NO-FAULT INSURANCE

Dennenberg vs. Shrager
For & Against
From the Dean’s Desk:

A Surge In Interest

A recent national survey and our own experience at Penn tell us that the interest of young Americans in securing a legal education has surged dramatically—a 150% increase in the past decade, so that college graduates seeking to enter law school are for the first time in history a close second to those looking to medicine for their careers. Watergate and its aftermath have raised the polar questions whether the issues and legal personalities involved will stimulate even more interest in law or have a repelling effect. No one can know, and extensive speculation seems fruitless. I would hope, however, that lawyers will be alert to point out that frailties of individuals who happen to be lawyers, and the great political and moral failures which made them important, are distinguishable from the law and legal structure which have not failed. Almost uniquely among nations, the United States has a tradition of judicial independence and law which, if properly supported by lawyers, the press and public opinion, can sustain the nation when its political and ethical systems have let it down.

On November 1, the Law School’s Capital Development Campaign went public. All of you have heard from the Campaign Chairman, Carroll R. Wetzel, L’30, and you will be hearing more in the coming months. It is appropriate in this issue of the Journal, however—one which reports the largest annual giving record in history—to note that advance gifts in the Capital Campaign exceed $1,200,000, an extraordinary beginning that bodes well for the future.

You will read throughout this Journal of Law School events of the immediate past and future that are charged with excitement. Savor as you read, but I urge you to do more—participate! Come to the Law School for its colloquia, class reunions, Alumni Society-student cocktail receptions, Roberts Lectures, Alumni Day seminars, and moot court arguments, or just to talk with the dean and faculty. This continues to be your law school, and we encourage you to take advantage of all that it offers you.

I hope that many of you will be able to come to our Alumni Breakfast in Harrisburg on January 24 during the Pennsylvania Bar Association meeting. Frank N. Jones, our new Vice-Dean, will be your speaker, and both of us look forward to seeing you.

Bernard Wolfman

LATE NEWS

Former Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox will deliver the annual Owen Roberts lecture on March 26, 1974.

Zelda Wolfman Fund for Prisoners’ Rights. This Fund will support those Law School “programs and activities primarily concerned with the study, development or vindication of the rights of prisoners.” The Fund was established in memory of Dean Wolfman’s wife who died in October.

Thomas A. O’Boyle Visiting Practitionership Fund. This Fund will be used to enable the Law School to support a practicing lawyer in a teaching or lecture role in conjunction with the activities of our Center for the Study of Financial Institutions. The Fund was established in memory of Thomas A. O’Boyle, L’40, a member of the Board of Managers of the Law Alumni Society and of the Advisory Council of the Center for the Study of Financial Institutions.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

NEWS & FEATURES

From The Dean's Desk
By Dean Bernard Wolfman .............. 2
No-Fault: The Case For
By Herbert S. Dennenberg .............. 4
No-Fault: The Case Against
By David S. Shrager, '60 .............. 5
"Character" And Admission To The Bar
By Hon. Roy Wilkinson, Jr., '39 ........ 6
Privacy And The Computer
By J. Taylor DeWeese, '73 ............ 7
$9 Million Fund Drive .................. 8
Woman In The Law: Temin
By Mary Jane Holland ................. 9
1973 Clerkships ......................... 10
Alumni Annual Giving Report .......... 11
Letters To The Editor .................. 45
President's Message
By Joseph P. Flanagan, Jr. ............ 52

NOTES

News Notes ................................ 46
Faculty And Staff Notes ............... 47
Alumni Notes ............................ 49
Necrology ............................... 51

IN THIS ISSUE:

Case For No Fault
Page 4

Bar Admission Standards
Page 6

Case Against No-Fault
Page 5

Privacy And The Computer
Page 7
No-fault is an idea whose time has come for many reasons. Perhaps the most obvious is that the present automobile insurance and reparations system is a consumer fraud—a legalized racket—a total disaster. It would be difficult to design or dream up a worse system. It's been said that a monkey at a typewriter could come up with a better system than we have now, and when it is objectively examined, the insult perhaps is only to the monkey.

Let's take a look at our present auto insurance and reparations system. One way to do this is to ask: If we wanted the worst of all possible systems, how would we do it? The answer is to come up with a system precisely like we have now.

If you wanted the worst of all possible systems, you would want an inefficient system. We can measure efficiency and inefficiency by a benefit-cost ratio. Of every dollar in costs, how much is returned in benefits to the victims of the auto accident? The answer in the case of automobile bodily injury liability insurance is that of each dollar, 42 cents comes back in benefits and 58 cents gets burned up in expenses and legal fees. To be exact, 26 cents of every dollar goes for insurance company expenses, 14 cents of every dollar goes for claims adjustment expenses, 16 percent goes for claimants lawyers' fees, and 2 percent goes for court costs.

The 42 cents that finally comes out at the very small end of the horn of plenty includes 21 cents for pain and suffering, 7 cents for duplication of economic recovery paid from other sources as well, and 14 percent for economic loss not compensated from other sources.

We can see this inefficiency in another way. How much do we have to pour into the system to get out a dollar in benefits? In the case of the auto bodily injury liability insurance system, we have to put in $2.38 to get back a dollar. In the case of workmen's compensa-

olation, it's $1.50 into the system to get back a dollar in benefits. In the case of group accident and health insurance, it's a $1.22 to get back one dollar. And, finally, in the case of a good Blue Cross Plan, it's $1.04 to get back a dollar.

This introduces an interesting multiplier effect. For example, if loss costs double, this means that we have to multiply loss cost by a factor of 4.8 to come out with a premium that must be charged.

Here's another way to measure the efficiency of the system. The U.S. Department of Transportation studied 220,000 lawsuits. It found that these lawsuits produced $700 million for the victims, $600 million in attorneys' fees, and $100 million for other expenses to be paid to the attorneys. Yes, the attorneys took exactly half the pot. That is not precisely a model of efficiency.

If all insurance became that inefficient, we would have to raise premiums 30 percent nationally to cover the newly introduced costs. This would amount to $25 billion a year.

If we want the worst of all possible systems, we also want one that produces uncertainty. What could be more uncertain than our present auto insurance and reparations system? It has been kindly described as part lottery and part oriental bazaar. It is the very essence of unpredictability and uncertainty. Who can predict the outcome of a lawsuit (other than perhaps a judge)? What are the witnesses to say? Will the witnesses even be around at all when the trial comes up? Who will be sitting on the jury? How will the plaintiff come off as a witness? These and a million other questions must be fed into the decisional process, and the outcome has often been described as about as predictable as a roll of dice.

Dean William Prosser, a ranking authority on fault law, described the process as follows:

(Continued on page 27)
"Consumerism" is the parent of much public policy these days and one of its more popular progeny is "no-fault" automobile insurance. It is not surprising that a Gallup poll disclosed that a plurality of those polled favored no-fault insurance, but that only 19% of those polled presumed to have any idea what no-fault was. Nor was I surprised to hear recently from a legislator that he did not know exactly what no-fault insurance was, but that he could not afford to vote against it!

Regrettably, the public debate on no-fault insurance has included very little attention to the underlying merits of any particular no-fault plan. Much of the discussion is taken up with criticism of the present system, including high insurance rates, delay in the disposition of claims, arbitrary cancellations and court congestion. These problems areas are, of course, a fair topic for public comment, but typically no effort is made to explain how, if at all, no-fault insurance would remedy these alleged defects in the status quo or even relate to them.

It is sad, too, to note that in some quarters the no-fault insurance debate has been characterized by more than a little invective and public name-calling directed toward either the legal profession or the insurance industry. I am particularly concerned that there has been injected into the public discussion an unfortunate and illogical juxtaposition between the issue of no-fault insurance and an unrelated problem affecting a small segment of the Bar which it is said has behaved less than ethically in personal injury practice. With rather callous disregard to the merits of no-fault insurance, one proponent of a certain type of no-fault proposal who serves as insurance commissioner of a major industrial state has gone so far as to say that the test of a "good" no-fault bill is whether the Bar opposes it.

In the face of all of the public rhetoric on the issue and the mass media's representations of no-fault insurance as a "consumer's dream," and with a concern for those in the public sector who, on this and other issues, engage in the unseemly business of attempting to structure public policy on the backs of the great professions, I am pleased to state the case against certain forms of no-fault insurance in pages which will be read largely by members of the legal profession. Attorneys insist on assessing public policy proposals critically on their merits, rather than on the basis of the label they bear. They understand the need to decide issues on the basis of a sound factual predicate.

At the threshold, the Bar must concede its vested interest on the subject, since every form of no-fault insurance will to some extent reduce the number of claimants who will require the representation of counsel in automobile-accident-related matters. This fact, which, of course, must not serve as a criterion for assessment of any no-fault insurance proposal, must be sharply differentiated from the natural effect of certain forms of no-fault insurance to effectively preclude claimants from obtaining counsel in circumstances where legal representation is desirable in preserving an arm's length relationship with an insurance company in the disposition of important rights which the insured or claimant has. The disposition of a personal injury claim for money damages is a qualitative judgment and it is naive to suppose that the insurance adjuster with which the claimant may be obliged to deal, unrepresented by counsel, has other than a vested interest himself in disposing of the claim on terms most advantageous to the insurance company involved.

The Bar likewise has an obligation to assert its experience and knowledge in the area of insurance and to fulfill its special obligation to the public by identifying the effect of no-fault insurance on the most (Continued on page 30)
"Character"  
And Admission To The Bar

By Hon. Roy Wilkinson, Jr., '39

With the adoption of the multi-state examination by some 40 states, I believe that feature of bar admissions has received careful scrutiny by those most concerned. In addition, we have the many cases pending in the Federal Courts challenging the administration of the bar examination and thus requiring the courts to give it a careful scrutiny.

On the other hand, in many ways I believe the problem of the "testing" of a person's "character" to determine whether it meets the standard of morality required for admission to the bar is a much more difficult problem and one which requires a great deal of thoughtful attention. I am not so foolhardy as to suppose in the next few minutes that I can set forth what the law is much less what the law ought to be with regard to the permissible inquiry that can or should be made into an applicant's character. I do hope that I will be able to impress you with the fact that the law is very unclear, and thoughtful people in responsible positions must give the subject a very careful study.

In 1940—not 1970—in 1940 in Pennsylvania, a young, then current graduate of the University of Pittsburgh applied for registration as a law student. He had been a student "activist", albeit mild indeed by today's standards, and had received some publicity for leading peaceful student strikes against war. When he appeared before the Character Committee, they questioned him on his part in these affairs. He replied that he had not broken the law, and, therefore, his part had no relevance to the Character Committee. When asked if he would take an oath and defend the Constitution of the United States, he replied that he would but with a reservation that he wanted to propose some changes. The Committee failed to recommend him as being of good moral character. He appealed to the State Board, asking either for a reversal of the local Board or to be given the reasons for which he was rejected. The State Board denied his appeal without comment. He then appealed, using the appropriate procedures, to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania where the appeal was dismissed, per curiam, without opinion. The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari.

With all the fired-up enthusiasm of a young law graduate, I donned my armor, mounted my white charger, and wrote an article which was published in the Bill of Rights Review, under the title, "Shoemaker's Children". The thesis of the article was that lawyers defended everyone else's constitutional rights but had none themselves—shoemaker's children go barefoot! After a study of the law as it was reported in 1940, I concluded that an applicant for admission who was denied because of character and fitness stood in the same position as he would have had he applied for listing in the Social Register.

I am not going to bore you with a detailed discussion of a great number of individual United States Supreme Court decisions which cannot be reconciled. There are many able articles in current legal periodicals.

(Continued on page 35)
By J. Taylor DeWeese, '73

The face of our personal checks reveals a great deal about our lives. They not only tell what church or political organizations we belong to, but how much we contribute to each. They reveal what magazines we read, to whom we owe money, how much we owe, and how often we pay. They leave a fairly detailed information trail.

Ironically, after all the attempts by American citizens to discover who contributes to the political campaigns of its elected officials, now, after the Bank Secrecy Act, the elected officials know where the citizens makes his contributions, but the citizen still has little idea who pays the politician.

Most alarming of all, we have witnessed in the last few years the rapid growth of a massive criminal justice information network which girds the United States and reaches into Canada. The FBI, itself, pro-

(Continued on page 37)
Dean Bernard Wolfman and Development Steering Committee Chairman Carroll R. Wetzel have announced a new Law School Development Program which is designed to ultimately raise $9 million in new funds for the school.

The first stage of the program will seek $3 million over the next two years.

In their joint letter announcing the new program Wolfman and Wetzel wrote:

"Your Law School today is in the best of academic health. Historically distinguished, it is "one of the nation's great law schools," to quote a 1972 evaluation team representing the American Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools. This impartial panel found the faculty "excellent," the new curriculum "exciting." Eighty percent of the students are drawn from the top 15% of the national applicant pool.

"Qualities such as these are not self-perpetuating. Our School has stayed great only by keeping its antennae tuned to tomorrow's demands on lawyers and law schools and by periodically girding itself to accommodate them.

"A time has now come when the School must again so act to fortify its excellence. We write to announce a new Law School Development Program.

"Much of the Law School's present health it owes to a building program started in the fifties and completed in the early sixties. From that marshaling of energies and funds came its splendid new classrooms and lecture halls, student residences, research quarters, and much-enlarged Biddle Law Library. Had these facilities not been built when they were, the School today would be quite unequipped to hold its place among the leaders.

"Now we find it necessary to give that same kind of forethought to the nurturing of the School's living resources: its faculty and students; its teaching, research and publications programs; its capacity for educational enterprise, and the library materials all these will require.

"Even the warmly complimentary ABA-AALS report found our student-faculty ratio to be higher and our library budget smaller than the prevailing standards among other law schools of Pennsylvania's stature. Our own self-examination, moreover, has shown these limitations to be symptomatic of a broader condition that could be as pivotal to the School's future as the state of its physical plant has been to its present: its fiscal base lacks depth. It rests too heavily upon currently generated income — the volume of which allows little margin for contingencies, new ventures, research and a faculty of proper size.

"What would it take to put the School's excellence on a sure financial footing? The Law School Board and a Development Steering Committee, representing the alumni and the Bar, have been wrestling with that question. After a year's study, their finding is that the

(Continued on page 40)

---

Temple's Toast

The following is a toast proposed by Peter J. Liacouras, '56 Dean of the Faculty of Law of Temple University, in honor of the Faculty of Law at the University of Pennsylvania on the occasion of a reception held by Temple for Penn, on October 27, 1973, in the Faculty Lounge of the Charles Klein Law Building. Liacouras is one of five alumni now serving as Law Deans.

Dean Wolfman (Bernie), faculty colleagues and guests from the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania:

(Continued on page 43)
Carolyn Engel Temin, '58:
Executive director of the Chancellor's Drug Commission of the Philadelphia Bar Association

Had the Equal Rights Amendment already reshaped the Constitution, perhaps the whole thing could have been avoided.

But there was no Equal Rights Amendment, and if women in Pennsylvania's correctional institutions have a better future now than their counterparts did 10 years ago, much of the credit belongs to Carolyn Engel Temin.

Ms. Temin, a 1958 graduate of the Law School, is executive director of the Chancellor's Drug Commission of the Philadelphia Bar Association.

She's also the attorney who successfully challenged a discriminatory state law on women's prison sentences, a lengthy legal battle which more than ever convinced her of the need for an equal rights amendment.

"I've always been interested in what happens to people after they've been tried," she explains.

"I'm concerned with the inequalities in the criminal justice system — the educated vs. the uneducated, men vs. women, rich vs. poor."

Her concern turned to horror when she read the

**Woman In The Law:**

*By Mary Jane Holland*

Although some people might view the rare book section of a law library as merely an interesting collection of antiques, the volumes it contains are actually much more, says associate Biddle Law Librarian Paul Gay.

These collections, says Gay, such as the one in the Biddle Law Library, provide the source material for research performed by legal historians and other scholars, act as an indication of the type of law school and the quality of its library, and help to attract faculty to the school.

About 5000 volumes comprise the rare book collection in the Biddle Law Library.

*(Continued on page 41)*
1973
Clerkships

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
Chief Justice (Ret.) Earl Warren
Theodore Eisenberg
Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.
Jordan A. Luke
Associate Justice Byron R. White
Jonathan D. Varat

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS:
Second Circuit
Judge Walter R. Mansfield
John H. Mason
Third Circuit
Judge Arlin M. Adams
Timothy C. Russell
Judge William H. Hastie
Jonathan F. L. Silver
Judge James Hunter, III
W. Jeffrey Garson
Judge Max Rosenn
Linda A. Fischer
Staff Clerk
Frederick Kuhn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:
California
Judge Stanley A. Weigel (Northern)
Philip Hulpern
Delaware
Judge Caleb R. Layton, III
Roderick W. McKelvie
New York
Judge Marvin E. Frankel (Southern)
Marshall Jordon Breger
Judge Murray I. Gurfein (Southern)
Henry S. Schleiff
Pennsylvania
Judge Herbert A. Fogel (Eastern)
Dale Lieberman
Joseph H. Wolfe, Jr.
Judge William W. Knox (Western)
Richard A. Finberg

UNITED STATES TAX COURT:
Judge Charles Simpson
Jeanne E. Gorrissen
Judge Theodore Tannenwald, Jr.
Stephen D. Berger

STATE APPELLATE COURTS:
Supreme Court of Illinois
Judge Walter V. Schaefer
David O. Lehman
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
Judge Thomas E. Delahanty
George S. Isaacson
Supreme Court of New Jersey
Judge Nathan L. Jacobs
Michael J. Kalison
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Judge Michael J. Eagen
Barry S. Roberts
Judge Thomas W. Pomeroy
George M. Cheever
Judge Samuel J. Roberts
Charles E. Dorkey, III
Joel M. Kaufman
George W. Westervelt, Jr.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Judge Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr.
Regina Austin
Raymond W. McKee
Judge Theodore Spaulding
David L. Brich

STATE TRIAL COURTS:
New Jersey
Judge Nathan Staller (Cape May County)
Philip R. Lezenby
Pennsylvania
Judge Alexander F. Barbieri (Philadelphia)
Joel M. Hamme
Judge John J. McDevitt, 3rd (Philadelphia)
Dennis L. O’Connell
Judge Clinton B. Palmer (Northampton)
Robert M. Davison
Harry M. Spaeth, Jr.
24th Annual Campaign
FINAL REPORT • 1972-1973
Alumni Annual Giving

SPECIAL REPORT
September 14, 1973

Dean Bernard Wolfman
The Law School
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19174

Dear Bernie:

The 1972-73 Law School Alumni Annual Giving campaign jumped our record total of $132,461 last year to a new high of $143,419, an increase of $11,000. Our volunteer workers labored diligently, loyally and efficiently to make this success possible. We are greatly indebted to them, not only because of the time and energy which they expend on the Law School's behalf, but because they recognize the importance of our program.

It is obvious that these efforts would not have borne fruit were we not blessed with alumni, parents of students, and friends who also recognize the needs of the Law School and respond enthusiastically and generously.

We are certainly planning to maintain our momentum into the 1973-74 Annual Giving campaign, so that we will move closer to the annual support which our great Law School requires.

I wish to express my thanks to every worker and to speak for them in expressing our thanks to every individual who supported our 1972-73 campaign.

Sincerely,

John F. E. Hippel

JFEH:mca
Dear John:

Your letter to me of September 14 is your third report as General Chairman of Law School Alumni Annual Giving. Each letter has brought good news, but this most recent report certainly gladdens the hearts of the Law School community and, I am sure, all of your volunteer workers, our alumni, and friends.

Your prediction last year that the groundwork had been laid for a significant increase in the 1972-73 campaign totals proved to be accurate. I cannot emphasize too strongly how essential Annual Giving is to the well-being of our Law School.

I am grateful to you, John, to your fellow workers, and to our alumni and friends who support the Annual Giving effort.

Sincerely,

Bernard Wolfman

John F. E. Hippel, Esquire
1418 Packard Building
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102
THE BENJAMIN FRANKLIN ASSOCIATES IS A UNIVERSITY-WIDE GROUP OF ALUMNI AND FRIENDS WHO CONTRIBUTE ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS OR MORE TO ALUMNI ANNUAL GIVING. LISTED ARE LAW SCHOOL ALUMNI WHO JOINED THE BENJAMIN FRANKLIN ASSOCIATES.

THE FELLOWS OF THE BENJAMIN FRANKLIN ASSOCIATES, THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF CONTRIBUTION IN ALUMNI ANNUAL GIVING, HONORS THOSE WHO CONTRIBUTE FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS OR MORE TO ALUMNI ANNUAL GIVING.

Chairman for the Law School
—Richard P. Brown, Jr., L'48

FELLOWS OF THE BENJAMIN FRANKLIN ASSOCIATES
Mr. Henry M. Chance II
*Louis J. and Mary E. Horowitz Foundation
*Bernard G. Segal, L'31

BENJAMIN FRANKLIN ASSOCIATES

Harold E. Kohn, C'34, L'37
Robert C. Liggett, W'13, L'17
*John T. Macartney, W'44, L'49
W. James MacIntosh, W'22, L'26
*John L. McDonald, L'40
J. Wesley McWilliams, W'15, L'15
*Mrs. Lillian E. Morris, in honor of Professor Clarence Morris
*Leon J. Obermayer, W'08, L'08
*the late Thomas A. O'Boyle, L'40
*Gilbert W. Oswald, C'31, L'34
*Lloyd J. Schumacker, L'30
*Marvin Schwartz, L'49
*Robert L. Trescher, W'34, L'37
*Wendell E. Warner, L'24

*To recognize those Benjamin Franklin Associates gifts allocated solely to the Law School.

WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS ASSOCIATES

Chairman—Barton E. Ferst, L'44

the late Daniel Lowenthal, L'31
David S. Malis, L'11
Desmond J. McGlynn, L'25
Philip F. Newman, L'17
Lipman Redman, L'41
James W. Scanlon, L'30
in memory of Judge Mark Lefever
G. William Sheu, L'36

Prof. Martin J. Aronstein, L'65
Mitchell Brock, L'53
Hon. Francis Shunk Brown, Jr., L'16
Clive S. Cummis, L'52
William H. Ewing, L'65
Barton E. Ferst, L'44
Joseph P. Flanagan, Jr., L'52
John R. Gibbel, L'64
Leon C. Holt, Jr., L'51

TO HONOR THE MEMORY OF WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS, DEAN OF THE LAW SCHOOL FROM 1896 TO 1914, THE WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS ASSOCIATES WAS FOUNDED IN RECOGNITION OF CONTRIBUTIONS OF FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS OR MORE TO LAW SCHOOL ANNUAL GIVING.
SUSTAINING FELLOWS OF THE CENTURY CLUB

John T. Andrews, Jr., L'64  
S. Samuel Arsh, L'34  
Harry Norman Ball, L'28  
Frederic L. Ballard, L'42  
John A. Ballard, L'48  
John T. Bamberger, L'58  
Ralph M. Barley, L'38  
Marshall A. Bernstein, L'49  
Robert M. Bernstein, L'14  
William C. Bodine, L'32  
John P. Bracken, L'39  
Raymond J. Bradley, L'47  
Floyd E. Brandow, Jr., L'54  
Robert J. Callaghan, L'33  
E. Calvert Cheston, L'35  
Morris Cheston, L'28  
Mrs. Joseph A. Coleman  
Stuart Coven, L'S1  
Harold Cramer, L'51  
Park B. Dilks, Jr., L'51  
M. Carton Dittmann, Jr., L'38  
Charles H. Dorsett, L'35  
Mrs. Elinor G. Ellis  
in memory of  
Herman M. Ellis, L'28  
Bernard Eskolin, L'35  
Richard J. Farrell, L'41  
Albert J. Feldman, L'53  
Louis J. Goffman, L'35  
Edward M. Harris, L'49  
William F. Hyland, L'49  
William D. Iverson, W'63  
Edward A. Kailer, L'33  
Ben F. Kaito, L'54  
Laurence A. Krupnick, L'63  
Ashby M. Larmore, L'31  
Bernard V. Lentz, L'56  
W. Barclay Lex, L'12  
David H. Marion, L'63  
Paul A. Mueller, Jr., L'55  
Prof. Robert H. Mintzheim  
David H. Nelson, L'49  
Michael A. Orlando III, L'58  
Isidor Ostroff, L'30  
in memory of  
Judge Mark Lefever  
Hon. Israel Packel, L'32  
Raymond M. Pearlstone, L'32  
Robert E. Penn, L'00  
William B. Pennell, L'61  
Franklin Poul, L'48  
Walter N. Read, L'42  
Russell R. Reno, Jr., L'57  
John N. Schaeffer, Jr., L'37  
Robert M. Shay, L'61  
Alvin L. Snowiss, L'55  
J. Tyson Stokes, L'31  
in memory of  
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal  
Robert W. Valimovich, L'49  
Stewart E. Warner, L'27  
Morris W. Weisberg, L'47  
Dean Bernard Wolfman, L'48  
Joseph C. Woodcock, Jr., L'53  
H. Albert Young, L'29  
John R. Young, L'30  
in memory of  
Judge Mark Lefever

CENTURY CLUB MEMBERS

Anonymous  
Alexander B. Adelman, L'31  
in memory of  
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal  
James H. Agger, L'61  
Sadie T. M. Alexander, L'27  
Jerome B. Apfel, L'54  
Louis B. Appelbaum, L'56  
Vincent J. Apruzzese, L'33  
William B. Arnold, L'29  
William W. Atterbury, Jr., L'50  
Peter F. Axelrad, L'64  
Henry W. Balka, L'26  
Augustus S. Ballard, L'48  
J. William Barba, L'50  
Samuel Bard, L'36  
Jay D. Barsky, L'45  
John D. Bartol, Jr., L'52  
Walter W. Beachboard, L'32  
Edward P. Beatty, Jr., L'56  
Lewis E. Beatty, Jr., L'49  
Robert M. Beckman, L'56  
Thomas J. Bedlow, L'39  
Harry P. Belger, Jr., L'64  
Hon. John C. Bell, Jr., L'17  
Joseph Bell, L'37  
Robert K. Bell, L'24  
David Berger, L'36  
Milton Berger, L'29  
Leonard J. Bernstein, L'34  
Franklin H. Berry, L'28  
John H. Berntz, L'31  
Claire G. Biehn, L'37  
G. William Bissell, L'64  
Allen D. Black, L'66  
Samuel A. Blank, L'32  
David Blashband, L'58  
David Blashband, L'58  
Charles J. Bloom, L'71  
Stanley W. Bluestine, L'54  
Fred Blume, L'66  
Bernard M. Borish, L'43  
James C. Bowen, L'48  
James S. Boynton, L'71  
Christopher Branda, Jr., L'51  
Joseph Brandschmied, L'28  
Gerald Broker, L'39  
Hon. H. Edward Brown, II, L'24  
Theodore L. Brubaker, L'38  
James S. Bryan, L'71  
the late Herman M. Buck, L'35  
Frank D. Glazer, Jr., L'70  
Joseph W. P. Burke, L'39  
Thomas J. Burke, L'49  
Walter M. Burkhardt, L'14  
H. Donald Busch, L'59  
Ralph C. Busser, Jr., L'30  
in memory of  
Judge Mark Lefever  
Harold F. Butler, L'22  
John Butterworth, L'53  
J. Russell Cadet, L'28  
T. Sidney Cadwallader II, L'39  
James S. Carey, L'33  
E. Barclay Cale, Jr., L'62  
J. Scott Calkins, L'52  
Hon. Curtis C. Carson, Jr., L'46  
Louis J. Carter, L'49  
Meyer L. Casman, L'17  
Harry Cassman, L'12  
Sidney Chait, L'33  
Hon. Paul C. Charlton, L'41  
Linda Klein Chaplin, L'66  
Keron D. Chance, L'38  
Frederick J. Charley, L'41  
Dr. Roland J. Christy, L'34  
Hon. Joseph S. Clark, Jr., L'26  
Roderick T. Clarke, L'36  
William N. Clarke, L'42  
Harrison H. Clement, L'37  
Isaac H. Clothier, L'57  
Mrs. Jules Cohen  
W. Frederick Colclough, L'30  
in memory of  
Judge Mark Lefever  
Marvin C. Comisky, L'41  
William H. Conca, L'34  
Joseph J. Contobly, Jr., L'65  
George H. Conover, Jr., L'52  
Charles R. Cooper, Jr., L'47  
Jerome J. Cooper, L'51  
Meyer E. Cooper, L'25  
A. Lynn Corcelius, L'41  
Samuel B. Corliss, L'49  
Henry B. Cortesi, L'63  
Robert I. Cottom, L'67  
John J. Cowan, L'59  
Stephen A. Cozen, L'64  
Cassius W. Craig, Jr., L'49  
Albert J. Crawford, Jr., L'39  
Fronestfield Crawford, L'59  
Fred B. Creamer, L'31  
Thomas F. Cunnane, L'63  
Edward I. Cutler, L'37  
Stewart R. Dalzell, L'69  
Edward M. David, L'41  
Mrs. Herman S. Davis  
in memory of  
Herman S. Davis, L'41  
J. Lawrence Davis, L'28  
David J. Dean, L'27  
Daniel A. Deitch, L'39  
Robert Deichert, L'21  
George C. Denniston, L'30  
in memory of  
Judge Mark Lefever  
Raymond K. Dewortiz, Jr., L'61  
John M. DeSiderio, L'66  
Harry T. Devine, L'36
Joseph A. Grazier, L'28
Oliver F. Green, Jr., L'51
Frank E. Greenberg, L'60
Harold Greenberg, L'62
Harry A. Greenberg, L'58
Mr. Bruce M. Greenfield
Robert W. Greenfield, L'30
Harold D. Greenwell, L'27
W. Edward Greenwood, Jr., L'29
George C. Griffin, L'57
Gordon D. Griffin, L'48
Hon. George W. Griffith, L'23
Mary E. Groff, L'32
Hon. Bernard M. Gross, L'59
Bernard M. Guth, L'58
Paul D. Guth, L'56
Richard J. Huber, L'64
Frank E. Halim, Jr., L'35
John S. Halsted, L'60
Rayner M. Hamilton, L'61
Philip M. Hammett, L'48
the late William D. Harkins, L'22
Hon. Doris May Harris, L'49
J. Barton Harrison, L'56
George A. Haspelt, Jr., L'51
Robert H. Hasseker, L'50
John S. Hayes, L'59
Jesse G. Heiges, L'38
Carl E. Heilman, L'39
Charles A. Heimbach, Jr., L'60
William C. A. Heuer, Jr., L'41
William C. A. Henry, L'28
Andrew Hourigan, Jr., L'40
Irving M. Hirsh, L'55
Irvin M. Hirsch, L'55
Donald E. Hittle, L'42
Hon. T. Linus Hoban, L'17
Abraham Hoffer, L'34
Richard V. Holmes, L'56
Andrew Hourigan, Jr., L'40
Richard A. Huettner, L'52
Philip L. Hummer, L'61
Hon. Daniel H. Hughes III, L'48
Richard S. Hyland, L'60
Thomas M. Hyland, L'11
the late R. Sturgis Insinger, L'21
Joseph B. Ingalls, L'29
Charles S. Jacobs, L'36
Myron Jacoby, L'31
in memory of
Knox Henderson and
Daniel Lowenthal
Howard M. Jaffe, L'61
Paul L. Jaffe, L'50
Sidney E. Jaffe, L'33
Israel E. Jamison, L'31
in memory of
Knox Henderson and
Daniel Lowenthal
Howard M. Jaffe, L'61
Paul L. Jaffe, L'50
Sidney E. Jaffe, L'33
Israel E. Jamison, L'31
in memory of
Knox Henderson and
Daniel Lowenthal
Thomas M. Johnson, L'24
John P. Jordan, L'28
Norman J. Kalcheim, L'30
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Thomas J. Kalman, L'42
John O. Kamin, L'57
Allan Katz, L'60
David J. Keeney, L'55
Ernest R. Keiter, L'19
Hon. Bernard J. Kelley, L'26
Alexander Kerr, L'70
Allan W. Kincaid, L'43
Hon. Miles W. Kirkpatrick, L'43
Richard Kirschner, L'57
David Kittner, L'51
Robert E. Klein, Jr., L'61
John P. Knox, L'53
Charles G. Kopp, L'60
Bernard J. Kostman, L'55
Meyer Kraus, L'44
Phyllis Krafkitch, L'44
William H. Kresch, L'30
in memory of
Judges Mark Lefever
Conner M. Krestal, L'57
Martin N. Kroll, L'63
David H. Kubert, L'32
Jadah L. Libovitch, L'63
Vincent J. LaBrasca, L'41
Marlene F. Lachman, L'70
Hon. Gregory G. Lagkos, L'38
Albert W. Laisy, L'30
Robert M. Landis, L'47
Sue Nadel Lang, L'71
George C. Laub, L'36
Samuel S. Landers, Jr., L'42
Charles H. Laveson, L'57
Henry W. Lavina, L'60
Nathan Lavine, L'31
in memory of
Knox Henderson and
Daniel Lowenthal
Samuel P. Lavine, L'28
David J. Lawler, L'45
Arthur W. Lefco, L'71
Arthur W. Leibold, Jr., L'56
Anthony S. Leiderman, L'61
William T. Leddy, L'25
George E. Letchworth, Jr., L'25
Dr. A. Leo Levin, L'42
Harvey Levin, L'38
Hon. Herbert S. Levin, L'31
in memory of
Knox Henderson and
Daniel Lowenthal
Leonard Levin, L'50
Russell R. Levin, L'47
Hon. Louis E. Levinthall, L'16
A. Harry Levitan, L'35
Arthur Levy, L'45
William J. Levy, L'64
Edward J. Lewis, L'62
Henry N. Libby, L'68
William E. Lindenmuth, L'41
Herbert M. Linsenberg, L'51
Hon. Abraham H. Lipez, L'29
William Lipkin, L'35
Louis Lipsitz, L'40
Arthur Littleton, L'20
S. Gerald Litvin, L'54
H. Allen Lochner, L'39
Edwin P. Longstreet, L'15
Wilfred R. Lorry, L'30
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Carl P. Lundy, L'33
William F. Lynch, L'39
Harry K. Madison, L'36
D. Arthur Magaziner, L'14
Elias Magil, L'30
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Wm. Morris Maier, L'35
Richard B. Malo, L'40
Frank H. Mancill, L'14
Alan Wm. Margolis, L'58
Robert Margolis, L'48
Jerome L. Markovitz, L'33
Francis E. Marshall, L'48
William M. Matz, L'29
Baldwin Matt, L'25
David F. Maxwell, L'24
LeRoy S. Maxwells, L'27
Robert F. Maxwell, L'48
Judson L. Maxwells, L'20
Milford M. McBride, Jr., L'49
John F. McCarthy, Jr., L'48
Daniel J. McCauley, Jr., L'41
Hon. Barron P. McCune, L'38
Walter P. McEvilly, L'39

LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
CONTRIBUTORS

Mr. John L. Cobbs
Mr. A. George Cockburn
Mr. Jules Cohen
Mr. & Mrs. Joseph S. Coleman
Rev. & Mrs. Samuel F. Daly

Mr. Kjeld Damsgaard
Mrs. Eleanor C. Edgar
Mr. Robert G. Frederick
Edward Freint, Esq.
Mrs. Lloyd J. Goulet

PARENTS

Mr. Henry M. Chance II, Chairman
Mrs. A. George Cockburn
Mr. & Mrs. Joseph S. Coleman
Rev. & Mrs. Samuel F. Daly

Mr. Irving Sussman
C. Leo Sutton, L’27
James A. Sutton, L’38
Marc L. Swartzbaugh, L’61
Thomas A. Swotes, L’17
Kenneth Syken, L’52

Stephen J. McEwen, Jr., L’57
Thomas M. McEwen, L’70
Ellis H. McKay, L’53
George W. McKee, Jr., L’34
Edward M. Medvec, L’57
Edward B. Meredith, L’51
Regina Haig Meredith, L’51
Leon J. Mesrovis, L’34
Patricia A. Metzer, L’66
Charles W. Miles III, L’36
A. Arthur Miller, L’54
Clinton F. Miller, L’40
William E. Miller, Jr., L’49
Dorothea G. Minskoff, L’34
Burton M. Minsky, L’59
Charles J. Mocs, L’41
James M. Mulligan, L’57
John T. Mulligan, L’59
John C. Murphy, Jr., L’70
John M. Musselem, L’42
Louis H. Neinas, L’63
Samuel W. Newman, L’60
Alexander L. Nichols, L’31
Eugene A. Nugi, L’52
Paul A. Nolle, L’53
Roderick O’Noll, L’33
David W. O’Brien, L’49
James E. O’Connell, L’51
Martin J. O’Donnell, L’49
Wilson H. Oldhouser, L’52
Harris Ominsky, L’56
Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr., L’53
George Ovington, Jr., L’07
Henry N. Paul, Jr., L’25
Henry D. Paxson, L’29
Lawrence M. Perskie, L’49
Morris Pfeifer II, L’38
Martin H. Phillips, L’31
John C. Phillips, L’39
Hon. Felix Piekariski, L’23
Charles K. Plotnick, L’56
Harry Pollikoff, L’31

Honor in memory of
Knox Henderson and
Daniel Lowenthal
Stanley M. Poplaw, L’33
Michael A. Poppiti, L’48
Robert C. Porter, L’39
Herman B. Poul, L’38
Calvin K. Prine, L’53
Daniel Promisio, L’66
Louis C. Pulvermacher, L’51
Alfred W. Putnam, L’47
R. Stewart Rausch, Jr., L’41
John F. Rautbauer, Jr., L’48
in memory of
Lewis M. Jack and
Harvey Levin
Henry T. Reith, L’48
Clarence P. Reberkeny, L’52
Samuel J. Reich, L’60
G. Hayward Reid, L’48
Hon. Augustine A. Repetto, L’31
in memory of
Knox Henderson and
Daniel Lowenthal
Donald H. Reith, L’57
Paul H. Rhoads, L’31
Grover C. Richman, Jr., L’35
George C. Rittenhouse, L’48
Vicetor J. Roberts, Jr., L’37
Herman M. Rodgers, L’47
Edwin P. Rome, L’40
Richard M. Rosenbluth, L’57
David H. Rosenbluth, L’53
Harold S. Rosenbluth, L’50
Hon. Max Rosenn, L’32
Charles N. Ross, L’59
Daniel R. Ross, L’66
John Ross, L’35
Michael J. Rotko, L’63
Alexander N. Rubin, Jr., L’30
William M. Ruddock, L’25
John R. Rueck, L’28
Samuel B. Russell, L’48
Peter M. Ryan, L’63
Maurice Saeta, L’17
Raymond Saltzman, L’27
Arthur S. Salus, L’31
in memory of
Knox Henderson and
Daniel Lowenthal
Hon. Herbert W. Salus, Jr., L’48
W. Albert Sanders, L’31
Alex Satinsky, L’37
Hon. Edwin H. Satterthalwaite, L’40
Joseph H. Savitz, L’38
Helen Solis-Cohen Sax, L’40
Henry W. Scarborough, Jr., L’36
Roger Scarrattgood, L’33
Raymond C. Schlegel, L’54
Carl W. Schneider, L’56
Andrew J. Schrodier II, L’30
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Bernard Schwartz, L’32
Prof. Louis B. Schwartz, L’35
Murray M. Schwartz, L’35
Emanuel G. Scoblionko, L’34
the late Ernest Scott, L’29
W. Frazier Scott, L’39
David E. Seymour, L’60
Anita R. Shapiro, L’65
Charles S. Shapiro, L’48
David V. Shapiro, L’44
Milan H. Shapiro, L’40
William J. Sharkey, L’58
William Simon Shumway, L’39
Richard M. Sharp, L’47
Hon. Charles A. Shea, Jr., L’36
Dr. and Mrs. Marvin P. Sheldon
Stanford Shumker, L’54
David S. Shragar, L’60
Morris M. Shuster, L’54
Joel D. Siegel, L’66
Nathan Silberman, L’33
Seymour S. Silverstone, L’25
John P. Sinclair, L’39
Jack Sirott, L’52
Steven A. Skatet, L’71
Edward D. Slevin, L’62
Arthur R. G. Solmssen, L’53
Edwin Lee Solor, L’60
Elvin R. Souder, L’42
A. Grant Sprecher, L’41
Hon. Joseph H. Stanzani, L’55
Sidney S. Stark, L’32
Lee N. Stein, L’49
Hon. James L. Stern, L’33
Peter M. Stern, L’66
Robert J. Sterlin, L’63
Stanley P. Stern, L’53
Jeffrey M. Stopford, L’69
J. Pennington Straus, L’35

Prof. James A. Strazzella, L’64
Mr. Irving Sussman
C. Leo Sutton, L’27
James A. Sutton, L’38
Marc L. Swartzbaugh, L’61
Thomas A. Swotes, L’17
Kenneth Syken, L’52
John T. Synnestvedt, L’52
Hon. Harry A. Takiff, L’37
Myles H. Tanenbaum, L’57
Frank K. Tarbox, L’50
Howard W. Taylor, Jr., L’39
William J. Taylor, L’52
S. Robert Teitelman, L’41
Michael L. Temin, L’57
William Thatchner, L’54
George W. Thompson, L’48
Jra P. Tiger, L’59
Thomas J. Timoney, L’52
Herbert Toth, L’38
Charles C. Townsend, L’27
William F. Trapnell, L’51
Stanley J. Trister, L’52
Edmund P. Turitzo, L’41
Frederick A. VanDenbergh, Jr., L’37
Charles B. P. Vanelt, L’49
Michael D. Valetov, L’63
E. Norman Venese, L’57
Harry P. Voldow, L’31
Theodore Voorhees, L’29
Kimber E. Vogel, L’48
Murry J. Waldman, L’52
Virginia B. Wallace, L’50
John A. Walter, L’60
Guy E. Walpert, L’29
Helen Maren Warren, L’30
Gilbert Wasserman, L’61
Roy J. Waychoff, Jr., L’41
Wilton W. Webster, L’12
Mr. Gerald Weiner
Benjamin Weinstein, L’37
Jerome B. Weinstein, L’34
Lewis Weinstock, L’40
H. John Weisman, Jr., L’42
Aaron Weiss, L’16
Harold B. Wells, Jr., L’32
Ronald P. Wertheim, L’57
Carroll R. Wetzel, L’20
Edward S. Weyl, L’28
Hon. C. Norwood Wherry, L’53
Samuel K. White, Jr., L’47
Thomas R. White, Jr., L’46
William White, Jr., L’38
Thomas E. Wilcox, L’48
Hon. Roy Wilkinson, Jr., L’39
Lance H. Wilzog, L’72
William C. Wise, L’33
Marvin M. Wodlinger, L’60
Morris Wolf, L’03
Paul A. Wolkin, L’41
Hon. J. Colvin Wright, L’25
William A. Wyatt, L’53
Howard Yarusz, L’49
Sidney T. Yates, L’54
Norman P. Zarwin, L’55
the late Judah Zelitch, L’27
Mr. Richard A. Zevnik
Ronald Ziegler, L’60
Lloyd R. Ziff, L’71
David B. Zoob, L’27
Edward K. Zucker, L’61

Winter 1974
Mr. & Mrs. Joseph Greenberg
Mr. Bruce H. Greenfield
Mr. & Mrs. William P. Gross
Mr. & Mrs. James V. Hackney, Jr.
Mr. Robert Hoe, Jr.
Dr. & Mrs. Milton Ickes
Mr. Allen B. Kollon
Mr. & Mrs. Adam Kossek
Mrs. Phyllis P. Lipsitt
Dr. George Makdisi
Mrs. Catherine K. McKee
Mrs. Rose H. Merres
Robert V. Ritter, Esq.
Mr. Seymour M. Roberts
Mr. & Mrs. Jesse Ross
Mr. & Mrs. Norman Schnittman
Dr. & Mrs. Marvin P. Sheldon
Dr. & Mrs. Jay Spiegelman
Harry J. Stevens, Jr., Esq.
Mr. Irving Sussman
Edward P. Tanenbaum, Esq.
Dr. & Mrs. Frederick A. Waldron
Mr. George H. Weber
Mr. & Mrs. Edward H. Weinberg
Mr. Gerald Weiner
Mr. Harold W. Wolf
Mr. & Mrs. Saul Ziff

NON ALUMNI
Prof. Alexander M. Capron
Mrs. Herman S. Davis
in memory of
Herman S. Davis, L'41
Mrs. Elinor G. Ellis
in memory of
Herman M. Ellis, L'28
Louis J. & Mary E. Horowitz
Foundation
William D. Iverson, Esq.
Mrs. Samuel Mink
in memory of
Samuel Mink, L'33
Mrs. Lillian E. Morris
in honor of
Prof. Clarence Morris
Prof. Robert H. Mundheim
Mrs. Theodore Rosen
in memory of
Hon. Theodore Rosen, L'22
Mrs. William J. Troutman
in memory of
Hon. William J. Troutman, L'30
Mrs. Nelson D. Warwick
in memory of
Nelson D. Warwick, L'39
Mr. Richard A. Zevnick

CLASS OF 1903
Morris Wolf

CLASS OF 1907
George Ovington, Jr.

