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P E N N S Y L V A N I A L A W S C
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L E C T R O N I C C O M M E R C
E : V E R S I O N 2.0
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Congratulations to the Fall 2001 class for an excellent semester.
eCommerce will return next year.
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eContracts II: UCITA, etc. on
Formation
[ Class Exercise
1 ]
R E A D I N G S
In the prior section, we took a look
at how the current law is adapting to meet the challenge of eContracts.
In this section, we'll discuss how
legislative action is reshaping the legal infrastructure for electronic
commerce. Our inquiry will focus on two particular projects initiated
by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
The first is the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"), which was formerly known
as (proposed) Article 2B of the UCC.
The second is the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act ("UETA").
Each of these documents has different
goals, and different scope. Of the two, UCITA has garnered the most
attention, and is probably the most significant, for reasons that
we shall see below.
The Prefatory Note to UCITA is as
follows:
Uniform Computer transactions
act (UCITA)
"A commercial contract code for
the computer information transactions"
Once land ownership and agrarian
production were primary sources of wealth and income in our economy,
and contracts for the exchange of horses and grain dominated the
commercial landscape. Following the industrial revolution, manufactured
goods assumed center stage. In the 1930s Llewellyn recognized that
this change required revisions to the law of sales, so that its
rules were relevant to the new economy. The result was UCC Article
2. Despite initially strong resistance, Article 2 won universal
acceptance, for it reflected the reality of economic change and
its implications for contract law.
Our economy has experienced
another fundamental change, with information products and services
now driving increased productivity and growth. Accompanying this
change is a widely diverse and rich array of methods for distributing
and tailoring digital information to the modern marketplace. Contracts
underlie both the creation and distribution of such information.
However, legal rules that are not relevant to commercial practice
or that are uncertain in application inhibit contracting or raise
transaction costs. UCITA was drafted in response to this fundamental
economic change and need for clarity in the law.
Article 2 served as both
a model and a point of departure for UCITA. Like Article 2, UCITA
covers a variety of transactions, many of which take place solely
between merchants. Article 2 governs sales of jet planes as well
as toasters, not to mention the large-scale acquisition of jet and
toaster parts. UCITA governs access by Fortune 500 businesses to
sophisticated databases as well as distribution of software to the
general public; it also covers custom software development and the
acquisition of various rights in multimedia products.
Both UCITA and Article 2
are based upon the principle of freedom of contract: with limited
exceptions, the terms and effect of a contract can be varied by
agreement. Most provisions of both statutes are default rules, applicable
only if the parties do not specify some other rule. Although one
could try to fashion a contract code that regulates comprehensively
rather than permitting such flexibility, it is hard to imagine such
an approach being compatible with a vibrant market economy. Even
if one succeeded in making the regulations stick, the effect would
be to hinder rather than facilitate commerce. On the other hand,
as noted, without certain default rules, contracting and thus legal
rights remain unclear.
To be sure, not every contract
should be enforced. UCITA follows Article 2 in providing a standard
of unconscionability for courts to employ in policing contract terms.
UCITA goes beyond Article 2 in authorizing courts to strike down
over-reaching language that conflicts with fundamental public policy.
UCITA provides that common law doctrines such as fraud and duress
remain effective. UCITA does not alter competition or antitrust
law. It does not change trade secret law, intellectual property
law, or substantive consumer law. It deals only with contracts.
As Llewellyn recognized in
drafting Article 2, contract law must be tailored to the type of
transactions that it covers. Just as a body of law based on images
of the sale of horses was not relevant a half century ago to sales
of manufactured goods, so today a body of law based on images of
the sale of manufactured goods ill fits licenses and other transactions
in computer information. Rules based on an antiquated view of the
transactional world do not give coherent guidance to courts or to
transacting parties.
UCITA is the first uniform
contract law designed to deal specifically with the new information
economy. Transactions in computer information involve different
expectations, different industry practices, and different policies
from transactions in goods. For example, in a sale of goods, the
buyer owns what it buys and has exclusive rights in that subject
matter (e.g., the toaster that has been purchased). In contrast,
someone that acquires a copy of computer information may or may
not own that copy, but in any case rarely obtains all rights associated
with the information. See DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications,
Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999). What rights are acquired or
withheld depends on what the contract says. This point only is implicit
in Article 2 for goods such as books; UCITA makes it explicit for
the information economy where, unlike in the case of a book, the
contract (license) is the product.
