UNIFORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT
drafted by the
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
and by it
APPROVED AND RECOMMENDED FOR ENACTMENT
IN ALL THE STATES
at its
ANNUAL CONFERENCE
MEETING IN ITS ONE-HUNDRED-AND-FIFTEENTH YEAR
HILTON HEAD, SOUTH CAROLINA
July 7-14, 2006
WITH PREFATORY NOTE AND COMMENTS
Copyright ©2006
By
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
November 27, 2006
ABOUT NCCUSL
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), now in its 115th year, provides states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of state statutory law.
NCCUSL members must be lawyers, qualified to practice law. They are practicing lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative staff and law professors, who have been appointed by state governments as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands to research, draft and promote enactment of uniform state laws in areas of state law where uniformity is desirable and practical.
• NCCUSL strengthens the federal system by providing rules and procedures that are consistent from state to state but that also reflect the diverse experience of the states.
• NCCUSL statutes are representative of state experience, because the organization is made up of representatives from each state, appointed by state government.
• NCCUSL keeps state law up-to-date by addressing important and timely legal issues.
• NCCUSL’s efforts reduce the need for individuals and businesses to deal with different laws as they move and do business in different states.
• NCCUSL’s work facilitates economic development and provides a legal platform for foreign entities to deal with U.S. citizens and businesses.
• NCCUSL’s Commissioners donate thousands of hours of their time and legal and drafting expertise every year as a public service, and receive no salary or compensation for their work.
• NCCUSL’s deliberative and uniquely open drafting process draws on the expertise of commissioners, but also utilizes input from legal experts, and advisors and observers representing the views of other legal organizations or interests that will be subject to the proposed laws.
• NCCUSL is a state-supported organization that represents true value for the states, providing services that most states could not otherwise afford or duplicate.
DRAFTING COMMITTEE FOR THE UNIFORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT
The Committee appointed by and representing the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in preparing this Act consists of the following individuals:
JOHN P. BURTON, P.O. Box 1357, 315 Paseo de Peralta, Santa Fe, NM 87501, Chair
KENNETH W. ELLIOTT, City Place Building, 204 N. Robinson Ave., Suite 2200, Oklahoma City, OK 73102,
DAVID M. ENGLISH, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law, Missouri Ave. & Conley Ave., Columbia, MO 65211
THOMAS L. JONES, University of Alabama School of Law, University Station, P.O. Box 865557, Tuscaloosa, AL 35486-0050
MARTHA T. STARKEY, 30 S. Meridian St., Suite 850, Indianapolis, IN 46204
NATHANIEL STERLING, Law Revision Commission, Suite D-1, 4000 Middlefield Rd., Palo Alto, CA 94303
STEVE WILBORN, 306 Tower Dr., Shelbyville, KY 40065
LINDA S. WHITTON, Valparaiso University School of Law, Wesemann Hall, 656 S. Greenwich St., Valparaiso, IN 46383, Reporter
EX OFFICIO
HOWARD J. SWIBEL, 120 S. Riverside Plaza, Suite 1200, Chicago, IL 60606, President
JACK DAVIES, 687 Woodridge Dr., Mendota Heights, MN 55118, Division Chair
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ADVISORS
WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, New York Law School, 57 Worth St., New York, NY 10013, Advisor
ABIGAIL G. KAMPMANN, 153 Treeline, Suite 320, San Antonio, TX 78209-1880, Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section Advisor
CHARLES P. SABATINO, ABA Commission on Law and Aging, 740 15th St., Washington, DC 20005, ABA Commission on Law and Aging Advisor
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
WILLIAM H. HENNING, University of Alabama School of Law, Box 870382, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0382, Executive Director
Copies of this Act may be obtained from:
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
211 E. Ontario Street, Suite 1300
Chicago, Illinois 60611
312/915-0195
www.nccusl.org
UNIFORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
[ARTICLE] 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 104. POWER OF ATTORNEY IS DURABLE.
SECTION 105. EXECUTION OF POWER OF ATTORNEY
SECTION 106. VALIDITY OF POWER OF ATTORNEY.
SECTION 107. MEANING AND EFFECT OF POWER OF ATTORNEY
SECTION 108. NOMINATION OF [CONSERVATOR OR GUARDIAN]; RELATION
OF AGENT TO COURT-APPOINTED FIDUCIARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
SECTION 109. WHEN POWER OF ATTORNEY EFFECTIVE
SECTION 110. TERMINATION OF POWER OF ATTORNEY OR AGENT’S
AUTHORITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
SECTION 111. COAGENTS AND SUCCESSOR AGENTS
SECTION 112. REIMBURSEMENT AND COMPENSATION OF AGENT
SECTION 113. AGENT’S ACCEPTANCE
SECTION 115. EXONERATION OF AGENT
SECTION 117. AGENT’S LIABILITY
SECTION 118. AGENT’S RESIGNATION; NOTICE
SECTION 119. ACCEPTANCE OF AND RELIANCE UPON ACKNOWLEDGED
POWER OF ATTORNEY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
SECTION 120. LIABILITY FOR REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ACKNOWLEDGED
POWER OF ATTORNEY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
SECTION 120. LIABILITY FOR REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ACKNOWLEDGED
STATUTORY FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
SECTION 121. PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND EQUITY
SECTION 122. LAWS APPLICABLE TO FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ENTITIES
SECTION 123. REMEDIES UNDER OTHER LAW
SECTION 201. AUTHORITY THAT REQUIRES SPECIFIC GRANT; GRANT OF GENERAL AUTHORITY
SECTION 202. INCORPORATION OF AUTHORITY.
SECTION 203. CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORITY GENERALLY
SECTION 205. TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
SECTION 207. COMMODITIES AND OPTIONS
SECTION 208. BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.
SECTION 209. OPERATION OF ENTITY OR BUSINESS
SECTION 210. INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES
SECTION 211. ESTATES, TRUSTS, AND OTHER BENEFICIAL INTERESTS
SECTION 212. CLAIMS AND LITIGATION
SECTION 213. PERSONAL AND FAMILY MAINTENANCE
SECTION 214. BENEFITS FROM GOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS OR CIVIL OR MILITARY SERVICE
SECTION 301. STATUTORY FORM POWER OF ATTORNEY
SECTION 302. AGENT’S CERTIFICATION
[ARTICLE] 4
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SECTION 401. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION
SECTION 402. RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT
SECTION 403. EFFECT ON EXISTING POWERS OF ATTORNEY
UNIFORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT
The catalyst for the Uniform Power of Attorney Act (the “Act”) was a national review of state power of attorney legislation. The review revealed growing divergence among states’ statutory treatment of powers of attorney. The original Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act (“Original Act”), last amended in 1987, was at one time followed by all but a few jurisdictions. Despite initial uniformity, the review found that a majority of states had enacted non-uniform provisions to deal with specific matters upon which the Original Act is silent. The topics about which there was increasing divergence included: 1) the authority of multiple agents; 2) the authority of a later-appointed fiduciary or guardian; 3) the impact of dissolution or annulment of the principal’s marriage to the agent; 4) activation of contingent powers; 5) the authority to make gifts; and 6) standards for agent conduct and liability. Other topics about which states had legislated, although not necessarily in a divergent manner, included: successor agents, execution requirements, portability, sanctions for dishonor of a power of attorney, and restrictions on authority that has the potential to dissipate a principal’s property or alter a principal’s estate plan.