CLASS OF 1908
Isaac Ash
Leon J. Obermayer

CLASS OF 1909
Russell Wolfe

CLASS OF 1910
Harold Evans

CLASS OF 1911
Nelson P. Fegley
Fred T. Fruit
Thomas M. Hyndman
Michael Korn
David S. Malis
*deceased

CLASS OF 1912
Harry N. Brenner
Harry Caseman
W. Barclay Let
Wilton W. Webstor

CLASS OF 1913
Robert M. Berstein
Edwin H. Burgess
Walter M. Burkhardt
L. Leroy Deininger
in memory of
Hon. Whitaker Thompson

CLASS OF 1915
*David D. Goff
Edwin P. Longstreet
J. Wesley McWilliams

CLASS OF 1916
Hon. Francis Shunk Brown, Jr.
Joseph L. Ehrenreich
Hon. Louis E. Levinthal
Hon. Thomas M. Lewis
*Thomas E. Shipley
Elmer D. Simon
Paul C. Waguer
Hon. Leo Weinrott
Aaron Weiss

CLASS OF 1917
*Harry E. Apeler
Hon. John C. Bell, Jr.
Meyer L. Casman
*John J. Goldy
M. Joseph Greenblatt
Hon. T. Linus Hoban
Albert L. Katz
Robert C. Ligget

CLASS OF 1918
Ernest N. Votaw

CLASS OF 1919
Ernest R. Keiter

CLASS OF 1920
Miss Ethel F. Donaghe
Hon. Harold L. Ervin
Arthur Littleton
Eugene H. Southall
Donald H. Williams

CLASS OF 1921
Francis H. Bollin, Jr.
Robert Dechert
*R. Sturgis Ingersoll
Clarence G. Myers
John Russell, Jr.
Joseph Smith
Isadore S. Wachs
William L. Woodcock, Jr.

CLASS OF 1922
Franklin H. Bates
Harold F. Butler
W. Meade Fletcher, Jr.
William D. Harkins

CLASS OF 1923
Hon. Leo H. McKay
Edward A. G. Porter
Mrs. Theodore Rosen
in memory of
Hon. Theodore Rosen
Miss Sybil U. Ward
Allen H. White

CLASS OF 1924
Samuel A. Goldberg
Hon. George W. Griffith
Holman G. Knouse
Hon. Felix Pickerski
John G. Rothermel

CLASS OF 1925
Robert K. Bell
Hon. Hazel H. Brown
Mrs. Ides Oranovich Creskoff
Edward H. P. Frontfield
Thomas M. Johnston
Richard H. Klein
Davis F. Maxwell
Wendell E. Warner

CLASS OF 1926
Meyer E. Cooper
Samuel R. Greenwald
George E. Letchworth, Jr.
Abram L. Lischin
Baldwin Maull
Desmond J. McGilke
Henry N. Paul, Jr.
William M. Ruddock
James B. Sayers
Walter Seller
Severo S. Silverstone
Geoffrey S. Smith
Hon. J. Colvin Wright

CLASS OF 1927
Henry W. Balka
Hon. Joseph S. Clark, Jr.
Hon. Gerald A. Gleeson
Rev. Edward B. Guerry
John F. E. Heppel
Hon. Bernard J. Kelley
W. James MacIntosh

CLASS OF 1928
Herman P. Abramson
Sadie T. Alexander
Philip W. Amram
Alvin W. Carpenter
David J. Dean
Herman Eisenberg
John K. Ewing
Harry Friedman
Hon. Emil F. Goldhaber
Harold D. Greenwell
Harold H. Hoffman
Charles M. Justis
Louis Lipschitz
Thomas P. Mikell
Raymond Saltzman
Manuel Sidkoff
Hon. Frederick B. Smilie
C. Leo Sutton
Charles C. Townsend
Stewart E. Warner
Morris Weisman
William Nelson West
John H. Wharton
*Judah Zelitch
David B. Zeeb

CLASS OF 1929
Hon. Theodore Rosen Ball
Alexander S. Bauer

Franklin H. Berry
Mrs. Esther G. Brandschaim
Joseph Brandschaim
J. Rhodes Bower
Morris Cheston
J. Lawrence Davis
Frederick W. Deininger
Nathaniel B. Edelman
Mrs. Elinor G. Ellis
in memory of
Herman M. Ellis
Stuart B. Frazier
Joseph A. Graizer
Martin Greenblatt
William C. A. Henry
Louis I. Karp
John P. Jordan
Samlut P. Lavin
Hon. Paul S. Lehman
Abraham Levin
Thomas R. MacFarland, Jr.
George M. Miller, Jr.
Benjamin J. Schmbelan
Lawrence M. C. Smith
Robert S. Taylor, Jr.
Edward S. Weyl

CLASS OF 1930
Anonymous
Samuel A. Armstrong
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
George M. Brodhead
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Ralph C. Buehler, Jr.
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
W. Frederick Colclough
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
George C. Denniston
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Samuel E. Ewing
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Joseph M. First
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Sydney Gerber
J. Russel Gibbons
Robert W. Greenfield
Stanley Jakubowski
Norman J. Kalheim
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Herman Krakovitz
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
William H. Kresh
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Hon. J. Hurwitz Levin
Wilfred R. Lorrey
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Herbert G. Lowenstein
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Elia Magil
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Clarence Menisov
Hon. Dawson H. Muth
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Ididor Winter 1974
Fraley N. Weidner, Jr.
Hon. Wilfred R. Lorry
CLASS OF
Israel I. Jamison
Myron Jacoby
Judge Mark Lefever
James W. Scanlon
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Andrew J. Scherder II
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
Lloyd J. Schumacker
Norman Snyder
Mrs. William I. Troutman
in memory of
Hon. William I. Troutman
Mrs. Helen M. Warren
Fraley N. Weidner, Jr.
Carroll R. Wetzel
John R. Young
in memory of
Judge Mark Lefever
CLASS OF 1931
Alexander B. Adelman
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
Nathan Agrest
Philip I. N. Alperdt
Arthur W. Bean
Kellogg W. Beck
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
John H. Bertolet
Richard R. Bongartz
Fred B. Bormer
Natt M. Emery, Jr.
Samuel Handloff
Edwin S. Heins
Myron Jacoby
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
Israel J. Jamison
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
Alexander Katzin
George D. Kline
Ashby M. Larmore
Albert Laub
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
Nathan Lavine
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
*deceased
Hon. Herbert S. Levin
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
Daniel Lowenthal
Robert V. Massey, Jr.
Jack I. McDowell
Alex L. Nichols
Martin H. Philip
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
Harry Polkoff
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
Maurice Pollon
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
Shalon Ralph
Hon. Augustine A. Repetto
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
Paul H. Rosals
George M. D. Richards
Hon. Samuel I. Roberts
Arthur S. Salus
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
W. Albert Sanders
Wills H. Satterthwaite
Bernard G. Segal
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
Merr C. Solomon
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
J. Tyson Stokes
in memory of
Knox Henderson and Daniel Lowenthal
Allen C. Thomas, Jr.
William H. Vincent
Harry P. Voldow
Mrs. Edith H. West
CLASS OF 1932
Hon. Alexander F. Barbieri
Walter W. Beachboard
Robert M. Beckman
Samuel A. Blank
William C. Bodine
Miss Mary C. Goff
David H. Kubert
Mrs. Rose Kotzin Landy
Eugene A. Nogi
Hon. Israel Packel
Raymond M. Pearlstone
Harold R. Prowell
Hon. Max Rosenn
Bernard Schwartz
Sidney S. Stark
Harold B. Wells, Jr.
Edward Z. Winkleman
Richard V. Zugg
CLASS OF 1933
Max M. Batzer
Robert J. Callaghan
Sidney Chaft
Hon. Jay H. Eiseman
Eugene H. Feldman
Edward First
Joseph H. Flanzer
Austin Gavrin, Jr.
Henry Greenwald
Sidney E. Huff
Edward A. Kaier
Sidney H. Kanig
Joseph M. Leib
William Lipkin
Carl P. Lundy
Jeremy L. Markovitz
Mrs. Samuel Mink
in memory of
Samuel Mink
Francis J. Morrissey, Jr.
Henry B. Oestreicher
John B. Pearson
Samuel Popper
John E. Power, Jr.
J. Josiah Ratter
David H. Rosenbluth
Col. Francis M. Sasse
Nathan Silberstein
Hon. James L. Stern
William C. Wise
Samuel R. Wurtman
CLASS OF 1934
S. Samuel Anshiet
Leonard J. Bernstein
Dr. Roland J. Christy
J. Horace Churchman
William H. Conca
Louis W. Craner
Mrs. Irene R. Dobbs
Anthony G. Felix, Jr.
Eugene C. Fish
Edward Fishman
Sokman Freedman
Hon. Albert H. Heimbach
Abraham Hoffman
George W. McKee, Jr.
Leon I. Mersiov
A. Arthur Miller
Mrs. Dorothea G. Minisoff
Gilbert W. Oswald
Harold B. Saler
Emanuel G. Scoblionsko
Milton C. Sharp
Jerome B. Weinstein
CLASS OF 1935
*Herman M. Buck
E. Calvert Chastion
James B. Doak
Charles H. Dorsett
Bernard Eskin
Samuel Fessenden
Calvin J. Friedberg
Gordon W. Gabell
Frank H. Gelman
Kenneth W. Gemmill
Fred P. Glick
Louis J. Goldman
Frank E. Hahn, Jr.
Donald V. Hoek
Robert F. Lehman
A. Harry Levitan
Daniel W. Long
William Morris Maier
Daniel F. Marple
Harry R. Most
Nathan L. Reibman
Grover C. Richman, Jr.
John Ross
Louis H. Schwartz
Boyd L. Spahr, Jr.
J. Pennington Straus
Albert C. Weyman, Jr.
Irving Wilens
Arnold Winokur
CLASS OF 1936
Sydney S. Asher, Jr.
Samuel Barnard
David Berger
Roderick T. Clarke
Harry T. Devine
Herbert G. Du Bois
Wayland F. Dunaway III
Edward P. Frankel
*Milton B. Garner
Lewis M. Gill
Charles S. Jacobs
George C. Laub
Bernard V. Lentz
Berthold W. Levy
Harry K. Madway
Hon. Edwin S. Malmed
Charles W. Miles III
Henry W. Scarborough, Jr.
G. William Shea
Hon. Charles A. Shea, Jr.
Karl H. Strohl
Thomas R. White, Jr.
John K. Young
CLASS OF 1937
Joseph Bell
Claire G. Biehn
Harrison H. Clement
Edward I. Cutler
Dr. Lawrence O. Ealy
Albert B. Gerber
Hyman Goldberg
Moe H. Hinkin
Herman F. Kerner
Harold E. Kohn
Frederick E. Lark
Benjamin S. Lowenstein
Norman L. Plotka
Bayard H. Roberts
Victor J. Roberts, Jr.
Alex Satinsky
John N. Schaeffer, Jr.
Lester J. Schafes
Hon. Harry A. Taki
Clyde W. Teel
Robert L. Trescher
Frederick A. Van Denbergh, Jr.
Ernest R. Vomitor
Benjamin Weinstein
CLASS OF 1938
Ralph M. Barley
Samuel B. Blaskey
Theodore L. Brubaker
Joseph W. Carmath
Keren D. Chance
Richard N. Clattenburg
Sylvan M. Cohen
J. Harry Covington III
M. Carlton Dittman, Jr.
Leonard L. Eitinger
Myer Feldman
Robert N. Ferrer
Bernard Frank
Richard W. Goslin, Jr.
Harry A. Greenberg
Paul J. Grumbly
Jesse G. Hedges
Jack R. Hildbrand
C. Clothier Jones, Jr.
Hon. Gregory G. Lagakos
Maurice Levin
Hon. Barron P. McCune
John L. Owens
Morris Pfahlzer II
Herman B. Poul
Hanley S. Rubinson
Roger Seittergood
CLASS OF 1939
Thomas J. Beddow
Henry M. Biglan
John P. Brazen
Philip A. Bregy
Joseph W. P. Burke
T. Sidney Cadwallader II
Albert J. Crawford, Jr.
Fronfield Crawford
William H. Egli
Leon S. Forman
William L. Fox
Thomas P. Glassmoyer
Carl E. Hellman
Arthur R. Kane, Jr.
H. Allen Lochner
William H. Losche, Jr.
Ralph S. Mason
Le Roy S. Maxwell
Sherwin T. McDowell
Walter P. McEvilly
Miss Doris E. Montgomery
John C. Phillips
Robert C. Porter
W. Frazier Scott
W. Simms Sharninghausen
John P. Sinclair
W. Lloyd Snyder, Jr.
Elias W. Spengler
Aaron S. Swartz III
Howard W. Taylor, Jr.
Robert Ungerleider
Mrs. Nelson D. Warwick
in memory of
Nelson D. Warwick
Hon. Roy Wilkinson, Jr.

CLASS OF 1940
Robert D. Branch
Samuel A. Breene
Hon. Martin J. Coyne
John C. Decker
Richard M. Dicke
Robert J. Dodds, Jr.
William S. Eisenhart, Jr.
Sidney W. Friess
Carl J. W. Hessinger
Andrew Hourigan, Jr.
Theodore B. Kingsbury III
Richard B. Malls
John L. McDonald
Samuel V. Merrick
Clinton F. Miller
Arthur E. Newbold III
*Thomas A. O'Boyle
William J. Oliver
William R. Reynolds
Edwin P. Rome
David J. Salaman
Hon. Edwin H. Satterthwaite
Mrs. Helen Solis-Cohen Sax
Robert W. Susy
Jacob Seldenberg
Milton H. Shapiro
A. Dix Skillman
Lewis Weintraub
Adam G. Wenchel

CLASS OF 1941
Edmund Backman
Horace R. Cahn
Hon. Paul M. Chalfin
Frederick J. Charley
John R. Clark
Marvin Comisky
A. Lynn Corcellus
Robert I. Cottom
John J. Daughdrill
Edward M. David
Mrs. Herman S. Davis
in memory of
Herman S. Davis
Richard J. Farrell
Wesley R. Frysztacki
Oscar Goldberg
George W. Hener, Jr.
Vincent J. Lahrasca
William T. Leith
William E. Lindenmuth
William J. Lowry III
Daniel J. McCasley, Jr.
Charles J. Moos
R. Stewart Rauch, Jr.
Lipman Redman
Milton W. Rosen
George B. Ross
Leonard Sarner
William J. Scarlett
Bernard J. Smolens
Edwin K. Taylor
S. Robert Teitelman
Edmund P. Turtzo
Robert C. Walker, Jr.
Roy J. Waychoff, Jr.
Paul A. Wolkin

CLASS OF 1942
Frederic L. Ballard
Philip E. Barringer
Pershing N. Calabro
William N. Clarke
John R. Graham
Donald E. Hittle
Hon. Robert W. Honeyman
Hon. Edmund Jones
Thomas J. Kalman
Hon. Robert L. Kunzig
Samuel S. Lankes, Jr.
Dr. A. Leo Levin
John M. Musseman
Charles E. Rankin
Walter N. Reed
William Z. Scott
Mrs. Mabel Ditter Sellers
Craig M. Sharpe
Elwin R. Sonder
Thomas B. Steiger
Joseph W. Swain, Jr.
Thomas H. Swentz
George C. Williams

CLASS OF 1943
Bernard M. Borish
William J. Dickman
Allan W. Keusch
Hon. Miles W. Kirkpatrick
Charles M. Korschka
Austen M. Lee
Richard E. McDavitt
Joseph Shans
Ellis W. Vanhorn, Jr.

CLASS OF 1944
Bartow E. Ferst
Meyer Kramer
Miss Phyllis Kravitch
L. Stanley Meager
Carl F. Mogel
David V. Shapiro

CLASS OF 1945
Jay D. Barsky
S. Harry Galfand
Mrs. Marcella C. White

CLASS OF 1946
Hon. Curtis C. Carson, Jr.
Robert G. Erskine, Jr.
John L. Esterhai
John K. Hanahan
John R. Miller
Harold Tall
William H. G. Warner

CLASS OF 1947
Hon. Artin M. Adams
Sidney Apfelbaum
Samuel S. Blank
Raymond J. Bradley
Charles M. Fine
Robert B. Doll
Albert G. Driver
Justin G. Duryea
Leon Ehrlich
Donald W. Hedges
Robert M. Landis
Russell R. Levin
William H. Mann
Alfred W. Putnam
Read Rocap, Jr.
Herman M. Rodgers
Henry W. Sawvell
Richard M. Sharp
Hon. Donald W. Vanartsdalen
Morris L. Weisberg
Samuel K. White, Jr.

CLASS OF 1948
Walter Y. Anthony, Jr.
Augustus S. Ballard
John A. Ballard
James C. Bowen
Richard P. Brown, Jr.
Hon. James E. Buckingham
Aaron M. Fink
Robert P. Frankel
William J. Fuchs
Harry M. Grace
Gordon D. Griffin
Philip M. Hammett
Joseph F. Harvey
Hon. Daniel H. Huyett III
Noyes E. Leech
Marvin Levin
Robert Margolis
Francis E. Marshall
Robert F. Maxwell
John F. McCarthy, Jr.
Marvin D. Perskie
Michael A. Poppiti
Franklin Poul
John F. Rauhauser, Jr.
in memory of
Lewis M. Jack and
Herman H. Mattleman

CLASS OF 1949
Robert B. Doll
Hon. Donald W. Vanartsdalen
Hon. Robert L. Kunzig
Samuel S. Lankes, Jr.
Dr. A. Leo Levin
John M. Musseman
Charles E. Rankin
Walter N. Reed
William Z. Scott
Mrs. Mabel Ditter Sellers
Craig M. Sharpe
Elwin R. Sonder
Thomas B. Steiger
Joseph W. Swain, Jr.
Thomas H. Swentz
George C. Williams

CLASS OF 1950
Howard W. Taylor, Jr.
Robert Ungerleider
Mrs. Nelson D. Warwick
in memory of
Nelson D. Warwick
Hon. Roy Wilkinson, Jr.