Licensing is one way in which
computer information is tailored to the information marketplace.
Courts have enforced contract terms that, among other things:
- preclude commercial use
- permit commercial use
- preclude making copies
- permit making multiple copies
- grant access
- limit access
- allow use throughout a site
- limit use to a specific computer
- preclude distribution of copies for a fee
- allow distribution of copies
- preclude modification
- allow modification
- allow distribution only in specific way
- limit use to internal operations
Such contract terms have
helped to create the wondrous array of products and services that
characterizes our modern economy. Whether specific terms are appropriate
for a given transaction or set of parties is fundamentally a marketplace
issue.
As noted, in computer information
transactions, license terms often define the product. A software
product may be provided in the same form in two transactions, but
in one case the user is authorized to make 100,000 copies and in
the other merely to use a single copy at home. The value of the
transaction inheres not in the tangible medium (if, indeed, any
is used), but rather in the license grant terms. UCITA does not
require that computer information products and services be licensed;
it covers sales as well. But UCITA provides a coherent contract
law framework for analyzing a license, which has been the dominant
contractual framework for commerce in computer information.
Up to this point, a complex
mix of common law and Article 2 has governed computer information
transactions. The common law is frequently difficult to ascertain,
and it varies widely among states. In addition, differences in the
legal norms that have developed in different areas of information
practice are producing unpredictable results as those areas converge.
Article 2, while uniform, does not properly apply to many issues
involved in transactions in computer information, and when it applies,
it often does not provide appropriate guidance because of differences
in subject matter and transactional frameworks.
The need for a coherent,
uniform body of law has never been greater. Revolutions in telecommunications
and computer technology have made geography increasingly irrelevant
to modern commerce. The Internet enables small firms as well as
large ones to provide products and services throughout the country
and around the world. Even as online systems have altered how many
information transactions are performed, however, fundamental issues
associated with contracting online remain unanswered. A modern contract
law must give guidance on those issues. Failure to do so does not
foster but rather impedes commerce in computer information.
The liberating promise of
technology cannot be fully realized unless there is predictability
in the legal rules that govern such transactions. This is the need
that UCITA addresses. It clarifies and sets forth uniform legal
principles applicable to computer information transactions. UCITA
is a statute for our time.
The prefatory notes for UETA state
as follows:
DRAFT PREFATORY NOTES
With the advent of electronic
means of communication and information transfer, business models
and methods for doing business have evolved to take advantage of
the speed, efficiencies, and cost benefits of electronic technologies.
These developments have occurred in the face of existing legal barriers
to the legal efficacy of records and documents which exist solely
in electronic media. Whether the legal requirement that information
or an agreement or contract must be contained or set forth in a
pen and paper writing derives from a statute of frauds affecting
the enforceability of an agreement, or from a record retention statute
that calls for keeping the paper record of a transaction, such legal
requirements raise real barriers to the effective use of electronic
media.
One striking example of electronic
barriers involves so called check retention statutes in every state.
A study conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston identified
more than 2500 different state laws which require the retention
of canceled checks by the issuers of those checks. These requirements
not only impose burdens on the issuers, but also effectively restrain
the ability of banks handling the checks to automate the process.
Although check truncation is validated under the Uniform Commercial
Code, if the bank's customer must store the canceled paper check,
the bank will not be able to deal with the item through electronic
transmission of the information. By establishing the equivalence
of an electronic record of the information, the UETA removes these
barriers without affecting the underlying legal rules and requirements.
A. Scope of the Act and Procedural
Approach. The scope of this Act provides coverage which sets forth
a clear framework for covered transactions, and also avoids unwarranted
surprises for unsophisticated parties dealing in this relatively
new media. The clarity and certainty of the scope of the Act have
been obtained while still providing a solid legal framework that
allows for the continued development of innovative technology to
facilitate electronic transactions.
With regard to the general
scope of the Act, the Act's coverage is inherently limited by the
definition of "transaction." The Act does not apply to all writings
and signatures, but only to electronic records and signatures relating
to a transaction, defined as those interactions between people relating
to business, commercial and governmental affairs. In general, there
are few writing or signature requirements imposed by law on many
of the "standard" transactions that had been considered for exclusion.
