 535 U.S. 1158 (2002); see also id. at 1159 (statement of Scalia, J.); id. at 1162 (statement of Breyer, J., dissenting).

Contemporaneously with the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Act, with Senate rather than House initiative, Congress considered and ultimately enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which was in unbearable tension with some of the goals of the 1988 amendments. Congress thereby signaled not, as previously, political interest in controversial proposals with arguable substantive impact or in isolated goodies for interest groups, but the capacity for political interest in the core of procedural regulation (or, as it has been called, “the heartland of Civil Procedure”). The CJRA provided a “wake-up call” to the federal judiciary (which, on one view of the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules, had difficulty responding).

The politics of the mid-1990s, including the agenda captured in the “Contract with America” and the war on crime (and criminals), brought forth legislation in which Congress prescribed a substance- (or litigant-) specific procedure at variance with the Federal Rules, notably the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) and the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act of 1996.

Since 1996 the judiciary’s system for tracking bills and legislation affecting the Federal Rules indicates that although many bills introduced would have directly amended specific Federal Rules (albeit, again, far more Criminal than Civil Rules) or changed the requirements of the Rules in specific substantive contexts, few such proposals have been enacted.

Here again, however, quantitative judgment is a matter of perspective. As against the virtually statute-free environment described

---

88 “Coming so closely on the heels of legislation that culminated a four year effort, led by the House of Representatives, to reform and discipline the Enabling Act process, the CJRA, driven by a powerful Senator, could be viewed as repudiation of the new treaty.” Burbank, supra note 39, at 235.
89 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 83 (listing proposals to amend Rule 68).
90 See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 74, at 846–48 (considering revised Rule 35).
93 See Burbank, supra note 39, at 232–33.
96 See supra text accompanying notes 54–58.
by Judge Clark in 1958,\textsuperscript{97} the recent landscape is much more crowded, and keeping the population of statutory procedural law in check requires significant effort by the judiciary.

Thus, for example, the Administrative Office identified forty-one bills and resolutions that would have affected the Federal Rules in the 105th Congress (1996–1998). Only three of those bills became law. The judiciary did not oppose one of the three, it secured an amendment to another, and it took no position on the third.\textsuperscript{98}

The situation was similar in the 106th Congress (1998–2000), when the Administrative Office identified thirty-three bills and resolutions potentially affecting Federal Rules, which issued in four statutes.\textsuperscript{99} The judiciary successfully opposed one statutory amendment of a Federal Rule,\textsuperscript{100} but it was unsuccessful in opposing the class action and heightened pleading provisions of the Y2K Act.\textsuperscript{101}

In the 107th Congress (2000–2002), the Administrative Office identified forty-nine bills and resolutions potentially affecting the Federal Rules, from which six statutes resulted.\textsuperscript{102} One of them includes a statutory amendment to Criminal Rule 16 that the judiciary requested because of the inadvertent omission of provisions in proposed amendments previously transmitted by the Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{103} Another (the E-Government Act of 2002) requires the Supreme Court to promulgate

\textsuperscript{97} See supra note 67 and accompanying text.


\textsuperscript{100} See Memorandum from John K. Rabiej, supra note 99, at 2.


rules.104 Two others (the USA PATRIOT ACT105 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002106) amend the Criminal Rules.

In the current (108th) Congress, the Administrative Office has thus far identified “[t]hirty-three bills . . . that affect the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure.”107 To date, only one of those bills has been enacted,108 but legislation in prospect could significantly affect the Federal Rules.109


(A) (i) The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules, in accordance with sections 2072 and 2075 of title 28, United States Code, to protect privacy and security concerns relating to the electronic filing of documents and the public availability under this subsection of documents filed electronically.

(ii) Such rules shall provide to the extent practicable for uniform treatment of privacy and security issues throughout the Federal courts.

(iii) Such rules shall take into consideration best practices in Federal and State courts to protect private information or otherwise maintain necessary information security.

(iv) To the extent that such rules provide for the redaction of certain categories of information in order to protect privacy and security concerns, such rules shall provide that a party that wishes to file an otherwise proper document containing such information may file an unredacted document under seal, which shall be retained by the court as part of the record, and which, at the discretion of the court and subject to any applicable rules issued in accordance with chapter 131 of title 28, United States Code, shall be either in lieu of, or in addition to, a redacted copy in the public file.

Id. In the succeeding subsections, Congress authorized the Judicial Conference to issue interim rules, id. § 205(c)(3)(B), and required it to submit periodic reports on the adequacy of the Court’s rules “to protect privacy and security.” Id. § 205(c)(3)(C). The federal judiciary has sought amending legislation. See Memorandum on E-Government Act of 2002 (undated) (on file with author).


109 See, e.g., Memorandum from James N. Ishida, supra note 107, at 1–3 (discussing
The judiciary’s monitoring effort requires substantial staff time and often results in letters stating concerns from either members of the judiciary or the Director of the Administrative Office to members of Congress. In addition, when Congress has seriously considered bills that would have substantially altered existing procedural arrangements, such as the CJRA and PSLRA, the judiciary’s efforts have also included in-person negotiations.

Finally in this aspect, as noted above, at least one recently enacted statute requires the Supreme Court to promulgate rules under the Enabling Act, and more congressional mandates to engage in rulemaking are likely (if, for instance, H.R. 975, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, which the House passed in March 2003, becomes law).

As the foregoing makes clear, exclusive attention to the period between 1934 and 1973 not only may encourage erroneous claims about the respective lawmaking powers of Congress, the federal courts, and the federal judiciary, but such a blinkered view may also obscure the extent to which, over our entire history, Congress has eschewed de facto or de jure delegations and itself prescribed the procedure to be followed in federal civil litigation. It is hardly sufficient, however, to substitute for ignorance of history an approach that is content with uncritical quantification.

Thus, at a time when mandatory conformity to state law in actions at law was the preferred norm, Congress may have had good reason to prescribe some aspects of federal procedure in areas where uniformity was thought important. Or at least it may given evidence of (1) the Supreme Court’s crabbed (and at times overtly ideological) interpretations of pending class action legislation).

110 See, e.g., Memorandum from John K. Rabiej, supra note 98, at 1. More recently, the Chair of the Standing Committee wrote to the Chairs of the House and Senate judiciary committees opposing provisions in pending class action bills that were inconsistent with Rule 23(f) (discretionary interlocutory appeal of class certification decisions) and with proposed requirements for notices to members of a class that the Supreme Court transmitted to Congress (and that subsequently became effective in December 2003). See Letter from Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., U.S. Representative (May 12, 2003) (on file with author); Letter from Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, to Orrin G. Hatch, U.S. Senator (May 19, 2003) (on file with author).

111 See, e.g., McArthur, supra note 23, at 571; Burbank, supra note 39, at 232.

112 See supra text accompanying note 104.


114 See Burbank, supra note 56, at 105.
Congress’s grants of local rulemaking power, as a result of which the federal trial courts were stuck in the procedural worlds of the past,\(^{115}\) and (2) the Court’s disinclination to exercise supervisory rulemaking power for actions at law, even when the delegation was reaffirmed and strengthened.\(^ {116}\)

Similarly, although the ultimate success of the twenty year campaign to restore to the Supreme Court supervisory rulemaking power for actions at law should not blind us to the realities of lawmaking power, it can hardly be questioned—the evidence from the period after 1934 confirms—that the Court’s bold approach to its recovered power signaled a new era in the regulation of federal procedure. For almost forty years, Congress was content to leave procedural lawmaking to the federal courts and to the institutional judiciary whose independence Congress itself had fostered, including in rulemaking.\(^ {117}\)

Congress is no longer content to accord to the federal judiciary an effective monopoly in the regulation of procedure. Today, there is no guarantee that proposed amendments to Federal Rules originating with the federal judiciary and promulgated under the Enabling Act will be permitted to go into effect, there is no guarantee that Congress will abstain from independently and directly amending the Federal Rules, and there is no guarantee that Congress will accept the procedures prescribed in Federal Rules as appropriate for all types of cases or litigants. Today, moreover, Congress may be content (provisionally) to cede its power to make prospective procedural law to the judiciary only if it is clear that the rulemakers will exercise delegated power on designated subjects and in designated ways.\(^ {118}\)

### III. WHAT HAS CHANGED AND WHY?

According to this account, we are still living in a historical period that began decades ago, and understanding what has changed and why in the relationship between Congress, the federal courts, and the federal judiciary as to the regulation of federal procedure is thus not merely of historical interest. To the extent that the arrangements, relationships, and accommodations characteristic of our current situation are deemed

---


116 See *supra* text accompanying notes 26, 48–49. Note also the Court’s failure to update its Equity Rules between 1842 and 1912, see *supra* note 53, and the need for regulation, by statute or court rule, of aspects of the intersection of law and equity. See Clark & Moore, *supra* note 55, at 415–35.

117 On this important perspective, see Geyh, *supra* note 3, at 195–208.

118 See *supra* note 104 and accompanying text; see also *supra* text accompanying notes 112–113.
unsatisfactory, such understanding is essential to the development of what
Professor Geyh has termed a new paradigm.\(^{119}\)

In previous work I have sought to explain the dramatic changes in
Congress’s attitudes towards procedural lawmaking as between the periods
before and after 1973 by reference to three primary developments. First,
key members of Congress (particularly in the House) in the 1970s and
1980s came to believe that the rulemakers were cavalier about the Enabling
Act’s limitations on their power, promoting changes under the banner of
procedure that would have consequential effects on articulated
congressional policy, including particularly policy concerning access to
court. The most prominent examples of rulemaking proposals that elicited
such concerns were the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, which went into
effect, although just barely,\(^{120}\) and the various proposals to amend Rule 68,
which the rulemakers abandoned when it became clear both that a switch in
rationale (from fee-shifting to sanctions) was an inadequate response and
that Congress was watching carefully.\(^{121}\) These members of Congress
promoted the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Acts, one purpose of
which was to recall the judiciary to the proper limits of the rulemaking
enterprise. The hope was that self-discipline by the rulemakers, reinforced
by changes making the process more inclusive and transparent, would
enable Congress to disengage.\(^{122}\)

Second, lawyers, members of an increasingly diverse and fragmented
(through specialization and competition) profession, came to believe that
the rulemakers (who had come to be dominated by judges) were not
listening, and they turned to Congress for relief from proposals to which
they objected.\(^{123}\) From this perspective, the fact that the intense opposition
to the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 did not succeed may have done more
harm to the rulemaking enterprise than would congressional
nonacquiescence. For, those amendments were perceived (correctly or
incorrectly) to create all of the problems that had been predicted, including
poisoning relationships between lawyers and their clients, lawyers and
other lawyers, and lawyers and judges.\(^{124}\) Moreover, although opinions

\(^{119}\) See Geyh, supra note 42.

\(^{120}\) See Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1948 n.119 (1989); supra text accompanying
note 75.

\(^{121}\) See Burbank, supra note 82.

\(^{122}\) See supra text accompanying notes 77–86.

\(^{123}\) See Burbank; supra note 39, at 224–28; Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power,
46 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 513, 515–16 (1996); Burbank & Silberman, supra note 92, at 701–02;
Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the

about Rule 11 among lawyers differed, few lawyers appeared to support the regime of mandatory disclosure ushered in—again, just barely—in 1993. Indeed, the perception that an important community of interest had disintegrated helps to explain, I believe, the efforts made by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee under the leadership of Judge Patrick Higginbotham, to reach out to the bar (among others), and to proceed more deliberately, in the mid-1990s.