CLASS OF 1949, FEBRUARY
Lewis B. Beatty, Jr.
Marshall A. Bernstein
Thomas J. Burke
Bernard P. Carey, Jr.
Samuel B. Cortiss
Cass W. Craig
Ralph B. D'Orio
Hon. George C. Eppinger
Robert B. Frailey
Gordon W. Gerber
James W. Haga
Edward M. Harris, Jr.
A. C. Reeves Hicks
William F. Lynch II
John T. Macartney
Milton L. McDonald, Jr.
Lambert O. Ott
Lawrence M. Perskie
Lee M. Steiner
Charles B. P. Van Pelt
Bernard Wexler
Howard Yarus

CLASS OF 1949, JUNE
William H. Bayer
Francis J. Carey
Louis J. Carter
Warren Y. Francis
Hon. Doris May Harris
Bancroft D. Haviland
William M. Hebrank
Hon. John F. Henderson
Hugh H. Howard
William F. Hyland
Fred H. Law, Jr.
William D. Lucas
Herman H. Mattleman
Thomas A. McVoy
William E. Miller, Jr.
Edward W. Mullins
David H. Nelson
David W. O'Brien
Martin J. O'Donnell
Charles C. Parlin, Jr.
Marvin Schwartz
Robert W. Valimont

CLASS OF 1950
Morton Abravanel
William W. Atterbury, Jr.
J. William Barba
Stanley Bashman
Francis A. Biano
Frank J. Bowden, Jr.
Arthur C. Dorrance, Jr.
John W. Douglass
Peter Florey
John R. Gauntt
M. Kalman Gitomer
Robert I. Goldy
Richard J. Gordon
Robert A. Hausshofer
John F. Heinz
Thomas M. Hyndman, Jr.
Paul J. Imbesi
Hon. D. Donald Jamieson
Stephen J. Korn
Joseph T. Labrum, Jr.
Leonard Levin
Patrick G. Mahoney
Merton J. Matz
Charles F. Mayer
Joseph Grant McCabe III
Murray S. Monroe
William G. O'Neill
CLASS OF 1959
Louis J. Adler
Donald Lampman
Gerald Broker
H. Donald Busch
Richard L. Cantor
James J. Weis, Jr.
Philip Cherry
Jonathan S. Cohen
George C. Corson, Jr.
John J. Craven
Alex A. Di Santi
William H. Eastburn III
Murray S. Eckell
Seymour H. Feingold
Gerald F. Flood, Jr.
John J. Francis, Jr.
Murray C. Goldman
Bernard M. Gross
John S. Hayes
Selwyn A. Horwitz
John R. Hudders
David M. Jordan
Samuel H. Kinch
Albert W. Laisy
Burton M. Mirsky
Thomas B. Moorhead
John T. Mulhern
Parker C. Paul
Peter H. Pfund
Martin B. Pitkov
George F. Roberts
G. Wayne Ren enhe
Charles N. Ross
Marshall A. Rutter
Walter A. Smith
Joseph F. Straub
Joseph B. Sturgis
Thomas A. Swope, Jr.
Ira F. Tigges
David R. Tomb, Jr.
Herbert A. Vogel
John D. Wilson

Sillas Spengler
Lowell S. Thomas, Jr.
Nicholas Vadina, Jr.
Joseph T. Vodnoy
John A. Walter
Charles M. Weisman
Alvin M. Weis
David L. Williams
Marvin M. Wodlinger
Ronald Ziegler

CLASS OF 1961
Jared H. Adams
James H. Agger
Paul R. Anapol
Lewis Becker
Bernard D. Beitch
Albert A. Ciardi
Lawrence F. Corson
Raymond K. Denworthy, Jr.
Mrs. Ruth Morris Force
Michael D. Foxman
Bernard Glassman
Rayner M. Hamilton
Peter Hearn
Joseph I. Horvath
James N. Norwood
Philip F. Hummer
Howard M. Jaffe
Edward L. Jones, Jr.
Anthony L. Joseph
Michael Joseph
Malcolm B. Kane
Robert H. Kleebr, Jr.
Lewis S. Kunkel, Jr.
Herbert W. Larson
Anthony S. Leidner
Paul G. Levy
Wilfred F. Lorr
Jack K. Mandel
William B. Moyer
Spencer G. Nauman, Jr.
David F. Norcross
William B. Pen nell
Frances J. Pfizenmayer
Robert A. Rosin
Mayor Shanken
Robert M. Shay
Anthony J. Sobczak
A. Grant Sprecher
David L. Steck
Gilbert Wasserman
Bruce B. Wilson
Rober S. Young
Edward K. Zuckerman

CLASS OF 1962
Milton D. Abowitz
Richard D. Atkins
Paul Auerbach
Mrs. Andrea C. Balliette
William M. Balliette, Jr.
Joseph F. Battle, Jr.
Lew B. Bauer
Frank C. Bender
Mrs. Barbara Berman
R. David Bradley
Jonas Brodie
E. Eugene Brosius
Phillip R. Burnam
E. Barclay Cale, Jr.
William B. Christy, IV
Leonard J. Cooper
Kenneth M. Cus ham
George C. Decas
Richard D. Ehrl ich
Richard H. Elliott
Nick S. Fishe
Frederick J. Francis
Joel Friedman
John E. Gillmor

Herbert Goldfied
Stephen R. Goldstein
Harold Greenberg
John A. Herdeg
Andrew W. Hiller
Burton Hoffman
Paul D. Horgan
Steven D. Ivins
Warren J. Kauffman
Emmon D. Kirby
Daniel J. Lawler
Edward J. Lewis
David P. Loughran
Spencer A. Manthorpe
Stephen J. Moses
Francis W. Murphy
Robert M. Philson
Alan J. Pogarsky
Martin M. Pollock
John H. Potts
Charles B. Pursel
Richard J. Sharkey
M. Michael Shariat
Louis P. Silverman
Edward D. Slevin
Clayton H. Thomas, Jr.

CLASS OF 1963
Steven A. Arbitriff
David C. Auten
Phillip H. Baer
Donald V. Berlanti
Auron D. Blumberg
Harold Bogatz
Robert P. Browning
Henry B. Cortesi
Robert J. Cotton
Thomas F. Cunnane
Nicholas P. Damicco
Mrs. Joanne R. Denwor th
Stephen R. Donesick
Lowell H. Dubrow
David M. Epstein
Mrs. Myrna Paul Field
Milton M. Freedman
Edward M. Glickman
Jay L. Goldberg
Michael A. Greene
Frederick P. Hafetz
John L. Harrison, Jr.
Harold Jacobs
Albert W. Johnson III
Robert L. Kaminsky
Arthur S. Karrin
Morris C. Kellett
Martin N. Kroll
Robert Kruger
Lawrence A. Krupnick
Judah I. Labovitz
John J. Langenburg
Arthur L. Levine
Steven M. Lipschutz
Thomas Lombard
Arnold Maclish
David H. Marston
Sidney G. Maser
Francis G. Mays
John H. McGrail
Paul R. Melletz
Henry F. Miller
Joseph L. Monte, Jr.
Louis H. Nevin
John W. Packell
Earle J. Patterson III
Neil Reisman
Lcdr. J. Ashley Roach
Michael J. Rotko
Peter M. Ryan
Daniel C. Soriano, Jr.
Max Spinrad
Albert M. Stark

CLASS OF 1964
John T. Andrews, Jr.
Richard A. Ash
Steven T. Atkins
Peter F. Axelrad
Frank B. Baldwin III
Michael M. Baylson
Harry P. Begier, Jr.
G. William Bissell
George C. Bradley
Earl T. Britt
Stephen A. Cozen
George M. Dallas
David Dearborn
Frank W. Deegan
Marshall A. Deutsch
Frank Felleman
H. Robert Fleibach
Dennis M. Flannery
Michael O. Floyd
Jerome J. Forman
Michael H. Frankel
Stephen R. Frankel
Robert G. Fuller, Jr.
John R. Gibbel
L. Anthony Gibson
Henry A. Goldstone
Richard J. Hacer
Cary R. Hardy
Henry S. Hilles, Jr.
James G. Hirsh
George H. Johnson III
David C. Johnson
Alan K. Kaplan
William J. Levy
Mrs. Frederic Lombard
Charles M. Marshall
Richard C. Montgomery
Bruce S. Nelesen
David C. Patten
Paul D. Pearson
Mrs. Roselyn Prager Ramisi
David L. Robinson
Christopher R. Rossner
Melvin B. Ruskin
Herbert F. Schwartz
Howard Shapiro
Earl B. Slavin
Burton K. Stein
Steven M. Stein
Prof. James A. Strazella
Peter C. Ward
Richard D. Wood III

CLASS OF 1965
Martin J. Aronstein
Harvey Barile III
Robert E. Benson
Harold P. Block
George G. Breed
Paul J. Bratton
Vincent A. Carbonar
Bernard Chanin
Joseph I. Connolly
Robert F. Daflin
Henry T. Dechant
Albert L. Deering III
Charles H. Dorsett, Jr.
Alfred J. Dougherty
Neil C. Epstein
William H. Ewing
Merritt B. Gavin
Richard Gordimer

LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
ABOVE AVERAGE

These classes equalled or bettered the overall alumni participation of 32%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>William I. Woodcock, Jr.</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>David S. Malls</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Joseph L. Ehrenreich</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Frank H. Manuell</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Donald H. Williams</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Herbert S. Riband, Jr.</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>M. Carton Dittmann, Jr.</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>John A. Walter</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Rodney T. Bonsall</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>J. Russell Gibbons</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>Doris E. Montgomery</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Kenneth M. Cushman</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Morris M. Shuster</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Wilfred F. Lorry</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Desmond J. McTighe</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Joseph Brandschain</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Frederic L. Ballard</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Stephen J. Korn</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Hon. George W. Griffith</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>C. Leo Sutton</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Nathan Silverstein</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Paul A. Wolkin</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Leonard Barkan</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>William J. Levy</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Harvey Battle III</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Thomas A. Ralph and Alfred H. Wilcox</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Henry M. Irwin</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Frank E. Hahn, Jr.</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>James F. Bell III</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>George B. McNelis</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CLASS PERFORMANCES

GREATEST NUMBER OF DOLLARS CONTRIBUTED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Franklin Poul</td>
<td>$5,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Lewis Weinstock</td>
<td>4,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>William J. Levy</td>
<td>4,710</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GREATEST NUMBER OF CONTRIBUTORS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>James F. Bell III</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Thomas A. Ralph and Alfred H. Wilcox</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Herbert S. Riband, Jr.</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BEST PER CENT OF PARTICIPATION (Classes of 25 or more)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Herbert S. Riband, Jr.</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>M. Carton Dittmann, Jr.</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>John A. Walter</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BEST PER CENT OF PARTICIPATION (Classes of less than 25)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Per Cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>William I. Woodcock, Jr.</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>David S. Malis</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Joseph L. Ehrenreich</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A GLANCE AT TEN YEARS OF ANNUAL GIVING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Contributors</th>
<th>Per Cent Participation</th>
<th>Amount Contributed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>1791</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>$72,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>87,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>102,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>105,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>118,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>118,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>1631</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>121,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>1736</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>130,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>1668</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>132,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>1682</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>143,419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CORPORATE GIFT PROGRAM

A total of 39 forward-looking companies matched, wholly or in part, the gifts that their employees, officers and directors made to Law Alumni Annual Giving in the 1972-73 campaign.

Alumni who are eligible to have their gifts matched are urged to send their company's form in order that the Law School may benefit from it. The matching amount is also credited to you, your class, and your region. The Alumni Office will be glad to supply information to any alumnus who may be in a position to suggest the establishment of a matching gift plan in his company.

The companies who participated in the 1972-73 Law School Alumni Annual Giving campaign are listed below.

- AIR PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS, INC.
- AMOCO FOUNDATION
- ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY
- ARTHUR ANDERSEN COMPANY
- BRISTOL MYERS COMPANY
- BROCKWAY GLASS COMPANY
- CHARLES J. WEBB FOUNDATION
- CHASE MANHATTAN BANK FOUNDATION
- CHEMICAL BANK NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY
- CHICOPEE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
- COVINGTON AND BURLING
- EATON, YALE AND TOWNE, INC.
- FORD FUND EDUCATIONAL AID PROGRAM
- GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY FOUNDATION
- H. J. HEINZ COMPANY FOUNDATION
- HERCULES, INCORPORATED
- IBM CORPORATION
- INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA
- ITEK CORPORATION
- KIDDER, PEABODY FOUNDATION
- KIMBERLY-CLARK, INC.
- KIPLINGER FOUNDATION, INC.
- LUKENS STEEL FOUNDATION
- McGRAW-HILL, INC.
- MOBIL OIL CORPORATION
- MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY
- OLIN MATTHIESON CHARITABLE TRUST
- PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL FOUNDATION
- PENNSYLVANIA POWER AND LIGHT
- PENNWALT FOUNDATION
- PITNEY-BOWES, INC.
- PITTSBURGH NATIONAL BANK FOUNDATION
- PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA
- SCOTT PAPER COMPANY
- SIMMONS COMPANY
- SMITH, KLINE AND FRENCH FOUNDATION
- STANDARD OIL COMPANY (INDIANA)
- TIME, INCORPORATED
- WEEDEN AND COMPANY, INC.

SUMMARY OF REGIONS

(Areas, other than Delaware Valley, with 15 or more alumni)

Chairman—LIPMAN REDMAN, L'41

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Chairman</th>
<th>No. Alumni</th>
<th>No. Participating</th>
<th>Per Cent Participation</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>Marshall A. Rutter, L'59</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>$2,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilmington</td>
<td>Herbert W. Larson, L'61</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>Charles B. Rustenberg, L'49</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Richard J. Farrell, L'41</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>Philip S. Nyman, L'62</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>Robert Neustadter, L'56</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlantic City</td>
<td>Edward B. Meredith, L'51</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercer County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Richard M. Dicke, L'40</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>6,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>Henry W. Lavine, L'60</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania Counties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allegheny</td>
<td>George J. Miller, L'51</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berks</td>
<td>Francis B. Haas, Jr., L'51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Dauphin</td>
<td>Francis B. Haas, Jr., L'51</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erie</td>
<td>James E. O'Connell, L'51</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lackawanna</td>
<td>Robert L. Pfannebecker, L'58</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Lancaster</td>
<td>Emmanuel G. Scobionko, L'34</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Lehigh</td>
<td>Emanuel G. Scobionko, L'34</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luzerne</td>
<td>Charles D. Lemmon, Jr., L'55</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northampton</td>
<td>John C. Hambrock, L'47</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schuylkill</td>
<td>Calvin J. Friedberg, L'35</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*York</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>$32,993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* These regions equalled or bettered the over-all alumni participation of 32 per cent.

Winter 1974
REPORT OF CLASSES

Chairman—Andrew Hourigan, Jr., L'40

1927-28

No. in Class | Giving | Per cent Giving | Amount | No. in Class | Giving | Per cent Giving | Amount
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Non Alumn | 42 | $2,170.00 | 27 | $1,605.00
Morris Wolf | 12 | 7,100.00 | 11 | 2,081.00
1930 | 1 | 100.00
1931 | 2 | 100.00
1932 | 4 | 100.00
1933 | 1 | 25.00
1934 | 1 | 25.00
1935 | 1 | 100.00
1936 | 1 | 100.00
1937 | 1 | 25.00
1938 | 1 | 25.00
1939 | 1 | 100.00
1940 | 1 | 100.00
1941 | 1 | 25.00
1942 | 1 | 25.00
1943 | 1 | 100.00
1944 | 1 | 100.00
1945 | 1 | 25.00
1946 | 1 | 25.00
1947 | 1 | 100.00
1948 | 1 | 100.00
1949 | 1 | 25.00
1950 | 1 | 25.00
1951 | 1 | 100.00
1952 | 1 | 100.00
1953 | 1 | 25.00
1954 | 1 | 25.00
1955 | 1 | 100.00
1956 | 1 | 100.00
1957 | 1 | 25.00
1958 | 1 | 25.00
1959 | 1 | 100.00
1960 | 1 | 100.00
1961 | 1 | 25.00
1962 | 1 | 25.00
1963 | 1 | 100.00
1964 | 1 | 100.00
1965 | 1 | 25.00
1966 | 1 | 25.00
1967 | 1 | 100.00
1968 | 1 | 100.00
1969 | 1 | 25.00
1970 | 1 | 25.00
1971 | 1 | 100.00
1972 | 1 | 100.00

26 LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
The process by which the question of legal fault, and hence of liability, is determined in our courts is a cumbersome, time-consuming, expensive, and almost ridiculously inaccurate one. The evidence given in personal injury cases usually consists of highly contradictory statements from the two sides, estimating such factors as time, speed, distance and visibility, offered months after the event by witnesses who were never very sure just what happened when they saw it, and whose faulty memories are undermined by lapse of time, by bias, by conversations with others, and by the subtle influence of counsel. Upon such evidence, a jury of twelve inexperienced citizens, called away from their other business if they have any, are invited to retire and make the best guess they can as to whether the defendant, the plaintiff, or both were 'negligent,' which is itself a wobbly and uncertain standard based upon the supposed mental process of a hypothetical and non-existent reasonable man. European lawyers view the whole thing with utter amazement; and the extent to which it has damaged the courts and the legal profession by bringing the law and its administration into public disrepute can only be guessed."

In addition to inefficiency and uncertainty, any reparation system, if it is to be the worst of all possible systems, must fail to compensate the victims. In this regard, our present system is richly adequate measured by the standard of the worst system. Fifty-five percent of the seriously injured and fatally injured get nothing whatsoever from the tort liability system. Here, we're using a definition of seriously injured that includes anyone whose medical costs, excluding hospitalization, exceed $500; or who spent two weeks in the hospital; or who missed work for three weeks; or in the case of someone not working, missed his usual activities for six weeks.

In addition to failing to compensate most of the seriously injured, the worst system should also inadequately compensate the balance. And precisely what does our system do? The U.S. Department of Transportation found that the permanently and totally disabled suffered losses of $78,000 on the average and collected $12,556 from the tort liability system. This, of course, is an overstatement because these people had to pay legal fees as well. In the case of death, the average loss was $22,894 and the average recovery from the tort system was $10,981.

Let's take one more view of the system. Those who suffered $25,000 or more in economic loss recovered only about 12.6 percent of their economic loss from the tort system. They recovered 30 percent from all sources.

Inadequate recovery, or no recovery at all, means all kinds of family dislocations. To be precise, the U.S. Department of Transportation found that at least one other member of the family of the accident victim had to seek employment in 22 percent of all cases. Fourteen percent of families were forced to move to cheaper housing. Thirty percent had to draw on savings. Twenty-eight percent had to borrow money to meet expenses. Twenty-nine percent missed credit payments. Forty-five percent were forced to lower their standard of living.

The statistics of recovery from our present system translate into social disorganization, family disruption, poverty and hardship of every sort.

Still another characteristic of the worst possible system is that it should most generously compensate the least seriously injured and least generously compensate the most seriously injured. And that is precisely what our system does.

One insurance company study showed that those who suffered economic loss of less than $100, and retained a lawyer, recovered on the average of seven times their economic loss.

According to the U.S. Department of Transportation Study, those seriously injured whose economic loss was between $1 and $499 recovered, on the average, four times their economic loss from the tort system. So, those with the smallest economic losses did 32 times as well as those with the most serious economic losses.

The minor cases are settled generously for their nuisance value. The more serious cases are fought through the courts, generating the delay, expense, inefficiency, and other adverse side effects of the present system.

If you want the worst of all possible systems, make it a lawsuit system. This we have. If you're in an accident, you don't get compensation, you get a lawsuit. And all the books of wit and wisdom from the earliest moments of history suggest the boundless aggravation inflicted on the parties to a lawsuit. And a lawsuit system contributes to the uncertainties and inefficiencies already described.

It does this in part by complexities that require legal services. Twenty-five percent of all tort recoveries in serious injury cases go to attorneys. We know, of course, in some places like Philadelphia, most contingent fees range from 40 percent to 50 percent.

Nationally the U.S. Department of Transportation found that the average legal fee paid by plaintiffs who filed lawsuits was 35.5 percent. In addition, the plaintiff had to pay $250 in court costs, as did the defendant. The defendant paid on the average of $819 for his legal defense.

The worst of all systems must be slow. Indeed ours is. The U.S. Department of Transportation Study
found that it took 16 months from the date of the accident to the date of final settlement in the case of fatalities and serious injury cases. Only 8 percent received interim payments.

The more serious the loss, the slower the settlement. In the case of the 220,000 lawsuits filed, more than a half required in excess of two years to reach termination. In urban areas, the situation was much worse. For example, in New York, Los Angeles and Essex County, it took 48 months, 26 months, and 30 months, respectively, to dispose of one-half of the cases. In these same areas, it took 70 months, 56 months, and 36 months to dispose of 90 percent of the cases.

The situation in Philadelphia, of course, closely parallels that of the other major metropolitan areas. The worst of all systems should discriminate against the most disadvantaged. Our system gives a higher ratio of economic loss recovery to those with higher educational achievement and to those with higher income. For example, the U.S. Department of Transportation Study found that high income families did 61 percent better in obtaining full reparation than low income families.

Another characteristic of an ideally imperfect reparation system should be that it discourages rehabilitation. Our present auto insurance and reparation system does exactly that. It discourages rehabilitation first of all because the money is not there when the victim needs it. Rehabilitation requires immediate action and not the long delays associated with litigation.

Liability insurance is geared to protect the policyholder and not the claimant. So, it's not surprising that rehabilitation doesn't fit into the grand scheme of litigation and settlement.

In the adversary environment of our present system, the automobile liability insurance company has little or no credibility. The plaintiff's attorney may, in fact, discourage rehabilitation as he may see it as a threat to his legal fee. When damages are minimized through rehabilitation, so is recovery. And when recovery is minimized, so is the contingent legal fee.

The U.S. Department of Transportation asked claimants whether or not rehabilitation was suggested. The answer was "yes," in 11.3 percent of the cases. In only 2 percent of this 11.3 percent universe, did the suggestion come from an insurance company. This means that only in one-fifth of one percent of total cases did the liability insurance suggest rehabilitation. Seventy percent of those who received a suggestion of rehabilitation actually participated in such a program. It should be remembered that 7 percent of those victims who made successful claims suffered some total or partial permanent disability that would suggest rehabilitation.

Another characteristic of the ideally imperfect system is that it should have little or no deterrent effect. For whatever it is worth, 58 percent of the public surveyed thinks that the liability insurance and liability system has no deterrent effect whatsoever. Fourteen percent said "yes," it does cause careful driving and 17 percent said it does make some difference in the direction of more careful driving. The U.S. Department of Transportation, which conducted this survey, also reached the same conclusion as the public based on two scientific studies:

"Unfortunately, the claim of a significant deterrent effect for the present automobile liability insurance system has so far proven unsusceptible to substantiation by empirical evidence."

Furthermore, the Department of Transportation Study concluded:

"Two investigations conducted during the course of the department study, however, indicate that most accidents are caused by environmental or personal factors which are external to the individual's conscious control and that punishment or its threat, therefore, is ineffective as a deterrent to deviate driving behavior."

Finally, the ideally imperfect system should create insurance problems. This it does. The high cost of auto insurance is too well known to be explained in detail here. The $1,000 premium in large cities is becoming commonplace. Those in certain categories, such as youthful drivers or high risk drivers, find insurance sky-high, if available at all.

This system also encourages other types of discrimination. It is a lawsuit system. This is the reason that those with nicknames, traveling salesmen, military personnel, members of minority groups, divorcees, and many others have difficulty obtaining coverage. The underwriter must evaluate policyholders in terms of what sort of witnesses they would make if involved in an accident. And this, of course, leads to all kinds of irrational, unsatisfactory and unfair discrimination.

It helps make insurance hard to get and hard to keep for many. Cancellation and nonrenewal are one of the most common problems that we hear about in the Insurance Department. Auto insurance creates the greatest difficulties, according to our complaint statistics, and cancellation and nonrenewals are the leading cause of the automobile insurance complaints we receive.

No-fault attempts to eliminate many of these difficulties. As most experts see it, the twin cancers of the present system are the issue of fault and the issue of pain and suffering. In a University of Michigan study directed by Alfred Conrad, plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys were asked what the reasons for disagreement were in automobile accident cases that came on for trial. Forty-six percent of the plaintiffs' attorneys and fifty percent of the defendants' attorneys gave fault as the most difficult issue. This was followed by pain and suffering which was given as the second most difficult issue by 17 percent of both groups of attorneys.

