THE PATHS OF CHRISTIAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

David A. Skeel, Jr.

THE HISTORY OF TWENTIETH CENTURY Christian legal scholarship – really, the absence of Christian legal scholarship in America’s elite law schools – can be told as a tale of two emblematic clashes: the first an intriguing historical footnote, the second a brief, explosive war of words.

The first came in a rural Nebraska courthouse, circa 1890. The counsel for the plaintiff in the case, a routine tort action against a railroad, was “a rising Nebraska politician named William Jennings Bryan,” who would soon be elected to Congress and in 1896 would be the Democratic presidential nominee for the first of three times. The counsel for the defendant, Roscoe Pound, would follow the circuit court in Nebraska for a few more years before joining the law faculty at the University of Nebraska and eventually moving east to Harvard, where he served as dean of the law school for two decades. Pound won that case, his first victorious jury trial, but he lost his share of others. He later quipped that the initials J.P. – which stood for justice of the peace, the judicial official who heard many of these cases – “were popularly taken to represent ‘Judgement for Plaintiff,’ partly because the plaintiff was wise enough to select for a defendant a party who could pay the costs.”

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1 Quoted in DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 71 (1974).
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In the waning years of a century in which judges had unselfconsciously treated Christianity as a foundation of the common law, the elite American law schools, led by Harvard dean Christopher Columbus Langdell, had begun to conceive of legal scholarship in scientific terms. Langdell’s innovation was a systematic, case-oriented approach that distilled the key principles of each area of law from the existing cases, so that these abstract principles could be applied to any subsequent controversy. Langdellian legal science, like similar reforms taking place elsewhere in American higher education, quite explicitly excluded religious perspectives, which were seen as insufficiently scientific and inappropriately sectarian.

Roscoe Pound was a product of the Langdellian system – he took his legal training from Harvard in 1889 and 1890 – but he was also one of its earliest critics. According to Pound, Langdell’s system, with its singleminded focus on previously decided cases, was too narrow and formalistic, a “mechanical jurisprudence.” Pound insisted that lawyers and legal scholars needed to take into account the insights of sociology, economics, and political science to fully understand the role of law, an approach he called “sociological jurisprudence.” Sociological jurisprudents, according to Pound, “look to the working of the law rather than to its abstract content; they regard law as a social institution involving both finding by experience and conscious making – an institution which may be improved by conscious human effort.” Although not himself religious, Pound traveled in the same Progressive circles as advocates of the Social Gospel, the liberal Protestant movement that married modern criti-

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cal theology with an optimistic program for social reform; and he, unlike Langdellian legal science and subsequent movements such as Legal Realism, which emerged in the 1930s, included morality as a central concern of the law.

William Jennings Bryan, Pound’s adversary in that Nebraska courthouse, was no intellectual – his sympathetic biographer suggests he was a “rather simple man” who “showed little interest in literature, art, or philosophy” and Bryan was much more theologically conservative than the Social Gospel theologians. But he was fond of many of the leading Social Gospelers, and would later join forces with them on issues like Prohibition. Thus, there was, at most, one degree of separation between Bryan and Pound.

It is tempting to imagine how things might have been different if a friendship had taken root in that Nebraska courthouse. If Bryan had included people like Pound among his advisors, their friendship might (one can at least dream) have sown the seeds for an early twentieth century Christian legal scholarship.

But it didn’t. Bryan, the nation’s leading evangelical at the end of the nineteenth century, crafted his appeal for the untutored “common man,” keeping a wary distance from secular intellectual elites like Pound. Pound returned the favor. Pound disdained the Populist movement that Bryan represented, lacing his later speeches with dismissive references whenever the occasion seemed to call for a laugh line. “He found the raw protest of lower-class reform distasteful,” according to his biographer: “it lacked dignity, it was not respectable, and its arguments were unsound.”