Third, lobbying by lawyers and others led members of Congress to perceive that some issues of court practice and procedure either could be used to generate political support among certain interest groups or in any event might require attention in order to preserve such support. Thus, Senator Biden apparently saw potential political gain in allegedly broad-scale and excessive expense and delay in federal civil litigation as he contemplated a run for the Presidency in the late 1980s, while Republicans in particular (but not exclusively) saw it in allegedly frivolous securities fraud class actions in the mid-1990s.

We know that Congress holds the cards—that it has virtually plenary

---

125 See Burbank, supra note 24, at 845–46.
126 See Burbank & Silberman, supra note 92, at 702–03. As noted there, having woken up to the need to reach a truce with the practicing bar, the rulemakers appear to be nodding off again. The proposal to return to a norm of twelve-person civil juries was scrapped by the Judicial Conference, and the proposal to permit greater participation of counsel in voir dire did not even get that far.
127 “Members of Congress were by then accustomed to lobbying by interests opposed to or favoring proposed amendments and thus were encouraged to view rules of procedure as a magnet, if not for constituent interests, then for special interests.” Burbank, supra note 39, at 228.
128 “Senator Biden is not a captive of the insurance industry any more than he is the son of a Welsh coal miner. He is a politician who wanted a statute on civil justice reform.” Burbank, supra note 24, at 852 (footnotes omitted); see also Burbank, supra note 39, at 229.
129 “[T]he 1995 legislation was one of the few elements of legislative legal reform successfully enacted by a Republican Congress that had a far more ambitious agenda; it was enacted over the President’s veto, and its final form was considerably less hostile to private securities litigation than the initial bills on which it was based.” Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action in American Securities Regulation, ZZPINT (4) 321, 330 (1999).
power over federal procedure. It remains better to understand the reasons why, having left the field for almost forty years, Congress has since chosen to exercise its power, both in matters initiated by the judiciary and independently. My hope is that, by revisiting the subject informed by the recent work of other scholars and insights from other disciplines, a richer account will emerge that is useful for both historical understanding and, if and as appropriate, efforts to fashion a new order in federal procedural regulation.

A. The Rhetoric of Procedure and the Reality of Power

It is astonishing how long lawyers, judges, and scholars were able (or continued to try) to hide the reality of the power of procedure beneath layers of adjectives that were designed to persuade the speaker’s audience that procedure was unimportant (“adjective law”), that it was technical (and thus for experts), or that it was or could be neutral. As those claims became increasingly untenable, it was possible to obscure the reality of procedure’s power behind the revealed truth that there is no bright line between procedure and substantive law, continuing to portray it as the “handmaid” of the substantive law. Such strategies did not observe, any more than the desire to acquire

130 “Law reformers have long assured us that procedure is technical, details—in short, adjective law.” Stephen B. Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to Professor Hazard and a Comment on Marrese, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 662 (1985). See Burbank, supra note 12, at 1052, 1068; Clark, supra note 55, at 457.


132 See Burbank, supra note 131, at 1472 (“It is true that procedural rules are never neutral in their effects, if not their purposes. It is also likely that there has been more systematic misrepresentation about the value-free nature of procedural rules than about any other category in the traditional lexicon.”) (footnote omitted). Although the Chair of the original Advisory Committee publicly stated in 1938 that the Committee “found very little difficulty” in distinguishing between procedure and substantive rights, see RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, OH 183 (1938) (statement of William D. Mitchell), he had admitted in a private letter in late 1937 that he was frequently dissatisfied with himself, “because after more than two years of struggling with practice and procedure, when a question arises as to whether a matter is procedure or substance, my mind is murky on the subject and I am unable to reach a conclusion in which I have confidence whenever the question is at all debatable.” Letter from William D. Mitchell, to Hon. George Wharton Pepper (Dec. 19, 1937), quoted in Burbank, supra note 12, at 1134 n.530; see also Burbank,
and hold power observes, party lines, with the result that people as different politically as William Howard Taft and Charles Clark pursued many of the same goals with respect to the Enabling Act and the rules it authorized, most prominently the merger of law into equity and of rules into discretion.  

The Congress that finally passed the Enabling Act, unlike its predecessors, did not give the bill much (really, any) attention. It was enough (particularly in 1934) that the administration supported it, and it cannot have hurt that the delegation and the rhetoric used to support it were consistent with the ethos of the emerging administrative state. Thus, the judiciary was not alone in making claims to expertise; the political climate was receptive to such claims, and their tendency to yield monopoly power was predictably greater in a delegation to fashion law plausibly described as separate from substance (and both technical and neutral) than

supra note 65, at 1012.

133 See Burbank, supra note 123, at 513; Burbank, supra note 24, at 854 (“Remember that Charles Clark and William Howard Taft were dancing cheek-to-cheek.”). Taft was “dedicated to reforming the judicial system to make it more efficient and thus more powerful. . . . The conservative Taft, according to Mason, saw an important link between judicial reform and the continued protection of property rights against popular reform . . . .” Sue Davis, Alpheus Thomas Mason: PIERCING THE JUDICIAL VEIL, IN THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 329 (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003); see also id. at 330 (discussing Taft’s “dogged” lobbying for the Enabling Act and attributing failure to fact that “it was invariably viewed by members of Congress as a measure that would further aggrandize the power of the judiciary”).

Professor Bone has asserted that the “distinction [between procedure and substance] made sense to early twentieth-century reformers,” and that “leading federal rule proponents assumed the integrity of adversarial process.” Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 Geo. L.J. 887, 897 (1999). Neither proposition seems to me accurate as a description of the views of the two most important architects of the Federal Rules, Charles Clark and Edson Sunderland. Both men were realists who favored greater control by judges precisely because they did “seriously question[ ] the basic features of adversarial adjudication.” Id.; see Burbank, supra note 130, at 1477; Subrin, supra note 62, at 978–79.

134 See Burbank, supra note 12, at 1096.

135 That surely would not have sufficed had not Senator Walsh, the bill’s long-time Senate opponent and President Roosevelt’s Attorney General designate, who recognized the rhetoric for what it was, “overtaxed his heart in the sleeping car from Washington to Florida in 1933.” Letter from Henry J. Friendly, U.S. Circuit Judge, to Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School (Feb. 12, 1983) (on file with author); see Burbank, supra note 12, at 1095.


137 “[T]he claim to expertise is also a claim to monopoly power.” McArthur, supra note 23, at 605.
to flesh out substance itself.

The Congress that allowed the original Federal Rules to become effective in 1938 *did* attempt to give the proposed Rules serious consideration, but in the absence of shared (let alone coherent) conceptions of the limits of the enterprise, and given the rulemakers’ decisions both to fashion trans-substantive rules and to limit the policy choices made therein (as opposed to such choices made by judges applying them), it was difficult independently to assess the Court’s fidelity, as Congress’s agent in fashioning prospective law, to its mandate.\(^{138}\) Then, too, Congress was fed a heavy dose of the traditional rhetoric and was assured that the Court would be “zealous to correct its mistake, if any has been made.”\(^{139}\)

There were not many amendments to the Civil Rules between 1938 and the 1960s, at least by contemporary standards;\(^{140}\) supporters represented that the Rules were the greatest thing since sliced bread,\(^{141}\) and there was a substantial community of interests among the lawyers practicing in federal court and federal judges. Even before the influence to that end of a common educational experience, “uniformity in training, conduct and ideas could not fail to produce a class with a highly developed group consciousness.”\(^{142}\) Moreover, “community of interest stimulates

---

\(^{138}\) Moreover, an effort to secure more time to evaluate the proposed Rules foundered on the difficulty of securing agreement from both bodies (and the President) within the short period prescribed in the original Enabling Act. See Burbank, *supra* note 12, at 1178.


\(^{140}\) See *Clark, supra* note 67, at 436 n.8. Even so, in 1955 there was criticism of the “alleged overamendment of the rules.” *Id.* at 446 n.51.

\(^{141}\) See *id.* at 435, 443.

It may smack of hyperbole to say, as one commentator has, that the rules are “one of the greatest contributions to the free and unhampered administration of law and justice ever struck off by any group of men since the dawn of civilized law.” It is nevertheless true that the chorus of approval of the rules by judges, lawyers, and commentators had been, until very recently, unanimous, unstinted, and spontaneous. *Wright, supra* note 69, at 429–30 (footnotes omitted).

\(^{142}\) Edson R. Sunderland, *The English Struggle for Procedural Reform*, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 725, 726 (1926). Professor Sunderland saw “a broadened and socialized legal education” as the best antidote to “continu[ing] to value conventionality over efficiency,” and he noted with favor the campaign of the American Bar Association “for elevating legal education.” *Id.* at 746.

The courts and judiciary have great influence on the bar even though the proportion of lawyers heavily engaged in contested litigation is probably less now than ever before in this country. Many lawyers still are regularly before the courts on either contested or uncontested matters, and the courts provide a common
association,” and “bar associations [became] the recognized agencies for dealing with” problems in the administration of justice.143

Having led the fight to restore rulemaking power to the Supreme Court for so many years, the American Bar Association used the occasion of the imminent promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to launch “the most far-reaching and comprehensive program”144 it undertook in the period between 1936 and 1950. This decade-long campaign “emphasize[d] the importance of eliminating outworn technicalities in the practice of the state courts and reforming their procedure along the general lines followed by the federal rules.”145 As a result, one elite group of lawyers was championing and seeking to extend the influence of the practices and procedures of another.146

With the proliferation of civil rights and other legislation in and after the 1960s, the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 on class actions, the 1970 amendments unleashing document discovery from the need for prior court approval, and the litigation that these developments elicited or facilitated, the emptiness of the traditional rhetoric about procedure became hard to miss. In the ensuing culture of “adversarial legalism” so well described by Robert Kagan,147 it also became increasingly clear that federal courts wielded enormous power under the banner of procedure and that many choices they made under (or under the authority of) Federal Rules had consequential substantive impact.148

Even in the absence of a shared consensus about the Enabling Act's experience and common meeting ground for much of the bar.

QUINTIN JOHNSTONE & DAN HOPSON, JR., LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 56 (1967); see also SMITH, supra note 23, at 128 (noting that the “policy community” of those concerned about court procedure is small and that lawyers and judges “share a common socialization with its attendant implications for shared values and perspectives on the judicial process”).

143 Sunderland, supra note 142, at 745.

144 EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 213 (1953).

145 Id. at 213–14.

146 See SMITH, supra note 23, at 128 (“[M]ainstream lawyers’ organizations consistently defer to and support the preferences of judges on many court reform issues[,]”). For additional material on the ABA in this period, see JOHNSTONE & HOPSON, supra note 142, at 35–42, 71.


148 “[T]his Court’s rulemaking under the enabling Acts has been substantive and political in the sense that the rules of procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of litigants.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989).
limitations, it was impossible to miss the substantive implications of some of the policy choices required by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the early opposition, which was directed at the proposed privilege provisions, placed separation of powers, and hence Congress’s proper role, at center stage.149 This was important, because it made clear that, contrary to the consistent theme of the Court’s jurisprudence under the Enabling Act and of the academic literature, overreaching by the rulemakers threatened not only (and, in fact, not primarily) the lawmaking prerogatives of the states, but those of Congress itself.150

The messages that Congress was likely to derive from this evidence of the changing role of the federal courts, of the power of procedure in aid of that enhanced role, and of the potential threat of supervisory court rulemaking to its lawmaking prerogatives,151 were, moreover, consistent with messages received as a result of contemporary developments in the cognate area of administrative regulation. By the mid-1970s Congress had reason for “growing skepticism about the possibility of neutral or objective judgment,”152 and reason to believe “that much besides expertise necessarily permeated . . . choice.”153 In time, Congress addressed the perceived problems in the two areas with similar strategies, insisting upon greater public access to, and greater transparency in, the processes of delegated lawmaking,154 and relying on the interest group monitoring


150 “Forty years of Supreme Court decisions and academic commentary have reversed this plan, with the result that federalism has loomed large, and allocation of powers between federal institutions hardly at all, in the discussion of Federal Rules.” Burbank, supra note 12, at 1187. The fact that most occasions of congressional nonacquiescence in proposed Federal Rules in the period immediately after 1975 concerned proposed Criminal Rules, is suggestive in this regard.