A national survey was then conducted by the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts (JEB) to ascertain whether there was actual divergence of opinion about default rules for powers of attorney or only the lack of a detailed uniform model. The survey was distributed to probate and elder law sections of all state bar associations, to the fellows of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, the leadership of the ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law and the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, as well as to special interest list serves of the ABA Commission on Law and Aging. Forty-four jurisdictions were represented in the 371 surveys returned.
The survey responses demonstrated a consensus of opinion in excess of seventy percent that a power of attorney statute should:
(1) provide for confirmation that contingent powers are activated;
(2) revoke a spouse-agent’s authority upon the dissolution or annulment of the marriage
to the principal;
(3) include a portability provision;
(4) require gift making authority to be expressly stated in the grant of authority;
(5) provide a default standard for fiduciary duties;
(6) permit the principal to alter the default fiduciary standard;
(7) require notice by an agent when the agent is no longer willing or able to act;
(8) include safeguards against abuse by the agent;
(9) include remedies and sanctions for abuse by the agent;
(10) protect the reliance of other persons on a power of attorney; and
(11) include remedies and sanctions for refusal of other persons to honor a power of
attorney.
Informed by the review and the survey results, the Conference’s drafting process also incorporated input from the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, the ABA Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, the ABA Commission on Law and Aging, the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts, the National Conference of Lawyers and Corporate Fiduciaries, the American Bankers Association, AARP, other professional groups, as well as numerous individual lawyers and corporate counsel. As a result of this process, the Act codifies both state legislative trends and collective best practices, and strikes a balance between the need for flexibility and acceptance of an agent’s authority and the need to prevent and redress financial abuse.
While the Act contains safeguards for the protection of an incapacitated principal, the Act is primarily a set of default rules that preserve a principal’s freedom to choose both the extent of an agent’s authority and the principles to govern the agent’s conduct. Among the Act’s features that enhance drafting flexibility are the statutory definitions of powers in Article 2, which can be incorporated by reference in an individually drafted power of attorney or selected for inclusion on the optional statutory form provided in Article 3. The statutory definitions of enumerated powers are an updated version of those in the Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act (1988), which the Act supersedes. The national review found that eighteen jurisdictions had adopted some type of statutory form power of attorney. The decision to include a statutory form power of attorney in the Act was based on this trend and the proliferation of power of attorney forms currently available to the public.
Sections 119 and 120 of the Act address the problem of persons refusing to accept an agent’s authority. Section 119 provides protection from liability for persons that in good faith accept an acknowledged power of attorney. Section 120 sanctions refusal to accept an acknowledged power of attorney unless the refusal meets limited statutory exceptions. An alternate Section 120 is provided for states that may wish to limit sanctions to refusal of an acknowledged statutory form power of attorney.
In exchange for mandated acceptance of an agent’s authority, the Act does not require persons that deal with an agent to investigate the agent or the agent’s actions. Instead, safeguards against abuse are provided through heightened requirements for granting authority that could dissipate the principal’s property or alter the principal’s estate plan (Section 201(a)), provisions that set out the agent’s duties and liabilities (Sections 114 and 117) and by specification of the categories of persons that have standing to request judicial review of the agent’s conduct (Section 116). The following provides a brief overview of the entire Act.
Overview of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act
The Act consists of 4 articles. The basic substance of the Act is located in Articles 1 and 2. Article 3 contains the optional statutory form and Article 4 consists of miscellaneous provisions dealing with general application of the Act and repeal of certain prior acts.
Article 1 – General Provisions and Definitions – Section 102 lists definitions which are useful in interpretation of the Act. Of particular note is the definition of “incapacity” which replaces the term “disability” used in the Original Act. The definition of “incapacity” is consistent with the standard for appointment of a conservator under Section 401 of the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act as amended in 1997. Another significant change in terminology from the Original Act is the use of “agent” in place of the term “attorney in fact.” The term “agent” was also used in the Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act and is intended to clarify confusion in the lay public about the meaning of “attorney in fact.” Section 103 provides that the Act is to apply broadly to all powers of attorney, but excepts from the Act powers of attorney for health care and certain specialized powers such as those coupled with an interest or dealing with proxy voting.
Another innovation is the default rule in Section 104 that a power of attorney is durable unless it contains express language indicating otherwise. This change from the Original Act reflects the view that most principals prefer their powers of attorney to be durable as a hedge against the need for guardianship. While the Original Act was silent on execution requirements for a power of attorney, Section 105 requires the principal’s signature and provides that an acknowledged signature is presumed genuine. Section 106 recognizes military powers of attorney and powers of attorney properly executed in other states or countries, or which were properly executed in the state of enactment prior to the Act’s effective date. Section 107 states a choice of law rule for determining the law that governs the meaning and effect of a power of attorney.
Section 108 addresses the relationship of the agent to a later court-appointed fiduciary. The Original Act conferred upon a conservator or other later-appointed fiduciary the same power to revoke or amend the power of attorney as the principal would have had prior to incapacity. In contrast, the Act reserves this power to the court and states that the agent’s authority continues until limited, suspended, or terminated by the court. This approach reflects greater deference for the previously expressed preferences of the principal and is consistent with the state legislative trend that has departed from the Original Act.
The default rule for when a power of attorney becomes effective is stated in Section 109. Unless the principal specifies that it is to become effective upon a future date, event, or contingency, the authority of an agent under a power of attorney becomes effective when the power is executed. Section 109 permits the principal to designate who may determine when contingent powers are triggered. If the trigger for contingent powers is the principal’s incapacity, Section 109 provides that the person designated to make that determination has the authority to act as the principal’s personal representative under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) for purposes of accessing the principal’s health-care information and communicating with the principal’s health-care provider. This provision does not, however, confer on the designated person the authority to make health-care decisions for the principal. If the trigger for contingent powers is incapacity but the principal has not designated anyone to make the determination, or the person authorized is unable or unwilling to make the determination, the determination may be made by a physician or licensed psychologist, who must find that the principal’s ability to manage property or business affairs is impaired, or by an attorney at law, judge, or appropriate governmental official, who must find that the principal is missing, detained, or unable to return to the United States.
The bases for termination of a power of attorney are covered in Section 110. In response to concerns expressed in the JEB survey, the Act provides as the default rule that authority granted to a principal’s spouse is revoked upon the commencement of proceedings for legal separation, marital dissolution or annulment.
Sections 111 through 118 address matters related to the agent, including default rules for coagents and successor agents (Section 111), reimbursement and compensation (Section 112), an agent’s acceptance of appointment (Section 113), and the agent’s duties (Section 114). Section 115 provides that a principal may lower the standard of liability for agent conduct subject to a minimum level of accountability for actions taken dishonestly, with an improper motive, or with reckless indifference to the purposes of the power of attorney or the best interest of the principal. Section 116 sets out a comprehensive list of persons that may petition the court to review the agent’s conduct and Section 117 addresses agent liability. An agent may resign by following the notice procedures described in Section 118.
Sections 119 and 120 are included in the Act to address the frequently reported problem of persons refusing to accept a power of attorney. Section 119 protects persons that in good faith accept an acknowledged power of attorney without actual knowledge that the power of attorney is revoked, terminated, or invalid or that the agent is exceeding or improperly exercising the agent’s powers. Subject to statutory exceptions, alternative Sections 120 impose liability for refusal to accept a power of attorney. Alternative A sanctions refusal of an acknowledged power of attorney and Alternative B sanctions only refusal of an acknowledged statutory form power of attorney.