Pound’s and Bryan’s disinterest in one another, and in the perspective each man represented, was emblematic of the historical forces that would shape Christian legal scholarship for much of the twentieth century. Evangelicals, who might have generated a Chris-

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5 Pound’s biographer notes, for instance, that he urged his students “to attend the lectures given by Charles R. Henderson, a Social Gospel chaplain who doubled as a criminologist.” WIGDOR, supra note 1, at 142.


7 WIGDOR, supra note 1, at 74.
tian legal scholarship, were (like Bryan himself) often anti-intellectual; and after 1925, the year of the Scopes trial and Bryan’s death, many evangelicals began to turn their back on American culture altogether. At the same time, the legal elites of the time had little interest in religious perspectives. Both Langdellian legal science and the movements that succeeded it – Pound’s sociological jurisprudence and Legal Realism, which shared many of the same cross-disciplinary aspirations – treated religion as irrelevant to the scientific study of law.

If the conflict between Pound and Bryan was one emblematic clash, the other came fifty years later, in the early 1940s – a dispute over the legacy of Supreme Court Justice and leading legal scholar Oliver Wendell Holmes. Holmes had by this time achieved revered status in American legal academia. Out of nowhere came a blistering attack. Writing in 1942, shortly after America’s entrance into World War II, several Jesuit scholars condemned Holmes’s “bad man” theory of law and his skepticism of morality. Holmes’ claim that the law has no room for morality, they argued, would leave no moral resources for combating the horrific totalitarian regimes that had sprouted in Europe. “This much may be said for Realism,” Fa-

8 This tendency is chronicled in detail in MARK A. NOLL, THE SCANDAL OF THE EVANGELICAL MIND (1994).

9 Of the three – Langdell, Pound and Legal Realism – Pound paid the most attention to the influence of religion. Although he tended to be highly critical of the impact of religion, particularly during his heyday, he recognized its relevance in several of his articles. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 140, 164 n.93 (1911) (describing influence of Puritanism on the common law).

10 John C. Ford, S.J., The Fundamentals of Holmes’ Juristic Philosophy, in PHASES OF AMERICAN CULTURE 51 (1942); Francis E. Lucey, S.J., Natural Law and American Legal Realism: Their Respective Contributions to a Theory of Law in a Democratic Society, 30 GEO. L.J. 493 (1942). See also Walter B. Kennedy, Realism, What Next?, 7 FORD. L. REV. 203 (1938). These attacks were the bubbling over of a neo-Thomist ferment in Catholic law schools and universities that had begun several years earlier. For a helpful discussion of these developments and their aftermath, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 159-78 (1973).
ther Francis Lucey wrote. “If man is only an animal, Realism is correct, Holmes was correct, Hitler is correct.”11 A subsequent article in the ABA Journal cast off decorum still further. “The fact that Holmes was a polished gentleman who did not go about like a storm-trooper knocking people down and proclaiming the supremacy of the blond beast,” the author wrote, “should not blind us to his philosophy that might makes right, that law is the command of the dominant social group.”12

In 1951, Harvard Law Professor and future Holmes biographer Mark DeWolfe Howe rallied to Holmes’ defense in the pages of the Harvard Law Review, arguing, among other things, that Holmes’ most notorious statements, which seemed to reflect a thorough-going positivism, had been misconstrued by his critics.13

For present purposes, two aspects of the clash are especially noteworthy. First, unlike evangelicals – who produced little serious scholarly reflection on legal issues – Catholics continued to produce Christian legal scholarship throughout the twentieth century, much of it drawing on natural law principles. This scholarship, which was nourished by the writings of theologians and scholars outside of legal academia, was reflected in the founding of several new legal journals at mid-century, including the Catholic Lawyer in 1955 and Natural Law Forum in 1956.