151 DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, COUNTING OUR BLESSINGS: REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 123 (1980):

But if the federal courts are going to make law (a legislative function) and enforce law (an executive function)—which is what Chayes’s term the public law litigation model implies—they are inevitably going to find themselves in conflict with the legislative and executive branches.

152 Kagan, supra note 136, at 2261.

153 Id. at 2262; see Walker, supra note 136, at 1274–75.

By the 1970s, however, concerns about regulatory capture, a loss of faith in expertise, and a growing awareness that administrative regulation involved social policy choices had eroded public confidence in administrative agencies. These same factors undermined confidence in the efficacy and legitimacy of the traditional court rulemaking model as well.

Bone, supra note 133, at 902 (footnote omitted).

154 See Bone, supra note 133, at 902–04; supra text accompanying notes 79–82; Kagan,
thereby facilitated to sound “fire alarms”\textsuperscript{155} when such lawmaking strayed from the proper course.

As a result of all of these developments, although some of the rulemakers clung to traditional rhetoric,\textsuperscript{156} interested observers, including interested members of Congress, were more likely than they had been in the past to perceive overreaching, nontrivial substantive effects and lack of neutrality—encouraged to do so by attention to the Enabling Act in the scholarly literature and by calls for and the conducting of empirical research.\textsuperscript{157} The claim of procedural neutrality is put at risk whenever it is proposed to study the effects of a Federal Rule. This may help to explain why, however congenial the notion of expert procedural lawmaking may have been in the progressive period or for that matter in the modern administrative state, and even though the most prominent civil rulemaker of the twentieth century was a legal realist who himself had conducted substantial empirical work,\textsuperscript{158} very little such work informed the original Federal Rules or, until recently, subsequent amendments.\textsuperscript{159} It also helps to explain the invocation of a “veil of ignorance”\textsuperscript{160} as an appropriate normative posture for the rulemakers by the Reporter for the Civil Rules Committee in the late 1980s.

An important part of the scholarly critique of the Federal Rules system challenged both the notion that the Enabling Act’s requirement of “general rules”\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{161}} required that the Federal Rules be trans-substantive, and the notion that, normatively, such rules are always appropriate. This strand of research dominated by legal realists like Clark and Mullenix, was complemented by empirical research -conducted by the American Law Institute in its Study of the Business of the Federal Courts,\textsuperscript{162} and by numerous other works by scholars like Marcus and Willging -that suggested that the Federal Rules system was not achieving the goals of reducing delay and expense.

\textsuperscript{155} Kagan, supra note 136, at 2261–66.


\textsuperscript{157} See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 24, at 844; Burbank, supra note 120, at 1927–28, 1939–41, 1963; Mullenix, supra note 74, at 828–30.

\textsuperscript{158} See Subrin, supra note 62, at 965–68 (discussing Clark’s career and use of empirical studies). Thus, for example, Clark led an early attempt to gain empirical information about litigation in the federal courts. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1934).


\textsuperscript{160} Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. Rev. 2067, 2079 (1989); see infra note 162.

\textsuperscript{161} See Burbank, supra note 120, at 1934–35.
the critique was, of course, an outgrowth of the perception that procedure may drive substance.\textsuperscript{162} In addition, at least in some quarters, it was central to a vision of political accountability in which, on some (relatively few) matters, prospective and transparent policy choices by democratically accountable actors are preferable to buried policy choices by federal judges.\textsuperscript{163} Whether or not this strand of the critique has been influential in Congress,\textsuperscript{164} lawmakers and those who seek to influence them have learned the lesson that some matters of “procedure” are integrally related to substance and/or useful to the effectuation of substantive goals. They have come to understand, therefore, that to fail to address those matters, whatever the label given to them, when seeking to change the substantive law is either to surrender a potentially potent technique or to commit the fate of those substantive goals to the preferences of judges.\textsuperscript{165}

In sum, informed observers have for many years recognized that “‘real procedure’ is hard to find”\textsuperscript{166} and thus is, at some level, the strength of the normative argument for greater congressional attention to the regulation of

\textsuperscript{162} Id. at 1940–41.

No one I know is suggesting a return to the forms of action or a wholesale rejection of trans-substantive procedure. Some of us, however, are suggesting that it is time both to face facts, in particular the fact that uniformity and trans-substantivity rhetoric are a sham, and to find out the facts, in particular the facts about discretionary justice. A “veil of ignorance” may be an apt metaphor to describe federal rulemaking to date. It is not, I contend, an appropriate normative posture for the rulemakers of the future.

\textit{Id.} (footnotes omitted); see Burbank, supra note 24, at 846–47.

\textsuperscript{163} See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 344 (2002) (“For, when one knows that a rule has a statistically significant differential impact on a class of litigants or in a particular type of case, the veil is lifted, the myth of neutrality as to litigant power is exploded, and the question of lawmaking power to address the situation is unavoidable.”) (footnote omitted); see also Burbank, supra note 131, at 1473–76.

\textsuperscript{164} See 1985 House Hearing, supra note 78, at 9 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (“Congress too rarely adverts to the possible need for specialized procedure—as opposed to the trans-substantive procedure of Federal Rules—when it enacts legislation”); \textit{id.} at 21 n.12 (advocating “a Procedural Impact Statement, the purpose of which would be to ensure that existing federal procedure adequately will serve a bill’s substantive policies”).

\textsuperscript{165} Considerations of this sort seem to me more important determinants of recent direct congressional regulation of procedure (as, for example, in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)) than the rejection of expertise simpliciter, let alone “new-found [congressional] confidence in its own law-making ability.” Walker, supra note 136, at 1285.

\textsuperscript{166} See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 714 (1988) (“In much of today’s litigation landscape, procedure is adjectival to substantive law in the same way that, in negligence law, reasonable is to man. In other words, ‘real procedure’ is hard to find.”) (footnote omitted).
federal procedure, under the Enabling Act and more generally. Paying attention does not mean taking control, however, and particularly given the increased self-discipline of the rulemakers during the past decade (manifested in part through interest in and attempts to secure empirical evidence), the demise of the power of the procedure/substance dichotomy to order lawmaking responsibilities cannot by itself explain congressional behavior.

B. The Rulemakers and the Rulemaking Process

The original Advisory Committee consisted exclusively of practicing lawyers and academics. As late as the 1960s judges remained in the minority. Under Chief Justice Warren Burger, however, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee came to be heavily dominated by judges selected by the Chief Justice. This imbalance has continued, only partially redressed under political pressure.

I do not know, but additional historical research may illuminate, the reasons for the change. Likely candidates seem to be either, or some combination of, (1) the quest for greater agenda control, (2) the realization that federal judges and/or the federal judiciary have discrete interests, or (3)

167 For a list and description of the original Advisory Committee, consisting of five law professors and nine lawyers, two of whom had been judges, see Subrin, supra note 62, at 971–72.


Lawyer participation has declined as that of judges increased. Today, lawyers comprise just a bit more than a third of the members of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. The tide had begun to shift in this direction within two decades after the original Rules were enacted. In 1961, just over half of the Advisory Committee’s members were practicing lawyers; that proportion held throughout the early 1980s. By 1985, the proportion had dropped to about twenty-five percent; over the last few years it has hovered between thirty-three and forty percent.

Id. at 237. Professor Yeazell notes that “[t]he proportion of lawyers on the Standing Committee, a body that had no analogue in 1938, is similar.” Id. For the pressure, see Bone, supra note 133, at 903 n.87; Carrington, supra note 160, at 2076 n.50; and Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15. Professor Bone’s comment that “these efforts have failed.” Bone, supra note 133, at 903 n.87, is potentially misleading, since the number of lawyers did increase somewhat, almost surely in response to proposed legislation. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 59 (1995) (“[S]everal steps have been taken to enhance outside participation by [among other steps listed] increasing bar membership on the rules committees . . . .”); Burbank, supra note 123, at 516 (“[W]e may never see a vote on a Senate bill to require more practicing lawyers on the rules advisory committees, because the chief justice has already unilaterally increased their numbers.”).
suspicion of lawyers’ ability to put aside their (or their clients’) interests. The latter two phenomena are related and would naturally enhance the perceived importance of controlling the rulemaking agenda.\footnote{169}{See S. Sidney Ulmer, *Researching the Supreme Court in a Democratic Pluralist System*, 1 LAW & POL’Y Q. 53, 67 (1979) (“[I]f the social balance of power among competing groups is relevant to the way in which government responds to articulated needs, one must take into consideration the relative success of these groups in getting on the formal agenda of appropriate decision making bodies.”); see also supra note 126 (noting that Judge Patrick Higginbotham, who spear-headed outreach efforts as Chair of the Advisory Committee, was not reappointed).}

To say that “federal judges and/or the federal judiciary have discrete interests” is not to say that, when engaged in rulemaking, either is an interest group in the sense of “an organized body of individuals who share some goals and who try to influence public policy.”\footnote{170}{Jeffrey M. Berry, *The Interest Group Society* 5 (1984) (emphasis omitted), quoted in Smith, supra note 23, at 4. See David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* 33 (1951) (“[I]nterest group’ refers to any group that, on the basis of one or more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes.”).} That would be an odd way to describe a group engaged in lawmaking, although it does prompt inquiry concerning the influence if any of the existence of the federal judiciary as an interest group in its relations with Congress and the Executive\footnote{171}{See, e.g., Smith, supra note 23, at 3–4; McArthur, supra note 23, at 569 n.55, 571.} on the effectuation of individual or institutional judicial interests in rulemaking. Moreover, although it is difficult to dispute the notion that both federal judges and the federal judiciary as an institution have interests, many would doubtless disagree that such interests are, or that they may properly be, influential in supervisory court rulemaking, at least if they are juxtaposed with the “public interest.”\footnote{172}{Burbank, supra note 123, at 515: A recent attempt by Jonathan R. Macey to bring public choice analysis to the service of procedure, although not without flaws, at least gives theoretical imprimatur to a view long held by some scholars, to wit, that in making and applying procedural law judges attend to their own professional interests as well as to the interests of practicing lawyers, litigants, and society.} The latter question takes us into a debate spurred by public choice theory. The former may suggest that, in a world where supervisory court rulemaking is provisional (or defeasible) and no longer holds monopoly power, the need of the judiciary qua interest group to defend institutional interests may have prompted the heavy tilt towards judges on the rulemaking bodies.

Public choice theory has not fared well as applied to court rulemaking. An early effort by Professor Macey\footnote{173}{See Jonathan R. Macey, *Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure*, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994); supra note 171.} encountered criticism by Professor
Alexander,¹⁷⁴ and more recently, by Professor Geyh.