Sections 121 through 123 address the relationship of the Act to other law. Section 121 clarifies that the Act is supplemented by the principles of common law and equity to the extent those principles are not displaced by a specific provision of the Act, and Section 122 further clarifies that the Act is not intended to supersede any law applicable to financial institutions or other entities. With respect to remedies, Section 123 provides that the remedies under the Act are not exclusive and do not abrogate any other cause of action or remedy that may be available under the law of the enacting jurisdiction.
Article 2 – Authority – The Act offers the drafting attorney enhanced flexibility whether drafting an individually tailored power of attorney or using the statutory form. Like the Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act, Sections 204 through 217 of the Act set forth detailed descriptions of authority relating to subjects such as “real property,” “retirement plans,” and “taxes,” which a principal, pursuant to Section 202, may incorporate in full into the power of attorney either by a reference to the short descriptive term for the subject used in the Act or to the section number. Section 202 further states that a principal may modify in a power of attorney any authority incorporated by reference. The definitions in Article 2 also provide meaning for authority with respect to subjects enumerated on the optional statutory form in Article 3. Section 203 applies to all incorporated authority and grants of general authority, providing further detail on how the authority is to be construed.
Article 2 also addresses concerns about authority that might be used to dissipate the principal’s property or alter the principal’s estate plan. Section 201(a) lists specific categories of authority that cannot be implied from a grant of general authority, but which may be granted only through express language in the power of attorney. Section 201(b) contains a default rule prohibiting an agent that is not an ancestor, spouse, or descendant of the principal from creating in the agent or in a person to whom the agent owes a legal obligation of support an interest in the principal’s property, whether by gift, right of survivorship, beneficiary designation, disclaimer, or otherwise.
Article 3 – Statutory Forms – The optional form in Article 3 is designed for use by lawyers as well as lay persons. It contains, in plain language, instructions to the principal and agent. Step-by-step prompts are given for designation of the agent and successor agents, and grant of general and specific authority. In the section of the form addressing general authority, the principal must initial the subjects over which the principal wishes to delegate general authority to the agent. In the section of the form addressing specific authority, the Section 201(a) categories of specific authority are listed, preceded by a warning to the principal about the potential consequences of granting such authority to an agent. The principal is instructed to initial only the specific categories of actions that the principal intends to authorize. Article 3 also contains a sample agent certification form.
Article 4 – Miscellaneous Provisions – The miscellaneous provisions in Article 4 clarify the relationship of the Act to other law and pre-existing powers of attorney. Enacting jurisdictions should repeal their existing power of attorney statutes, including, if applicable, the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, The Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act, and Article 5, Part 5 of the Uniform Probate Code.
UNIFORM POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT
GENERAL PROVISIONS
General Comment
The Uniform Power of Attorney Act replaces the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, the Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act, and Article 5, Part 5 of the Uniform Probate Code. The primary purpose of the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act was to provide individuals with an inexpensive, non-judicial method of surrogate property management in the event of later incapacity. Two key concepts were introduced by the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act: 1) creation of a durable agency–one that survives, or is triggered by, the principal’s incapacity, and 2) validation of post-mortem exercise of powers by an agent who acts in good faith and without actual knowledge of the principal’s death. The success of the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act is evidenced by the widespread use of durable powers in every jurisdiction, not only for incapacity planning, but also for convenience while the principal retains capacity. However, the limitations of the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act are evidenced by the number of states that have supplemented and revised their statutes to address myriad issues upon which the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act is silent. These issues include parameters for the creation and use of powers of attorney as well as guidelines for the principal, the agent, and the person who is asked to accept the agent’s authority. The general provisions and definitions of Article 1 in the Uniform Power of Attorney Act address those issues.
In addition to providing greater detail than the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, this Act changes two presumptions in the earlier act: 1) that a power of attorney is not durable unless it contains language to make it durable; and 2) that a later court-appointed fiduciary for the principal has the power to revoke or amend a previously executed power of attorney. Section 104 of this Article reverses the non-durability presumption by stating that a power of attorney is durable unless it expressly provides that it is terminated by the incapacity of the principal. Section 108 gives deference to the principal’s choice of agent by providing that if a court appoints a fiduciary to manage some or all of the principal’s property, the agent’s authority continues unless limited, suspended, or terminated by the court.
Although the Act is primarily a default statute, Article 1 also contains rules that govern all powers of attorney subject to the Act. Examples of these rules include imposition of certain minimum fiduciary duties on an agent who has accepted appointment (Section 114(a)), recognition of persons who have standing to request judicial construction of the power of attorney or review of the agent’s conduct (Section 116), and protections for persons who accept an acknowledged power of attorney without actual knowledge that the power of attorney or the agent’s authority is void, invalid, or terminated, or that the agent is exceeding or improperly exercising the power (Section 119). In contrast with the rules of general application in Article 1, the default provisions are clearly indicated by signals such as “unless the power of attorney otherwise provides,”or “except as otherwise provided in the power of attorney.” These signals alert the draftsperson to options for enlarging or limiting the Act’s default terms. For example, default provisions in Article 1 state that, unless the power of attorney otherwise provides, the power of attorney is effective immediately (Section 109), coagents may exercise their authority independently (Section 111), and an agent is entitled to reimbursement of expenses reasonably incurred and to reasonable compensation (Section 112).
SECTION 101. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the Uniform Power of Attorney Act.
Comment
This Act, which replaces the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act, does not contain the word “durable” in the title. Pursuant to Section 104, a power of attorney created under the Act is durable unless the power of attorney provides that it is terminated by the incapacity of the principal.
SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS. In this [act]:
(1) “Agent” means a person granted authority to act for a principal under a power of attorney, whether denominated an agent, attorney-in-fact, or otherwise. The term includes an original agent, coagent, successor agent, and a person to which an agent’s authority is delegated.
(2) “Durable,” with respect to a power of attorney, means not terminated by the principal’s incapacity.
(3) “Electronic” means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.
(4) “Good faith” means honesty in fact.
(5) “Incapacity” means inability of an individual to manage property or business affairs because the individual:
(A) has an impairment in the ability to receive and evaluate information or make or communicate decisions even with the use of technological assistance; or
(B) is:
(i) missing;
(ii) detained, including incarcerated in a penal system; or
(iii) outside the United States and unable to return.
(6) “Person” means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(7) “Power of attorney” means a writing or other record that grants authority to an agent to act in the place of the principal, whether or not the term power of attorney is used.
(8) “Presently exercisable general power of appointment,” with respect to property or a property interest subject to a power of appointment, means power exercisable at the time in question to vest absolute ownership in the principal individually, the principal’s estate, the principal’s creditors, or the creditors of the principal’s estate. The term includes a power of appointment not exercisable until the occurrence of a specified event, the satisfaction of an ascertainable standard, or the passage of a specified period only after the occurrence of the specified event, the satisfaction of the ascertainable standard, or the passage of the specified period. The term does not include a power exercisable in a fiduciary capacity or only by will.
(9) “Principal” means an individual who grants authority to an agent in a power of attorney.
(10) “Property” means anything that may be the subject of ownership, whether real or personal, or legal or equitable, or any interest or right therein.
(11) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
(12) “Sign” means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:
(A) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
(B) to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic sound, symbol, or process.
(13) “State” means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(14) “Stocks and bonds” means stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and all other types of securities and financial instruments, whether held directly, indirectly, or in any other manner. The term does not include commodity futures contracts and call or put options on stocks or stock indexes.