Other difficult issues were medical prognosis, value of lost wages and medical causation. So, no-fault is geared to get rid of the question of fault and to get
rid of the determination of pain and suffering. We cannot, without adoption of a sweeping social insurance program, find methods of eliminating the question of medical prognosis, value of lost wages and medical causation. Of course, it should be noted that the third most difficult issue, medical prognosis, is also alleviated by no-fault because payments are made on a periodic basis, so it is unnecessary to determine medical prognosis in order to make a determination of the case.

The New York Insurance Department summarized the situation by saying:

“In general, the highly abstract standard of liability called fault and the indeterminate measure of damages called pain and suffering offer rich rewards to the claimant who will lie, the attorney who will chisel, and the insurance company which will stall or intimidate.”

There are various versions of no-fault but they all eliminate or minimize the question of fault by paying benefits without regard to fault. They also eliminate or minimize the question of pain and suffering by abolishing or limiting coverage for pain and suffering.

One approach is through a pure no-fault system. Under such a system, all economic loss might be paid with or without limitations. It would be paid just as your other insurance losses are paid, such as life insurance and health insurance. Your own company would pay you for wage loss, medical expense and other economic loss, as these losses are incurred. This gets expensive so money is saved by eliminating pain and suffering recoveries. Under a pure no-fault system, there is no recovery for pain and suffering allowed.

The systems that have been adopted and most widely discussed are modified no-fault systems. They do pay first-party benefits without regard to fault, as in the case of pure no-fault, but they allow pain and suffering recovery in certain cases. For example, if medical expenses exceed a given amount or if there are specified types of disability or disfigurement.

Under modified no-fault laws, damages for economic loss that is not compensated by payment of no-fault benefits may be sought under the tort system.

The third class of no-fault laws is the phony no-fault law characterized by legislation now in effect in Maryland and Delaware. These basically leave the present system intact and merely require a minimum amount of first-party payments — $10,000 in Delaware and $2,500 in Maryland. Like true no-fault laws, the phony laws involve a rule precluding the pleading or proof of damages relating to losses for which no-fault benefits have been paid.

There is a further class of laws, sometimes classified as no-fault, but not properly so. A Minnesota and South Dakota statute, for example, require that certain supplemental "no-fault" coverage be offered to every insured. Oregon requires that supplemental "no-fault" coverage be included in every liability policy covering private passenger vehicles. The Oregon law does not make insurance mandatory. It merely requires it to be included in every liability policy issued on private passenger automobiles.

Almost all no-fault laws and proposals make insurance mandatory for both no-fault coverage and the liability coverage typically carried at the present time.

Property damage is treated in a much different fashion under the no-fault system. Under a no-fault property damage system, each owner or driver picks up his own property damage to his automobile by insurance or self-insurance. He had no cause of action against another driver for such damage.

No-fault laws, to date, have all been enacted at the state level, but Federal legislation has received growing support. At the present time, state action is favored by the Nixon Administration, but there is a strong Congressional group that would like to see Federal action. The Hart-Magnuson Bill, which came very close to passage in the U.S. Senate last year, would make a national no-fault law applicable in any state which did not pass its own law meeting minimum Federal standards.

In discussing no-fault, I would suggest that you avoid certain commonly accepted fallacies. Fallacy one is the confusion of no-fault with workmen's compensation. Workmen's compensation is a no-fault system but it involves difficult and complex issues due to the necessity of determining whether or not a given injury arises out of and in the course of employment. There are analogous problems in the case of a no-fault auto system, but they are comparatively simple compared to the massive dimensions posed by the endlessly litigated question of what arises out of and in the course of employment.

Another fallacy to be avoided is to judge the entire system by a single hypothetical case or class of cases judged in isolation. Opponents of no-fault customarily cite the rare injury that would not be treated as well under no-fault as under the present system. Trial lawyers are fond of citing an array of cases ranging from the most tragic to the most trivial. Such cases exist, but they should not be used as a basis for striking down no-fault. No-fault should be judged in terms of the great majority of cases, and in terms of the overall system. It should be judged by comparing its overall performance, efficiency, and equity with that of the present system. Under any reasonable comparison, no-fault emerges by far the superior system.

By like token, when considering the possibility of payment for pain and suffering recovery, and of limiting such pain and suffering recovery, consider both the strength and weaknesses of the alternatives. Recognize that resources are limited and that the economist must be the true tragedian. It would be possible to pay everyone, both for all pain and suffering and for all economic loss on a no-fault basis, but this would
require that we double the cost of auto insurance for bodily injury liability coverage.

Before you shed tears for the deprivation of recovery for pain and suffering, remember that most of it now goes to pay for attorneys' fees. Twenty-one percent of the bodily injury premium dollar goes for pain and suffering, and 16 percent goes for payment to claimants' attorneys.

Also, remember the problem associated with pain and suffering recoveries. First of all, it is immeasurable, so it encourages disagreement and litigation. Second, it generates discriminatory and arbitrary awards because it cannot be measured in any objective fashion. It introduces a profit factor into the system and, therefore, encourages exaggerated claims, phony claims, ambulance chasing, and a whole host of related problems. Third, it calls for the dramatization of injuries and thus leads to overutilization of medical and other resources. "Three times specials" is an expensive concept in practice, as medical costs are run up to enhance recovery for pain and suffering.

Fourth, do not assume that because we have constitutional problems in designing some no-fault bills, that all no-fault bills necessarily encounter such difficulty. As we read Article 3, Section 18, it seems to us that it was clearly aimed at the old common carrier statutes which would put a ceiling on total recovery in the event of death or injury caused by a railroad: for example, $3,000 in the event of injury and $5,000 in the event of death. This is the same kind of absolute ceilings or limitations encountered in workmen's compensation laws.

The bills that we have drafted and proposed place no such limit or ceilings in this constitutional sense on recovery. When there is recovery, it is without limit at law. However, we do not believe that the constitution enshrines every cause of action and every element of damage into the law without possibility of legislative change.

No-fault is an issue that benefits nearly everyone. It is an issue supported by nearly everyone. The near lone exception in both cases are the trial lawyers. Up till now they have been successful in preserving their economic self-interest, but only at tremendous social cost.

By opposing no-fault so vehemently, trial lawyers are drawing their entire profession into public disrepute. The general silence of other members of the bar in the face of the trial lawyers' activities has only deepened this impression.

I only hope that lawyers will recognize their broader social responsibility. I hope they will remember that they too are auto insurance policyholders and that they too have traffic accidents.

The time has come for no-fault. And the time has come for the bar to take a sound and defensible position on auto insurance reform. The time has come for the lawyers to put the public interest ahead of their narrow economic interest.

Shrager

(Continued from page 5)

important consumer group involved. The consumer group to which I refer is not the public at large, nor indeed even the automobile policyholders in general. Rather, it is the accident victim, for he alone will in the final analysis sustain the major benefit or detriment from basic changes in the automobile insurance system. This is an elementary point, but one frequently overlooked when the issue is discussed. It is the accident victim whose interests must be the measuring rod of fair and responsible automobile insurance reform. This group is not organized, nor can it be, for its membership is formed by the happenstance of an accident. No one represents this group specifically. The accident victim typically learns of his rights only after the fact. Thus, insurance of any type cannot fairly be considered without an appraisal of the benefits available per dollar of premium paid in the event the risk insured against eventuates. It is well and good to note that certain no-fault proposals will save each policyholder $5, $10 or $15 per year, but surely no worthwhile public purpose has been served if on the occasion of a loss under a particular insurance policy, the net benefits paid to the accident victim are diminished. Curiously, this trade-off between reduced benefits and cost reduction has only very slightly intruded itself in the public discussion. Critics of the present system tend to emphasize that the overhead expense (i.e., underwriting, claims adjustment and legal expenses) can consume up to 50% of the premium dollar. Such criticism is, in part, fair, but what these same critics always seem to fail to mention is the fact that under no-fault, the net payout to the innocent accident victim is invariably less than what that victim receives under the present tort system.

For example, much attention has been focused on the fact that supposedly there will be an expanded number of recipients of automobile insurance benefits, whose claims, it is said, will promptly be paid, but little attention seems to be given to the fact that the net payout to those who are entitled to benefits under the present system will be reduced under a no-fault system. In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, there are two facts which have been totally obscured by headlines announcing reductions in the bodily injury rates (although the aggregate automobile insurance premium is higher than ever before in many areas). First, the number of claimants has been reduced on an absolute basis. No-fault, which was supposed to increase, the number of claimants (since theoretically all accident victims, as opposed to simply innocent accident victims, would be entitled to benefits) has not accomplished that. Secondly, the net amount of the payout, both on an absolute basis and relative to the premium dollar paid, to the pre-no-fault claimant (presumably the innocent accident victim) has decreased since no-fault.

LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
What then is no-fault automobile insurance and why do certain species of no-fault deserve the opposition of the legal profession? There are "no-fault" laws in effect in more than twenty states, and various measures are being seriously considered in many other jurisdictions, including a federal proposal which is very high on the Senate's calendar. These bills are widely disparate in their content and, in the main, the only thing in common is the label they bear—"no-fault." It is for this reason that the dichotomy between the pro and anti no-fault position is vague and unmanageable and serves only the purpose of less than responsible public spokesmen who seek to curry public favor with the use of a meaningless although popular tagline, "no-fault insurance."

However, it is possible to identify certain ingredients which form part of most no-fault plans and to identify the key areas of dispute. All no-fault laws provide a certain measure of "first-party" (i.e., between the insured and his own insurance company) rights for reimbursement of medical expenses, lost income, loss of services and other financial losses incident to an automobile accident. In this respect, no-fault insurance is nothing more or less than accident-and-health coverage and is essentially identical to other types of insurance which are "no-fault" in nature—Blue Cross/Blue Shield, life insurance, group medical insurance, etc. Virtually all no-fault bills make this first-party coverage mandatory, subject, in some instances, to deductible amounts which the named insured may elect for himself and members of his household. These first-party economic loss benefits may also be thought of as an expanded form of medical payment coverage which any insured may elect to obtain from his own automobile insurance company at the present time. In a word, there is little new in including within the protection of an automobile insurance policy, medical payment benefits. The principal changes involved in a no-fault insurance policy in this respect are that the amount of insurance coverage for medical expenses is usually pegged at a higher figure than that which is routinely carried by an average policyholder, the scope of the protection is broader in terms of covering items of lost income, services and death benefits, and, finally, the coverage is compulsory.

Some may quarrel with the mandatory aspect of this first-party coverage, particularly those who have wisely planned their insurance portfolio or are already covered by some collateral source (81% statistically being covered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, wage continuation plans, group medical, Social Security and like type plans) and thus would wish to resist the legally-imposed obligation to pay for duplicative insurance protection. However, it is difficult to contest seriously a societal judgment which recognizes that the automobile accident injury, which, by definition, is not a predictable loss, should be insured against on a mandatory basis with respect to out-of-pocket losses. Very few members of the profession oppose this facet of no-fault automobile insurance, although the compulsory aspect may be distasteful.

The states of Oregon, Maryland and Delaware, among others, have no-fault insurance programs which simply provide for protection against out-of-pocket losses in the nature of medical expense, lost income and loss of services which vary in amount and time limit (Oregon, for example, provides medical expense protection up to $3,000 for a period of one year and 70% loss of income up to a maximum of $500 per month for a period of one year).

Theoretically, one might suppose that the payment of all accident victims' financial losses would dramatically increase the aggregate payout by the insurance industry and thereby drive up insurance premiums. This has not occurred for a variety of reasons. The principal factor, as noted above, is that the great majority of people already carry some form of collateral protection against accidental losses and, typically, the protection under a no-fault automobile insurance policy for out-of-pocket expenses is in the form of excess coverage only. A second factor appears to be the reluctance on the part of many policy holders to assert claims against their own insurance carrier. Claims for small financial loss tend to be overlooked. It is thought, often mistakenly, that the rate charged by one's own insurance company will be a function of benefits paid by that company. This has proven to have a salutory affect in discouraging the accident victim from processing relatively de minimis claims. The beneficial financial fall-out from this effective reduction of small claims to the insurance industry must not be under estimated. Public legend to the contrary notwithstanding, adverse loss experience by the automobile insurance industry does not accrue as a function of the occasional large spectacular and headline-making settlements or verdicts. If there be any question on this, one needs only to inquire as to the cost of excess coverage on any insurance line to find that it is rather slight, this, attesting to the actuarial experience in terms of the relatively few large claims. Rather, as any experienced insurance claims adjuster will explain, the industry asserts it has been "nicketled and dimed to death." It is the $500, $1,500 and $2,500 claims that far and away represent the major concern from the industry's point of view and the industry believes that if the claims for a few hundred dollars in medical expense and lost wages can be kept under control either through prompt payment or by the insured, in effect, waiving them, this source of loss experience will largely be removed.

Massachusetts proves these suppositions to be correct. As already noted, the total number of claims is down as is the net payout to each claimant. I asked two Boston cab drivers about no-fault on the way to and from Logan Airport recently. One driver told me no-fault was "great" because last year he paid $12 less for the liability portion of his insurance policy on his personal car. The other driver called it a "fraud"
because, unlike the first driver, he had an accident in his personal car. He had been struck in the rear and could not recoup the $100 deductible amount under his collision coverage that he had paid for repair of his automobile. And so far as the $150 in medical bills and lost wages he incurred, "I figured the hell with it. It's too much of a hassle and I don't want to get cancelled out."

But the battleground on no-fault is not particularly in terms of benefits which are supposed to be given to the accident victim, but, rather with those proposals which extend beyond first-party benefits and unnecessarily remove from the innocent accident victim his ability to seek a fair measure of compensation at common law for non-economic detriment, or the intangibles of physical pain, mental anguish, cosmetic disfigurement and, in general, the manner in which an injury may compromise the accident victim's life style. On this issue, certain no-fault bills (e.g., Florida, Massachusetts and New Jersey) impose financial "threshold" figures which must be exceeded before the accident victim would be entitled to bring a claim in tort. In Massachusetts, the medical expenses must exceed $500, in Florida, $1,000, and in New Jersey, $200. The statutes which impose such a threshold figure usually contain exceptions for cases which are thought to be more serious, but where the medical expenses may not exceed the minimum dollar amount (typically, death, serious cosmetic disfigurement, fracture of a weight bearing bone, and permanent impairment of an important body function).

Some urge that these non-financial losses, or "intangibles," should no longer be the fit subject for compensation at common law. Hopefully, that is the view of a small minority, for it would seem difficult to persuade the average wage earner who has sustained a low back injury that weeks or months of pain and disability and a compromise of his recreational and pleasurable pursuits is less important than his out-of-pocket loss. So, too, the average homemaker would regard a serious sprain of an elbow or wrist which prevents her from cooking, cleaning the house or picking up a baby to be a more significant loss than the $100 or $150 in medical expenses incurred for x-rays and a few visits to the doctor. And a parent whose child has been struck down by an automobile and rendered unconscious is surely entitled to be more concerned about possible brain damage, personality changes or other latent neurologic sequelae of head trauma than the few hundred dollars in expenses necessary for medical review of the situation. Those who have suffered injury and resultant disability are aware that "pain and suffering" is not a plaintiff's lawyer's makeshift.

It is not an answer to suggest that the occasional abuses of the system through the "whiplash syndrome" should tarnish the right of those who sustain bonafide injury to seek compensation therefor. Men and women trained in the law do not lightly urge abrogation of legally-created rights on the basis of occasional abuses in the execution of those rights. The rather colossal abuse of the power of the presidency urged by many to be evidenced by the "Watergate Affair" has not seriously been urged as a basis for abrogation of the presidency and the establishment of a parliamentary system. The argument centers, rather, on what effectively can be done to avoid such abuses in the future.

Nor has the common law ever shrunk from the challenge of being able to estimate the money value of intangibles. If it were otherwise, then we would need to abrogate wholesale causes of action for defamation, invasion of privacy and various intentional torts. Nor would we be able to tolerate the "guestimates" that are made daily in breach of contract actions for loss of good will and the like.

The president of a leading casualty insurance company inquired of me what good was accomplished by paying an accident victim several thousands of dollars for a sprained back. I inquired of him, in turn, what was accomplished if money damages were sought under the personal articles floater on his homeowner's policy in the event of the theft of his wife's diamond engagement ring. Money damages are a poor substitute for loss of an article of cherished personal value and so, too, a million dollar recovery may not remedy the quadriplegic's dramatic neurologic deficit. It's simply the next best thing that the law can do. It should be agreed that damaged bodies and broken life styles are as important as loss following an accident as a dented fender or the invasion of one's pocketbook. We should be proud of the value judgment which the American common law subsumes in its protection of the individual in his person and property from negligently-inflicted loss or injury, and a high burden of proof should be cast on those who would compromise this right. The development of the civil law reflected the consensus of civilized society, that in disputes between man and man, restitution was better than retribution. The Judeo-Christian tradition teaches that for offenses between man and God, atonement is necessary, but that for offenses between man and man, only compensation will do.

And thus, the principal battleground on the no-fault issue has been with respect to those proposals which seek to diminish or, in certain cases, abrogate the right to seek general damages for non-economic detriment. The insurance industry will concede arguendo that general damages should be preserved but, it urges, that since out-of-pocket benefits are given to all accident victims, there must be a financial quid-pro-quo out of the pockets of the innocent accident victims if insurance premiums are not to be raised. It is said that the public demands reductions in automobile insurance rates. Many will contest the policy judgment which requires innocent accident victims to subsidize first-party payments to negligent drivers out of their own pockets through diminished or no recovery for general damages. But this threshold value judgment aside, the answer is that the financial quid-pro-quo is abso-
lately unnecessary and it has been a fallacious premise to the contrary on the basis of which wholesale abrogation of the right of recovery in tort has been advocated.

What are the facts? As already noted, several states have passed laws which provide for first-party benefits and nothing more. These bills, which by their detractors are called "add-on bills," have proven by their track records that when the accident victim promptly receives his out-of-pocket expense, there is removed the incentive to bring a third-party tort action unless his injury is more than de minimus. In the State of Delaware, litigation is down two-thirds. There have been two rate cuts in liability insurance (including a recently-announced 15% cut).

The dramatic reduction of claims in Massachusetts is not accountable on the basis of that jurisdiction's $500 threshold figure. Virtually every observer of the Massachusetts experience has pointed out that the creation of a legislatively-mandated first-party relationship and prompt payment of out-of-pocket expenses have both dissuaded many accident victims from pursuing the "fender-bender" case and at the same time permitted the industry to "control" (i.e., prevent them from going to counsel) potential third-party tort claimants. Thus, in Massachusetts, the industry has been able to dispose on a first-party basis of not only an overwhelming number of cases involving less than $500 in medical expense, but of well over 50% of the cases in which medical expenses exceeded $500. The Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner produly announces that claims are down more than 50%. But accidents still occur in Massachusetts and at the same frequency as before, Massachusetts no-fault does not spare people injury. So a 50% reduction in insurance claims is a badge of honor or disgrace, depending on one's view of the purpose of automobile insurance protection and the importance of so structuring our laws as to assure a fair measure of compensation for the innocent automobile accident victim.

In a word, the insurance industry has totally failed to document the financial need for a dollar threshold. This is why it is now possible to represent on a solid factual predicate that every accident victim can enjoy protection against out-of-pocket expense without the need for compromising his right to secure a fair measure of compensation where he has sustained a bona-fide injury at the hands of a negligent driver, this, without any increase in insurance rates and, indeed, with probable decreases in rates.

In addition to first-party benefits and limitations of the tort recovery in certain bills, most no-fault measures include compulsory or mandatory liability insurance coverage to protect the named insured and permissive users of his vehicle against liability claims. Little controversy has centered on this aspect of the debate, since it is the clear consensus that the operation of an automobile on the public highways carries with it the obligation fairly to assure the driver's financial re-

sponsibility in the event he negligently inflicts injury on some unknown accident victim.

Conspicuous by its absence is most no-fault bills is any treatment of that which is the source of the major portion of the insurance premium dollar — property damage. One of the popular no-fault legends in the community is that under no-fault, you will be paid for your property damage (i.e., collision, theft, vandalism) by your own insurance company. This is simply not so. The insurance industry, for understandable economic reasons, has no interest in no-fault coverage for property damage, at least from the first dollar of loss. And yet, if we consult the premium statements on our own automobile policies, each of us will find that at least 50% of the premium cost is for the property damage line. When we urged an amendment to a no-fault insurance bill which was before the Pennsylvania legislature to the effect that every insurance company had the obligation to offer protection against property damage, the same industry that was so anxious to protect every accident victim against his out-of-pocket expense was unanimous in condemning such an amendment. So the public is entitled to know what losses are insured against and what losses remain uncovered. With perhaps one exception, there is no no-fault bill presently in effect in the country which alters the status quo in terms of property damage. As before, it remains the option of the policyholder to insure himself against property damage and then almost universally on the basis of a deductible amount. When Florida attempted to compel purchase of collision coverage on the basis that failure to do so would constitute a waiver of the accident victim's right to seek his out-of-pocket property loss from the negligent driver, the Florida Supreme Court had little difficulty in finding the law unconstitutional in that respect.

But what of the viability of the fault principle itself? Should a legal determination of fault any longer be the criterion for the award of damages. This issue has not much intruded itself in the public debate, which has been dominated by political imperatives and liberal invocation of "consumerism" but very little philosophy. Indeed, if one were to examine the philosophic consistency of proponents of radical forms of no-fault insurance (i.e., those that would essentially totally abrogate general damages), one would need respectfully to identify an element of intellectual hypocrisy. Thus, I have many times in public debate on this issue invited proponents of radical no-fault bills to announce their support for a comprehensive national health scheme — the true and comprehensive no-fault — to protect the individual from financial loss associated with illness and accidents of any type. Why do we cull out the automobile accident victim? Why not those who fall on the sidewalk or the torn carpet? Why not those who sustain traumatic injury? Why not those who sustain iatrogenic injury? Why not those who sustain accidental injury? Why not those who sustain accidental injury?
ance bills, since these gentlemen see in a truly comprehensive no-fault approach to accident injury the precursor to national health insurance and the elimination of their segment of the insurance industry from the private sector.