In other words, Professor Macey’s formulation of judicial self-interest can explain almost every conceivable rule change. To the extent that desires for power, prestige, and leisure work in opposition to each other, a rule favoring one such interest will disfavor another—every hour a rule requires the judge to wield her power is an hour she will not be tanning herself by the pool. Thus, every rule change can be explained in terms of whichever interest is favored—never mind the interest that is disfavored. Likewise, insofar as one facet of a given interest comes at the expense of another facet of that same interest, every rule can be explained in terms of whichever facet is maximized. Therefore, a rule requiring the judge to exercise power that she did not have before is explicable because it increases her absolute power (as it decreases her discretionary power), while a repeal of that rule is explicable because it increases her discretionary power (as it decreases her absolute power).

At the same time as it explains too much, the premise that judges are motivated solely by appetites for leisure time, prestige, and power explains too little, because it fails to account adequately for the complexity of human motivation. . . . In short, self-interest explains judicial conduct only if self-interest is defined broadly to account for other-oriented behavior. With such a definition, however, the public choice model becomes tautological and explains nothing.¹⁷⁵

Another problem with Professor Macey’s and similar work, as applied to rulemaking, is the failure to account for, and make adjustments that may be required by, group decisionmaking—group decisionmaking, moreover, by a mix of trial and appellate judges and of judges, lawyers and academics, on behalf of institutions (courts) to which not all group members belong—rather than decisions by and on behalf of the same individual.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, Geyh’s additional point that “the judiciary [may]
take[ ] a position intended to promote the public good that is perceived by Congress or its constituents as promoting the judiciary’s narrow self-interest at the expense of the public good,” 177 reminds us that the room (and need) for strategic behavior in rulemaking results not only from group decisionmaking, but also from the influence of actors other than the rulemakers. Or, as put by Professor Bone, “a public choice analysis should treat court rulemaking as a strategic game among the [rulemakers], Congress, and the various interest groups.” 178

Since one of the banners in the long campaign for the Enabling Act was expertise, there is apparent irony in the fact that the group responsible for drafting the original Federal Rules did not include a single sitting judge. 179 Even though the Supreme Court could not fairly be described as a mere rubber stamp when reviewing the package of proposed Rules presented to it in 1937, 180 presumably no sentient observer equated its role with authorship. Indeed, one of the original rulemakers praised the advisory committee and similar systems both because of his normative preferences against courts preparing rules and for rulemaking by groups that included substantial lawyer representation, and also because they provided cover to the courts in the event of controversy. 181

supra note 173, at 627; see id. at 628 (stating that the Civil Rules Committee “is composed primarily of judges, with a sprinkling of practicing lawyers and academics”). As Macey recognizes, formally, only the Supreme Court makes the decision to promulgate a Federal Rule, but in doing so, it (usually) merely ensures procedural regularity and acts as a vetogate on proposals that are likely to be controversial and/or elicit plausible claims of overreaching. See id. (“To date, however, the Supreme Court has served as a mere conduit for the work of the advisory committee, approving the vast majority of changes recommended to it by the committee.”).

177 Geyh, supra note 42, at 1216.
178 Bone, supra note 133, at 924. I have substituted “rulemakers” for “Advisory Committee” because supervisory court rulemaking involves multiple layers of advisory groups, differently composed, and formal promulgation by the Supreme Court, before a proposal reaches the Congress. For someone who is knowledgeable about public choice and game theory, Professor Bone’s failures to recognize strategic behavior by the judiciary are surprising. See supra note 168 (discussing additional appointments of lawyers to the Advisory Committee in response to proposed legislation); infra note 205 and accompanying text (discussing changes in the rulemaking process under political pressure). But see Bone, supra note 133, at 906 (“[T]he Advisory Committee has become keenly sensitive to the risk of congressional interference in the rulemaking process.”).

179 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
180 See Clark, supra note 67, at 442 (discussing proposed Federal Rules that the Court rejected).
181 See Edson R. Sunderland, Rules of Court Governing Practice and Procedure, 9 Mo. BAR J. 198 (1938) [hereinafter Sunderland, Rules of Court]. Sunderland there observed that “bench-drawn rules would still be colored by special interests of the branch, modified by special interests of the bar,” id. at 200, and that “[l]awyers . . . are in a better position than
To the extent that there was a perceived community of interests among elite lawyers, academics and federal judges, and given the extensive efforts made by the original Advisory Committee to secure comments on their drafts, the composition of that committee may not have caused any discomfort to the purveyors of the expertise story, and their concern may in any event have been comparative lack of expertise in the legislature. Moreover, to the extent that the lawyers and academics appointed were familiar with, or represented, a broad variety of interests involved in federal litigation, as seems plausible in the comparatively unspecialized legal world of the 1930s—and in the absence of empirical investigation—they could plausibly be deemed to have made recommendations of “general rules” behind a veil of ignorance. Finally, with the Executive Branch enthusiastically supporting the effort in a period of unified government,

judges to understand the public attitude toward the administration of justice.” Id. at 202; see also Edson R. Sunderland, Trends in Procedural Law, 1 LA. L. REV. 477, 488 (1939). For similar views more recently expressed, see Yeazell, supra note 168.

182 See 1938 Hearing, supra note 139, at 3–4; Burbank, supra note 24, at 848 n.51.
183 See Clark, supra note 67, at 443; Sunderland, Rules of Court, supra note 181, at 199–200.
184 Burbank, supra note 24, at 847–48:

Professor Marcus is correct that the original Federal Rules were drafted “by a group of elite lawyers and law professors who acted with little empirical evidence.” They were, however, people of substantial practical experience concerned about rules that would work for lawyers and their clients while serving what Professor Garth calls “the universal principles of the profession.” Id. (footnotes omitted).

It is not clear that the same can be said of lawyer members today, because of the highly specialized nature of contemporary legal practice and the perspectives, incentives and client pressures that such specialized practice may engender, and because everyone is now aware of the potential for differential impact in the Federal Rules. See Garth, supra note 123, at 953–56, 959. Compare Yeazell, supra note 168, at 239 (“To have the rules themselves emerge from a group of once and future contestants . . . provides a splendidly Rawlsian icing on the cake . . . .”), with id. at 244 (“American lawyers tend to represent, if not the same clients, then the same kind of client throughout their careers.”).

Of course, my view of the original rulemakers may reflect “the prevalent notion that the legal profession has fallen from an earlier condition of grace into an abject and debased condition.” Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 DICK. L. REV. 549, 550 (1996). Professor Galanter observes that “it would be surprising if there were not many more Warren Christophers and Lloyd Cutlers engaged in public service today than there were Elihu Roots and Henry Stimsons then.” Id. at 559. Yes, but consider the membership of the Civil Rules Committee in 1963: Dean Acheson (Chair), George C. Dobb, Shelden D. Elliott, John P. Frank, Arthur J. Freund, Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Charles W. Joiner, Benjamin Kaplan (Reporter), David W. Louisell, John M. McIvaine, W. Brown Morton, Jr., Archibald M. Mull, Jr., Roszel C. Thomsen, Charles Alan Wright, Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. See H.R. Doc. No. 67 (1963).
there was little reason to anticipate major controversy.\textsuperscript{185}

Writing in 1926, Professor Sunderland remarked that “[a]lthough there can be no competition among individual lawyers, we have a very effective competition among systems and rules of practice.”\textsuperscript{186} Describing the country as “a laboratory in which experiments are being actively conducted,” Sunderland expressed hope that the movement for uniform state legislation would “not extend into the procedural field,” lest it “destroy the most promising possibility for the general improvement of American procedure.”\textsuperscript{187}

Sunderland did not foresee that, in part through his efforts, and with the active support of the elite bar, the local experimentation he celebrated would be put at risk.\textsuperscript{188} He also did not foresee other developments that were at war with procedural “conventionality,”\textsuperscript{189} including the social revolutions worked by the civil rights and equal rights movements and the demise of (some of) the anticompetitive practices of the organized bar.

All of these developments unleashed forces that contributed to legal (including procedural) innovation and hence to pressure on supposedly uniform rules. As a result of the changing opportunities and circumstances of practice, inviting to the reformer and entrepreneur alike (for each of whom amended Rule 23, as an example, offered a golden harvest), the legal profession became less homogeneous, more competitive, and more

\textsuperscript{185} Cf. Fiorina, supra note 13, at 46 (“During the New Deal period congressional Democrats could contemplate control over the administrative process for the foreseeable future.”).

\textsuperscript{186} Sunderland, supra note 142, at 744.

\textsuperscript{187} Id. The reader may have noted the similarity between the reasoning, and indeed the language, used by Sunderland in 1926, and that used by Justice Brandeis in his famous 1932 dissent in \textit{New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann}, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). Their common philosophy helps to explain Sunderland’s revisionist approach to the Enabling Act after it was passed. See Burbank, supra note 12, at 1135 (“Sunderland’s purpose in distorting the record probably was linked with his view that national uniformity in the procedural field was undesirable because it would foreclose state experimentation.”) (footnote omitted); \textit{infra} note 188, and both Brandeis’s opposition to the bill in 1926 and his dissent from the promulgation of the Federal Rules in 1938. See Letter from Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School, to Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Professor, New York University School of Law (Mar. 6, 1985) (on file with author).

\textsuperscript{188} See supra text accompanying note 145. There is irony in the fact that Sunderland went on to become one of the chief architects of the Federal Rules, as there is in the fact that his enduring doubts about uniform federal procedure almost kept him from being invited to join the Advisory Committee (and, with Clark’s help, did keep him from being selected as reporter). See Burbank, supra note 12, at 1135–36.

\textsuperscript{189} Sunderland, supra note 142, at 746; see supra note 141.
specialized,190 and the communities of interest among lawyers and between lawyers and judges shrank.

With the diversification of, and increasing specialization and competition within, the legal profession has come a greater risk that lawyers’ and judges’ views about desirable procedural regulation would diverge (as well, of course, as of divergent views among lawyers).191 That may have been reason enough for Chief Justice Burger to change the balance of lawyers and judges on the Advisory Committee. There were other likely contributing factors, however.

The increasingly contentious nature of the reception accorded proposed Federal Rules by Congress was a threat to the prestige and influence of the Court itself,192 reinforcing perhaps the tendency to equate individual with institutional judicial interests, to equate both with the public interest, and in any event to try to protect institutional interests from the start. Moreover, as the policy community concerned about procedure

---

190 See Garth, supra note 123, at 932, 938–45. Compare the demographic description of the bar in JOHNSTONE & HOPSON, supra note 142, at 19 (reporting that blacks constituted “slightly over 1 percent” and women “less than 3 percent” of American lawyers in the early 1960s).

191 See Burbank, supra note 24, at 854 (“Divisions among lawyer entrepreneurs on questions relating to open access bode ill of the ability of the ‘organized bar’ to have consequential impact on civil justice reform . . . .”) (footnote omitted). Such divergence of views is ever present and has meant that “the legal profession has difficulty in using power for its own collective ends.” JOHNSTONE & HOPSON, supra note 142, at 70.

As a group, lawyers are too independent, their work units too small and too fragmented and their perspectives too diverse to readily act together in their own occupational self-interest. To be sure, the organized bar fulfills traditional occupational association functions of group integration and advocacy—although less effectively than many trade unions and trade associations—and lawyers on the bench and elsewhere in government commonly favor the profession when they have a chance to do so. But by and large, the legal profession is not particularly effective in using group pressure for its own benefit. Within the profession, on matters of general professional concern, power is widely dispersed.

Id. at 70–71; see id. at 35. The nature of “work units” has changed since this description was written, as more and more lawyers have come to practice in larger and larger firms. Although certain groups of lawyers have become powerful interests to be reckoned with, see infra text accompanying note 198, their conflicting interests qua lawyers still make it difficult to secure legislation (including legislation overriding a proposed Federal Rule) on matters implicating those interests. See infra text accompanying 230.