Legislative Note: An enacting jurisdiction should review its respective guardianship, conservatorship, or other protective proceedings statutes and amend, if necessary for consistency, the definition of incapacity.
Comment
Although most of the definitions in Section 102 are self-explanatory, a few of the terms warrant further comment.
“Agent” replaces the term “attorney in fact” used in the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act to avoid confusion in the lay public about the meaning of the term and the difference between an attorney in fact and an attorney at law. Agent was also used in the Uniform Statutory Form Power of Attorney Act which this Act supersedes.
“Incapacity” replaces the term “disability” used in the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act in recognition that disability does not necessarily render an individual incapable of property and business management. The definition of incapacity stresses the operative consequences of the individual’s impairment–inability to manage property and business affairs–rather than the impairment itself. The definition of incapacity in the Act is also consistent with the standard for appointment of a conservator under Section 401 of the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act as amended in 1997.
The definition of “power of attorney” clarifies that the term applies to any grant of authority in a writing or other record from a principal to an agent which appears from the grant to be a power of attorney, without regard to whether the words “power of attorney” are actually used in the grant.
“Presently exercisable general power of appointment” is defined to clarify that where the phrase appears in the Act it does not include a power exercisable by the principal in a fiduciary capacity or exercisable only by will. Cf. Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills and Don. Trans.) § 19.8 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 5, approved 2006) (noting that unless the donor of a presently exercisable power of attorney has manifested a contrary intent, it is assumed that the donor intends that the donee’s agent be permitted to exercise the power for the benefit of the donee). Including in a power of attorney the authority to exercise a presently exercisable general power of appointment held by the principal is consistent with the objective of giving an agent comprehensive management authority over the principal’s property and financial affairs. The term appears in Section 211 (Estates, Trusts, and Other Beneficial Interests) in the context of authority to exercise for the benefit of the principal a presently exercisable general power of appointment held by the principal (see Section 211(b)(3)), and in Section 217 (Gifts) in the context of authority to exercise for the benefit of someone else a presently exercisable general power of appointment held by the principal (see Section 217(b)(1)). The term is also incorporated by reference when using the statutory form in Section 301 to grant authority with respect to “Estates, Trusts, and Other Beneficial Interests” or authority with respect to “Gifts.” If a principal wishes to delegate authority to exercise a power that the principal holds in a fiduciary capacity, Section 201(a)(7) requires that the power of attorney contain an express grant of such authority. Furthermore, delegation of a power held in a fiduciary capacity is possible only if the principal has authority to delegate the power, and the agent’s authority is necessarily limited by whatever terms govern the principal’s ability to exercise the power.
SECTION 103. APPLICABILITY. This [act] applies to all powers of attorney except:
(1) a power to the extent it is coupled with an interest in the subject of the power, including a power given to or for the benefit of a creditor in connection with a credit transaction;
(2) a power to make health-care decisions;
(3) a proxy or other delegation to exercise voting rights or management rights with respect to an entity; and
(4) a power created on a form prescribed by a government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality for a governmental purpose.
Comment
The Uniform Power of Attorney Act is intended to be comprehensive with respect to delegation of surrogate decision making authority over an individual’s property and property interests, whether for the purpose of incapacity planning or mere convenience. Given that an agent will likely exercise authority at times when the principal cannot monitor the agent’s conduct, the Act specifies minimum agent duties and protections for the principal’s benefit. These provisions, however, may not be appropriate for all delegations of authority that might otherwise be included within the definition of a power of attorney. Section 103 lists delegations of authority that are excluded from the Act because the subject matter of the delegation, the objective of the delegation, the agent’s role with respect to the delegation, or a combination of the foregoing, would make application of the Act’s provisions inappropriate.
Paragraph (1) excludes a power to the extent that it is coupled with an interest in the subject of the power. This exclusion addresses situations where, due to the agent’s interest in the subject matter of the power, the agent is not intended to act as the principal’s fiduciary. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.12 (2006) and M.T. Brunner, Annotation, What Constitutes Power Coupled with Interest within Rule as to Termination of Agency, 28 A.L.R.2d 1243 (1953). Common examples of powers coupled with an interest include powers granted to a creditor to perfect or protect title in, or to sell, pledged collateral. While the example of “a power given to or for the benefit of a creditor in connection with a credit transaction” is highlighted in paragraph (1), it is not meant to exclude application of paragraph (1) to other contexts in which a power may be coupled with an interest, such as a power held by an insurer to settle or confess judgment on behalf of an insured. See, e.g., Hayes v. Gessner, 52 N.E.2d 968 (Mass. 1944).
Paragraph (2) excludes from the Act delegations of authority to make health-care decisions for the principal. Such delegations are covered under other law of the jurisdiction. The Act recognizes, however, that matters of financial management and health-care decision making are often interdependent. The Act consequently provides in Section 114(b)(5) a default rule that an agent under the Act must cooperate with the principal’s health-care decision maker.
Likewise, paragraph (3) excludes from the Act a proxy or other delegation to exercise voting rights or management rights with respect to an entity. The rules with respect to those rights are typically controlled by entity-specific statutes within a jurisdiction. See, e.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.22 (2002); Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act § 118 (2001); and Unif. Ltd. Liability Co. Act § 404(e) (1996). Notwithstanding the exclusion of such delegations from the operation of this Act, Section 209 contemplates that a power granted to an agent with respect to operation of an entity or business includes the authority to “exercise in person or by proxy . . . a right, power, privilege, or option the principal has or claims to have as the holder of stocks and bonds . . . .”(see paragraph (5) of Section 209). Thus, while a person that holds only a proxy pursuant to an entity voting statute will not be subject to the provisions of this Act, an agent that is granted Section 209 authority is subject to the Act because the principal has given the agent authority that is greater than that of a mere voting proxy. In fact, typical entity statutes contemplate that a principal’s agent or “attorney in fact” may appoint a proxy on behalf of the principal. See, e.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act § 7.22 (2002); Unif. Ltd. Partnership Act § 118 (2001); and Unif. Ltd. Liability Co. Act § 404(e) (1996).
Paragraph (4) excludes from the Act any power created on a governmental form for a governmental purpose. Like the excluded powers in paragraphs (2) and (3), the authority for a power created on a governmental form emanates from other law and is generally for a limited purpose. Notwithstanding this exclusion, the Act specifically provides in paragraph (7) of Section 203 that a grant of authority to an agent includes, with respect to that subject matter, authority to “prepare, execute, and file a record, report, or other document to safeguard or promote the principal’s interest under a statute or governmental regulation.” Section 203, paragraph (8), further clarifies that the agent has the authority to “communicate with any representative or employee of a government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, on behalf of the principal.” The intent of these provisions is to minimize the need for a special power on a governmental form with respect to any subject matter over which an agent is granted authority under the Act.
SECTION 104. POWER OF ATTORNEY IS DURABLE. A power of attorney created under this [act] is durable unless it expressly provides that it is terminated by the incapacity of the principal.
Comment
Section 104 establishes that a power of attorney created under the Act is durable unless it expressly states otherwise. This default rule is the reverse of the approach under the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act and based on the assumption that most principals prefer durability as a hedge against the need for guardianship. See also Section 107 Comment (noting that the default rules of the jurisdiction’s law under which a power of attorney is created, including the default rule for durability, govern the meaning and effect of a power of attorney).