And so, too, I have invited these proponents of "consumer reform" in the automobile insurance field to establish their fidelity to the no-fault principle by announcing their support of no-fault in the award of general damages. If, as it is urged by some, the determination of fault is a time consuming, inexact and often legally clumsy process, then whether the determination is the amount of future medical expenses for an accident victim or the award of general damages, the same alleged imperfections must exist and the same salutary no-fault principle should obtain. But in this area I find no support at all from my good colleagues who favor radical no-fault bills. There is, then, no such thing as no-fault automobile insurance in any respect that would be commonly understood by the public, since every threshold-type no-fault proposal extends benefits only at the cost of reducing or eliminating benefits.

But aside from the evident philosophic inconsistencies of the no-fault proponents, what of the fault principle itself. The fault principle should be justified only in part on the ground that it may be a deterrent to negligent conduct. Concededly, any financial deterrent is quite indirect in view of the absorption of accident-related losses by insurance. Nor should the fault principle be justified as a technique of punishing negligent actors. In view of the almost universality of insurance, punishment is illusory. More importantly, the common law does not operate to punish the negligent; rather, it proceeds in attempting to compensate the innocent. In the context of no-fault insurance, there is, then, no inconsistency in a policy position that supports payment of financial losses for every accident victim but continues to assure protection of the innocent victim in the respect of his right to recover general damages.

The determination of fault is the legal variable which demands at common law that the innocent victim be fully compensated. It is a basic common sense notion of fair play which permeates the entire civil and criminal law and it is for that reason that it deserves the support of the community and especially of the profession which bears the responsibility to enforce the law. The fault principle thus stands on its own two feet for support simply because men of reason will agree that it is the right thing to do. The assessment of one's conduct as being with or without fault, which can seem so bothersome to the layman, is, of course, the sum and substance of the criminal and civil law. It would be colossal to urge that the most expeditious way to execute the criminal law would be by assuming the guilt of 100 persons accused of robbery and, on a "no-fault" basis, treat them accordingly, even if it be assumed that only one or two of the number of suspects were, indeed, innocent. We instinctively shrink from such a proposition and it bothers us little that the criminal defendant is clothed with elaborate legal protection and that we incur a rather high societal cost in the dispensation of criminal justice to assure that no man may be called upon to forfeit his liberty except by due process of law.

Is it now to be urged that the inviolability of property rights, in terms of the protection of one's person from negligent invasion, is to be treated as a legal outcast? Men and women trained in the law and proud of our legal tradition have, it seems to me, the obligation to resist to the wall any effort to "improve" the administration of justice by the elimination of certain basic rights.

No discussion of no-fault insurance could conclude without an attempt to fit this issue into the context of the entire automobile reparations system. At the outset, we noted that the major sources of complaint with the present system include high insurance rates in some areas, delay in the payment of claims, court congestion and unfair cancellation and renewal practices. More important still are the bedrock problems of the causes of accidents and injuries, which, after all, trigger insurance claims in the first instance. Some of the principal factors are automobile design, highway design and the drunken driver. No-fault has little to do with most of these problem areas. The danger is that many in the public tend to assume, on the basis of public utterances of proponents of certain forms of no-fault insurance, that it is a panacea. Ralph Nader recently made the following pertinent comment in connection with criticism of certain no-fault proposals (CBS, "Face the Nation" interview of September 2, 1973). After noting his own criticism of the existing system, he stated, "I'm skeptical of the existing no-fault [program] because it does not link its reform with loss prevention and control of insurance premiums; and in some versions of no-fault, it does not provide for pain and suffering."

No-fault does not touch the issue of automobile design safety, which even General Motors now concedes to be a significant variable in terms of accident rate and severity.

Every statistical estimate agrees that drinking is associated with at least 50% of all fatal accidents. No-fault does nothing about this except to assure that upon sobering up the day following the occurrence, the drunken driver may notify his insurance company and request his no-fault benefits.

What of rate reduction? The average driver in the urban high-risk areas may expect a savings of between $5 and $15 on the bodily injury facet of his automobile insurance. The trade-off in terms of benefit protection has already been described. If the insured supposes that his total automobile insurance premium will be reduced, he will usually be mistaken, since property damage premiums remain unaffected and will continue to pursue the normal course of inflation.
As to the delay in disposition of claims, no-fault insurance has nothing to do with that problem. That is a matter which can be, has been and should be treated as a separate issue requiring more rigorous regulation of insurance industry claims practices, the imposition of interest on verdicts from the date of an accident, and other appropriate penalty provisions. In like fashion, dilatory or otherwise improper handling of claims by counsel should be treated accordingly.

What of no-fault and court congestion? Court congestion is almost exclusively a function of the urban areas. In the City of Philadelphia, among cases that actually proceed to verdict, approximately 17% are automobile cases. If the administration of justice is to form a significant part of the portfolio of public affairs, then, of course, it is intolerable to answer the question of court congestion by partially closing the courtroom door.

As to the abrasive problem of cancellation or failure properly to renew insurance policies, no-fault insurance has nothing to do with the subject matter. Again, arbitrary policy cancellation must be controlled by rigorous state regulation. Equally important is the problem of discrimination in the issuance and rating of policies. In many areas, women, students, veterans, senior citizens and members of certain socio-economic groups find that they are compelled to pay exorbitant rates justified only by arbitrary rating classifications of the insurance industry. This is a serious problem that requires independent and prompt solution. In fact, mandatory no-fault insurance unaccompanied by reform in this area but simply engrained into the present rating system may soon eventuate in adverse fall-out in urban areas. Compulsory insurance is a fine notion except when, by reason of economic imperatives, hundreds of thousands of automobile owners will continue to drive their cars in violation of the law and that the segment of the community most in need of insurance protection does not have it.

The bottom line on this subject matter, then, may be the need to enact comprehensive legislation covering the automobile reparations system in terms of streamlined court and claims procedures, policy issuance and cancellation reform, non-discriminatory rating policies, compulsory first-party benefit programs (i.e., "no-fault insurance"), with assurance as a matter of public policy that all accident victims will be protected in the face of the reality of a large number of uninsured motorists through assigned risk pools and/or the creation of state funds for this purpose.

In this area, the Bar at large must shoulder its responsibility in actively participating in the design and implementation of comprehensive and fair legislative solutions. We must not default on our special obligation to the proper treatment of the automobile accident victim. At the same time that we identify and avoid ill-considered Utopian solutions proposed by some in the insurance industry and ignore the small segment within the trial bar which wishes to see no change at all, we should not permit the public debate to be dominated by self-appointed consumer advocates who use no-fault as a consumer tagline and a political ploy and in that fashion to take unfair advantage of public ignorance on the issue.

And so it is that when I am asked of my views on no-fault insurance, I tend to respond, "Of course I love my mother. Now tell me in plain English what you mean and I'll let you know how I feel."

**Wilkinson**

*(Continued from page 6)*

which collect and discuss them, including current ALR notes. However, a few must be mentioned. 

*Ex Parte Garland* will have a familiar ring as a case in every undergraduate textbook on Constitutional Law or History. It was decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1867, by a court divided 5 to 4. It declared unconstitutional an Act of Congress that denied the right to practice law in the United States courts to anyone who had supported the Confederacy. A former member of the bar of the Supreme Court, who had been an active supporter of the Confederacy, but had received a full pardon from the President, petitioned for readmission and his petition was granted. The majority held that the Act of Congress denying him the right to admission was punishment ex post facto and, in addition, the Presidential pardon cleared the record. The dissenting opinion pointed out that failure to meet minimum standards of character and fitness for admission to the bar did not constitute punishment, ex post facto or otherwise, for not having such character. Further, the Presidential pardon could wipe out the criminal record, but could not reestablish character by the stroke of a pen.

If *Ex Parte Garland* stood for, or stands for, anything, it must be that the admission to practice is a federally-protected constitutional right. Nevertheless, almost immediately and consistently until relatively recently, the United States Supreme Court either denied certiorari in appeals by applicants who were denied admission, or expressly ruled that no federally-protected right was involved. As a matter of current interest to "women's libbers", the court twice held, once in 1872 in a case from Illinois, and once in 1894 in a case from Virginia, that refusal of a state to admit women to a bar did not constitute a federal question! More recently, in 1945, the Supreme Court held that admission could be constitutionally refused to a conscientious objector since he could not swear to defend the Constitution and such denial did not violate First Amendment rights! Several cases have been decided that required the states to afford applicants procedural due process rights—notice, opportunity to be heard, right to confront witnesses, right to cross-examine, etc. Such decisions were a far cry from the early language; for instance, *In re: Summers*, in 1945, the responsibility for choice as to the personnel of its bar rests...
with Illinois". Nevertheless, it was merely procedural due process—"Don't lynch him; give him a fair trial and then hang him". The Supreme Court only began to seriously look into the substantive grounds for denial of admission based on character and fitness in the late 50's. In 1957, there was an Arizona case where admission was denied because the applicant had some 10-15 years before improperly used an alias, been arrested in a labor dispute, and had been a member of the Communist Party. On the other hand, following these episodes, the applicant had served as a paratrooper in World War II, successfully ran a business while attending law school, and had many good character letters. A unanimous court, albeit with a concurring opinion of three judges, held that Arizona denied the applicant substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment when it refused admission, saying that the earlier transgressions were clearly outweighed by the recent good conduct. Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion concurred in by Justices Clark and Harlan, felt called upon to recite the history of the control of the bar by the courts and the necessity for the state courts and the legislators to be unfettered in their aim to have the bar maintained at a high standard of character. After reciting the facts of this particular case, Justice Frankfurter was compelled to say that the court, in denying admission, had gone too far.

On the same day, the Supreme Court decided the first of two Konigsberg appeals from California. In this first case, a divided court remanded to California to take additional testimony as to whether Konigsberg belonged to the Communist Party, intending to support its belief that the government should be overthrown by force and violence. A strong dissent, filed by Justice Harlan and joined by Justice Clark (Justice Frankfurter dissenting on procedural grounds), stated that this was not clear enough for the case to be reversed. Interestingly enough, on remand, Konigsberg refused again to answer even the more particularized question, and the refusal to admit was affirmed. At the risk of gross over-simplification, I suggest you compare Gar­land, who had actually participated in an armed rebellion and could not be denied admission, with Konigsberg who could be denied admission because he might believe in the right to rebel.

Now for the coup d'etat—on February 23, 1971, the Supreme Court handed down three decisions, one an appeal from Arizona, one from Ohio, and one from New York, involving the right of a state to inquire into an applicant's political beliefs to determine character and fitness for admission. In the three cases, 12 opinions were filed. In the Arizona case, there was no majority opinion—just a majority holding. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

In the Ohio case, essentially the same case was handled essentially in the same way, but with some new opinions.

Finally, the New York case was one instituted before a three-judge Federal District Court, attacking the constitutionality of the questionnaire on character then used by New York State. Again, without a majority opinion and with a slightly different alignment of Justices, the court seems to have decided:

1. Some test of character and fitness if appropriate. (All Justices agreed on this)
2. An oath to support the Constitution can be required. (All agreed)
3. Supporting affidavits of good character can be required. (Not clear how many Justices agreed)
4. Applicants must believe in our form of government and must be loyal to it. (Four Justices dissented)
5. Applicants must answer the question whether they belonged to an organization they knew stood for overthrowing the government. (Four Justices dissented)
6. The entire proceeding was not invalid because it might have a chilling effect. (Two Justices dissented)

Where does this leave us as to character and fitness inquiries? Let me forget my judicial robes and my offices as immediate Past Chairman of the National Conference, and Chairman of the State Board of Pennsylvania. Let me be brash as I was as a young law graduate in "Shoemaker's Children". Thus, dis­robbed and rejuvenated, I say it leaves us with very little tests of character and fitness other than whether there has been fraud committed in the admission proc­ess or very current convictions of crimes having special relationship to the practice of law. Gay libera­tion? Busts for drugs in college? Participation in sit­ins? Violence in the streets?

Does this indecision, or worse almost emasculation of the character and fitness tests to which we heretofore have given lip service, make me disheartened with re­gard to the future moral qualifications of members of the bar? It most emphatically does not. The best ad­ministered character and fitness investigation can only, I repeat can only, be a prediction from a clouded crystal ball, a forecast if you will, of what an applicant will do after he has been admitted to the bar. My meteorological friends tell me that a meteorologist is a man who can look into a girl's eyes and tell weather and don't ask me how I spelled it. Perhaps we need a profession that can look into an applicant's eyes and tell character. Without digressing, I might say there are some meteorologists whose best judgments with regard to more than three-day weather forecasts are that they are no more accurate than random, because the facts and conditions which will cause the result are not in existence. Again, perhaps the analogy is super­ficial and perhaps it is not. To deny an applicant ad­mission because of his beliefs rather than of his actions brings to mind the story of the contested seating of one of the first United States Senators from Utah. He prop­erly stated that as a Mormon he believed in polygamy, but had only wife. There was considerable doubt that he would be seated until a Senator arose and stated...
that he could not see how a man could be of less moral character who believed in polygamy but did not "polyg" than the rest of us who believe in monogamy but do not "monog". We would do well to remind ourselves of that old homily: "What you do speaks so loudly, I cannot hear what you say".

I submit that the future of the moral qualifications of the bar must lie in the adoption of the Clark Committee's recommendation of an active and vigorous program of discipline and disbarment. This is not based on belief or prediction. This is based on performance. I cannot complete remarks on character and fitness of the bar without some reference to Watergate.

Let my only reference be: I wonder what test of character and fitness these men would have failed when admitted. Indeed, it would be interesting to have the results of a study of how many lawyers who have been disbarred would have failed a proper character and fitness test at the time of admission.

We are and we have a right to be proud of the high profession to which we belong and of the high standards that are maintained by the great, great majority of its members. Let us keep it so, not with nebulous questions and expensive investigations concerning acts and beliefs held and occurring in the distant past and under circumstances which may never arise again, but rather based on the insistence that once admitted, our members must perform their high obligations to their clients, to their courts, and to the government on which the legal system of the United States depends, with fidelity under the certain knowledge that a system is in being which vigorously investigate complaints and will follow through, when justified, with disciplinary proceedings, including disbarment, when appropriate.

DeWeese

(Continued from page 7)

vides the best description of this information giant in a pamphlet entitled, the "FBI and You."

"The FBI serves as a nucleus of a vast law enforcement communications network which includes local, state and Federal agencies throughout the United States and Canada. ... The National Crime Information Center's computer equipment is located at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C. The equipment includes rapid access storage units, popularly known as the memory, with a capability of accommodating an unlimited number of records ... In a matter of seconds, stored information can be retrieved through equipment in the tele-communication network. Connecting terminals, placed near the radio dispatcher, are located throughout the country in police departments, sheriffs' offices, state police facilities and Federal law enforcement agencies. ..."

The potential for misuse and injury generated by this informational monolith singles it out for special consideration.

The system began rather benignly in 1965 as a national index for stolen property. It hasn't changed its name but has changed its stripes. Today the network contains highly sensitive and derogatory personal information; information which in many cases is inaccurate, incomplete, misleading and outdated. In short, it has become a "record prison" for many Americans.

The core of the data base is no longer a file of serial numbers for stolen automobiles. Now, the core of the data base is the 200 million "criminal histories" which the FBI has accumulated since 1933. Many of these files are not criminal records at all. A substantial part of the data is neutral information which has been tainted by its very inclusion in files carelessly labeled "criminal histories."

The best illustration of this tainting effect is the system's total failure to distinguish between records of arrest and records of conviction. There are people with "criminal histories" stored in this computer network who have been detained and never arrested, people who have been arrested and never charged, people who have been charged with a crime but found not guilty by a court of law. Yet their records remain lumped together with the criminally guilty and disseminated at the push of a button to police, judges, creditors, and employers across the country.

Beyond the problem of failing to distinguish between records of arrest and records of conviction is the dilemma posed by the state and local data banks interfaced with the FBI's national files.

For example, in Kansas City, Missouri the local computer — in addition to — the usual information on stolen cars, arrests and convictions, contains:

(1) records of participants in political protests,
(2) individuals with a history of mental disturbances,
(3) persons known to have "confronted" law enforcement or other government officials,
(4) local college students active in campus protests, thus raising the substantial possibility that the "mentally ill" and the "politically vigorous" will be single out and labeled criminals or people with "criminal tendencies."

The problem is exacerbated by the substantial possibility that the information stored will be incomplete, inaccurate, or outdated.

For example, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement revealed that 35% of the criminal records maintained by the FBI were inaccurate in failing to include the final disposition of the charge.

With respect to "stale" and outdated information, the FBI has no procedure for expunging old data from its part of the network. However, at a recent hearing before our advisory panel, a representative of the FBI assured me that your record is purged from the system when you die ... if your friends are good enough to inform the bureau.
We should be reminded that sensitive personal information in government data banks is not limited to the fruits of clandestine surveillance or political "blacklisting" or attempts to catch welfare "cheaters" or otherwise regulate citizens.

Government information systems designed purely for social service purposes have a potential for misuse and abuse. The best illustration of this is the HEW data bank on migrant school children.

In 1969 the Office of Education began funding a national data bank for migrant children. The computer system houses 300,000 individual files containing each child's complete academic record, achievement tests scores, the results of personality and psychological tests and often subjective evaluations such as "short attention span," "does not play well with others," "fails to work to his capacity." The system is designed to aid the rapid placement of migrant children in schools. Using a "WATS line" (Wide Area Telephone Service), a school official can call the data center and receive the school and health records for a new pupil.

No doubt an efficient computerized information system of this type will enable school officials to integrate migrant children into their education program more effectively and perhaps upgrade the schooling generally afforded these children. However, the information handlers appear unaware of the destructive capacity of recorded remarks such as "under-achiever," "antisocial behavior," "disrespect for authority," when read ten years later; or the possible injury that might be caused by giving the results of untrustworthy psychological tests to a corporate employer or a government official. If the system operates without guidelines as to the nature of data to be recorded, procedures to insure accuracy, provisions for expunging outdated information, or restrictions on those who may have access to the files, HEW will have funded an "information time bomb" which could seriously harm the children who the program is designed to help.

Clearly, the prejudice and abuse surrounding criminal justice information is nothing new. There has always been a problem with confusing arrests and convictions. There has always been a problem with outdated youthful mistakes being thrown up in our faces many years later. Likewise, the specter of government surveillance and "blacklisting" has haunted the politically active since the "census" of King Harrold, the "Doomsday Book" of William the Conqueror, and the dossiers of Napoleon's infamous Minister of Police, Joseph Fouche.

But today it is a new ball game!

In the past our privacy was protected by the fragmented nature of personal information and the inefficiency of the information handlers. Data was scattered in little bits and pieces across the geography and years of our lives. Retrieval was impractical and often impossible. Computer technology has abolished this safeguard.

Compared to manual files, computers offer infinitely greater storage capacity; greater processing speed; lower cost per item of information; greater capacity for complex logical operation; simultaneous access to multiple records; remote access to central facilities; ability to link data from different files and exchange information with other computer systems. In a kind of spiral of self-justification, these new capabilities offer government a virtually irresistible temptation to "surveille," scrutinize, measure, count, and interrogate its citizens.

In short, the issue of government information collection takes on new dimensions in an age where laser technology makes it possible to store a twenty-page dossier on every American on a single reel of magnetic tape, and the computer, with its insatiable appetite for information, its "image" of infallability, and its inability to forget could become the heart of a surveillance system that would turn society into a transparent world in which our homes, our finances, our personal and political relations, our past mistakes, our emotional and physical shortcomings are bare to a wide range of observers, including the politically manipulative, the morbidly curious, and the malevolently intrusive.

That's the problem: Now, what is the solution?

In the first instance, certain types of information, because of their limited social value and their high potential for abuse, should be excluded from government information banks. For example, I believe the political surveillance activities of the Army and the Justice Department fall into this category.

Here we must strike a delicate balance. All data-gathering activities we have discussed have some social justification. For example, in the law enforcement field one objective of computerized filebuilding is said to be the elimination of organized crime and the preservation of law and order. In a similar vein, the FBI and the Army justify their intelligence operations in terms of combating subversion or quelling campus disruptions and riots in our urban centers by knowing whom to watch or seize in times of strife.

But there are limits. When a citizen knows that his conduct and associations are being put on file and that the information might be used to harass or injure him, he may become more concerned about the possible content of that file and less willing to risk asserting his expressive rights. The effect may be to encourage Americans to keep a political silence on all occasions. We cannot afford to allow constitutional guarantees to be debilitated by any type of coercion. Claims of governmental efficiency or the war against crime and subversion must not be allowed to justify every demand for gathering personal data.

Beyond outright exclusion, I believe we should take steps to promote good judgment and self-regulation on the part of the information-gathering and using communities. Those who handle individualized data — whether it be in the context of financial profiles in a credit bureau, student records in a school system, medical files in a hospital, intelligence information in a law enforcement computer, welfare lists in a governmental
agency, or personnel data in a large corporation—have an obligation to guard the privacy of the human beings whose lives are reflected in those dossiers. There are many ways in which this might be achieved, including the use of a wide range of technical, administrative, and procedural protections that might be imposed on all information systems containing personal data. These safeguards are currently available. The only question is how to promote their utilization.

To accomplish this end, to promote self regulation, I would suggest that Congress and Parliament impose a Code of Fair Information Practice on information handlers; a set of principles to guide their activities and give the individual a private right of action with appropriate compensatory and punitive damages to enforce this statutory duty of care.

The proposed code would ensure that:

—No computerized personal-data systems are kept secret from the public;
—Individuals can find out what’s in the records about them and how that information is being used;
—Anyone can prevent information about himself that was obtained for one purpose from being used for another;
—Procedures are available for correcting inaccurate information;
—Organizations that operate personal-data systems must assure the correctness of the data and take precautions to prevent its misuse.

When we discuss government information collection and the citizen, the question before us is not privacy. The question is power; for information is power, and those who control information hold the reins of power.

