Current & Recent Research at Penn LawThe Penn Law faculty are engaged in a wide array of scholarship in traditional, cross-disciplinary and cutting-edge areas of inquiry. This newly created section of our website, which we will continue to populate in the months ahead, gives you access and the ability to search current and earlier work. FEATURED RESEARCHQuick Links: 15 Most Recent | 15 Most Viewed | RSS Feeds | Search SEARCHEnter search criteria in one or more of the following fields.
17 publications matched your search.
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343 (2002).
Climate Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV 1-75 (2008).
Desperately Seeking Numbers: Global Warming, Species Loss, and the Use and Abuse of Quantification in Climate Change Policy Analysis, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (2007).
Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation? Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31(1) J. LEGAL ST. 39 (2002) (with Joel Waldfogel).
Fashioning Entitlements: A Comparative Law and Economic Analysis of the Judicial Role in Environmental Centralization in the U.S. and Europe, in RESPONSIBILITY AND GOVERNANCE (Giorgio Brosio et al. eds., Edward Elgar 2007) (with Michael G. Faure).
Investment, Information, and Promissory Liability, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1923 (2004).
Law, Judicial Review and Formal Models of the Regulation Game: A Comment on de Figueiredo and de Figueiredo, 4 BUSINESS AND POLITICS 183 (August 2002).
On the Commons and the Common Law, in Roger Meiners and Andrew Moriss, eds., THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 211 (2000).
On the Market for Ecosystem Control, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1791 (2001-2002).
Paradoxes of the Safe Society: A Rational Actor Approach to the Reconceptualization of Risk and the Reformation of Risk Regulation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 747 (2003).
Should the Law Ignore Commercial Norms? A Comment on the Bernstein Conjecture and its Relevance for Contract Law Theory and Reform, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1791 (2001).
Signaling Social Responsibility: On the Law and Economics of Market Incentives for Corporate Environmental Performance, (U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 05-16, May 2005).
The Law and Economics of Environmental Contracts, in Kurt Deketelaere and Eric Orts, eds., ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 271 (2000).
The Promise, and Limits of Voluntary Approaches to Regulatory Reform: An Economic and Legal Analysis of EPA’s Metal Finishing Industry Strategic Goals Program, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR 167 (Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash eds., 2006).
The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857 (2006).
The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of American Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 487 (2003).
Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 353 (Charles Kolstad and Jody Freeman eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2006).
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