Skip to main content area Skip to main content area Skip to institutional navigation Skip to search Skip to section navigation

Mitchell Berman

Leon Meltzer Professor of Law and Professor of Philosophy

Mitchell Berman

 Mitchell Berman teaches and writes in diverse areas of legal theory, specializing in criminal law, constitutional law, and a new domain of scholarly inquiry he has dubbed "the jurisprudence of sport". Continue reading…

Articles and Book Chapters

For Legal Principles, in MORAL PUZZLES AND LEGAL PERPLEXITIES: ESSAYS ON THE INFLUENCE OF LARRY ALEXANDER (Heidi Hurd ed., Cambridge 2019).

Sport as a Thick Cluster Concept, in GAMES, SPORTS, AND PLAY: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS (Thomas Hurka ed., Oxford 2019).

Kennedy's Legacy: A Principled Justice, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 311 (2018-2019) (with David Peters).

Of Law and Other Artificial Normative Systems, in DIMENSIONS OF NORMATIVITY: NEW ESSAYS ON METAETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE (D. Plunkett, S. Shapiro, and K. Toh eds. Oxford 2019).

Our Principled Constitution. 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1325 (2018).

The Tragedy of Justice Scalia, 115 MICH. L. REV. 783 (2017).

Modest Retributivism, in LEGAL, MORAL, AND METAPHYSICAL TRUTHS: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MICHAEL S. MOORE (Kimberly Kessler Ferzan & Stephen J. Morse eds., Oxford 2016).

Judge Posner's Simple Law. 113 MICH. L. REV. 777 (2015).

Some Skepticism About Skepticism: A Comment on Katz, 163 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 345 (2015)

Conditional Spending and the Conditional Offer Puzzle, in THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT DECISION: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS (Fritz Allhoff & Mark A. Hall, eds., Routledge 2014).

Abuse of Property Right Without Political Foundations: A Response to Katz, 124 YALE L.J. F. 42 (2014).

On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2013) (with Kevin Toh).

Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283 (2013).

Sprints, Sports, and Suits, 40 J. PHIL. SPORT 163 (2013).

On What Distinguishes New Originalism from Old: A Jurisprudential Take (with Kevin Toh), 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2013).

Rehabilitating Retributivism, 32 LAW & PHIL. 83 (2013).

Introduction: Punishment and Culpability, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441 (2012).

Pluralistic Non-originalism and the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739 (2013) (with Kevin Toh).

The Justification of Punishment, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 141 (Andrei Marmor ed., Routledge 2012).

Alexander’s Genius, APA NEWSL. PHIL. L., vol. 12, no. 1 (Fall 2012), at 1.

Two Kinds of Retributivism, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 433 (R. A. Duff & Stuart Green eds., Oxford 2011).

“Let ‘em Play”: A Study in the Jurisprudence of Sport, 99 GEO L.J. 1325 (2011).

Replay, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1683 (2011).

Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two about Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383 (2007) (excerpted as chapter 8 in IT IS A CONSTITUTION WE ARE EXPOUNDING: COLLECTED WRITINGS ON INTERPRETING OUR FOUNDING DOCUMENT (2009)).

More publications can be found here.

⇱ Return to Top