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Kimberly Kessler Ferzan L'95

Earle Hepburn Professor of Law; Co-Director, Institute of Law & Philosophy

Kimberly Ferzan

Kimberly Kessler Ferzan joined the Law School in 2020, after serving on the University of Virginia faculty, where she was the Harrison Robertson Professor of Law and the Joel B. Piassick Research Professor of Law. Ferzan teaches criminal law, evidence, advanced criminal law, and advanced law and philosophy seminars.

Ferzan's work focuses on criminal law theory. Continue reading…


REFLECTIONS ON CRIME AND CULPABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PUZZLES (Cambridge University Press, 2018) (with Larry Alexander).
[Available Here]


CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (Cambridge University Press 2009) (co-authored with Larry Alexander & Stephen Morse).
[Available Here]

CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS (Oxford University Press 2009) (co-edited with Paul Robinson & Stephen Garvey).
[Available Here]

Articles and Book Chapters

The Reach of the Realm, 14 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 335 (2020).

Losing the Right to Assert You've Been Wronged: A Study in Conceptual Chaos?, in CIVIL WRONGS AND JUSTICE IN PRIVATE LAW (Paul B. Miller and John Oberdiek eds., Oxford 2020).

Probing the Depths of the Responsible Corporate Officer’s Duty, 12 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 455 (2018).

Defending Honor and Beyond: Reconsidering the Relationship between Seemingly Futile Defense and Permissible Harming, 15 J. MORAL PHIL. 683 (2018).

Defense and Desert: When Reasons Don't Share, 55 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 265 (2018).

Patty Hearst Reconsidered: Personal Identity in the Criminal Law, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 367 (2018).

Consent and Coercion, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951 (2018).

How to Think (Like a Lawyer) About Rape, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 759 (2017) (with Peter Westen).

Consent, Culpability, and the Law of Rape, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2016)

Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 505 (2014).

Confused Culpability, Contrived Causation, and the Collapse of Tort Theory, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS (John Oberdiek ed., Oxford 2014) (with Larry Alexander).

Rethinking The Ends of Harm, 32 LAW & PHIL. 177 (2013).

Plotting Premeditation's Demise, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (2012).

Provocateurs, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 597 (2013).

Beyond the Special Part, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green, eds., Oxford University Press 2011) (with Larry Alexander).

Justification and Excuse, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW (David Dolinko & John Deigh, eds., Oxford University Press 2011).

Intention, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 2d ed. (Dennis Patterson, ed., Blackwell 2010).

A Planet By Any Other Name . . . , 108 MICH. L. REV. 1011 (2010) (review essay of Neil deGrasse Tyson’s THE PLUTO FILES).

More publications can be found here.

Working Papers

#BelieveWomen and the Presumption of Innocence: Clarifying the Questions for Law and Life (May 4, 2020), Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2020-39; NOMOS (forthcoming). (forthcoming)
[View Document]

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