Privacy is merely a convenient catch-word for the powerlessness that the citizen feels but cannot express. The long-cherished concepts of privacy that we point to in our heritage are largely a myth. A century ago, when Canada and the United States were nations of small towns, there was no concept of privacy. Along “Main Street” everybody knew everybody else’s business. But that was the key. Everybody knew about everybody else. Today only a few know. Today the large institutions — of which government is the largest — are the information brokers. They alone control the computers. Today, government and other institutions know more and more about the individual and the individual knows less and less about the institutions which control his life. It is this information imbalance — this powerlessness that so frightens the individual. Privacy is just a catchword—the computer a convenient whipping boy.

If we give the citizen the rights outlined above, we can take a significant step toward striking a proper information balance. We can give the individual some idea of what information is being collected; how it is used; and who has access to it. We can strike a balance which will give government the information necessary to govern effectively and will give the citizen the protection necessary to live freely.

Winter 1974

Gemmill

(Continued from page 7)

lawyer of international distinction, he served as Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service and as Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy in 1953-55.

In announcing the appointment, President Meyerson stated: “Bernard Wolfman is one of the great deans of American law schools, but he is much more than that. He is one of the most distinguished professors in his field. Nothing could be more fitting, therefore, than to have so extraordinary a professional and scholar as Dean Wolfman to be the first holder of the Kenneth Gemmill Professorship.”

A professor on the Law School faculty since 1962, Wolfman was appointed Dean of the Law School in 1970. While serving as Dean, he has continued his teaching and scholarship in the field of taxation. Before joining the faculty, he had been a member of the Philadelphia law firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen since 1948. He served as Visiting Professor of Law at Harvard and Stanford Universities in 1964-65 and 1966.

While a member of the Law School faculty, Wolfman served as general counsel of the American Association of University Professors from 1966 to 1968 and was a consultant on tax policy to the U.S. Treasury Department from 1963 to 1968. He was a member of the advisory group to the U.S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue in 1966-67. He is author of the book, Federal Income Taxation of Business Enterprise, and has published numerous articles in the field of tax law and tax policy.

He serves as chairman of the Committee on Taxation and its Relation to Human Rights of the American Bar Association’s Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities. Wolfman is also vice-chairman of the International Legal Education Section of the World Peace Through Law Center. He serves as a member of the Philadelphia Regional Planning Council of the Governor’s Justice Commission and on the advisory council of the newly created National Commission on Philanthropy. He was a consultant on the negative income tax for Mathematica, Inc., from 1967 to 1971 and for the Stanford Research Institute in 1970-71. He is a Trustee of The Foundation Center, a member of the editorial board of the law book division of Little, Brown and Co., publishers, and a member of the American Law Institute.

Wolfman was elected President of the Greater Philadelphia Branch of the American Civil Liberties Union in 1972. He had been a member of its board of directors since 1965 and now serves on the national A.C.L.U. Board as well. He is also a member of the boards of the Philadelphia Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and of the Federation of Jewish Agencies of Greater Philadelphia.
At the University of Pennsylvania, Wolfman served as chairman of the University's Task Force on Governance, a group comprised of faculty, students, administrative officers and Trustees. The Task Force, which functioned from 1968 to 1970, developed a detailed set of recommendations which are the basis for many improvements in the organization and administration of the University. He also served as chairman of the Faculty Senate during the 1969-70 academic year. The Senate is comprised of all University faculty members with the rank of assistant professor or higher.

He holds both the bachelor of arts (1946) and doctor of law (1948) degrees from the University. He was awarded an honorary doctor of laws degree by the Jewish Theological Seminary of America in 1971. During World War II, Wolfman served in the U.S. Army. His late wife was the former Zelda Bernstein. Their three children are Jonathan, 22, Brian, 16, and Dina, 11.

$9 Million
(Continued from page 8)

School could make rewarding use of some $9 million in new funds:
- $1.5 million in spendable income, including a million dollars over five years from Law School Annual Giving.
- $7.5 million in new endowment principal.

The additional endowment would be for the following purposes:
- Named professorships ............ $4 million
- Faculty and student research and publication ....... $1 million
- Biddle Law Library book acquisitions ........... $1 million
- Student financial aid ............. $1 million
- Dean's Turnaround Fund for acting on new opportunities ..... $500,000

"Those are, of course, brave objectives. Indeed, they aggregate even more than was received in the highly successful building program of the recent past. Time happily permits our assembling the endowment principal by stages. The Steering Committee has found it realistic to seek $3 million over the next two years. "On the basis of these findings, the Law School has launched a two-year program in which every alumnus and friend of the School will have a part. This program has twin objectives:

Endowment. To undergird the School's faculty, student body, library and programs with a secure financial base, $2.5 million in gifts of capital size will be sought from those believed capable of providing them.

Spendable funds. To afford the School ready funds for the support of scholarships, loan funds, research, and current operations, $500,000 will be sought during this period from Law School Annual Giving and other sources.

"To test the feasibility of its goal, the Law School has taken soundings of support among its own Board and Steering Committee, several Philadelphia Law firms, and a few others. From these sources have already come gifts totaling $1,069,311. The School thus begins its new Development Program with a third of its original goal in hand.

"This letter is not an appeal for funds; its purpose is to inform. Your opportunity to participate initially will come when you are asked to contribute to Law School Annual Giving for 1973-74.

"If, as many of us believe, there is a salvation for our embattled world, it must surely encompass the rule of law. And it will require an extraordinary breed of lawyers — near the seats of power; at the side of the powerless. We want the University of Pennsylvania Law School able to educate men and women equal to that responsibility.

"With encouragement and support from you and its other alumni and friends, your Law School will be prepared to fulfill its mission," Wolfman and Wetzel concluded.

Temin
(Continued from page 9)

The Court said that the appellant never substantiated the claim that a man convicted for exactly the same crime would have received a lesser sentence.

Shortly after the Supreme Court agreed to consider the case, Ms. Temin launched her second attack on the Muncy Act, in the case of Commonwealth v. Douglas.

Daisy Douglas and Richard Johnson were tried together and found guilty of aggravated robbery. She received the maximum sentence of 20 years; he, not less than three, nor more than 10 years.

The consolidated appeals were argued before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which reversed the judgments and found:

..., the considerations and factors which would justify a difference between men and women in matters of employment, as well as in a number of other matters, do not govern or justify the imposition of a longer or greater sentence on women than is imposed upon men for the commission of the same crime.

While the statute itself was overturned, there was no ruling that classification by sex alone violated the Fourteenth Amendment, which Ms. Temin believes is ample proof that the Equal Rights Amendment must be passed.

Women still have a way to go before there is equality, Ms. Temin says, especially in the prisons.

"The attitude of prison officials toward women is different, much more paternalistic, toward women than to men. The women are treated like children, and they're supposed to be happy.

40
"For instance, if a woman uses curse words, it's likely to be held against her when they evaluate her attitude. It wouldn't for men.

"Because there are fewer women than men in prison, they often did not have their own recreation area, or a gynecologist.

"Now women are given more educational opportunity than in the past, just as women on the outside are having their educational needs recognized."

Ms. Temin is "happy to see more women attending law school."

"There were only two women in my graduating class," she said.

"It was strange being a woman lawyer then. Everyone you encountered was male — the judges, lawyers, district attorneys, court personnel."

Although women now hold some of these positions, she still would like to see some changes.

"There are no women on the parole board."

"I do not understand why the Governor doesn't appoint one.

"I don't think there are any women in the U.S. Attorney's office. There are still large areas in governmental agencies where women should be and aren't —yet," she said.

In her position as director of the Bar Association's Drug Commission, she works with lawyers and judges, educating them on the programs available under Acts 63 and 64 of 1972.

"There are various means whereby people whose main problem is addiction can be placed in treatment rather than run through the system.

"I hope the problems of addiction — drug and alcohol — will be added to the curriculum in law school.

"The problems of dealing with addicts have been handed over to the lawyers and judges in the past. It's become a justice problem, where they have had to make the treatment decisions."

Before taking her job with the Bar Association, Ms. Temin was director of Villanova Law Associates, a clinical program in Juvenile Justice at Villanova University Law School.

She also has been a Philadelphia Assistant District Attorney, chief counsel of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, and an assistant defender with the Defender Association of Philadelphia.

She currently is a lecturer in prisoners rights at the Temple University School of Law, and heads the civil rights for inmates program, in which students try civil cases in Federal District Court.

Ms. Temin also is the supervising attorney of the Muncy Law Project, a volunteer program which provides legal services to the inmates of the State Correctional Institution at Muncy, and is on the boards of directors of the Pennsylvania Prison Society, Jewish Employment Vocational Service, Pensioners Rights Council and the Germantown Dance Theater.

She is married to Michael Temin, who was graduated from the University of Pennsylvania School of Law a year ahead of her. He is a partner in the firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen.

They have two boys, Aaron, 15½, and Seth, 14.

"The boys are very proud of me, and very supportive of my activities."

Books

(Continued from page 9)

"We have a great many 16th, 17th and 18th century volumes, particularly English works," Gay said, "and also early 18th century American and some continental books."

Among the recent additions to the collection include a letter written by Thomas Jefferson, donated by Philadelphia attorney Morris Wolf; a letter written by Blackstone on October 20, 1761, introducing a friend of his to a former colleague and a collection of 19th century prints of legal caricatures — both donated by Philadelphia attorney Jacob Koosman.

As rare and as interesting as these books are, they are also quite fragile and require special conditions for storage.

Until 1969, when the Law School was renovated, these books remained on stacks under conditions similar to those under which the other books in the library were stored.

As a result, says Gay, many of them began to crumble.

"Rare books, particularly leather, are very susceptible to changes in temperature and weather conditions, and if it got too dry, the books crumbled."

Part of the 1969 renovation of the Law School included the construction of a special vault with temperature controls for the rare book collection.

"This helps us to maintain the status quo with these volumes," Gay said, "but we still must rehabilitate those volumes which have suffered with the passage of time."

The cost of repairing damaged volumes is great, and this factor has prevented the Law School from rehabilitating many of the books.

"Just to put the collection back into shape would cost between $25,000 and $30,000," Gay said.

"A full leather binding on a book five by seven inches costs $150.00 and a cloth binding for the same book is $25.00. So even if we opt for the less expensive binding, it is still an expensive proposition."

"Whenever we can, we save the original binding, or paste some of the original on the new binding to preserve as much of the original as possible."

"The point is, there is very little meaning to dollar value if you lose a rare book."

In addition to attempting to repair damaged volumes, Gay said that the Law School would like to continue to add to the collection.

"Our collection has not grown for some time because we have received only a few items and we just don't have the money," he said.
“We would welcome any gift that would enrich the collection — either items to add to the collection or a monetary donation.”

Gay also invites alumni to visit the collection at any time and would be happy to aid anyone who is collecting and would like advice.

An indenture from the rare book collection.

Flanagan

(Continued from page 52)

Finance Committee
Sharon Kaplan Wallis, Chairman
Leonard L. Ettinger
David H. Marion

Friends of The Biddle Law Library Committee
Louis J. Goffman, Chairman
William F. Hyland
Edwin P. Rome
David H. Marion
Leonard L. Ettinger
Seymour Adelman

John G. Harkins
Mary Ellen Talbott
Richard Sloane, Librarian, Ex Officio

Distinguished Service Award Committee
Norma L. Shapiro, Chairman
Harold Cramer
Edward I. Cutler
Marshall A. Bernstein
Carroll R. Wetzel
Clive S. Cummis
William F. Hyland

Law Alumni Council
Harold Cramer and Patricia Ann Metzer, Cochairmen, with the following presidents of regional clubs or their delegates:

LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
A. Washington, D.C. .......... Michael Waris
B. New Jersey ............... Daniel deBrier
C. New York City ............. Silas Spengler
D. New England .............. Patricia Ann Metzer
E. California ................. Marshall A. Rutter
F. Delaware ................. Herbert S. Larson
G. Western Pennsylvania ...... (in process of formation)

Ad Hoc Committee for Women's Activities in the Society
    Sharon Kaplan Wallis
    Marlene F. Lachman
    Hon. Doris M. Harris
    Carol O. Seabrook

Ad Hoc Committee to Promote Attendance at Student Receptions
    Marshall A. Bernstein, Chairman
    Hon. Doris M. Harris
    Carol O. Seabrook
    Barton E. Furst

Leonard Ettinger for the Directory Committee reports that the Committee is moving into gear for the production of the 1975 Directory and is planning a mailing of a questionnaire to our alumni body to obtain a bring-down of information particularly among our more recent graduating classes. The 1970 issue of the Directory will provide a format for the future. Leonard anticipates that the 1975 edition will be as enthusiastically welcomed by alumni as the 1970 issue.

Tom O'Neill reporting for James Crawford noted that Dr. Anna Freud will be unable to give the 1974 Roberts Lecture. Dean Wolfman and Coif President, Norma Shapiro, are following leads for a suitable replacement in the high tradition of the Roberts Lecture now sponsored jointly by the Order of the Coif and the Law Alumni Society.

For those who have wondered what has happened to the Friends of the Biddle Law Library, I should explain that the Temple University Law Library fire resulted in a serious loss to that University which would have made a money-raising effort by the Friends of the Biddle Law Library most untimely. The activities of the Friends of the Biddle Law Library have therefore been confined to Librarian Richard Sloane's seminars on law library administration (given last year in Philadelphia) and the Law School's assistance to Temple in helping to get that University's library returned to utility. Happily, the situation now permits the Friends of the Biddle Law Library to get underway with respect to which more news will shortly be forthcoming.

The work of the Distinguished Service Committee often goes unnoticed. This Committee has made only a few awards since its inception a few years ago. The awards to date illustrate the high level of professional attainment of recipients. To the distinguished roster of Tony Amsterdam, Jefferson Fordham and Ernest Scott, the Committee added Bernard G. Segal as the recipient in 1973.

Until this time we have not been able to create a nation-wide organization of alumni that is contemplated by our By-law provisions calling for the creation of a Law Alumni Council. This organization is intended to be made up of the presidents of the regional clubs. Harold Cramer, over the last two years, has labored faithfully in sowing seeds that promise to germinate into an organization having a national view. For purposes of assisting Harold this year the Board of Managers has asked Patricia Ann Metzer to assist Harold as co-chairperson hoping that her enthusiasm for alumni affairs as shown in her organization of the New England club will result in pulling it all together this year.

Perhaps the most interesting organization in the Society is the Ad Hoc Committee for Women's Activities. The importance of this activity is attested by the fact that in this year's entering class girl students constitute 49 out of approximately 200. Sharon Wallis has been collecting information on our alumae and will have a profile ready for printing in this issue of the Journal or possibly the next.

Marshall Bernstein is Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to Promote Attendance at Student Receptions. These receptions will be held this year on the following dates:

Thursday, December 6, 1973 — Third Year Students
Wednesday, January 16, 1974 — Second Year Students
Thursday, February 28, 1974 — First Year Students

These receptions deserve more alumni support. I trust that each alumnus who is available on any of the dates will make an effort to attend. The receptions start about 4:30 in the afternoon and proceed until approximately 7:00 P.M. These are perfect opportunities to meet faculty and students and get the feel for what the Law School is all about. No reservations are needed. Just Come! Marshall Bernstein is particularly anxious to have you on hand. In this respect he is being aided by Judge Doris Harris.

By the time this issue of the Journal is distributed, the outstanding work of Carroll Wetzel, Chairman of the Capital Fund Drive will be known to all alumni. Carroll appeared as a guest at our recent meeting of the Board of Managers and explained the goals and accomplishments of the Fund to date. It was with the greatest enthusiasm that the Board of Managers voted Carroll and Dean Wolfman their fullest support in connection with the coming Drive.

**Toast**

(Continued from page 8)

On behalf of my colleagues who are here and those who unavoidably could not attend, and for the School...
of Law of Temple University, I welcome you to Temple and to this new and as yet unfinished and unadorned building for which we have waited a long, long time. Just as you at Penn had a Committee on Art chaired by Noyes Leech, so too do we at Temple have an Art Committee to recommend what art this building should display and where it should hang. I understand that Noyes Leech and his committee had only $5,000 with which to work; we may have as much as $75,000, but we will be satisfied if our Committee does as nicely as yours. We would then have a warm and pleasant interior. But committees being what they are, our walls remain bare for at least four more years!

* * * * *

This reception is an historic occasion of sorts: it represents the first formal get-together between our faculties. It is certainly appropriate and overdue. We do share a common purpose as law professors. Ours is a common calling. We seek to develop an understanding and use of law, and its institutions in a society that respects individual dignity and furthers the good life. Simultaneously, we strive to equip our students with the skills, insights, and high principles with which they, as the legal profession, can unloose the bonds of parochialism that thwart universal human development.

* * * * *

This common calling, this common purpose has been articulated and admirably performed for some 180 years at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.

Penn is at once one of the oldest and one of the finest law schools in the world. Yours is a tradition of excellence. You have produced enlightened leaders and toilers in the law on the local, state, national and international levels. Even today, more than 100 graduates of your law school are law professors, five of whom are among our number here at Temple. On the personal side, I have been a student at Harvard, Yale and Penn and can assure all that Penn, while smaller, was every bit as challenging and excellent for me as the other two. And Penn has maintained its national reputation and excellence even if it is only #2 in Philadelphia now!

* * * * *

So too, has Temple been honest to our common calling, our common purpose. Temple is still a relatively young school, with growing pains, potential and exuberance of youth. We are proud of where we are and where we are going.

Our Day Division for full-time legal study is only forty years old; it now constitutes 70% of our student body. Our first full time faculty member was not George Sharswood in 1850 but Elden S. Magaw in 1933, and Elden has just retired. Ours has been the burden and challenge of making a legal education available to working men and women, to the immigrants and their children, to the Jews, Italians, Blacks, Irish, who for some reason did not choose or were not admitted to, or could not afford Penn. And these graduates of Temple Law School have served the profession proudly in the front lines of the struggle for freedom, equality and progress across the nation.

During the 1940's and 1950's, a small band of full-time professors at Temple carried the major burden of operating two divisions: Elden Magaw and Ben Boyer who are now emeritus, Larry Park who retires this year after 45 years of service at the Law School, Warren Ballard, Herman Stern, Sam Polsky and our incomparable law librarian, Erwin Surrency: these men are primarily responsible for progress at Temple and for bringing us to where we are today. In a sense, they have passed a tradition and the torch to a new generation of gifted, younger faculty members several of whom are happily with us today.

We at Temple believe we are now at the take-off point. We have an outstanding student body: bright, diverse, tough. Ours is a faculty whose full-time contingent is now 33 and still rising: it is as rich in background and diversified in approaches as any; our faculty is resourceful and a major reason for our optimism about the future. And now we have a new plant in which we can work together as a community of scholars.

We like to say that at Temple we are in an era during which we are making a transition from being a good law school to an urban law center where excellence and human responsiveness are the hallmarks of all programs.

* * * * *

Thus, Penn's Law School and Temple's Law School have developed institutional personalities and individualized means for achieving our common purpose, our common calling. Diversity and pluralism among schools is no less appealing than among persons. Penn should continually develop and retain its own personality, Temple its.

* * * * *

But we can and should cooperate and communicate more so in the future than we have in the past in pursuit of our common calling, and common purpose. Although our physical plants have never been more than five statutory miles apart, this is the first known formal occasion of our convening, albeit at a social reception. Even President Nixon's trip to China seemed easier and sooner in coming! We are especially gratified to those of you who honor us with your presence today. There is little doubt that we have been worlds apart in communication and in sharing with each other the joys and sorrows, hopes and frustrations, skills and coincidences—experiences common to all of us in legal education. There is also no doubt that we should not continue in the future in such an isolated manner. We both have belatedly come to realize that Penn and Temple have, in Russell Conwell's immortal thought, acres of diamonds in our own backyards. The beneficiaries of our future cooperation
will be our respective institutions, the legal profession and the general public.

There have been two major areas where Penn has recently helped Temple which I would like to acknowledge publicly.

1. Bernie has, from the outset of my appointment as Dean, been extremely helpful both substantively and spiritually to me, for which I am very grateful.

2. And again through Bernie’s initiative and eventually through the cooperation of your faculty, the library staff and your students: for nearly a full academic year you made a law library available to our students and faculty after those dreadful hours in the early afternoon of July 25, 1972 when fire ravaged and wrought the destruction of more than one-half of our collection in what was apparently the largest single book loss in recorded history.

We thank you.

* * * * *

We are, therefore, honored and delighted by your presence at the Temple Law School today. In implementing our common calling, Penn has long been a leader: you are today responsible for continuing that magnificent tradition. By honoring you today, we honor the University of Pennsylvania Law School. We salute you.

I propose this toast to the past glories and present well-being of Penn, to a future as glorious and useful as the past, and to a period of goodwill and constructive cooperation between our faculties.

* * * * *

Letters

To THE EDITOR:

The Summer 1973 issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Alumni Journal displays a bad case of editorial schizophrenia on the issue of capital punishment.

If the purpose of the Journal, as stated on its masthead page, is “the information and enjoyment of” members of the Law Alumni Society, the text of the pro and con capital punishment articles in this issue was appropriate to the purpose of informing. But the Auth cartoon, featured on the cover, so overrode and destroyed the purported even-handedness of the text and featured words on the cover as to give the predominant impression that the Journal was in fact emotionally crusading against capital punishment. I do not consider such crusading as being the business of either the Law School or of its Alumni Society when there is respectable and substantial difference of opinion concerning capital punishment both among the general public and the Law School’s alumni.

The Auth cartoon may doubtless contribute to the enjoyment of the activists who are zealots against capital punishment; but the question which a more mature editor might ask himself, and which a Law School trying to foster the affection and financial support of as many alumni as possible should consider, is whether a substantial number of alumni would “enjoy,” or would be annoyed by, the Law School’s apparent endorsement of the philosophy of this cartoon. Also, when I believe the entire University of Pennsylvania receives substantial funding from the Legislature, you might ask whether the cartoon’s picturization of the Pennsylvania Legislature as a sadistic ruffian is in very good taste.