SECTION 105. EXECUTION OF POWER OF ATTORNEY. A power of attorney must be signed by the principal or in the principal’s conscious presence by another individual directed by the principal to sign the principal’s name on the power of attorney. A signature on a power of attorney is presumed to be genuine if the principal acknowledges the signature before a notary public or other individual authorized by law to take acknowledgments.
Comment
While notarization of the principal’s signature is not required to create a valid power of attorney, this section strongly encourages the practice by according acknowledged signatures a statutory presumption of genuineness. Furthermore, because Section 119 (Acceptance of and Reliance Upon Acknowledged Power of Attorney) and alternative Sections 120 (Alternative A–Liability for Refusal to Accept Acknowledged Power of Attorney, and Alternative B–Liability for Refusal to Accept Acknowledged Statutory Form Power of Attorney ) do not apply to unacknowledged powers, persons who are presented with an unacknowledged power of attorney may be reluctant to accept it. As a practical matter, an acknowledged signature is required if the power of attorney will be recorded by the agent in conjunction with the execution of real estate documents on behalf of the principal. See R.P.D., Annotation, Recording Laws as Applied to Power of Attorney under which Deed or Mortgage is Executed, 114 A.L.R. 660 (1938).
This section, at a minimum, requires that the power of attorney be signed by the principal or by another individual who the principal has directed to sign the principal’s name. If another individual is directed to sign the principal’s name, the signing must occur in the principal’s “conscious presence.” The 1990 amendments to the Uniform Probate Code codified the “conscious presence” test for the execution of wills (Section 2-502(a)(2)), which generally requires that the signing is sufficient if it takes place within the range of the senses–usually sight or hearing–of the individual who directed that another sign the individual’s name. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-502 cmt. (2003). For a discussion of acknowledgment of a signature by an individual whose name is signed by another, see R.L.M., Annotation, Formal Acknowledgment of Instrument by One Whose Name is Signed thereto by Another as an Adoption of the Signature, 57 A.L.R. 525 (1928).
SECTION 106. VALIDITY OF POWER OF ATTORNEY.
(a) A power of attorney executed in this state on or after [the effective date of this [act]] is valid if its execution complies with Section 105.
(b) A power of attorney executed in this state before [the effective date of this [act]] is valid if its execution complied with the law of this state as it existed at the time of execution.
(c) A power of attorney executed other than in this state is valid in this state if, when the power of attorney was executed, the execution complied with:
(1) the law of the jurisdiction that determines the meaning and effect of the power of attorney pursuant to Section 107; or
(2) the requirements for a military power of attorney pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Section 1044b [, as amended].
(d) Except as otherwise provided by statute other than this [act], a photocopy or electronically transmitted copy of an original power of attorney has the same effect as the original.
Legislative Note: The brackets in subsections (a) and (b) of this section indicate where an enacting jurisdiction may elect to insert the actual effective date of the Act.
Comment
One of the purposes of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act is promotion of the portability and use of powers of attorney. Section 106 makes clear that the Act does not affect the validity of pre-existing powers of attorney executed under prior law in the enacting jurisdiction, powers of attorney validly created under the law of another jurisdiction, and military powers of attorney. While the effect of this section is to recognize the validity of powers of attorney created under other law, it does not abrogate the traditional grounds for contesting the validity of execution such as forgery, fraud, or undue influence.
This section also provides that unless another law in the jurisdiction requires presentation of the original power of attorney, a photocopy or electronically transmitted copy has the same effect as the original. An example of another law that might require presentation of the original power of attorney is the jurisdiction’s recording act. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Property (Wills & Don. Trans.) § 6.3 cmt. e (2003) (noting that in order to record a deed, “some states require that the document of transfer be signed, sealed, attested, and acknowledged”).
SECTION 107. MEANING AND EFFECT OF POWER OF ATTORNEY. The meaning and effect of a power of attorney is determined by the law of the jurisdiction indicated in the power of attorney and, in the absence of an indication of jurisdiction, by the law of the jurisdiction in which the power of attorney was executed.
Comment
This section recognizes that a foreign power of attorney, or one executed before the effective date of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act, may have been created under different default rules than those in this Act. Section 107 provides that the meaning and effect of a power of attorney is to be determined by the law under which it was created. For example, the law in another jurisdiction may provide for different default rules with respect to durability of a power of attorney (see Section 104), the authority of coagents (see Section 111) or the scope of specific authority such as the authority to make gifts (see Section 217). Section 107 clarifies that the principal’s intended grant of authority will be neither enlarged nor narrowed by virtue of the agent using the power in a different jurisdiction. For a discussion of the issues that can arise with inter-jurisdictional use of powers of attorney, see Linda S. Whitton, Crossing State Lines with Durable Powers, Prob. & Prop., Sept./Oct. 2003, at 28.
This section also establishes an objective means for determining what jurisdiction’s law the principal intended to govern the meaning and effect of a power of attorney. The phrase, “the law of the jurisdiction indicated in the power of attorney,” is intentionally broad, and includes any statement or reference in a power of attorney that indicates the principal’s choice of law. Examples of an indication of jurisdiction include a reference to the name of the jurisdiction in the title or body of the power of attorney, citation to the jurisdiction’s power of attorney statute, or an explicit statement that the power of attorney is created or executed under the laws of a particular jurisdiction. In the absence of an indication of jurisdiction in the power of attorney, Section 107 provides that the law of the jurisdiction in which the power of attorney was executed controls. The distinction between “the law of the jurisdiction indicated in the power of attorney” and “the law of the jurisdiction in which the power of attorney was executed” is an important one. The common practice of property ownership in more than one jurisdiction increases the likelihood that a principal may execute in one jurisdiction a power of attorney that was created and intended to be interpreted under the laws of another jurisdiction. A clear indication of the jurisdiction’s law that is intended to govern the meaning and effect of a power of attorney is therefore advisable in all powers of attorney. See, e.g., Section 301 (providing for the name of the jurisdiction to appear in the title of the statutory form power of attorney).
SECTION 108. NOMINATION OF [CONSERVATOR OR GUARDIAN]; RELATION OF AGENT TO COURT-APPOINTED FIDUCIARY.
(a) In a power of attorney, a principal may nominate a [conservator or guardian] of the principal’s estate or [guardian] of the principal’s person for consideration by the court if protective proceedings for the principal’s estate or person are begun after the principal executes the power of attorney. [Except for good cause shown or disqualification, the court shall make its appointment in accordance with the principal's most recent nomination.]
(b) If, after a principal executes a power of attorney, a court appoints a [conservator or guardian] of the principal’s estate or other fiduciary charged with the management of some or all of the principal's property, the agent is accountable to the fiduciary as well as to the principal. [The power of attorney is not terminated and the agent’s authority continues unless limited, suspended, or terminated by the court.]
Legislative Note: The brackets in this section indicate areas where an enacting jurisdiction should reference its respective guardianship, conservatorship, or other protective proceedings statutes and amend, if necessary for consistency, the terminology and substance of the bracketed language.