Second, it is not accidental this Catholic legal scholarship took place almost entirely outside the elite American legal journals. It was Howe’s article, not those of Holmes’ critics, that appeared in the nation’s flagship law review, and the Howe article can fairly be read as dismissive of the religious dimension of the attack on Holmes.14 “It would have required no special insight,” he wrote, “to predict, twenty years ago, that Jesuit teachers of law would find

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11 Lucey, supra note 10, at 531.
13 Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Positivism of Mr. Justice Holmes, 64 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1951). See also Fred Rodell, Justice Holmes and His Hecklers, 60 YALE L.J. 620 (1951).
14 I should perhaps note that Georgetown Law Journal – which ran the best known attack on Holmes –while an elite law review now, was far from elite in 1942.
Holmes’ skepticism philosophically unacceptable.” Howe also warned that, if an “eagerness” to accept “the implications of divine authority … becomes predominant in our philosophy, we shall be obliged once more to free ourselves from the old shackles.”\(^{15}\) In short, unlike evangelical scholarship, Catholic legal scholarship existed, but rarely saw the light of day in the top law reviews.\(^{16}\)

By the mid 1970s, evangelicals had fully emerged from their cultural slumber and would soon flex their political muscles on issues like the tax exemption for religious schools, abortion, and gay rights.\(^{17}\) But Christian legal scholarship lagged well behind. Although there were important exceptions — such as work by Michael McConnell and others on the religion clauses of the First Amendment, and a revival of natural law theory that is generally associated with John Finnis — there was precious little Christian legal scholarship, especially in leading law reviews, even as of the early years of this century. Three years ago, I wrote the initial draft of an article on this theme that I entitled, with apologies to Milan Kundera, “The Unbearable Lightness of Christian Legal Scholarship.”\(^{18}\)

I fully stand by the assessment of that article. But there also is increasing evidence that a real renaissance may finally be underway. The volume of Christian legal scholarship seems to be increasing,\(^{19}\) as is exploration of Christian perspectives on law in other contexts.\(^{20}\) The remainder of this essay will take an initial look at these


\(^{16}\) This theme is developed in more detail in David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unbearable Lightness of Christian Legal Scholarship, 57 EMORY L.J. 1471 (2008).

\(^{17}\) See id.

\(^{18}\) Id.


\(^{20}\) Mirror of Justice, a blog started by a group of leading Catholic scholars, was
new developments, asking three very basic questions: What?, Who?, and How? – What are the most promising directions for Christian legal scholarship? Who is a Christian legal scholar? And how can Christian legal scholarship best be facilitated?

What?

Start with the “What” question – what are some of the most promising directions for the next generation of Christian legal scholarship? The short answer, in my view, is that redoing Roscoe Pound’s sociological jurisprudence (and its first cousin, Legal Realism), but with religious perspectives included, might be a worthy mission for the next several decades. Recall that Pound admonished the scholars of his era to “look to the working of the law rather than [solely] to its abstract content,” and to treat law “as a social institution involving both finding by experience and conscious making.”

A Christian scholar might qualify these words with a reminder that the backdrop against which our lawmaking takes place is the moral order that God has imposed on the universe. But the attention to social, political, and economic context – and the warning against the temptation to debate abstract concepts – is, in my view, precisely the right note to strike for the Christian legal scholarship of the next generation. Such a project might take one or more of three forms.

The first might be described as historical retrieval. This has been the strategy of choice for much of the existing Christian legal scholarship. In the religion clause literature, for example, McConnell and other scholars have explored the history of the Framers’ era, including the religious perspectives that helped to shape the First Amendment.

In family law, scholars like John Witte have traced the complex historical relationship between Christian and secular regul-

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21 See Pound, supra note 4.

22 For an example of McConnell’s historical work, see Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990).
The inspiration for much of this existing historical work by Christian legal scholars was Harold Berman, whose magisterial work on the relationship between religious turmoil and legal reform included, most recently, the second of two volumes on law and revolution. At its best, such scholarship can have a prophetic quality, using the past to point the way forward.

