

# Risk attitude, investments, and the taste for luxury

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## Abstract

Nudging people to make good investments is necessary because of low financial literacy. One type of advice concerns allocation to risky vs. safe investments. Financial advisors generally assume that people differ in their risk attitudes, and they sometimes try to assess these attitudes with questionnaires about risks. But attitudes toward risks are influenced by many factors that are irrelevant to ultimate outcomes. Arguably, what is important is the utility of money. Some people are satisfied with a no-frills retirement, while others hanker after travel, yachts, and large legacies. It is the latter group who would do well to take risks, as their utility for money is less concave, more linear. I report a questionnaire study in which questions about risk itself were uncorrelated with questions about the utility of money and the taste for luxuries, which were correlated in reasonable ways with each other.

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## 1 Introduction

People have trouble with investments for retirement (Benartzi & Thaler, 2007). Many have made bad decisions that led to the loss of their savings, such as putting their pension fund into the stock of their employer. Most people save too little. That is, the gain in expected utility in their later years from additional saving would exceed the loss in their earlier years. Young people are sometimes too risk-averse. For example, they invest too little in stocks relative to fixed-income investments. On the other hand, people are too risk-seeking to the extent to which they fail to diversify.

Paternalistic regulation may be warranted for some of these examples. Regulations should, and often do, discourage company stock for pension funds, encourage saving, and encourage diversification. Paternalistic measures may be warranted by thinking of a person in the future as a somewhat different person, whose well-being may be neglected by the current person who inhabits (roughly) the same body. The future person would be upset at the current person's failure to provide (Parfit, 1984). The state may intervene to protect the interests of that future person, just as it protects the interests of current people against the neglect of their contemporaries.

My concern here, though is with risk attitude, particularly the component that results from different tastes. In this case, it is difficult to adopt a general paternalistic prescription. Here, regulation may be best achieved through a "libertarian paternalist" approach (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), which gives people freedom while "nudging" them toward options that would benefit most people.

It is likely that the best investment options, with respect to risk differ considerably across individuals. For one thing, people face different profiles of income streams. A freelance writer (or freelance anything) typically faces considerable variability in income, and unpredictability over the long term. These should generally be compensated by less risky investment. But a tenured professor faces little variability or unpredictability and can thus afford to take more risks elsewhere, other things being equal. For another thing, people have different tastes for expenditures. Some people really value the "finer things" that money can buy, while others are convinced that the best things in life are free.

Theoretically, decisions about risk should conform to expected-utility theory. What matters are the probabilities of the outcomes and their utilities. For investing, the relevant utilities are those for money, or for the things that money can buy, when the investments are cashed in. Expected-utility theory implies that the utility function for money should determine decisions.

We have reason to think that people's choices about risk are influenced by many factors other than those that affect the utility of money for them. If decisions are distorted by these factors, people could choose options that are consistent with their immediate preferences yet not best for them in the long run, once the consequences happen.

Many investment companies and individual advisors try to assess the risk preferences of clients with questionnaires. All the examples of this that I have seen ask directly about risk attitude, in various ways. For example,

TIAA-CREF provides questions like the following in its web site:

Which of the following portfolios is most consistent with your investment philosophy?

- \* a. Portfolio A will most likely exceed long-term inflation by a significant margin and has a high degree of risk.
- \* b. Portfolio B will most likely exceed long-term inflation by a moderate margin and has a high to moderate degree of risk.
- \* c. Portfolio C will most likely exceed long-term inflation by a small margin and has a moderate degree of risk.
- \* d. Portfolio D will most likely match long-term inflation and has a low degree of risk.

Yet, what ultimately matters is the income level of investors at different ages, and the wealth they pass to their heirs. Economic theory implies that the relevant issue is the utility (subjective value) of income and wealth, and investment decisions should be based on expected utility. That is, the best decisions are those that maximize the expected utility of the money obtained. For example, if I have a choice between \$2,000,000 for sure and a 50% chance of getting either \$1,000,000 or \$4,000,000, I should take the gamble only if the difference between \$2,000,000 and \$4,000,000 matters more to me than the difference between \$1,000,000 and \$2,000,000. The former difference might be less, if all I care about is what I could get for \$2,000,000. I should not take the risk in that case.