Comment
Section 108(b) is a departure from the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act which gave a court-appointed fiduciary the same power to revoke or amend a power of attorney as the principal would have if not incapacitated. See Unif. Durable Power of Atty. Act § 3(a) (1987). In contrast, this Act gives deference to the principal’s choice of agent by providing that the agent’s authority continues, notwithstanding the later court appointment of a fiduciary, unless the court acts to limit or terminate the agent’s authority. This approach assumes that the later-appointed fiduciary’s authority should supplement, not truncate, the agent’s authority. If, however, a fiduciary appointment is required because of the agent’s inadequate performance or breach of fiduciary duties, the court, having considered this evidence during the appointment proceedings, may limit or terminate the agent’s authority contemporaneously with appointment of the fiduciary. Section 108(b) is consistent with the state legislative trend that has departed from the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act. See, e.g., 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 45/2-10 (West 1992); Ind. Code Ann. § 30-5-3-4 (West 1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 58-662 (2005); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 404.727 (West 2001); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:2B-8.4 (West 2003); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-5-503A (LexisNexis 2004); Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-501 (Supp. 2006); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 3509(a) (2002); Va. Code Ann. § 11-9.1B (2006). Section 108(b) is also consistent with the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act § 6(a) (1993), which provides that a guardian may not revoke the ward’s advance health-care directive unless the court appointing the guardian expressly so authorizes. Furthermore, it is consistent with the Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act (1997), which provides that a guardian or conservator may not revoke the ward’s or protected person’s power of attorney for health-care or financial management without first obtaining express authority of the court. See Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proc. Act § 316(c) (guardianship), § 411(d) (protective proceedings).
Deference for the principal’s autonomous choice is evident both in the presumption that an agent’s authority continues unless limited or terminated by the court, and in the directive that the court shall appoint a fiduciary in accordance with the principal’s most recent nomination (see subsection (a)). Typically, a principal will nominate as conservator or guardian the same individual named as agent under the power of attorney. Favoring the principal’s choice of agent and nominee, an approach consistent with most statutory hierarchies for guardian selection (see Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proc. Act § 310(a)(2) (1997)), also discourages guardianship petitions filed for the sole purpose of thwarting the agent’s authority to gain control over a vulnerable principal. See Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proc. Act § 310 cmt. (1997). See also Linda S. Ershow-Levenberg, When Guardianship Actions Violate the Constitutionally-Protected Right of Privacy, NAELA News, Apr. 2005, at 1 (arguing that appointment of a guardian when there is a valid power of attorney in place violates the alleged incapacitated person’s constitutionally protected rights of privacy and association).
SECTION 109. WHEN POWER OF ATTORNEY EFFECTIVE.
(a) A power of attorney is effective when executed unless the principal provides in the power of attorney that it becomes effective at a future date or upon the occurrence of a future event or contingency.
(b) If a power of attorney becomes effective upon the occurrence of a future event or contingency, the principal, in the power of attorney, may authorize one or more persons to determine in a writing or other record that the event or contingency has occurred.
(c) If a power of attorney becomes effective upon the principal’s incapacity and the principal has not authorized a person to determine whether the principal is incapacitated, or the person authorized is unable or unwilling to make the determination, the power of attorney becomes effective upon a determination in a writing or other record by:
(1) a physician [or licensed psychologist] that the principal is incapacitated within the meaning of Section 102(5)(A); or
(2) an attorney at law, a judge, or an appropriate governmental official that the principal is incapacitated within the meaning of Section 102(5)(B).
(d) A person authorized by the principal in the power of attorney to determine that the principal is incapacitated may act as the principal’s personal representative pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Sections 1171 through 1179 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1320d, [as amended,] and applicable regulations, to obtain access to the principal’s health-care information and communicate with the principal’s health-care provider.
Legislative Note: The phrase “or licensed psychologist” is bracketed in subsection (c)(1) to indicate where an enacting jurisdiction should insert the appropriate designation for the mental health professional or professionals in that jurisdiction who are qualified to make capacity determinations. An enacting jurisdiction should also review its respective guardianship, conservatorship, or other protective proceedings statutes and amend, if necessary for consistency, the definition of incapacity.
Comment
This section establishes a default rule that a power of attorney is effective when executed. If the principal chooses to create what is commonly known as a “springing” or contingent power of attorney–one that becomes effective at a future date or upon a future event or contingency–the principal may authorize the agent or someone else to provide written verification that the event or contingency has occurred (subsection (b)). Because the person authorized to verify the principal’s incapacitation will likely need access to the principal’s health information, subsection (d) qualifies that person to act as the principal’s “personal representative” for purposes of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(g)(1)-(2) (2006) (providing that for purposes of disclosing an individual’s protected health information, “a covered entity must . . . treat a personal representative as the individual”). Section 109 does not, however, empower the agent to make health-care decisions for the principal. See Section 103 and comment (discussing exclusion from this Act of powers to make health-care decisions).
The default rule reflects a “best practices” philosophy that any agent who can be trusted to act for the principal under a springing power of attorney should be trustworthy enough to hold an immediate power. Survey evidence suggests, however, that a significant number of principals still prefer springing powers, most likely to maintain privacy in the hope that they will never need a surrogate decision maker. See Linda S. Whitton, National Durable Power of Attorney Survey Results and Analysis, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 6-7 (2002), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/dpoaa/surveyoct2002.htm (reporting that 23% of lawyer respondents found their clients preferred springing powers, 61% reported a preference for immediate powers, and 16% saw no trend; however, 89% stated that a power of attorney statute should authorize springing powers).
If the principal’s incapacity is the trigger for a springing power of attorney and the principal has not authorized anyone to make that determination, or the authorized person is unable or unwilling to make the determination, this section provides a default mechanism to trigger the power. Incapacity based on the principal’s impairment may be verified by a physician or licensed psychologist (subsection (c)(1)), and incapacity based on the principal’s unavailability (i.e., the principal is missing, detained, or unable to return to the United States) may be verified by an attorney at law, judge, or an appropriate governmental official (subsection (c)(2)). Examples of appropriate governmental officials who may be in a position to determine that the principal is incapacitated within the meaning of Section 102(5)(B) include an officer acting under authority of the United States Department of State or uniformed services of the United States or a sworn federal or state law enforcement officer. The default mechanism for triggering a power of attorney is available only when no incapacity determination has been made. It is not available to challenge the determination made by the principal’s authorized designee.
SECTION 110. TERMINATION OF POWER OF ATTORNEY OR AGENT’S AUTHORITY.
(a) A power of attorney terminates when:
(1) the principal dies;
(2) the principal becomes incapacitated, if the power of attorney is not durable;
(3) the principal revokes the power of attorney;
(4) the power of attorney provides that it terminates;
(5) the purpose of the power of attorney is accomplished; or
(6) the principal revokes the agent’s authority or the agent dies, becomes incapacitated, or resigns, and the power of attorney does not provide for another agent to act under the power of attorney.
(b) An agent’s authority terminates when:
(1) the principal revokes the authority;
(2) the agent dies, becomes incapacitated, or resigns;
(3) an action is filed for the [dissolution] or annulment of the agent’s marriage to the principal or their legal separation, unless the power of attorney otherwise provides; or
(4) the power of attorney terminates.
(c) Unless the power of attorney otherwise provides, an agent’s authority is exercisable until the authority terminates under subsection (b), notwithstanding a lapse of time since the execution of the power of attorney.
(d) Termination of an agent’s authority or of a power of attorney is not effective as to the agent or another person that, without actual knowledge of the termination, acts in good faith under the power of attorney. An act so performed, unless otherwise invalid or unenforceable, binds the principal and the principal’s successors in interest.
(e) Incapacity of the principal of a power of attorney that is not durable does not revoke or terminate the power of attorney as to an agent or other person that, without actual knowledge of the incapacity, acts in good faith under the power of attorney. An act so performed, unless otherwise invalid or unenforceable, binds the principal and the principal’s successors in interest.