192 See WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 1–4, 75, 138 (1981); Burbank, supra note 12, at 1020–21. In a description of the latter study, which was undertaken by the Federal Judicial Center at his request, Chief Justice Burger noted that it “provide[d] policy makers with, among other things, a cogent analysis of the salient arguments for and against reducing the level of Supreme Court involvement in the rulemaking process.” Warren E. Burger, Year-End Report on the Judiciary 18 (Dec. 28, 1981), quoted in Burbank, supra note 12, at 1021 n.16.
expanded and fragmented, the latter equation was ever more likely itself to prove controversial, and changes in the process and culture of federal court rulemaking that contributed to the expanding policy community may also have contributed to continuing controversy.\footnote{Cf. \textit{Jack L. Walker, Jr., Mobilizing Interest Groups in America} 40 (1991) (“As a result of the expansion of the interest-group system and the change in its composition, the processes of passing legislation and evaluating public policies have become much more complicated, and policy formulation has become much more conflictual than ever before.”).}

An attempt to remove the Court from the process in the 1980s almost succeeded and had the blessing of Chief Justice Burger and, for a year, of a majority of the Court.\footnote{Compare Letter from Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert W. Kastenmeier, U.S. Representative (May 12, 1983), \textit{reprinted in 1983–1984 House Hearings, supra} note 78, at 195 (“The Members of the Court see no reason to oppose legislation to eliminate this Court from the rule making process.”), \textit{with} Letter from Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, to Robert W. Kastenmeier, U.S. Representative (June 25, 1984), \textit{reprinted in 1983–1984 House Hearings, supra} note 78, at 195 (“On further reflection, the Justices conclude that it would be better to keep the ultimate authority of passing on rulemaking within the Court as it is now . . . .”).} It appears to have failed because of lobbying on behalf of rulemakers in state systems modeled on the federal, who were concerned about their own prerogatives and the possible harm to rulemaking if the Court no longer formally sponsored the rules.\footnote{See 1985 House Hearing, \textit{supra} note 78, at 90 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank) (noting that “the Conference of Chief Justices has gone on record very strongly in favor of keeping the rulemaking power in the hands of the Supreme Court”).}

Continuing controversy doubtless helps to explain why members of the Court have gone to such lengths to distance the institution from proposed Rules that it formally promulgates, and it can only cause one to wonder why other members have been so enthusiastic in airing the dirty linen.\footnote{Burbank, \textit{supra} note 24, at 842:}

The risk of a rupture between federal judges and the bar was realized when, in response to a perceived crisis of expense and delay, judges pursued rulemaking strategies that either empowered them at the expense of lawyers and their clients (sanctions and active case management) or that

\id. (footnotes omitted); \textit{see infra} text accompanying note 202.
simply disempowered lawyers (discovery reform). In so doing, rulemakers and the judges they empowered directly confronted the culture of “adversarial legalism” and invited trouble from lawyers who, as Professor Kagan has put it, “can be an extraordinarily potent political force when their interests and ideology are challenged.” Their work also raised the question whether the rulemakers were serving the interests of federal judges, those of the federal judiciary, or the public interest. It cannot have helped that the rulemakers’ decision to proceed with the 1993 proposed amendments on required disclosures, in the face of overwhelming opposition from the bar and only months after having apparently abandoned the plan, was predicated in part on an institutional desire to regain “leadership” from Congress (in light of the CJRA).

Thus, the dissolution of the ties that bound lawyers and federal judges in rulemaking has meant that the federal judiciary is not guaranteed broad support when, functioning as an interest group, it has sought to avert congressional overrides of proposed Rules, direct congressional amendment of existing Rules, or the enactment of procedural law apart from the Federal Rules. In addition, when, as in 1983 and again in 1993, lawyers believe that the rulemakers are not listening to their objections—and particularly when they believe the rulemakers have confused the interests of judges or of the judiciary with the public interest—some of them will actively seek relief in Congress. They can only be encouraged to do so on occasions of recorded disagreement about proposed Federal Rules by members of the Supreme Court.

Lawyers also represent the members of other interest groups, and in that capacity as well some of them have found the opportunities for seeking to exercise influence (and/or to earn fees), which were created by the opening up of the rulemaking process, irresistible, particularly in a world in

197 See Burbank, supra note 123, at 514–15.
198 KAGAN, supra note 147, at 233. “Sharp reductions in adversarial legalism, it follows, would require concentrating governmental authority and shifting power from parties and lawyers to governmental officials and programs—and in the litigative process, to judges.” Id.
199 Id. at 245. But see supra note 191; infra text accompanying note 230.
200 “Does neutrality include the willingness to subordinate the interests of the judiciary narrowly viewed when they are in conflict with other interests traditionally valued, including by the organized bar? Is that the lesson of Rule 11, of sanctions in general, of court-annexed arbitration or of managerial judging?” Burbank, supra note 24, at 848 (footnotes omitted).
201 Burbank, supra note 24, at 845 (citation omitted).
202 See Burbank, supra note 39, at 228; Burbank, supra note 123, at 515–16.
203 See supra text accompanying note 195. In this respect recorded disagreement with the promulgation of a proposed Federal Rule may function like a dissent to a decision interpreting a federal statute. See infra text accompanying note 224.
which the myth of the neutrality of procedure has been exploded.204

From this perspective, the changes in the rulemaking process in the 1980s that were designed to open it up to more and more diverse points of view, make it more transparent, and diminish the need for congressional involvement, may in fact have facilitated a process of redundancy wherein participants treat rulemaking that is at all controversial as merely the first act.205 If so, and to the extent that those process changes, although required by statute as of 1988, originated with the judiciary,206 that would be ironic. For to that extent they would constitute an example of the late Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s “Iron Law of Emulation”207 or, more precisely, the “more subtle process” he described, “involv[ing] the emulation by one branch of another in order to eliminate any appearance of disparate levels of legitimacy.”208

204 Consider in that regard a September 1999 memorandum from the chair of the Federal Civil Procedure Committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers to his committee colleagues, reporting the “extremely good news” that the Judicial Conference had approved the proposal to narrow the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1), claiming that it was “the College proposal (substantially adopted by the Advisory Committee),” and observing that committee member “Fran Fox played a major role as a member of the Advisory Committee, itself, in advocating the proposed amendment . . . .” Memorandum from Robert S. Campbell, Jr., Chair, Federal Civil Procedure Committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers, to Members of the Federal Civil Procedure Committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers (Sept. 16, 1999) (on file with author).

205 Burbank, supra note 39, at 242. “In addition, far from helping to disengage Congress from the process of procedural rulemaking, the changes made in the 1980s, which assimilated it to the legislative process, may encourage Congress ‘to second-guess the product of that process or to preempt it.’” Id. (footnote omitted); see id. at 244.

206 It is probably more accurate to say that they resulted from the judiciary’s realization that changes were necessary in light of the controversy in the 1970s, with the interest of the organized bar and congressional oversight nudging the judiciary in the early 1980s, and 1988 legislation formally requiring a set of changes, most of which (but notably not the requirement of open meetings) had already been put in place. See 1985 House Hearing, supra note 78, at 92–93 (statement of Stephen B. Burbank); Burbank, supra note 34, at 998 n.2; Burbank, supra note 12, at 1020–21; supra note 191. In any event, Professor Geyh is correct that the 1988 legislation “did little more than codify existing practice,” Geyh, supra note 42, at 1189 n.124, and that “the trend toward politicization of the rulemaking process was in full swing by the time that the amendments were adopted.” Id. But see Bone, supra note 133, at 903 (stating that 1988 amendments “opened the rulemaking process” and noting Geyh’s contrary view).

207 MOYNIHAN, supra note 151, at 118. “Whenever any branch of the government acquires a new technique which enhances its power in relation to the other branches, that technique will soon be adopted by those other branches as well.” Id.

208 Id. at 121. There can be little question that other actions taken by the institutional federal judiciary illustrate Moynihan’s Law. Thus, at the same time as Congress was better equipping itself to monitor rulemaking (court and administrative) by enlarging staff, see infra text accompanying note 228, in 1976 Chief Justice Burger established and placed in the Administrative Office of the United States Courts a Legislative Affairs Office. See
Perhaps, however, describing the phenomenon as one of redundancy is tendentious. In the absence of effective judicial review of court rules, (the potential for) congressional review becomes the only feasible alternative. Writing about the administrative process, Professor Fiorina has observed:

But as the courts came to accept interest-group interpretations of American politics in general, and of regulation in particular, judicial deferral to agency expertise began to decline. Analogous developments occurred in Congress. Much of the legislation establishing the “new social regulation” was filled with detailed procedural requirements going far beyond the APA. Congressional majorities encouraged an accessible rulemaking process, sometimes going so far as to subsidize intervenors. And these same majorities provided every opportunity for disgruntled interests to shift the conflict from the administrative arena to the judicial. Though such developments admit to various interpretations, they are consistent with legislators trying to counter evident biases in administrative process.209

More recently, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the one-house veto,210 Congress implemented a system of review of administrative rules very much like that which has been in place for supervisory court rules since 1934.211 I have previously remarked the relevance to court rulemaking of some of the concerns about this system raised by Professor Strauss.212 For present purposes it is noteworthy that, although Congress

Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, *A Judicious Legislator’s Lexicon to the Federal Judiciary, in Judges and Legislators: Toward Institutional Comity* 63 (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1988). In recent years the efforts of that office to monitor legislation affecting the judiciary, including legislation affecting the Federal Rules, see supra text accompanying notes 96–113, have been supplemented by the work of an expanding Rules Committee Support Office, the staffing of, and level of support provided by, which has doubled since it was created in 1991. See E-mail from Peter McCabe, Esq., to Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law (Dec. 3, 2003) (on file with author).

After noting the creation of the Office of Judicial Impact Assessment in the Administrative Office, Robert Katzmann observed that “[i]t would not be surprising if Congress, following Moynihan’s Law of Emulation[,] . . . were to create its own capacity to produce such statements.” Robert A. Katzmann, *Courts and Congress* 102 (1997).

209 Fiorina, supra note 13, at 49 (footnote omitted).
212 See Burbank, supra note 39, at 245; Peter L. Strauss, *From Expertise to Politics: The Transformation of American Rulemaking*, 31 Wake Forest L. Rev. 745 (1996). Thus, noting Professor Strauss’s worry that agencies might “look for alternative means of accomplishing their business,” Strauss, supra, at 772, I pointed out that “[t]he use of case-by-case adjudication to circumvent or preempt court rulemaking obstacles posed by the Enabling Act process is not unknown.” Burbank, supra note 39, at 245. Recent evidence of
has only once formally invoked its power to block a rule, the power to do so has nonetheless cast a substantial shadow.213

C. Congress and the Legislative Process

The specific experience of the proposed Evidence Rules and a new jurisprudential climate combined to make members of Congress and their staffs aware of the potential of rulemaking choices to submerge substantive in favor of procedural policies, of supervisory court rulemaking to impinge on Congress’s lawmaking prerogatives, and of procedure consequentially to affect substantive rights. Less sanguine than Professor Bone about the power of ideas to shape congressional behavior, at least on a continuing basis,214 I believe that neither development, however, suffices to explain the changed pattern and pace of congressional hold-ups and overrides of Federal Rules in the 1970s and 1980s, let alone Congress’s recent willingness to act outside of the Enabling Act process.