Research in judgment and decision making has shown repeatedly that measures of risk attitude are influenced by many other factors aside from the utility of money (Baron, 2008 [OTHER REFERENCES NEEDED]). For example, decisions about risks are affected by: general beliefs about risk taking as a character trait, such as a desire to avoid being foolhardy, or timid; social pressures connected with these beliefs; superstition; anticipation of emotional reactions to losses, such as regret, guilt feelings (if others are affected), and disappointment, which go beyond the financial consequences in terms of lost purchasing power; lack of understand of comparative risks and benefits, or the risk/benefit trade-off; mis-perceptions of probability, such as neglect or exaggeration of very low probabilities; and isolation of individual decisions, so that they are not seen in the context of a total portfolio of income streams from various sources.

We might, then, expect to capture people's true values better with measures based on outcomes rather than hypothetical choices. In theory, outcome-based measures should be more consistent with the total utility of the individual over time.

## 2 Experiment

### 2.1 Method

Subjects were 77 members of a panel who did studies on the World Wide Web for pay. (Four others were omitted because they did the study too quickly to have read carefully.) Ages ranged from 20 to 76 (median 44); 36% were male.

The study began with 36 pages about expenditures after retirement (defined as no longer working or reaching age 65, whichever came last). The expenditures were:

owning one inexpensive car (vs. no car)

owning a second inexpensive car (vs. one inexpensive car)

owning two top-of-the line cars (vs. two inexpensive cars)

having access to a private airplane and pilot, on short notice

owning a boat that sleeps two

having an extra bedroom in your home, for visitors

having an extra two bedrooms in your home, for visitors, as opposed to one

having access to a vacation home (such as a time share) for 2 weeks each year

owning a vacation home or apartment

owning a television (as opposed to none)

owning a home theater

buying fresh fruit and vegetables daily (vs. occasionally)

having a high-speed (fiber optic or cable) Internet connection (as opposed to something that uses the phone)

spending \$1000/year on clothing (including accessories and jewelry, vs. minimal maintenance

spending more than \$5,000/year on clothing (including accessories and jewelry), vs. \$100

traveling as a tourist for 2 weeks each year (vs. not at all)

traveling as a tourist for 4 weeks each year (vs. 2 weeks)

flying to see relatives (including children) or friends once a year

flying to see relatives (including children) or friends 5 times per year (as opposed to once)

going out to dinner once a week to an inexpensive restaurant (as opposed to special occasions only)

going out to dinner twice a week to an inexpensive restaurant (as oppose to once)

going out to dinner twice a week to a top-of-the-line restaurant (as oppose to twice to an inexpensive restaurant)

going to musical or theatrical events once a week (as opposed to rarely)

going to sports events once a week (as opposed to rarely)

going to movies once a week (as opposed to rarely)

regularly buying wine that costs about \$10 for an ordinary bottle

regularly buying wine that costs over \$20 for an ordinary bottle

hiring someone to clean your home once per week

hiring someone to maintain a garden or lawn

hiring a chauffeur or cook

being able to hire a personal assistant or nurse if you need assistance for health reasons

being able to buy appropriate presents for friends and relatives on holidays, birthdays, etc.

donating \$1,000 to charity each year (as opposed to less than \$100)

donating \$10,000 to charity each year (as opposed to \$1,000)

leaving a legacy of \$1,000,000 on your death, as opposed to very little

leaving a legacy of \$10,000,000 on your death, as opposed to \$1,000,000

The order was reversed for half the subjects. Order had no effect (here, or for any other order manipulation). After each item, the subject answered the following:

How does this affect what is important to you about your life as a retiree or senior?

- \* I don't care about this at all.
- \* This would be nice, but it would have little effect.
- \* This would have a noticeable effect.
- \* This would have a large effect.
- \* This is absolutely essential.

The last 20 items consisted of 10 items about direct utility measurement and 10 about risk. Five of the utility items were of this form:

Which would have a greater effect on what is important to you about your life as a retiree or senior?

\* The difference between a household annual (pre-tax) income of \$40,000 and [\$50,000, \$60,000, \$70,000, \$80,000, \$90,000], or

\* The difference between [\$50,000, \$60,000, \$70,000, \$80,000, \$90,000] and \$120,000.

The figures in brackets were for the intermediate value, which increased from \$50,000 to \$90,000 over the five pages (or decreased, for half the subjects). Then the sequence was repeated, again with \$40,000 as the lowest income, but with all other differences from \$40,000 multiplied by 3, so that the steps were in increments of \$30,000 instead of \$10,000 and the top income was \$280,000 instead of \$120,000. (Order of the two sequences was reversed for half the subjects.)

The other ten pages (which came first for half the subjects) were of the form:

Supposed you had a choice of two investments for retirement. Each would provide your sole income during your entire retirement at the given rate (the same for all years). Which would you choose?