(f) The execution of a power of attorney does not revoke a power of attorney previously executed by the principal unless the subsequent power of attorney provides that the previous power of attorney is revoked or that all other powers of attorney are revoked.
Legislative Note: The word “dissolution” is bracketed in subsection (b)(3) to indicate where an enacting jurisdiction should insert that jurisdiction’s term for divorce or marital dissolution.
Comment
This section addresses termination of a power of attorney or an agent’s authority under a power of attorney. It first lists termination events (see subsections (a) and (b)), and then lists circumstances that, in contrast, either do not invalidate the power of attorney (see subsections (c) and (f)) or the actions taken pursuant to the power of attorney (see subsections (d) and (e)).
Subsection (c) provides that a power of attorney under the Act does not become “stale.” Unless a power of attorney provides for termination upon a certain date or after the passage of a period of time, lapse of time since execution is irrelevant to validity, a concept carried over from the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act. See Unif. Durable Power of Atty. Act § 1 (as amended in 1987). Similarly, subsection (f) clarifies that a subsequently executed power of attorney will not revoke a prior power of attorney by virtue of inconsistency alone. To effect a revocation, a subsequently executed power of attorney must expressly revoke a previously executed power of attorney or state that all other powers of attorney are revoked. The requirement of express revocation prevents inadvertent revocation when the principal intends for one agent to have limited authority that overlaps with broader authority held by another agent. For example, the principal who has given one agent a very broad power of attorney, including general authority with respect to real property, may later wish to give another agent limited authority to execute closing documents with respect to out-of-town real estate.
Subsections (d) and (e) emphasize that even a termination event is not effective as to the agent or person who, without actual knowledge of the termination event, acts in good faith under the power of attorney. For example, the principal’s death terminates a power of attorney (see subsection (a)(1)), but an agent who acts in good faith under a power of attorney without actual knowledge of the principal’s death will bind the principal’s successors in interest with that action (see subsection (d)). The same result is true if the agent knows of the principal’s death, but the person who accepts the agent’s apparent authority has no actual knowledge of the principal’s death. See Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.11 (2006) (stating that “termination of actual authority does not by itself end any apparent authority held by an agent”). See also Section 119(c) (stating that “[a] person that in good faith accepts an acknowledged power of attorney without actual knowledge that the power of attorney is . . . terminated . . . may rely upon the power of attorney as if the power of attorney were . . . still in effect . . . .”). These concepts are also carried forward from the Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act. See Unif. Durable Power Atty. Act § 4 (1987).
Of special note in the list of termination events is subsection (b)(3) which provides that a spouse-agent’s authority is revoked when an action is filed for the dissolution or annulment of the agent’s marriage to the principal, or their legal separation. Although the filing of an action for dissolution or annulment might render a principal particularly vulnerable to self-interested actions by a spouse-agent, subsection (b)(3) is not mandatory and may be overridden in the power of attorney. There may be special circumstances precipitating the dissolution, such as catastrophic illness and the need for public benefits, that would prompt the principal to specify that the agent’s authority continues notwithstanding dissolution, annulment or legal separation.
SECTION 111. COAGENTS AND SUCCESSOR AGENTS.
(a) A principal may designate two or more persons to act as coagents. Unless the power of attorney otherwise provides, each coagent may exercise its authority independently.
(b) A principal may designate one or more successor agents to act if an agent resigns, dies, becomes incapacitated, is not qualified to serve, or declines to serve. A principal may grant authority to designate one or more successor agents to an agent or other person designated by name, office, or function. Unless the power of attorney otherwise provides, a successor agent:
(1) has the same authority as that granted to the original agent; and
(2) may not act until all predecessor agents have resigned, died, become incapacitated, are no longer qualified to serve, or have declined to serve.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in the power of attorney and subsection (d), an agent that does not participate in or conceal a breach of fiduciary duty committed by another agent, including a predecessor agent, is not liable for the actions of the other agent.
(d) An agent that has actual knowledge of a breach or imminent breach of fiduciary duty by another agent shall notify the principal and, if the principal is incapacitated, take any action reasonably appropriate in the circumstances to safeguard the principal’s best interest. An agent that fails to notify the principal or take action as required by this subsection is liable for the reasonably foreseeable damages that could have been avoided if the agent had notified the principal or taken such action.
Comment
This section provides several default rules that merit careful consideration by the principal. Subsection (a) states that if a principal names coagents, each coagent may exercise its authority independently unless otherwise directed in the power of attorney. The Act adopts this default position to discourage the practice of executing separate, co-extensive powers of attorney in favor of different agents, and to facilitate transactions with persons who are reluctant to accept a power of attorney from only one of two or more named agents. This default rule should not, however, be interpreted as encouraging the practice of naming coagents. For a principal who can still monitor the activities of an agent, naming coagents multiplies monitoring responsibilities and significantly increases the risk that inconsistent actions will be taken with the principal’s property. For the incapacitated principal, the risk is even greater that coagents will use the power of attorney to vie for control of the principal and the principal’s property. Although the principal can override the default rule by requiring coagents to act by majority or unanimous consensus, such a requirement impedes use of the power of attorney, especially among agents who do not share close physical or philosophical proximity. A more prudent practice is generally to name one original agent and one or more successor agents. If desirable, a principal may give the original agent authority to delegate the agent’s authority during periods when the agent is temporarily unavailable to serve (see Section 201(a)(5)).
Subsection (b) states that unless a power of attorney otherwise provides, a successor agent has the same authority as that granted to the original agent. While this default provision ensures that the scope of authority granted to the original agent can be carried forward by successors, a principal may want to consider whether a successor agent is an appropriate person to exercise all of the authority given to the original agent. For example, authority to make gifts, to create, amend, or revoke an inter vivos trust, or to create or change survivorship and beneficiary designations (see Section 201(a)) may be appropriate for a spouse-agent, but not for an adult child who is named as the successor agent.
Subsection (c) provides a default rule that an agent is not liable for the actions of another agent unless the agent participates in or conceals the breach of fiduciary duty committed by that other agent. Consequently, absent specification to the contrary in the power of attorney, an agent has no duty to monitor another agent’s conduct. However, subsection (d) does require that an agent that has actual knowledge of a breach or imminent breach of fiduciary duty must notify the principal, and if the principal is incapacitated, take reasonably appropriate action to safeguard the principal’s best interest. Subsection (d) provides that if an agent fails to notify the principal or to take action to safeguard the principal’s best interest, that agent is only liable for the reasonably foreseeable damages that could have been avoided had the agent provided the required notification.
SECTION 112. REIMBURSEMENT AND COMPENSATION OF AGENT. Unless the power of attorney otherwise provides, an agent is entitled to reimbursement of expenses reasonably incurred on behalf of the principal and to compensation that is reasonable under the circumstances.
Comment
This section provides a default rule that an agent is entitled to reimbursement of expenses reasonably incurred on behalf of the principal and to reasonable compensation. While it is unlikely that a principal would choose to alter the default rule as to expenses, a principal’s circumstances may warrant including limitations in the power of attorney as to the categories of expenses the agent may incur; likewise, the principal may choose to specify the terms of compensation rather than leave that determination to a reasonableness standard. Although many family-member agents serve without compensation, payment of compensation to the agent may be advantageous to the principal in circumstances where the principal needs to spend down income or resources to meet qualifications for public benefits.
SECTION 113. AGENT’S ACCEPTANCE. Except as otherwise provided in the power of attorney, a person accepts appointment as an agent under a power of attorney by exercising authority or performing duties as an agent or by any other assertion or conduct indicating acceptance.