A good example relates to trusts, where the general rule on creation
of a trust imposes no formal writing requirement. Further, the writing
requirements in other contexts derived from governmental filing
issues. For example, real estate transactions were considered potentially
troublesome because of the need to file a deed or other instrument
for protection against third parties. Since the efficacy of a real
estate purchase contract, or even a deed, between the parties is
not affected by any sort of filing, the question was raised why
these transactions should not be validated by this Act if done via
an electronic medium. No sound reason was found. Filing requirements
fall within Sections 17-19 on governmental records. An exclusion
of all real estate transactions would be particularly unwarranted
in the event that a state chose to convert to an electronic recording
system, as many have for Article 9 financing statement filings under
the Uniform Commercial Code.
The exclusion of specific
Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code reflects the recognition
that, particularly in the case of Articles 5, 8 and revised Article
9, electronic transactions were addressed in the specific contexts
of those revision processes. In the context of Articles 2 and 2A
the UETA provides the vehicle for assuring that such transactions
may be accomplished and effected via an electronic medium. At such
time as Articles 2 and 2A are revised the extent of coverage in
those Articles/Acts may make application of this Act as a gap-filling
law desirable. Similar considerations apply to the recently promulgated
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ("UCITA").
The need for certainty as
to the scope and applicability of this Act is critical, and makes
any sort of a broad, general exception based on notions of inconsistency
with existing writing and signature requirements unwise at best.
The uncertainty inherent in leaving the applicability of the Act
to judicial construction of this Act with other laws is unacceptable
if electronic transactions are to be facilitated.
Finally, recognition that
the paradigm for the Act involves two willing parties conducting
a transaction electronically, makes it was necessary to expressly
provide that some form of acquiescence or intent on the part of
a person to conduct transactions electronically is necessary before
the Act can be invoked. Accordingly, Section 5 specifically provides
that the Act only applies between parties that have agreed to conduct
transactions electronically. In this context, the construction of
the term agreement must be broad in order to assure that the Act
applies whenever the circumstances show the parties intention to
transact electronically, regardless of whether the intent rises
to the level of a formal agreement.
B. Procedural Approach. Another
fundamental premise of the Act is that it be minimalist and procedural.
The general efficacy of existing law, in an electronic context,
so long as biases and barriers to the medium are removed, confirms
this approach. The Act defers to existing substantive law. Specific
areas of deference to other law in this Act include: 1) the meaning
and effect of "sign" under existing law, 2) the method and manner
of displaying, transmitting and formatting information in section
8, 3) rules of attribution in section 9, and 4) the law of mistake
in section 10.
The Act's treatment of records
and signatures demonstrates best the minimalist approach that has
been adopted. Whether a record is attributed to a person is left
to law outside this Act. Whether an electronic signature has any
effect is left to the surrounding circumstances and other law. These
provisions are salutary directives to assure that records and signatures
will be treated in the same manner, under currently existing law,
as written records and manual signatures.
The deference of the Act
to other substantive law does not negate the necessity of setting
forth rules and standards for using electronic media. The Act expressly
validates electronic records, signatures and contracts. It provides
for the use of electronic records and information for retention
purposes, providing certainty in an area with great potential in
cost savings and efficiency. The Act makes clear that the actions
of machines ("electronic agents") programmed and used by people
will bind the user of the machine, regardless of whether human review
of a particular transaction has occurred. It specifies the standards
for sending and receipt of electronic records, and it allows for
innovation in financial services through the implementation of transferable
records. In these ways the Act permits electronic transactions to
be accomplished with certainty under existing substantive rules
of law.
UCITA and UETA on Contract Formation
Each of these model laws takes a
different approach to issues of eContract formation:
UCITA §§
101-104, 201-211 (relevant to contract formation) (pdf, 28 kb)
UETA
(relevant to contract formation) (pdf, 8 kb)
Additional UCITA Information:
(43) "Mass-market license" means
a standard form used in a mass-market transaction.
