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The “Means” Presumption Overcome in TriMed v. Stryker
The Federal Circuit added another claim construction reversal to its precedent with its opinion in TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 2007-1327 (January 29, 2008) (appeal from a summary judgment of noninfringement).
The opinion, authored by Judge Moore, takes a district judge to task for reading a claim that used the term “means” as a means-plus-function claim and therefore subject to interpretation under 35 U.S.C. §112 para. 6 (“such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof”).
Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 5,931,839, which pertains to an implantable device for treating bone fractures, includes the language:
said holes in said plate providing means for allowing the pin to slide axially therein but preventing compression across the fracture, and stabilizing said near end of the pin against displacement in the plane of the plate
Perhaps troubled in part by the fact that the district judge had adopted “without any modification” the accused infringers Rule 56 Statement of Facts and Conclusions of Law, the court determined that although the word “means” was present, and although the claim included functional language, the structure that corresponded to the function were the holes, without additional structural limitations. See Page 5 (“The claim language makes clear that the structure for performing these functions is the holes themselves.”).
Having concluded that the claims were not limited to the structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof, the federal circuit reversed the district court, setting the table for an apparent TriMed win.
Stryker’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement was premised solely upon reading the claim language at issue as a means-plus-function limitation. Having properly construed the relevant claim language as falling outside the ambit of § 112 ¶ 6, we hold that Stryker has failed to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact that its accused devices do not infringe on the ’839 patent. By Stryker’s own admission, the structural limitation of holes in claim 1 is certainly present in its accused devices.
See page 8. Note 3 proceeds:
With a side-by-side comparison of figure 5 of the ’839 patent and the x-ray of Stryker’s implanted plate, it is hard to imagine any significant structural differences between the two. Indeed, Stryker was unable to point out any differences on appeal, only contending during oral argument that figure 5 does not show whether the pin has been inserted through a hole or a hole with some other structure. As the proper construction of claim 1 encompasses embodiments using holes to receive pins—with or without some other structure—this argument is unconvincing.
Reversed and Remanded.
Posted by at January 31, 2008 1:51 PM in Claim Construction, News & Commentary | Permalink