\* This one would pay [\$50,000, \$60,000, \$70,000, \$80,000, \$90,000] per year (in current dollars) throughout your retirement.

\* This one has a 50% chance of paying \$40,000 per year and a 50% chance of paying \$120,000.

The numbers used, and the orders, were the same as for the utility question. Because of this matching, I could directly compare the subject's risk attitude to the prediction of expected-utility theory.

## 2.2 Results and discussion

For a preliminary analysis, I calculated three measures for each subject. One, which I shall call luxury fever, was the slope of the linear regression of the subject's ratings (0-4) of the 36 expenditure items on the mean ratings of all the subjects. A high positive slope indicated that the subject rated items as essential when they received such high ratings from others, and as unnecessary when others gave them low ratings. A low slope indicated a tendency to rate the "essential" and "inessential" items similarly, hence to have more than average utility for the luxury items, which were, presumably, those that most subjects rated as less than essential. A low slope should predict a less concave (more linear) utility function for money.

The other two measures were simply the mean responses to the utility items and the gamble items, where 1 indicates that the subject accepted the gamble or thought that the difference between the intermediate and high amounts was larger than the difference between the low and intermediate amounts. These means would be 0.7 for those who were risk neutral and had linear utility functions (assuming that these subjects would be indifferent when the intermediate value was equidistant from the high and low values, so that they would respond randomly).

The means were 0.22 for the gambles and 0.42 for the utility measures. Subjects were generally risk averse and had concave utility functions. (For the gambles, 6% were greater than 0.8, the highest possible value for risk neutrality, and 16% were greater than 0.8 for the utility measures, indicating convex utility functions.) The difference between gambles and utility measures was highly significant, which indicates that risk aversion cannot be explained entirely in terms of the utility function. Indeed, the two means were uncorrelated across subjects ( $r = .11, p = .34$ ).

Of greatest interest were the correlations of these two measures with the luxury fever measure. As hypothesized, the correlation between slope, the luxury fever measure, and the utility measure was negative and significant ( $r = -.41, p = .0002$ ). However, the correlation between luxury fever and the risk measure was essentially zero ( $r = .05$ , slightly in the wrong direction). It is unlikely that this result is due to the unreliability of the risk measure itself, as the ten items had a reliability ( $\alpha$ ) of .88.

Some other results were of interest. The variance of the risk measure was lower than that of the utility measure (0.06 vs. 0.12,  $p = .0060$ ). It might have turned out the other way, which would have implied that paternalistic policies were more justified, on the ground that preferences for ultimate outcomes were similar across people. The obtained result implies the opposite, that people differ more in their utility functions than what we would assume from their risk preferences.

Risk aversion as determined from the gambles, and concavity as determined from the utility measure, were both higher for the larger amounts of money (\$280,000 maximum as opposed to \$120,000). The means were .33 (low) vs. .52 (high) for utility measures, and .14 (low) vs. .30 (high) for gambles, on the same 0–1 scale as described earlier. This result is difficult to interpret without more information about the shape of the utility function. For example, we so not know whether subjects thought of \$40,000 or \$0 as the reference point.

### 3 Conclusion

The results suggest two conclusions. First, asking people directly about their risk preferences may fail to maximize their expected utility. In particular, some people may have substantial utility for luxuries, so that they ought to be willing to take risks in hopes of being able to afford those luxuries. Other people have no use for luxuries and have no conflict with the single goal of trying to insure a no-frills retirement. These two extreme types do not seem to be differentiated by their risk attitude. But if we ask them about their utility for money using a method of comparing differences, the results do reflect their different tastes.

Second, and relatedly, people differ more in their tastes for luxuries, and consequently also in what should be their willingness to take risks for a higher income, than they differ in risk preferences themselves. Thus, a one-size-fits-all approach to retirement planning is unlikely to maximize expected utility.

It is not clear what the implications are for regulation. If regulations discouraged the use of risk-preferences

and encouraged the use of utility differences and direct questions about expenditures, then people would receive recommendations that go against their initial inclinations. The risk-averse luxury lover would be advised to invest in aggressive growth funds, raising fears. In a sense, this advice would create a conflict between her (probable) future self and her present self. Clearly, any regulation must be at most a nudge. People probably cannot be forced to be altruistic toward future people, at the expense of their current peace of mind.

That said, it might be easier to deal with the opposite conflict, in which a risk lover with no interest in luxuries must be told, “Why take risks? What are you going to do if you make a lot of money? Do you care that much?”

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