In 1991 Professor Eskridge published a pathbreaking study of congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretations,215 the influence of which has far transcended the specific topic and has extended as much to political science as to legal scholarship.216 He found that, although there were on average six overrides in the four Congresses from 1967 to 1974, the average increased to twelve in the eight Congresses from 1975 to 1990, and that the 94th Congress (1975–76) represented the turning point.217

that phenomenon comes in an opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, holding that the district court erred in refusing to enjoin state court cases that were brought as national class actions after the Court of Appeals had held that no such class could be certified under Rule 23. See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products Liability Litigation, 333 F.3d 763, 765–69 (2003). The Seventh Circuit thus required an injunction to implement common law rules of preclusion that the rulemakers had concluded was beyond the rulemaking power to authorize. See supra note 84. The decision’s treatment of preclusion law and of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000), is adventurous, to say the least.

214 See Bone, supra note 133, at 919 (“Ideas have power in the political process notwithstanding the force of raw interest. Armed with a persuasive justification of their role, court rulemakers can make it more difficult for Congress to justify intervention.”).
217 See Eskridge, supra note 215, at 338.
Professor Eskridge explored the characteristics of decisions likely to be overridden and of the groups likely to persuade Congress to take that action, noting as to the former that decisions attracting scrutiny “were much more likely to have a dissenting opinion”\(^\text{218}\) and that decisions “overridden were much more likely to have had an ideologically identifiable split on the Court.”\(^\text{219}\) Moreover, analyzing the reasons for the change in the rate of congressional override, Professor Eskridge identified, among others, the proliferation of interest groups, “producing more monitoring,”\(^\text{220}\) and he observed that between 1970 and 1975 the size of the staffs of standing committees in the House and Senate doubled,\(^\text{221}\) a factor that he found to have more explanatory power than the existence of divided government.\(^\text{222}\)

Because of these and other contributions, Professor Eskridge’s study is extremely useful in considering the relationship between the federal courts, the federal judiciary, and Congress in the regulation of procedure. Thus, the time period he identifies as the turning point for statutory overrides of Supreme Court decisions, 1975–1976, is equally salient for the greater incidence of overrides (and of close calls) in the rulemaking area.\(^\text{223}\)

Similarly, Eskridge’s finding concerning the effect of dissents and/or an ideologically identifiable split on the likelihood of a decisional override suggests that what I have called the Court “airing the dirty linen”\(^\text{224}\) may have contributed to congressional activity (and, indeed may have been intended to do so).\(^\text{225}\) In any event, the greater transparency of the rulemaking process as a whole has facilitated monitoring and hence identification of ideological and/or interest group flash points.\(^\text{226}\)

\(^{218}\) Id. at 350.

\(^{219}\) Id.

\(^{220}\) Id. at 338.

\(^{221}\) Id. at 339.

\(^{222}\) See id. at 340–41 (“The evidence from the 1980’s correlates very well with the suggestion that staff size has exercised an independent influence on the level of congressional overrides.”).

\(^{223}\) See supra text accompanying notes 73–74.

\(^{224}\) See supra text accompanying note 196.

\(^{225}\) Cf. Eskridge, supra note 215, at 388–89 (discussing “institutional signaling” when, for example, “the Court will sometimes refuse to interpret a statute broadly, especially when such an interpretation would represent a major policy decision that the Court would be more comfortable allowing Congress to make”).

\(^{226}\) The Supreme Court has also been concerned about its ability to monitor rulemaking. “The Advisory Committee was informed in February 1992 ‘that the Court would in the future like a memorandum explaining the contentious issues resolved.’ . . . Appendix H to the Judicial Conference Rules materials for September, 1992 is a document entitled ‘Proposed Rules Amendments Generating Substantial Controversy.’” Burbank, supra note
More important (because bearing directly on the change in Congress’s attitude or behavior with respect to proposed Federal Rules and federal procedural regulation in general) are Eskridge’s findings concerning congressional staff and his analysis and discussion of interest group dynamics.

The vast increase in staff between 1970 and 1975 equipped Congress to monitor supervisory court rulemaking, and its experience with the proposed Evidence Rules during that very period indicated that there might be reason to do so. Thereafter, even before the judiciary changed its rulemaking procedures (a process completed and formalized in 1988), the proliferation of interest groups discussed by Eskridge, and the monitoring they provided for a Congress better equipped to respond, surely contributed to the pace and rate of overrides and close calls in the 1970s and early 1980s. Moreover, as suggested above, it is likely that both increased staff and the capacity it gave to Congress stimulated emulation in the judiciary, commencing with the creation of the AO’s Legislative Affairs Office in 1976.

Although review of the occasions of friction between the rulemakers and Congress as to Civil Rules proposals in the 1970s and 1980s suggests the possibility of a partisan (or ideological) explanation, many of them are difficult to square with public choice and similar theories of legislative behavior. The 1983 sanctions/case management (as also the 1993 discovery) proposals may constitute an exception to both propositions, although both sets of proposals were recognized as having implications for access to court (which is often a partisan issue). Moreover, because lawyers do not constitute a unified interest group (and also speak for others who may constitute such groups), it may be that proposals designed to affect attorney behavior will usually produce a conflictual demand pattern, diminishing the likelihood of success in Congress.

When one moves from congressional review of proposed Federal Rules to procedural legislation initiated in Congress, whether in the form of direct legislative amendments to Federal Rules or of discrete, substance-(or litigant-) specific provisions, additional considerations bear on the analysis. Just as the rulemakers have mistakenly treated the Executive

56, at 124 n.177.
227 The same phenomenon may have affected congressional oversight of administrative agencies. See Kagan, supra note 136, at 2257 (citing JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE 14, 34–37 (1990), for a “large increase in formal methods of legislative oversight, such as committee hearings and investigations, in the 1970s and 1980s”).
228 See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
229 See supra text accompanying notes 72–75.
230 See Eskridge, supra note 215, at 365.
Branch as a monolith in the past, it is probably a mistake to treat Congress as a monolith for these purposes. Different congressional committees have different cultures and patterns of membership, including percentage of lawyer members, as well as different attitudes toward the federal judiciary.

Nonprofligate invocation of “The Enabling Act Process” may mean something to the members of the House and Senate judiciary committees, most of whom will be lawyers, and whose staffs work closely and regularly with representatives of the judiciary. Indeed, it may function as something like a rule of law value to restrain legislative behavior reasonably perceived as a breach of that treaty. The same may not be true of other committees, and it is interesting that some of the legislation containing provisions to which the federal judiciary has objected in recent years has come from such other committees. Moreover, of course, there may be no point in invoking—or, worse, no occasion to invoke—rule of law values when legislation is passed in violation of Congress’s own rules.

The question, however, is whether the judiciary is differently situated from any other interest group in this respect. In one of the clearest examples of the “Iron Law of Emulation,” Congress developed the committee system beginning late in the eighteenth century so as to “counter the expertise and experience that until that time had been monopolized by the executive branch.” Eventually, however, the power of congressional committees was seriously eroded with the adoption of reforms that brought sunshine to their meetings, “strengthened the Speaker and made him accountable to the caucus” and proliferated subcommittees. More

231 See Burbank, supra note 56, at 147–48.
233 See Miller, Congressional Committees, supra note 232, at 962.
234 Cf. Eskridge, supra note 215, at 367–72 (noting the “critical role” of committees in screening out override proposals).
235 Thus, the PSLRA was considered by the Banking Committee in the Senate and the Commerce Committee in the House; the Y2K Act was considered by the Commerce Committee in the Senate, and the E-Government Act was considered by the Committee on Government Reform in the House.
237 See supra text accompanying note 208.
239 Id. at 478.
240 See id. at 479–80.
recently, the power of the committee system as a whole has eroded, as more and more legislation is the product of activity on the floors of Congress, often taking the form of enormous multipurpose bills, including appropriations bills.\footnote{Id. at 480: Subcommittees get rolled by full committees, and full committees get rolled on the floor. Final legislation today is less the result of specialized consideration by experts than it is the product of whomever is skilled at assembling floor majorities. . . . The Congress becomes vulnerable to penetration from outside. . . . Id.; see id. ("[M]ore and more legislative business is conducted on the floor with subcommittee products getting amended, often beyond recognition."); see also \textsc{Walker}, supra note 193, at 136 (noting dramatic decline in introduced and enacted bills after mid-1970s and enactment of major programs in the 1980s as part of “the ritualistic, mammoth, omnibus budget reconciliation bills compiled at the end of each session of Congress”). “But the prime example of Congress at its worst is its stewardship on appropriation bills.” Becker, supra note 236, at 8.}

The Prison Litigation Reform Act was part of one such bill, for example.\footnote{Christopher E. Smith & Christopher E. Nelson, \textit{Perceptions of the Consequences of the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A Comparison of State Attorneys General and Federal District Judges}, 23 \textsc{Just. Sys. J.} 295, 310 (2002): Before the enactment of the PLRA, the repeated and sustained legislative initiatives to curtail prisoner litigation and related judicial authority to intervene into correctional operations were delayed and deflected by influential Democratic senators, who were concerned about the protection of constitutional rights in Correctional institutions. However, the statute eventually gained the opportunity for enactment without full examination in committee hearings because it was included in the 1996 Appropriations Act . . . . Id. (citation omitted); see \textsc{Schlanger}, supra note 95, at 1559.}

In any event, “The Enabling Act Process” has nothing properly to do (or at least not what the judiciary thinks it has to do) with most of the substance- (or litigant-) specific legislative procedure to which the judiciary has objected. The judiciary appears to be missing the points that (1) Congress has a strong claim to exclusive power to make prospective law for such matters, which it has not delegated, and (2) both ideological and interest group politics are likely to be at their apex (within the domain of procedure) when the question is the content of a substance-specific rule of procedure, contributing to, but by no means exclusively determining, the need for circumspection in the formulation and communication of the judiciary’s views.

It is quite remarkable that the federal judiciary continues to object to procedural provisions in statutes like the PSLRA and the Y2K Act on the basis of the “Enabling Act Process.” For although the Enabling Act does allocate power with respect to prospective, legislation-like procedural law, it is restricted to “general rules,” language that the rulemakers have consistently interpreted to require Federal Rules that both apply in all
federal district courts and that apply in all types of civil cases (i.e., are trans-substantive). Whether or not that interpretation is correct,\(^\text{243}\) it prevents promulgation of Federal Rules that are substance-specific, and behind the judiciary’s objections there must, therefore, lie either a claim that the Federal Rules represent the best accommodation of procedural values, and the best vehicle for the effectuation of substantive values, for every type of case in federal court, or a claim that the costs to such values are outweighed by the benefits of formally uniform procedure.

Yet, the numerous instances where federal courts themselves have sought to vary choices made in the Federal Rules to accommodate the perceived needs of particular types of cases is evidence, were it needed, of the implausibility of such claims.\(^\text{244}\) Moreover, as already suggested, for those many matters where the Federal Rules make no choices, leaving the procedure/substance accommodation to discretionary decisionmaking, the claim must be that Congress’s substantive agenda is always better served by trusting to the discretion of federal judges and thus abjuring the potentially potent technique of using procedure to drive, or to mask, substance.\(^\text{245}\) From the latter perspective, indeed, the claim seeks to deny to Congress a politically valuable instrument of ambiguity.\(^\text{246}\) Neither the

\(^{243}\) See Burbank, supra note 120, at 1934–35; supra text accompanying note 161.

\(^{244}\) See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 617–24 (2002).