A second promising strategy is to develop a normative analysis of the proper role of law. Many of the most important legal developments of the twentieth century, such as the emergence of the administrative state and the expansion of federal criminal law, have been largely un-studied by Christian legal scholars. Scholarship that marries theological perspectives with sophisticated institutional analysis seems long overdue. For Catholics, there is of course a rich reservoir of natural law and Catholic Social Thought to draw on; for Protestants, the tradition is thinner but includes valuable predecessors, from Abraham Kuyper to Reinhold Neibuhr. There are hints that a new normative Christian legal scholarship may be emerging. The most important illustration is the vibrant literature on international human rights. In domestic law, several scholars have recently asked when and how the law should be used to police morality: one has drawn on the Catholic Social Thought tradition to analyze the Supreme Court’s invalidation of Texas’s anti-sodomy law several terms ago, and others have explored the institutional effects of using federal criminal prohibitions as the strategy of choice for addressing vice, gambling, corporate misbehavior and other forms of immoral behavior. But this work is quite preliminary; a great deal

23 See, e.g., John Witte Jr., Retrieving and Reconstructing Law, Religion, and Marriage in the Western Tradition, in FAMILY TRANSFORMED: RELIGION, VALUES, AND SOCIETY IN AMERICAN LIFE 244 (Steven M. Tipton & John Witte Jr., eds. 2005).
26 Kalscheur, supra note 19.
27 See, e.g., David Skeel, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Christianity and the (Modest) Rule of
remains to be explored.

A third approach is, in a sense, to turn inward, and to examine the nature of Christian influence on law. When the Progressives and Legal Realists vowed to pursue a more genuinely scientific approach to law, what they had in mind was a careful, empirical study of how law was made and implemented. This same strategy can be used to explore, for instance, the influence theologically conservative Christians have had in particular areas such as gambling, abortion, religious freedom and human rights. There is now a great deal of recent work by sociologists and political scientists that could be used to inform this scholarship.

When I described these three approaches to a friend, his first reaction was, “What about philosophy?” His assumption, I think, was that Christian legal scholars would begin by developing a set of abstract, foundational principles, or by challenging the postmodern assumptions of much contemporary legal thought on theological grounds. I do not want to downplay the importance of philosophical approaches. Indeed, the project I have outlined can be seen as drawing, at least implicitly, on the philosophical insights of scholars such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Alvin Plantinga, and Nick Wolterstorff. My typology assumes, for instance, that Christian legal scholarship should be a quest for truth, that truth exists, and that our access to truth is partial and perspectival (that is, influenced by the particulars of our own perspective). 28

Nevertheless, I suspect that many of the most exciting developments in the next generation of Christian legal scholarship will

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come from outside the philosophical domain. In part, this is simply a matter of numbers. Of the Christian legal scholars who had emerged by the end of the twentieth century, 70% or more can surely be characterized as focusing on philosophy, the First Amendment religion clauses, or some combination of the two. Other issues and perspectives have received far less attention, and thus offer opportunities for exciting new contributions. It also seems to me that moral philosophy often becomes a debate about abstract propositions, especially when we legal scholars get our hands on it. Rather than abstract propositions, the focus of the coming generation of Christian legal scholars will, I think, more often be on the orientation of the law: does it reflect the God who welcomes back the prodigal son, and who became flesh and dwelt among us? Who?

The second question is, “Who,” or “Whose work are we talking about when we talk about Christian legal scholarship?” The particular question here is whether a scholar must be a Christian to write Christian legal scholarship.

