to the American Christian Missionary Society (1860) in which Campbell sounded like a patriarch as he defended the controversial missionary society and identified its purpose with his own life's work. Here again, Verkruyse's analysis of the text is interesting, but he overstates just how successful Campbell was in his pastoral and patriarchal roles.

Verkruyse's work is commendable for its research, originality, and often compelling analysis. His choice of Campbell texts astutely parallels the turning points in his movement's early history. However, despite its brevity and Verkruyse's explanation of rhetoric, this book will be more rewarding to rhetoricians than to general readers who may wonder if Campbell's rhetorical change was a natural response to very different circumstances, a calculated maneuver, or, as critics of rhetorical arts may say, just rhetoric. Although it does not detract from the book's quality, Journal of Church and State readers should also note that this book does not deal with Campbell's views on church-state separation which are worth examining elsewhere.

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Pity the poor scholar who sets out to write a new book on the Supreme Court's religion clause jurisprudence. Given its importance and the general consensus that the Supreme Court has made a hash of it, the First Amendment case law is an inviting target. But so much has been written for so many years it is hard to say anything new.

In Masters of Illusion, Frank Ravitch takes a middle of the road tack. Rather than scrapping the Supreme Court's existing analysis altogether, or trying to argue that there is a hidden consistency, Ravitch proposes to isolate the key principles running through the cases and to show how most but not all can be incorporated into a more coherent analysis. Two principles, neutrality and originalism, are illusory and should be discarded, but separation, accommodation, liberty, equality, "soft" originalism, and pragmatism have a role to play in determining the proper stance of the government toward religion.

The problem with neutrality, Ravitch's principal bete noire, is that there is no truly neutral perspective. Because objective neutrality is impossible, the Court's use of this standard for determining whether a government action is permissible simply disguises its actual basis for decision. Ravitch rejects originalism—interpreting the Religion
Clauses in accordance with the intentions of the original framers—on somewhat similar grounds. Because the framers held various, often conflicting views and they never could have anticipated many of the issues in today's cases, originalism should never be decisive. "Soft" originalism, on the other hand, which looks to history for general guidance, warrants at least a background role.

Ravitch's own approach has two parts. First, borrowing from an influential argument by Philip Bobbitt about "modalities" of constitutional interpretation, Ravitch argues that the Court should rely on all five of the principles noted above, adjusting their prominence depending on the particular issue in question. He calls this "the ebb and flow" of principles. Second, to "integrate[e] the various modes of religion clause interpretation into a legal test that has some promise to increase consistency," he proposes a "facilitation test" (p. 168). Under this test (which, as Ravitch acknowledges, is quite similar to Douglas Laycock's well-known "substantive neutrality" approach), "government action that substantially facilitates or discourages religion" would be struck down under the Establishment Clause (p. 168). A skeptic might suspect that the facilitation test makes the ebbing and flowing of principles superfluous, but Ravitch makes precisely the opposite claim, stating several times that this strategy could be used even if the facilitation test were rejected.

The first chapter introduces and summarizes Ravitch's arguments, and the second takes aim at the illusion of neutrality. The next five chapters then assess five other principles the Supreme Court has relied on in its cases: hostility to religion, liberty, equality, separationism, and accommodationism. Chapter 8 explores the question of how to define "religion" for the purposes of the religion clauses. Chapter 9 outlines Ravitch's "ebb and flow" of principles, contrasting it with various tests used by the Supreme Court, describes areas where each principle should be given more or less weight. The final chapter proposes the facilitation test, then applies it to school prayer, vouchers, general aid to religious organizations, religious symbols, and the free exercise and equal access cases.

Ravitch's is a Goldilocks approach—not too much accommodation, not too much separation—but it produces occasional surprises. He believes that tradition should not be given any weight, and thus would strike down the chaplain's prayer that opens legislative sessions as "substantially facilitating religion." Christmas trees may be permissible by themselves, but not if they are accompanied by a White House-style lighting ceremony.

Some readers, perhaps most, will question at least a few of his conclusions, even if they like his framework. Ravitch criticizes the Supreme Court's decision upholding a Cleveland school voucher program, for instance, concluding that it "substantially facilitates" religion, despite the fact that the families of students are the ones who decide how to use the voucher. But Ravitch's exposition is consistently
clear, and his “ebbing and flowing” of principles and facilitation test are a sensible strategy for pulling something of value out of sixty years of religion clause confusion.

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In his intriguing and informative book, John Blakeman takes up federal district courts, religious speech, public forum law, and the question of whether or not the public square is “naked” (i.e., devoid of religious speech). The primary flaw of the work is that the argument is a bit unorganized, leaving much of the work of constructing it (at least until the conclusion) to the reader. Still, Blakeman’s book contains an argument of real importance. It seems to run as follows: (1) The overarching question is this: “Is the public square in fact ‘naked’?”; (2) To answer the overarching question, we must study the regulation of access to the public square for those wishing to convey a religious message; (3) Federal court decisions play a crucial (though not exclusive) role in regulating the public square, and so those decisions merit study; (4) The most relevant decisions on which to focus are those handed down by federal district courts (as opposed, say, to the Supreme Court); (5) When we analyze the opinions of federal district courts, we should focus on public forum case law; (6) When we analyze federal district court decisions that define the contours and content of public forums, we discover that the “public square” is half naked. A bit more must be said about the most important of these points.

As to (1), Blakeman never formulates an overarching question or a precise hypothesis. Still, by endeavoring to connect his analysis of federal court public forum decisions to the openness of the public square to religious speakers, he implicitly acknowledges that empirical and quantitative inquiries are only meaningful insofar as they bear upon matters of normative import. As to (4) and (5), Blakeman appears to advance two inconsistent hypotheses. In chapter 2, he argues that the Supreme Court has failed to provide clear guidelines for categorizing public forums and for determining whether or when religious speech is admissible in forums opened to speech more generally. This conclusion justifies a focus on federal district rather than Supreme Court decisions. But chapter 4 seems to argue that the Supreme Court’s guidelines for categorizing public forums have been sufficiently clear to foster consistency in federal district court decisions.