\(^{245}\) See id. at 617–19. Professor Fairman is critical of the pleading provisions in the Y2K Act, as of those in the PSLRA, on which they were modeled, defending trans-substantive procedure on the ground of uniformity and because it fosters “greater social justice.” Id. at 622–23. But surely this is an ideological judgment that presupposes the current content of Rule 8. Moreover, the Court’s statements that “[a] requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is a result that ‘must be obtained by the process of amending the federal rules, and not by judicial interpretation,’” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002) (quoting Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993)), should be approached with care. But see Fairman, supra note 244, at 623 (criticizing heightened pleading and the PSLRA model). A Federal Rule requiring heightened pleading in any case alleging “fraud or mistake” is one thing. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). A proposed Federal Rule attempting to impose heightened pleading requirements as to a particular substantive claim would be quite another, something hard if not impossible to square with the rulemakers’ traditional interpretation of “general rules” and—perhaps this is the point—not something that they would conceivably attempt in the post-1988 rulemaking world.

\(^{246}\) My defense of statutory substance-specific procedure, occasional and tailored to meet an identified misfit between Congress’s substantive goals and the trans-substantive Federal Rules, is predicated in part on a normative preference for transparent policy choices on matters of substantive import by democratically selected lawmakers over buried policy choices by judges. See supra text accompanying note 163. Even if, as in the PSLRA and the Y2K Act, heightened pleading was an avoidance technique, enabling Congress to navigate substantive controversy or an empirical vacuum, see Fairman, supra note 244, at
From an interest group perspective, the judiciary’s invocation of the “Enabling Act Process” as an objection to statutory substance-specific procedure may reinforce the view that the judiciary cares more for its power and supposed prerogatives than it does for the public interest. More harmful still, inconsistency in the invocation of that objection may reinforce suspicion that the objection is not really based on the interests of the judiciary *qua* judiciary, but rather on ideological considerations, depending therefore on the proposed legislation in question. If so, the judiciary will be regarded as taking sides in an inevitably policy preference-laden debate and incur the same costs as if it were actually participating on the merits of such debate, which costs may be substantial.

607, 617; *id.* at 618 (“reach[ing] out to procedural alternatives as salves for the substantive tension”), I do not see that “congressional heightened pleading escapes scrutiny by the bench, bar, and public in the same way as the judicially imposed standards do.” *Id.* at 624. Although modern legislation may escape just about everyone’s scrutiny, that was not true of the pleading provisions of the PSLRA or the Y2K Act. Moreover, transparency is only part of the normative preference. Accountability for prospective choices having predictable and identifiable effects on the substantive law is the other, and the Federal Rules process is not the proper vehicle for such choices.

248 See *supra* text accompanying note 200.
249 No such objection was made in connection with the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act.
250 As so well discussed by Professor Resnik, such suspicion has attended efforts by the institutional federal judiciary to persuade Congress not to enact legislation creating new federal rights on the ground that, in a time of crowded dockets, and in light of federalism concerns, the resulting cases would represent a misallocation of federal resources. See Judith Resnik, *Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power*, 78 Ind. L.J. 223 passim (2003).

On matters as to which one would expect the judiciary to try to maximize the institution’s collective preferences, such as salary, terms, and conditions of employment, everyone recognizes that judges are self-interested and can discount what they say without closing off an obvious and important source of relevant information. This is also true of workload/docket concerns, although, as Professor Resnik points out, there are reasons to doubt the judiciary’s ability to forecast the work that new statutory rights would create. *See id.* at 286, 289. Opposition to the creation of new federal rights by the institutional judiciary on docket grounds, whether or not backed up with an explicit statement of the “proper” role of the federal courts, may carry undue weight or in any event be invoked by congressional opponents. The costs are not just the perception that the judiciary has a unified policy preference but that the preference, once expressed, may skew individual judicial decisionmaking by those socialized not to express their views ex ante and affected perhaps by the institutionally expressed view ex post. *See id.* at 308–09. In an interview in 2003, the Chair of the National Conference of Federal Trial Judges stated:
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 appears to confound the transactional model of legislation, which posits that Congress will have little interest in statutes that distribute benefits broadly (a theory under which the Enabling Act makes eminent sense so long as procedure is thought to be neutral). It is not necessary to endorse that theory in order to believe that we shall not see the CJRA’s like soon again. Legislation containing substance-specific procedure is, for reasons already adumbrated, quite a different matter. The climate for ideological and interest group politics with respect to procedure today recalls the mid-1990s. That is not good news.

IV. THE FUTURE

In the current political climate—perhaps the most poisonous in thirty years for the relationship between Congress and the federal judiciary—there is reason for concern about adherence to long-standing customs or norms and hence about resort to blunt instruments of influence or control by members of Congress determined to work their will on the federal courts and “to take no prisoners” in the process. The proper response is

One of the things that you will not find within our Conference, however, is any official position or opinion contrary to the policies of the Judicial Conference. So, while we target issues that would certainly be of interest to the Judicial Conference, such as legislation affecting independence or compensation, and we discuss these frankly and vigorously, our public position never conflicts with any official policy adopted by the Judicial Conference. We believe the federal Judiciary needs to speak with one voice on such policy issues.

Conference Represents Federal Trial Judges, THIRD BRANCH, June 2003, at 10 (interview with Chief Judge Irene M. Keeley, N.D. W. Va.).

More fundamentally, it is not, I believe, appropriate for the federal judiciary to have an institutional view about the “proper” role of the federal courts, or at least one that purports to drive official positions on proposed legislation creating new federal rights. That is a matter for Congress. The judiciary should be expected to provide data to Congress, and there is no harm in a repeated plea that Congress consider caseload implications (and adequately fund the courts). Anything beyond that is likely to be taken, perhaps with good reason, as “taking sides in an inevitably policy preference-laden debate.”


[T]hirteen members of the U.S. House of Representatives recently formed the “House Working Group on Judicial Accountability.” The working group is chaired by Representative Lamar Smith (R-Texas) and Representative Steve Chabot (R-Ohio). The working group’s stated goals include educating Members and the public about so-called “judicial abuse,” preventing “judicial abuse,” and supporting the nomination of judges “who will not substitute their own policy views for the law.”
not—it cannot be—assertions of power that does not exist. The federal judiciary not only lacks a purse and a sword; its shield is very narrow. Wiser heads must prevail, and, if necessary, informed public opinion must be brought to bear on those who are ignorant of, or choose not to heed, the lessons of our constitutional history.\(^{253}\)

Power has a shadow, just as law does.\(^{254}\) Yet, although one may have to yield to naked power, as also abide by a foolish law, neither means that one must accept irrationality or irresponsibility “without question, or for that matter, without insistence that legislative foolishness be clear for all to see.”\(^{255}\) Rather than waging a losing battle about power, far better to seek to forestall irrationality and irresponsibility through genuine dialogue, informed and nourished by the respect that is due to all branches of government and that is required if we are to honor the genius of those who

Representative Tom DeLay (R-Texas), House Majority Leader and a member of the working group, praised the group for its intention “to take no prisoners” when it comes to exposing and preventing “judicial abuse.” Among other measures, the working group has committed to increasing direct oversight of the federal courts and to calling federal judges to account when they “exceed the authority given them under Article III.”

253 E-mail from Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, University of Pennsylvania School of Law, to Todd Metcalf, Legislative Ass’t (Oct. 23, 2003) (on file with author):

Representative Sandlin would know better than I whether a self-appointed group of members of the House from one side of the aisle has any standing or power to do anything, other than further pollute discourse that is already debased. I would have thought not. The risk, however, is precisely that, by adding to a legislative corpus of misinformation and inter-branch hostility that is already too large, the House Working Group will influence those who do have power. In that regard, the quoted characterization of the group’s “take no prisoners” approach, however praiseworthy in the pursuit of termites, manifests a woefully ignorant and inappropriate attitude towards an institution for the establishment of which our ancestors fought and died and which has been a cornerstone of our freedoms.

If in fact the House Working Group is serious, it appears that the members of that group want to turn back the clock and to use the recognized power of oversight, among other legislative powers, to coerce the judiciary, the “least dangerous branch” in part because it lacks the power adequately to defend itself. Fortunately, Representative Sandlin is alert to the dangers, and if the effort subsists, he will have the support of all thoughtful citizens, who, even when they do not like a federal court decision, know that an independent (and accountable) judiciary has been critical to our development as a functioning democracy.

Id. (responding to Letter from Max Sandlin, supra note 252).


fought and died for our liberty.

The challenge is especially daunting, however, because the breakdown in norms of institutional respect and accommodation is not confined to the judiciary and Congress. It is rather a defining characteristic of contemporary federal government and should be a source of the most serious concern for all thoughtful citizens. As recently put by Professor Shane, although “[w]e have a national system of government whose orderly and effective operation depends to an exceptional degree upon certain norms of cooperation among its competing branches,” today “there is reason to worry that new habits of unalloyed combat . . . have replaced old habits of mutually respectful competition, to the long-term detriment of democratic vitality in the United States.”

Over the last decade the rulemakers have, by and large, taken seriously the Chief Justice’s assurance to Congress that they would observe the Enabling Act’s limitations. They have also taken seriously a number of calls, including in a 1995 self-study of rulemaking, that rulemaking attend far more in the future than it has in the past to the need for and the fruits of empirical study. Both developments have helped the rulemakers keep their ambition under control, for evidence of which one need only consider the recently shelved proposals to address in Federal Rules problems stemming from duplicative or overlapping class actions.

256 Peter M. Shane, When Inter-branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, “Orderly Shutdowns,” Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coup.s,” 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 503, 505 (2003). I have suggested that the so-called House Working Group on Judicial Accountability is pursuing a “partisan, if not strongly ideological, effort to use the supposed excesses of the federal judiciary for political advantage in future elections.” Letter from Max Sandlin, supra note 252. If so, it is an example of “inter-branch aggression for political goals.” Shane, supra, at 521.

Informed citizens know that a Republican-initiated broadside founded in allegations of judicial abuse and judicial overreaching against a federal judiciary dominated by judges nominated by Republican presidents is unlikely to be sincerely motivated. The problem, of course, is that most citizens are not well informed and that they trust their elected representatives for accurate information and sincere legislative action when a genuine problem affecting the common weal arises.

Letter from Max Sandlin, supra note 252. Whether or not the group’s activities will pose “a special threat to democratic legitimacy,” Shane, supra, at 521, depends upon its ability to generate popular support. Of course, that is why the group seeks to “educate” the public. See Letter from Max Sandlin, supra note 252.

257 Shane, supra note 256, at 542. “I am critiquing the substitution of norms that support inter-branch consensus building and democratic deliberation with norms that favor winner-take-all politics and unproductive inter-branch tension.” Id. at 504 n.8.

258 See supra text accompanying note 85.

259 See Self-Study, supra note 71, at 699; supra text accompanying note 156.

260 See supra note 212; Resnik, supra note 250, at 296–305.
The result of the judiciary’s self-restraint is likely to be few occasions of friction when the Court promulgates, and few overrides of, proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the future. But that same self-restraint, coupled with the discovery of the power of procedure by interest groups and Congress alike, seems destined to yield more proposals for “procedural” legislation and hence the need for closer and more frequent cooperation with Congress.