I suppose the obvious answer to this question would be yes, one must be a Christian to produce Christian legal scholarship. It says so right on the label. But I don’t think this is correct. Perhaps the answer depends on just what one means by Christian legal scholarship. In my view, Christian legal scholarship is scholarship that does two things: 1) it provides either a normative theory derived from Christian scripture or tradition; or a descriptive theory that explains some aspect of the influence of Christianity on law, or of law on Christianity; and 2) it seriously engages the best secular scholarship treating the same issues.29

The vast majority of scholarship that satisfies this standard no doubt will come from scholars who are themselves professing Christians. Moreover, as George Marsden has pointed out, professing Christians may bring a unique perspective to particular issues. A Christian may be more inclined, for instance, to consider the possi-

29 This definition is discussed in more detail in Skeel, supra note 16, at 1502-1505.
bility that faith or the working of the Holy Spirit influenced the direction of a historical movement. For much of my discussion, I therefore have assumed that Christian scholars are the ones producing Christian legal scholarship. But one can imagine work that satisfies the two criteria outlined above, yet issues forth from the word processors of scholars who do not identify themselves as believing Christians.

The final question is how: How might the renaissance of Christian legal scholarship be facilitated?

Let me start my answer with a word of warning about what has been perhaps the most popular legal strategy of theologically conservative Christians in the past several decades: legal defense funds. In a 1981 book called A Christian Manifesto, Francis Schaeffer wagged a finger at Christian lawyers. “Now I have a question,” he wrote. “In the shifts that have come in law [from Christian conceptions of truth to relativistic pluralism], where were the Christian lawyers …?” “We must say,” he concluded, “that the Christians in the legal profession did not ring the bell, and we are indeed very, very far down the road toward a totally humanistic culture.”

While Schaeffer recognized that “there are going to be people who say, ‘don’t use the legal and political means, just show the Christian alternatives,’” he insisted that sticking to spiritual rather than worldly responses “is absolutely utopian in a fallen world, and specifically in a world such as ours at the present moment.”

Inspired in part by the calls of Schaeffer and others, evangelicals started a number of legal defense funds to litigate cases on the religion clauses and related issues. Two of the earliest were the Christian Legal Society’s Center for Law and Religious Freedom, started in 1975, and the Rutherford Institute, founded by John Whitehead in

33 Id. at 133.
1982.\textsuperscript{34} Other leading Christian legal defense funds include the American Center for Law and Justice, which was founded by Pat Robertson in 1990 as a Christian challenge to the American Civil Liberties Union;\textsuperscript{35} and the Alliance Defense Fund, the 1994 brain-child of a group of evangelical leaders, including Bill Bright (the former head of Campus Crusade for Christ), James Dobson (president of Focus on the Family), and James Kennedy (former president of Coral Ridge Ministries in Florida).\textsuperscript{36}

These defense funds have been quite successful on many levels, but they are not a promising seedbed for Christian legal scholarship. They are designed to defend Christian positions, rather than to debate or wrestle with the appropriateness of the particular position. This is not a recipe for the kind of intellectual give-and-take that is likely to inspire innovative Christian legal scholarship. The historical track record seems to reinforce this conclusion, particularly within American evangelicalism: at least since the mid-nineteenth century, as Mark Noll has pointed out, the activism of evangelicals has usually discouraged rather than encouraged serious reflection.\textsuperscript{37}

More promising is the emergence, or rededication, of faith-oriented law schools. Among Protestants, scholars at law schools like Pepperdine and Regent Law School are producing increasingly valuable Christian legal scholarship.\textsuperscript{38} The Catholic side has seen

\textsuperscript{34} For a thorough history of the major defense funds, their budgets and their general focus, see STEVEN P. BROWN, TRUMPING RELIGION: THE NEW CHRISTIAN RIGHT, THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE, AND THE COURTS 27-45 (2002).

\textsuperscript{35} The ACLJ has arguably become the most prominent of the Christian legal funds, in no small part due to its colorful current chief counsel, Jay Sekulow.

\textsuperscript{36} Until recently, the Alliance Defense Fund did not directly litigate religious defense cases, serving instead as a source of funding for other groups. \textit{id.} at 41. In the last several years, however, the ADF has established a litigation branch and has begun to litigate its own cases.

\textsuperscript{37} NOLL, supra note 8, at 243; \textit{see also id.} at 173, 245.

