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Tel: 215.898.9334
Fax: 215.573.2025
Email: lkatz@law.upenn.edu
Expertise
- Criminal Law
- Jurisprudence
- Corporations
Bio
Leo Katz is one of the most creative thinkers about criminal law of his generation.
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Leo Katz is one of the most creative thinkers about criminal law of his generation. His explorations of the paradoxes of criminal law and deontological theory set the stage for a deeper understanding of a wide variety of philosophical and legal issues. For example, by investigating crimes of coercion and deception, economic crimes like tax evasion, and crimes without apparent victims, he tries to shed light more generally on problems of consent, the use and abuse of legal stratagems, and the nature of harm throughout the law. Katz is the author of Bad Acts and Guilty Minds: Conundrums of the Criminal Law (University of Chicago Press, 1987), Ill-Gotten Gains: Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud and Kindred Puzzles of the Law (University of Chicago Press, 1996), and co-editor with Stephen Morse and Michael Moore of Foundations of the Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 1999). He was recently awarded a Guggenheim fellowship for his on-going book project, Why the Law is so Perverse. Katz has also authored numerous articles for law journals, as well as for the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, National Law Journal, and The American Lawyer. Katz joined the Penn Law faculty, coming from the University of Michigan Law School.
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Representative Professional Positions
Penn Law - Frank Carano Professor of Law (2004 -); Professor of Law (1991-2004)
University of Michigan Law School - Assistant Professor (1987-91)
Visiting - Australian National University, RSSS; Berkeley (Guggenheim fellowship for work in criminal law theory; Goethe Universitat, Frankfurt); Wissenschaftskolleg, Berlin
Mayer, Brown and Platt - Associate (1984-87)
Law Clerk to the Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Representative Publications
Complicity and the Murderous Judge, in CRIMINAL LAW STORIES (R. Weissberg ed., forthcoming 2008).
Choice, Consent and Cycling:The Hidden Limitations of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 627 (2006).
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The Prerequisites of Responsibility: Comments on Antony Duff, 2 OHIO CRIM. L.J. 463 (2005).
Before and After: Temporal Anomalies in Legal Doctrine, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 863 (2003).
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What to Compensate? Some Surprisingly Unappreciated Reasons Why the Problem Is So Hard, 40 U. SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1345, symposium on Harms, Baselines and Counterfactuals (2003).
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Justification and Harm in Negligence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 397 (2003).
Duress, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (MacMillan Press 2002).
Villainy and Felony: A Problem Concerning Criminaliztion, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 451 (2003).
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Comments on Scott Shapiro, in 1 LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 217 (Enrique Villanueva ed., 2002).
Villainy and Felony, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 100, Symposium on "The New Culpability" (2002).
Preempting oneself: the right and the duty to forestall one's own wrongdoing, 5 LEGAL THEORY 339 (1999).
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FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, ed. with Stephen Morse and Michael Moore (New York: Oxford University Press 1999).
BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1987).
ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1996).
For additional publications, please consult
Current & Recent Research
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