When such proposals take the form of direct statutory amendments of the Federal Rules, the judiciary has a legitimate interest in focusing attention on the “Enabling Act Process,” and Congress should ensure that there is a compelling reason to depart from that process, be it a genuine need for speedy adoption, inadvertent omission from proposed Rules that are about to become effective, or the desire to place law properly made by Congress as opposed to the rulemakers in its proper context. The last of these reasons requires no disruption in the normal process prior to congressional action. Moreover, when considering action for any of these reasons (or any other), the form proposed (statutory amendment of Federal Rules) should remind Congress that following the normal process, if possible, is important not just to improve the quality of the product, and not just to show respect for the federal judiciary as an institution. “If

261 “Friction, to some extent, is a sign of the system at work. But life cannot be all friction.” Shane, supra note 256, at 508.
262 See Self-Study, supra note 71, at 687:
   Rulemaking today is more accessible to interested parties than ever before. It is also slower, and the exchange is not an unmixed blessing. In the wake of the 1988 changes, only Congress can change rules with dispatch. This means that any group with a perceived pressing need seeks its forum in the legislature rather than the judiciary, and today Congress readily demonstrates its interest in federal rules matters by holding committee hearings and amending the rules themselves.
   Id. But see supra note 205 (noting that the 1988 changes largely confirmed existing practices).
263 See supra text accompanying note 102.
264 Burbank, supra note 56, at 145–46.
   When prudence counsels (or the Enabling Act requires) that federal law be made through legislation rather than court rules, the desire to take advantage of the rulemakers’ expertise, to facilitate comprehensive procedural reform, to honor a sense of shared institutional authority, or to overcome traditional congressional inertia, may nonetheless suggest the wisdom of a two-tier process. The weak version of such a process would require only that the rulemakers bring questionable exercises of authority to Congress’s attention. The strong version would require legislation to implement the rulemakers’ recommendations on such matters. Both versions would leave the initiative to formulate new or amended Federal Rules with the rulemakers.
   Id. (citations omitted).
interdependence is as critical to the Framers’ system as autonomy, then it follows that no branch should seek to eliminate longstanding forms of interdependency between the branches.”

Those unmoved by such considerations may wish to recall that although Congress holds the ultimate power to make procedural law, the judiciary and federal judges are not without power to frustrate its effective implementation. Forbearance in one realm of power may induce similar forbearance in the other. More generally, a “system of separated powers . . . works only if every branch is committed to effective governance and is willing to forbear from the deployment of its powers to their extreme theoretical limits.”

When, however, Congress proposes to enact substance-specific procedural law, appeals to the “Enabling Act Process” risk the perception that the institution is advancing its own interests over the public interest or that the appeal is a cover for substantive disagreement. In such cases, the judiciary’s legitimate interests lie rather in timely and sincere consultation on the questions whether the existing trans-substantive rules are in fact not appropriate and, if so, what alternatives would be best. Like a certain four letter word, “The Enabling Act Process” loses its power when invoked too often.

The Federal Rules include more than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, as has been noted, most congressional hold-ups or overrides of Federal Rules, and most direct statutory amendments, actual and proposed, have concerned the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Although some of my normative prescriptions—perhaps all of them, at least in theory—apply equally to criminal as to civil procedure—it is evident that, for instance, the perceived need for speedy lawmaking will be more pressing and more frequent in the criminal realm, particularly now that the war on crime (and criminals) includes the war on terrorism (and terrorists). It is also evident that the forces of politics and ideology are more likely to be irresistible in that realm, rendering the reestablishment of something approaching the pre-1973 equilibrium impossible, at least in the short term.

I have noted, but devoted insufficient attention to, the phenomenon of Congress eschewing both the traditional “Enabling Act Process” approach

265 Shane, supra note 256, at 512; see id. at 513.
266 See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 23, at 127, 130.
267 See Shane, supra note 256, at 506 (“For the most part, each branch needs the forbearance, if not actually the agreement of, the other two branches in order to work its will.”).
268 Id. at 508.
269 See supra text accompanying notes 248–250.
270 See supra text accompanying notes 74, 96.
and substance-specific procedure in favor of (1) statutory directions to the
rulemakers either requiring or encouraging rulemaking on particular
subjects, coupled with (2) standards to be reflected in any such rules.\textsuperscript{271}
Although personal conversations have suggested that some members of the
federal judiciary bristle at such directions, particularly when given to the
Supreme Court, and at such standards, at least when they are inconsistent
with the preferred policy of the institutional judiciary or appear to preempt
a suitably deliberative process for the development of policy,\textsuperscript{272} they may
be preferable to some of the alternatives. Indeed, the technique deserves
careful study as lawmaking \textit{via media} with the promise to meet the
legitimate process, institutional, and political needs of both the judiciary
and Congress.

There is no necessary connection between an individual’s ability as a
federal judge (or rulemaker) and his or her personal political skills. For
many years the federal judiciary was poorly served by some of the judges
(and other rulemakers, including academics) who interacted with the public
and with Congress on proposed Federal Rules. Arrogance, particularly
when conjoined with ignorance (of the facts), is well calculated to yield
calls for help to higher authority. The same reasoning that has shaped the
constitution of the Judicial Conference’s Budget Committee\textsuperscript{273} is
applicable to all committee leadership positions that predictably require
substantial interaction with Congress, the bar, or the public.

Moreover, with the traditional rhetoric about procedure revealed as
empty, when cynicism about law and those who make it is rampant, and
given more than thirty years of appointments to the rules committees by
chief justices appointed by Republican presidents, it has not been helpful
that a few of those appointed to positions of rulemaking responsibility have
worn their ideological preferences on their sleeves. In any event, a game
theoretic or institutionalist perspective confirms the importance of having
people in leadership positions who are in tune with congressional
preferences.\textsuperscript{274}

Given the concerns that almost effected the Supreme Court’s removal
from “The Enabling Act Process” in the 1980s, it is ironic that today the
Court may be a source, rather than a victim, of the current distress of
federal procedural lawmaking. For, however disingenuous claims of
“judicial abuse” or “judicial activism” may appear as applied to the lower

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{271} \textit{See supra} text accompanying notes 103, 111–12, 117.
\item \textsuperscript{272} Concerns of this sort appear to lie behind the judiciary’s attempt to secure
\item \textsuperscript{273} \textit{See} Smith, \textit{supra} note 23, at 20 (referring to judges “having ability, legislative
experience, and congressional associations”).
\item \textsuperscript{274} \textit{See} Bone, \textit{supra} note 133, at 906; \textit{supra} note 177.
\end{itemize}
federal courts, there is no blinking the fact that the Supreme Court has declared federal statutes unconstitutional at an unprecedented rate in recent years, and it is not unreasonable to believe “that the Court is not approaching its review functions modestly, but instead actually is inventing new reasons for invalidating legislation.” It is doubtful that members of Congress who so believe will distinguish the Court from the institutional federal judiciary or that they will quickly embrace arguments grounded in the need for forbearance and mutual respect.

In any event, creating a system or culture in which timely and sincere consultation is accepted practice will not be easy with respect to some congressional committees, and it would not foreclose last-minute or stealth legislation, nongermane provisions smuggled into appropriation bills, and other excrescences of the contemporary legislative landscape. The judiciary suffers no differently than other interest groups, however, although its institutional experience doubtless causes special regret that there appears to be so little legal space in which to require due process in lawmaking.

It is reasonable, but in the current political climate perhaps not realistic, to expect more responsible behavior from the Department of Justice, which at least twice in recent years proposed last-minute additions to bills that affected Federal Rules or responsibilities under the Enabling Act without previously consulting the judiciary. But that is a small point at which to stick if, as is widely believed, the Justice Department was the primary moving force behind the so-called Feeney Amendment, where the absence of consultation has been the subject of much adverse comment.

---

275 See supra note 256.
276 Shane, supra note 256, at 510. “Of the 151 federal statutes declared unconstitutional in whole or part by the Court between 1789 and June 2000, 40—over 26 percent—were declared unconstitutional since 1981.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also id. at 536.
277 See Becker, supra note 236, at 7.
278 See Memorandum from John K. Rabiej, Chief, Rules Comm. Support Office, to the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, at 3 (Dec. 4, 1996) (describing provision concerning effective date of new Evidence Rules 413–415 “included as part of the enacted general Appropriations Law” and submitted by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to Congress “the night before the vote was taken on the legislation”); Memorandum from James N. Ishida, supra note 103, at 3 (reporting that provision requiring Supreme Court rulemaking in the E-Government Act resulted from “a last-minute move [inserting] language proposed by [the DOJ]”).
279 Becker, supra note 236, at 7:

Excrescences indeed. I have seen too many of them, especially in recent months. First and foremost is the Feeney Amendment to the Amber Alert Bill, which resulted in a drastic cutback on the ability of federal sentencing judges to make downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines in certain kinds of cases, and which also limited the number of judges who can serve on the U.S.
including from the Chief Justice, and some of the provisions of which have recently been declared an unconstitutional abridgment of separation of powers. Moreover, if the federal judiciary’s appeals for regularity and consultation are to be credible, its leaders must ensure that their house is in order, which means resisting in the future temptations to game the legislative system in the very ways the judiciary has recently decried.

The “current political climate” and the pessimism it naturally engenders about the future of inter-branch relations in general put the problems of federal procedural lawmaking in humbling and depressing perspective. They may also suggest that past proposals about federal rulemaking or federal procedural lawmaking as a whole, including my own, are hopelessly academic and/or hopelessly naive. We have seen where the power lies, and we know that the answers to our ills do not lie either in its unilateral deployment or in undiscriminating resistance. History did not start in 1934, but a history of mutual respect and forbearance did start in that year, and although subsequent events have revealed the need for some adjustments, the reasons therefore are not also reasons to abjure norms of interdependence.

The reestablishment of such norms will not, I am confident, issue from elegant models or finely reasoned metrics, and experience suggests that commissions are also not the solution. We need to rediscover, in relations between the federal judiciary and Congress, a form of politics that seems almost a lost art in today’s landscape. The notion that the judiciary

Sentencing Commission. The Feeney Amendment was tacked onto an unrelated and popular bill, making it difficult for legislators to vote against it, and then rammed through the Congress in violation of House and Senate rules without any public hearings and virtually no debate regarding its effect on sentencing law, policy, or practice.

Id.; see also id. at 7–8.

280 See 2004 Year-End Report.


282 See Becker, supra note 236, at 8 (noting that judiciary secured “last minute riders creating new district court judgeships” and “that too was wrong”); Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 208, at 84 (noting the “tendency of the courts to seek authorizations for experimental programs directly through the appropriations process” and the “effort by the legislative representatives of the judicial branch to play off the appropriations and authorizing committees in order to obtain maximum leverage”);

283 As a start, the federal judiciary should at last come to grips with questions about communications with members of Congress that have been asked (and answered) by Robert Katzmann and Charles Geyh. See KATZMANN, supra note 208 passim; Geyh, supra note 42 passim; see also Resnik, supra note 250 passim.

Perhaps the Brookings Institution could again sponsor a conference, as it did in 1986, among the three branches at which they could discuss these issues (“the matter of congressional process across the board”) at the highest level...
might take the lead in reestablishing such a politics—of “custom, dialogue, compromise, and statesmanship”\(^{284}\)—will come as a shock only to those who believe that politics and law, like judicial independence and judicial accountability,\(^{285}\) are irreconcilable, or those whose exposure to politically feckless judges has caused them to forget those who are adepts.\(^{286}\)

---

Although the impact of the perverse Congressional practices that I have described affects all kinds of legislation, perhaps the judiciary can furnish the template that can persuade the Congress to clean up its act.

Becker, supra note 236, at 10.

\(^{284}\) See supra text accompanying note 41.

\(^{285}\) See Burbank, supra note 2, at 325.

The instrumental view of judicial independence taken here, on the other hand, requires no dichotomy and sees no paradox, since it proceeds from the premise that judicial independence and judicial accountability “are different sides of the same coin.” An accountable judiciary without any independence is weak and feeble. An independent judiciary without any accountability is dangerous.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

\(^{286}\) See Burbank, supra note 41, at 1234–35.