\textsuperscript{38} Pepperdine’s law school was founded in the 1970s, and Regent law school was founded (as part of Pat Robertson’s Regent University) in 1986, after the law school at Oral Roberts University closed and donated its library to Regent. Other Protestant law schools include Trinity Law School in California (founded 1980) and Liberty University Law School in Virginia (founded 2003).
both the formation of new law schools, and the renewed focus on faith perspectives at long-established law schools like Notre Dame, Boston College and Villanova. These faith-oriented schools are wrestling with many of the same difficult issues that religiously oriented universities invariably face, such as the question whether to limit the faculty and student body to people who hold the beliefs of a particular denomination or faith. Perhaps in part due to the relative dearth of scholars writing from a discernibly faith-oriented perspective, many of the faith-oriented law schools have defined their mission relatively broadly, including, for example, orthodox Jews on the faculty. But the great promise of these law schools is their willingness to nurture and reward religiously informed scholarship. Young scholars in secular law schools still face significant disincentives to producing faith-oriented scholarship early in their careers, such as the possibility that Christian legal scholarship will be valued less highly in the tenure and promotion process than more traditional secular legal scholarship, and the difficulty of placing Christian legal scholarship in elite law journals. If some or many of the scholars in Christian law schools respond by producing scholarship that seriously engages the best secular scholars in their fields, the Christian law schools may contribute significant new Christian legal scholarship in the coming years.

39 The two most prominent of the new Catholic law schools are Ave Maria Law School in Michigan (founded 1998) and the University of St. Thomas Law School in Minnesota (re-opened in 1999, sixty-six years after having closed).

40 The practical dilemma faced by a school with a faith-oriented mission statement is that the narrower the mission statement the smaller the pool of scholars who both fit the mission statement and are among the leaders in their particular field. A recent illustration of the tradeoff was the decision by Wheaton College, a premier evangelical college, not to renew the contract of Joshua Hochschild, a promising young philosopher, after he announced his intention to convert to Catholicism. See Alan Jacobs, To Be A Christian College, FIRST THINGS (April, 2006) (description and analysis of the controversy by a Wheaton professor).

41 For a discussion and defense of one version of this approach, written by the dean of Villanova’s law school, see Mark Sargent, An Alternative to the Sectarian Vision: The Role of the Dean in an Inclusive Catholic Law School, 33 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 171 (2001).
A second strategy for fostering the new generation of Christian legal scholarship is through foundations and Christian think tanks. Some of the most active Christian institutes are themselves linked to defense funds. The Alliance Defense Fund, for instance, is both actively involved in litigation efforts and an institute that funds scholarly events and educational training. These ties to ongoing litigation efforts may give dual-purpose funds some of the same limitations as venues for Christian reflection as the single-purpose defense funds have. But standalone think tanks – like Emory’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion – as well as funds like Pew Charitable Trusts that finance research on religion in a variety of disciplines, can provide both high-level interaction and venues for serious reflection, thus nurturing Christian legal scholarship.

A final strategy is targeted scholarships for students and professors. Establishing scholarships for Christian law students and endowing chaired professorships at leading law schools seems a promising way to foster a new generation of Christian legal scholarship. As with each of the strategies, there are potential obstacles to funding scholarships and chairs. A few years ago, for instance, Yale failed to use and eventually returned a gift that the donor had pledged for the purpose of funding an intensive course in Western Civilization.42 One can imagine a similar reaction in a leading law school to a chair established for a theologically conservative Christian legal scholar. But that won’t always be the case – witness the chairs used at schools like Emory Law School to attract leading scholars – and funding individual students and professors is an important way to nourish Christian legal scholarship.

The history of Christian legal scholarship in the twentieth century is depressing, but the developments of the last few years are grounds for cautious optimism looking forward. If these trends continue, the William Jennings Bryan and Roscoe Pound of the new century may even see themselves as participants in the same scholarly conversation. And perhaps this generation’s Mark DeWolfe Howe won’t feel the need to warn about the “old shackles” of religious perspectives on the law.