(44) "Mass-market transaction"
means a transaction that is:
(A) a consumer contract; or
(B) any other transaction with
an end-user licensee if:
(i) the transaction is for
information or informational rights directed to the general
public as a whole, including consumers, under substantially
the same terms for the same information;
(ii) the licensee acquires
the information or informational rights in a retail transaction
under terms and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction
in a retail market; and
(iii) the transaction is not:
(I) a contract for redistribution
or for public performance or public display of a copyrighted
work;
(II) a transaction in which
the information is customized or otherwise specially prepared
by the licensor for the licensee, other than minor customization
using a capability of the information intended for that purpose;
(III) a site license; or
(IV) an access contract.
SECTION 305. TERMS TO BE SPECIFIED.
An agreement that is otherwise sufficiently definite to be a contract
is not invalid because it leaves particulars of performance to be
specified by one of the parties. If particulars of performance are
to be specified by a party, the following rules apply:
(1) Specification must be made
in good faith and within limits set by commercial reasonableness.
(2) If a specification materially
affects the other party's performance but is not seasonably made,
the other party:
(A) is excused for any resulting
delay in its performance; and
(B) may perform, suspend performance,
or treat the failure to specify as a breach of contract.
Class Exercise
This class session is a little different from our
usual. For this class, we'll break into groups to work on a series
of exercises. For ease of administration, we'll use just six groups:
Group A: contains members
of Groups 1, 7
Group B: contains member of Groups 2, 8
Group C: contains members of Groups 3, 9
Group D: contains members of Groups 4, 10
Group E: contains members of Groups 5, 11
Group F: contains members
of Groups 6, 12
Each group will separately consider the following
two parts of the exercise, reporting their consensus at the end of
class:
Part I: UCITA Hypotheticals
The basic transaction:
Albert (A) operates a web site,
offering "downloadable electronic widgets" "DEWs" for sale.
Betty (B) is in the market for
some DEWs.
A and B want to agree to exchange
DEWs for money, using the Internet.
For each of the following cases,
consider whether there has been a contract formed under UCITA, and
whether all the terms of the contract are included:
[1] B uses an electronic agent to contact A,
establishing the price of $10,000 for 500 DEWs. B downloads the
DEWs from A's web site.
[2] A places the following statement on his web site, on the page
in which B fills in her credit card number: "This transaction will
be governed by the terms and conditions which will be downloaded
with the DEWs." B downloads the DEWs.
[3] A posts the terms and conditions of the agreement on his
web site. These terms include the following statement: "we reserve
the right to amend, modify, or vary this agreement at any time
during its duration with or without notice to you." B downloads
the DEWs.
[4] A's web site offers the DEWs at $5.00 each. B sends a message
to A, stating: "I accept your offer, and will pay $4.00 for each
DEWs," and then downloads the DEWs
[5] A's web site lists DEWs at $5.00 each. There is no apparent
opportunity to negotiate. Upon downloading, each DEW is associated
with a set of "terms and conditions," one term of which is that
"the license to use the DEW expires in 30 days."
Part II: The UCITA Debate
So far, only Virginia and Maryland have passed UCITA;
attempts to do so in other jurisdictions have met with great resistance.
In this part of the Class Exercise, each group will assume the role
of a state legislature, and consider the policy aspects of enacting
UCITA and/or UETA. The bottom-line question is whetheryour state should
pass UCITA.
In considering the policy aspects, consider the following
questions and resources:
1. How does the scope of UCITA and UETA differ?
What, precisely, is the scope of UCITA? Does the phrase "computer
information transactions" helpfully define which contracts fall
within UCITA and which fall without?
2. Does UCITA reach the same result as ProCD
and Hill? Why or why not?
3. UCITA Online
(pro-UCITA information clearinghouse) (includes a "State Legislators'
Guide") (browse)
4. AFFECT:
Americans For Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions (anti-UCITA
information clearinghouse) (browse)
5. Pamela
Samuelson, Forward: The Impact Of Article 2b Of The Uniform Commercial
Code On The Future Of Information And Commerce, 13 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 809 (1998) (pdf, edited) (reviewing various objections
to UCC Article 2B/UCITA)
6. Federal
Trade Commission, Letter Opposing UCITA on Public Policy Grounds
[ pageprints
]
C
O P Y R I G H T © 2001 R. P O L K W
A G N E R.