A cartoon, humorously or bitingly appropriate to the viewpoints expressed in each of the articles in the Journal supporting and attacking capital punishment, printed side by side on the cover, or inside accompanying each article, could be appropriate and “enjoyable” as more or less even-handed satire or pungent persuasion; but this one-sided single cartoon, given the most prominent place in the whole publication, and undoubtedly seen by those who may have had neither the time nor the inclination to read the inside pages, casts the Law School in the role of a propagandist, which is not its proper function. It is quite possible that the Law School does not attempt to control the content of its Alumni Journal; but it doubtless subsidizes the Journal’s publication, and cannot escape the appearance of responsibility. And it is appearances and impressions which create and retain, or which destroy, alumni loyalty and financial support.

William B. Arnold, ’29

Editor’s Note: The use of the Auth cartoon was not in any was intended to suggest an institutional position on capital punishment. Any inference by readers to the contrary was — perhaps — understandable, but also mistaken.

To THE EDITOR:

Arlen Specter has written in the summer 1973 issue of the Journal an article on the innovation of A. R. D. (accelerated rehabilitative disposition) under the recent Pennsylvania legislation.

The Program has evidently been in operation in Philadelphia during most of 1971, 1972 and 1973. Thus a trial period of nearly three years should give some indication of the reality of the accomplishments hoped for by this significant change in the criminal procedure.

The scheme has been put to use in various counties, including my own here (Franklin County), where I have made some inquiry about its success. I regret that in the elaborate writeups we have seen about this method for short-cutting the courtroom process saving time of the courts, the staff and the offender, there has appeared little if anything in the nature of an assessment of the ultimate effectiveness of the Program in reforming lives.

We all know that the Probation Departments have
been understaffed, overloaded with work, that the amount of time spent with each man each month is nominal and that the prospects of changing human nature are not so great at best and unless we have people of extraordinary personality and skill occupying the posts in the Probation Offices, probation is nothing but a costly deception for the taxpayers in reducing crimes. Probation staffs have been hampered enormously by a whole series of difficulties in doing effective work with prisoners at the criminal courts and I wonder what promise there is that they can do any better work now with the new mass of probationers (without adjudication) handed to them through the A.R.D. procedure.

Before any kind of intelligent assessment can be made of the new scheme for speeding up disposition by District Attorneys, Judges and court staffs, isn’t it essential to have an evaluation of the ultimate result in changing the lives of offenders who have come under guidance of Probation staffs in connection with the new system?

Chauncey M. Depuy, ’35

News Notes

Bayless Manning, former Dean of Stanford Law School and currently President of the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. was the guest speaker at the first-year luncheon held on September 17th.

Four graduates of the Law School have offspring in the class of 1976, they are: Milton Berger, ’29; (Richard M. Bernstein); Robert F. Maguire, ’51; (Margaret Mary Maguire); Lawrence M. Perskie, ’48; (Philip Jay Perskie); and Thomas E. Wilcox, ’48; (Mark M. Wilcox).

Jan B. Vlcek, ’68, is represented among the first-year students by his brother Anton Benes Vlcek.

Two alumni affairs were held in California recently — a cocktail and dinner party for the Penn Law Alumni Club in Los Angeles to meet the 1973 area graduates and summer law clerks and a Law Alumni Meeting in connection with the California Bar Meetings.

The cocktail and dinner party, held at the colorful Casey’s Bar in L.A. on July 11th, was a first for the Alumni Club of Los Angeles. Over twenty-five alumni were in attendance to meet three 1973 graduates and six summer law clerks. Among the participants were G. William Shea, ’36, the newly elected president of the Los Angeles County Bar Association; Morris Pfaelzer II, ’38; Joel Bennet, ’47; and James Lyons, ’47. The party was coordinated by the California Alumni President Marshall Rutter, ’59 and a summer law clerk, Sandor X. Mayuga, ’74.

In his address to the gathering Rutter noted that more L.A. firms than ever are interviewing at Penn which is due to the excellent performance of recent graduates throughout the South California area. The party was viewed as a success and it may well become an annual affair.

The Law Alumni Society Meeting at the California Bar Convention was held on September 12 at the Disneyland Hotel. Professor Covey Oliver flew out from Houston to address the alumni when Dean Wolfman was unable to attend the gathering because of last minute problems in Philadelphia.

Oliver reported interestingly and amusingly on the status and stature of the faculty, student body and alumni.

Alumni from all over southern California had an opportunity to exchange opinions for more than an hour prior to lunch. Among those in attendance were: Bill Shea, ’36; Mel Feldman, ’60; Marshall Rutter, ’59; Mary Snyder, ’66; Oliver Green, ’51; Richard Gross, ’67; Alan Markison, ’53; Jack Mandel, ’61, and Bill Goichman.

Rutter announced that the next meeting of the organization will be held at the State Bar Convention at Sacramento in September, 1974.

The Law Alumni Society and the Law School are having a breakfast meeting at 8 A.M., on Thursday morning, January 24, 1974, in conjunction with the Pennsylvania Bar Association annual meeting at the Host Inn in Harrisburg. Vice Dean Frank N. Jones will be the principal speaker.

Reservations for the breakfast may be made through the PBA registration director or through the Law Alumni Office.

A student/alumni/faculty party in honor of the first year students will be held at 4:30 p.m. on Thursday, December 6, 1973. All alumni and their spouses are invited and urged to attend.

The Law ’48 annual reunion dinner will be held at the Law School on Friday, December 7, 1973.

Assistant to the Dean, Rae Di Blasi has announced that Alumni interested in teaching should begin to make inquiries about positions in September or October before the school year in which the applicant is available. A teacher register is maintained by the Association of American Law Schools and interested alumni are strongly urged to register.
Marshall A. Bernstein has been appointed Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to promote attendance at student receptions by the Board of Managers at their October 24th meeting.

Assistant to the Dean Rae DiBlasi found the following letter in former Dean Jefferson Fordham's files. It was written by Congressman Joseph Reed Ingersoll to Benjamin Markley Boyer (later Judge Boyer) who was a student in Ingersoll's law office in Philadelphia 130 years ago.

DEAR SIR:

In pursuing your studies you will find a frequent recurrence to Blackstone of the greatest importance. His arrangement, style and selection of topics are all excellent. If the work had been written at the present day and in our own state it would have been a sufficiently broad basis of elementary instruction to support the system of general study, into which the ambitious and industrious student must be interested. Thomas's notes to Coke upon Littleton (together with the text and Hargrave and Butters valuable annotations) supply many unavoidable deficiencies, and Kent's Commentaries serve to bring the fundamental principles of British jurisprudence to bear upon our own, and to expand the view beyond what is merely elementary. Other works of a primary character may be read with advantage—such as Woodson's lectures. Sheppards Touch Stone—Various parts of Anise's Digest, Tucker's notes to Blackstone Judge Reed's additions to Blackstones text—Reeves' Domestic relations &c.

After this and during the whole of the remaining course of study careful attention should be given to the Acts of Assembly as found in Purdon's Digest which are public acts. Treatises on particular branches of the law would at this stage be appropriate—Preston's treatises (on Estates and abstracts of title) Judge Story on agency &c.—Comyn on Contracts, Fearne on Remainders—Their one or two books of practice—Chitty's first volume on Pleading—Phillips on Evidence—Tidd, &c. If there is time, it would be useful to embrace Treatises on Insurance (Phillips') on Shipping (Abbott by Story) on Corporations (Angell) on Landlord & Tenant (Woodfall) on attachments (Sergeant). During the period of probationary study, recreation will be found in occasional perusal of Grotius, Vattell, Story's Conflict of Law, Wheaton on Captures &c.

Reports are not the most useful kind of reading. They do not often sufficiently develop principles, and are confined of course to the material of the single case. But when a good course of study has been accomplished they may be recurred to as illustrations and confirmations of the principles which have been already rendered familiar as such. Full and constant noting is indispensable to the acquisition of legal knowledge; and every thing like definition must be committed to memory with the same devotion and patient care that a school boy applies to his axioms in Mathematics or his rules in Latin grammar.

With much regards
Very truly yours,
J. R. Ingersoll

The Morris Wolf Law Review Fund. The firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen honored its founder, Morris Wolf, L'03, on the occasion of his 90th birthday by creating an endowment in the university to be known as The Morris Wolf Law Review Fund. Income from this substantial Fund will be used exclusively to provide financial support for the operations of the Law Review. At a dedication ceremony held on November 8, 1973, in which Dean Bernard Wolfman, L'48, President Martin Meyerson, Louis J. Goffman, L'35, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Benjamin R. Jones, L'30, and Jonathan Z. Cannon, L'74, Editor-in-Chief of the Law Review, participated, a handsome plaque was presented to the Law Review. A reception followed the ceremony.

The Ernest Scott Law Student Loan Fund. This Fund was established in 1972 by the firm of Pepper, Hamilton and Scheetz in honor of the 69th birthday of Ernest Scott, L'29. Upon Mr. Scott's death in September, 1973, the Pepper firm and others have committed a substantial sum to the Fund in memory of Mr. Scott.

The final argument of the Keedy Cup Moot Court Competition will be held on April 8, 1973. The extraordinary Bench consists of Honorable Byron R. White, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Honorable Henry S. Friendly, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and the Honorable John Minor Wisdom, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Faculty and Staff Notes

Professor RALPH S. SPRITZER has announced that the Law School's Indigent Prisoners' Litigation Project has received a grant from the Pennsylvania Governor's Justice Commission to continue operations for the current year.

The project, under Spritzer's direction, will supervise participating students in the counseling and representation of some forty prisoners who have filed complaints under the Civil Rights statutes.

Other faculty members involved with the project include Professors Field, Goldstein, Goodman, Reitz and Spiegel.
Professors NOYES LEECH and COVEY OLIVER have published a new book, "The International Legal System." The two Penn Faculty members were joined by Tulane University's Pat Sweeney in research and publication of the work.

ALEX CAPRON has spent a busy Fall. He has been appointed to the Ad Hoc Panel on Clinical Evaluation of a Left-Ventricular Assist Device, to advise the Director of the National Heart and Lung Institute of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, on federal support for implanted "artificial heart" device.

He spoke at the University of Wisconsin Symposium on "Genetic Manipulation of Man" on November 8th. Capron also delivered a paper at the Brookings Institution conference on "Social Experimentation" during September in Washington, D.C.

ARNOLD J. MILLER was a panelist on law school admissions at a meeting of 100 pre-law advisers at Williams College, Williamstown, Mass., on August 28. Miller was also the luncheon speaker before the Justice Lodge of B'Nai B'rith of Philadelphia. Joining Miller in the latter appearance were Dean O'Brien of Villanova Law School and Dean Liacouras of Temple Law School.

Professor JAMES O. FREEDMAN has been elected to membership in the American Law Institute. He is the author of "The Administrative Process and the Elderly," in the Summer, 1973 edition of the Temple Law Quarterly.
Freedman's election to the ALI brings the total number of faculty members elected to 10. Other new members include Professors Ralph Spritzer, Stephen Goldstein, and Jan Krasnowiecki.

Professor STEPHEN GOLDSTEIN is currently actively serving as a reporter for Education Law on the American Bar Association, Institute of Judicial Administration, Juvenile Justice Standards Project.

Professor GEORGE L. HASKINS received a special invitation to represent the American Society of Legal History at the Inauguration ceremonies for Dr. Gerson D. Cohen as the new head of the Jewish Theological Seminary in New York City. The ceremonies were held on October 23.

CLARENCE MORRIS, Emeritus Professor of Law has announced that his publication “Law in Imperial China” originally published in hardback by the Harvard University Press in 1967, is now available in paperback from the University of Pennsylvania Press. The original publication received favorable reviews all over the western world.

Most interesting, in Professor Morris' opinion, is Part III of the book which includes a comparison of statutory interpretations in the West with those in China.

Professor ROBERT H. MUNDHEIM addressed the members of the Institute of Quantitative Analysis in New Orleans recently. He discussed the proposed Securities Act of 1973, a bill which would put self-regulations on the Securities Industry.

During November, Professor Mundheim co-chaired the Fifth Annual Institute of Securities Regulation. This program, which reviews major developments in the securities field is attended by more than 1,000 lawyers from all over the country.

Professor COVEY T. OLIVER notes in a letter from Cuernavaca, Mexico, that he will be participant, by invitation, in the week-long seminar on multinational enterprise sponsored by the University of Santiago de Compostela in Spain.

Alumni Notes

1924
ROBERT N. C. NIX, of Philadelphia, a member of the United States House of Representatives, has been named one of the five United States delegates to the United Nations.

1927
ALBERT B. MELNIK, of Haddonfield, New Jersey is a member of the New Jersey firm of Melnik, Muller, Morgan and Weinberg.

1928
JOHN H. REINERS, JR., of Camden, and the partners of the Philadelphia firm of Montgomery, McCracken, Walker and Rhoads, have formed an interstate partnership under the name of Reiners and Davis with offices located in Camden.

1933
GUSTAVE G. AMSTERDAM of Overbrook, Pa. received the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce’s William Penn Award which is presented annually to an individual who “has made a major contribution to the advancement and welfare of business in the Delaware Valley.”

1936
RONALD A. ANDERSON, of Philadelphia, professor of law and government at Drexel University recently published the ninth edition of Business Law, a text he co-authored with Walter A. Kumpf.

1943
RICHARD D. GRIFO, of Easton, Pa., Judge of the court of Common Pleas of Pennsylvania’s third judicial district, was defeated in his bid for a seat on the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on November 6th.

1950
HELEN M. THATCHER has been named assistant dean for academic administration at the John Marshall Law School.

1951
LAWRENCE EALY, of Trenton, N.J., was one of two recipients of Rider College’s annual Lindback Award for Distinguished Teaching. He is professor of history and a former vice president and dean at Rider.

1953
JOHN T. ACTON, of Ambler, Pa., was elected to the Government Study Commission of Montgomery County.
PAUL DUKE was elected to the Government Study Commission in Delaware County, Pa.
THOMAS N. O’NEILL, JR. of Gladwyne, Pa., has been nominated as candidate for vice-chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar Association. The vice-chancellor, under the Association’s By-Laws, automatically moves up to chancellor in three years.

1954
WILLIAM L. GLOSSER, of Johnston, has been appointed the United States Magistrate for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
JAMES F. SWARTZ, JR., of Madison, N.J., has been named Vice President of the New York Stock Ex-
change's newly created Regulation and Surveillance Group.

1955
BERNARD J. KORMAN, of Philadelphia, has been elected Chairman of the Board of American Medicorp, Inc., one of the nation’s leading hospital management companies.

1956
JAMES L. MULLER, of Haddonfield, N.J., is a member of the firm of Melnik, Muller, Morgan and Weinberg.
ALVIN G. SHPEEN, of Glassboro, N.J., has been appointed a judge of the Municipal Court of Deptford Township, New Jersey.

1960
RONALD ZIEGLER, of Philadelphia, has been elected to the National Legal Committee of the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S. at the annual national convention in Hollywood, Florida. Ziegler will represent the states of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware.

1961
STEWARD M. DUFF, of Swarthmore, Pa., was appointed associate general counsel in the law division of the Scott Paper Company.

1962
EDMOND M. KIRBY, of Livingston, N.J., is the Deputy Public Defender in charge of the Essex County Region of New Jersey. This is the largest public defender office in New Jersey with 36 attorneys.

1964
DENNIS M. FLANNERY, of Washington, D.C., has become a member of the firm of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering in Washington.

HOWARD SHAPIRO, of Albany, N.Y., has been appointed chairman of the New York State Commission of Investigation.
JAMES ROBERT PARISH, of New York City, N.Y., is the author of the newly published “Hollywood’s Great Love Teams” and co-author of “Film Director’s Guide.”

1965
ANITA RAE SHAPIRO, of Fullerton, California, has been promoted to senior counsel with the Second District Court of Appeals in Los Angeles. Her third child and second daughter, Lisa Michelle, was born in August.
WELSH S. WHITE, of Pittsburgh, Pa., is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. White specializes in criminal law. He is associated with Professor Tony Amsterdam’s efforts to abolish capital punishment.

1966
STEPHEN BRETT, of Denver, Colorado, has become a member of the firm of Lawson, Nagel, Sherman and Howard with offices in Denver.
JOHN M. DESIDERIO, of Whitestone, N.Y., has been appointed permanent head of the New York State Attorney General’s Anti-Monopolies Bureau.
STEPHEN L. GORDON, of New York City, has been named Assistant Commissioner for New York City Metropolitan Affairs of the Department of Environmental Conservation of New York State.
PETER LEWICKI, of Seattle, Washington, received a LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL
master’s degree in taxation from New York University and has joined the Seattle firm of Helsell, Paul, Fetterman, Tood and Hokanson.

STEPHANIE W. NAIDOFF, of Philadelphia, has been appointed Regional Counsel for Region III (Pa., Md., Del., Vir., W.V., and D.C.) for the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

1967

JOHN G. ABRAMO, of Wilmington, Delaware, has announced the formation of the Wilmington firm of Abramo, Hunt and Abramo.

JOHN C. FOX, of Seneca Falls, N.Y., has joined the legal staff of GTE Sylvania, Inc., as a patent attorney.

PAMELA ELLEN PROCUNIAR, of Cherry Hill, N.J., has been named an Associate Professor of Law at Rutgers University School of Law. She is teaching problems of modern property, land use and school law.

JASON A. SOKOLOV, of Ipswich, Mass., and his wife are the parents of a boy, their third child and second son.

1968

J. ANTHONY KOSOVE, of Wyncote, Pa., and his wife Joan are the parents of a daughter, Alexis Alexandra, their second child and first daughter.

HOWARD L. SHECター, of Philadelphia, has become a partner in the firm of Morgan, Lewis and Bockius. Shecter was also recently elected a member of the Board of Trustees of Community Legal Services, Inc.

RICHARD P. SILLS, of Arlington, Virginia, has been promoted to Assistant Branch Chief in the Legislation and Regulations Division, Office of the Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service, in Washington.

1970

RICHARD M. LEISNER, of Tampa, Florida, has become associated with the Tampa firm of Trenam, Simmons, Kemker, Scharf and Barkin.

JOHN MICHAEL WILLMANN, of Philadelphia, has been named to the Board of Directors of the Pennsylvania Law and Justice Institute. He has also been named to the Board of Safe Streets, Inc.

STEPHEN MATHES, of Philadelphia, has been appointed an Assistant District Attorney in Philadelphia.

1971

BARRY E. BRESSLER, of Philadelphia, has become associated with the Philadelphia firm of Meltzer and Schifflin. Bressler has completed a clerkship with Judge Theodore O. Spaulding of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

RICHARD H. HAMILTON, of Vancouver, B.C., Canada, has joined the Vancouver firm of Farris, Vaughan, Wills and Murray.

SHELDON E. JAFFE, of Delran, N.J., has been named head corporate counsel to March Realty Co., with its headquarters in Willingboro, N.J.

SANDRA SHERMAN, of Washington, D.C., has joined the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver, and Kampelman, with offices at The Watergate.

JOEL MESSING, of New York City, N.Y., has joined the New York office of Morgan, Lewis and Bockius.

LAURENCE SKIEKMAN, of Tallahassee, Florida, has been appointed Assistant Professor of Law at the Florida State University College of Law.

1972

DAVID PETKUN, of Philadelphia, is now associated with the Philadelphia firm of Schnader, Harrison, Segal and Lewis.

DAVID L. POLLACK, of Philadelphia, and ROSLYN H. GOOLD, L’73, were married on August 11, in Wilmington, Delaware. Ms. Pollack is currently associated with Cohen, Shapiro, Polisher, Shieckman and Cohen in Philadelphia. Mr. Pollack is associated with Charleston and Fenerty.

1973

STEPHEN J. POPIELARSKI, of Philadelphia, has been appointed an Assistant District Attorney by Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter.

MARTIN E. LYBECKER, of Arlington, Virginia, has joined the legal staff of the Office of the Chief Counsel, Division of Investment Management and Regulation, of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington.

Necrology

1899

1901

1910

1915

1917

1920

1921

1922

1927

1929

1932

1935

1936

1938

1940

1952

1955


HON. JASPER Y. BRINTON, Cairo, Egypt, August 8.


HARRY E. APELER, Philadelphia, September 5.


R. STURGIS INGERSOLL, Philadelphia, September 11.

WILLIAM D. HARKINS, Philadelphia, October 8.

THEODORE F. DEADY, Upper Darby, Pa., August 28.

JUDAH ZELITCH, Philadelphia, October 1.

EDWARD H. BRYANT, JR., Havertown, Pa., June 27.

LEON N. MANDEL, Exton, Pa.

ERNEST SCOTT, Berwyn, Pa., September 6.

HON. CHARLES W. KALP, Lewisburg, Pa., August 4.

HERMAN M. BUCK, Uniontown, Pa., July 9.

HON. DANIEL F. WOLOCott, New Castle, Del., July 10.

SYDNEY J. FIRES, Marlon, Pa., October 9.

JOSEPH H. MARTINO, Sacramento, Calif., August 27.


MICHAEL A. MAROLLA, Philadelphia, July 27.

JEROME H. HARWITZ, Maple Glen, Pa., October 8.
Alumni Society

President's Message

By Joseph P. Flanagan, Jr.

At a recent meeting of the Law Alumni Society Board of Managers, the Board approved the appointments of Committees and Representatives prescribed by the By-laws or authorized by the Board in respect of certain ad hoc committees. It is appropriate at this time that recognition be given to alumni who serve on our committees. The incumbents approved by the Board of Managers are:

Representative to General Alumni Board
David H. Marion replacing Marvin Comisky

Representative to Pennsylvania Gazette
John Michael Willmann

Representative to Association of Alumnae
Marlene F. Lachman

Directory Committee
Leonard L. Ettinger, Chairman
Arthur E. Newbold, IV
Hon. Doris M. Harris
Carol O. Seabrook

Delegates to Coif Laison Committee
James D. Crawford
Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr.
Bernard Wolfman, Ex Officio

(Continued on page 42)