Comment
This section establishes a default rule for agent acceptance of appointment under a power of attorney. Unless a different method is provided in the power of attorney, an agent’s acceptance occurs upon exercise of authority, performance of duties, or any other assertion or conduct indicating acceptance. Acceptance is the critical reference point for commencement of the agency relationship and the imposition of fiduciary duties (see Section 114(a)). Because a person may be unaware that the principal has designated the person as an agent in a power of attorney, clear demarcation of when an agency relationship commences is necessary to protect both the principal and the agent. See Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of Fiduciary Relationships, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 1, 41 (2001) (noting that “fiduciary duties should be imposed only to the extent the attorney-in-fact knows of the role, is able to accept responsibility, and affirmatively accepts”). The Act also provides a default method for agent resignation (see Section 118), which terminates the agency relationship (see Section 110(b)(2)).
(a) Notwithstanding provisions in the power of attorney, an agent that has accepted appointment shall:
(1) act in accordance with the principal’s reasonable expectations to the extent actually known by the agent and, otherwise, in the principal’s best interest;
(2) act in good faith; and
(3) act only within the scope of authority granted in the power of attorney.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in the power of attorney, an agent that has accepted appointment shall:
(1) act loyally for the principal’s benefit;
(2) act so as not to create a conflict of interest that impairs the agent’s ability to act impartially in the principal’s best interest;
(3) act with the care, competence, and diligence ordinarily exercised by agents in similar circumstances;
(4) keep a record of all receipts, disbursements, and transactions made on behalf of the principal;
(5) cooperate with a person that has authority to make health-care decisions for the principal to carry out the principal’s reasonable expectations to the extent actually known by the agent and, otherwise, act in the principal’s best interest; and
(6) attempt to preserve the principal’s estate plan, to the extent actually known by the agent, if preserving the plan is consistent with the principal’s best interest based on all relevant factors, including:
(A) the value and nature of the principal’s property;
(B) the principal’s foreseeable obligations and need for maintenance;
(C) minimization of taxes, including income, estate, inheritance, generation-skipping transfer, and gift taxes; and
(D) eligibility for a benefit, a program, or assistance under a statute or regulation.
(c) An agent that acts in good faith is not liable to any beneficiary of the principal’s estate plan for failure to preserve the plan.
(d) An agent that acts with care, competence, and diligence for the best interest of the principal is not liable solely because the agent also benefits from the act or has an individual or conflicting interest in relation to the property or affairs of the principal.
(e) If an agent is selected by the principal because of special skills or expertise possessed by the agent or in reliance on the agent’s representation that the agent has special skills or expertise, the special skills or expertise must be considered in determining whether the agent has acted with care, competence, and diligence under the circumstances.
(f) Absent a breach of duty to the principal, an agent is not liable if the value of the principal’s property declines.
(g) An agent that exercises authority to delegate to another person the authority granted by the principal or that engages another person on behalf of the principal is not liable for an act, error of judgment, or default of that person if the agent exercises care, competence, and diligence in selecting and monitoring the person.
(h) Except as otherwise provided in the power of attorney, an agent is not required to disclose receipts, disbursements, or transactions conducted on behalf of the principal unless ordered by a court or requested by the principal, a guardian, a conservator, another fiduciary acting for the principal, a governmental agency having authority to protect the welfare of the principal, or, upon the death of the principal, by the personal representative or successor in interest of the principal’s estate. If so requested, within 30 days the agent shall comply with the request or provide a writing or other record substantiating why additional time is needed and shall comply with the request within an additional 30 days.
Comment
Although well settled that an agent under a power of attorney is a fiduciary, there is little clarity in state power of attorney statutes about what that means. See generally Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the Family of Fiduciary Relationships, 36 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (2001); Carolyn L. Dessin, Acting as Agent under a Financial Durable Power of Attorney: An Unscripted Role, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 574 (1996). Among states that address agent duties, the standard of care varies widely and ranges from a due care standard (see, e.g., 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 45/2-7 (West 1992); Ind. Code Ann. § 30-5-6-2 (West 1994)) to a trustee-type standard (see, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 709.08(8) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 404.714 (West 2001)). Section 114 clarifies agent duties by articulating minimum mandatory duties (subsection (a)) as well as default duties that can be modified or omitted by the principal (subsection (b)).
The mandatory duties–acting in accordance with the principal’s reasonable expectations, if known, and otherwise in the principal’s best interest; acting in good faith; and acting only within the scope of authority granted–may not be altered in the power of attorney. Establishing the principal’s reasonable expectations as the primary guideline for agent conduct is consistent with a policy preference for “substituted judgment” over “best interest” as the surrogate decision-making standard that better protects an incapacitated person’s self-determination interests. See Wingspan–The Second National Guardianship Conference, Recommendations, 31 Stetson L. Rev. 595, 603 (2002). See also Unif. Guardianship & Protective Proc. Act § 314(a) (1997).
The Act does not require, nor does common practice dictate, that the principal state expectations or objectives in the power of attorney. In fact, one of the advantages of a power of attorney over a trust or guardianship is the flexibility and informality with which an agent may exercise authority and respond to changing circumstances. However, when a principal’s subjective expectations are potentially inconsistent with an objective best interest standard, good practice suggests memorializing those expectations in a written and admissible form as a precaution against later challenges to the agent’s conduct (see Section 116).
If a principal’s expectations potentially conflict with a default duty under the Act, then stating the expectations in the power of attorney, or altering the default rule to accommodate the expectations, or both, is advisable. For example, a principal may want to invest in a business owned by a family member who is also the agent in order to improve the economic position of the agent and the agent’s family. Without the principal’s clear expression of this objective, investment by the agent of the principal’s property in the agent’s business may be viewed as breaching the default duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit (subsection (b)(1)) or the default duty to avoid conflicts of interest that impair the agent’s ability to act impartially for the principal’s best interest (subsection (b)(2)).
Two default duties in this section protect the principal’s previously-expressed choices. These are the duty to cooperate with the person authorized to make health-care decisions for the principal (subsection (b)(5)) and the duty to preserve the principal’s estate plan (subsection (b)(6)). However, an agent has a duty to preserve the principal’s estate plan only to the extent the plan is actually known to the agent and only if preservation of the estate plan is consistent with the principal’s best interest. Factors relevant to determining whether preservation of the estate plan is in the principal’s best interest include the value of the principal’s property, the principal’s need for maintenance, minimization of taxes, and eligibility for public benefits. The Act protects an agent from liability for failure to preserve the estate plan if the agent has acted in good faith (subsection (c)).
Subsection (d) provides that an agent acting with care, competence, and diligence for the best interest of the principal is not liable solely because the agent also benefits from the act or has a conflict of interest. This position is a departure from the traditional common law duty of loyalty which required an agent to act solely for the benefit of the principal. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 (1958); see also Unif. Trust Code § 802(a) (2003) (requiring a trustee to administer a trust “solely in the interests” of the beneficiary). Subsection (d) is modeled after state statutes which provide that loyalty to the principal can be compatible with an incidental benefit to the agent. See Cal. Prob. Code § 4232(b) (West Supp. 2006); 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 45/2-7 (West 1992); Ind. Code Ann. § 30-5-9-2 (West 1994 & Supp. 2005). The Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01 (2006) also contemplates that loyal service to the principal may be concurrently beneficial to the agent (see Reporter’s note a). See also John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 Yale L.J. 929, 943 (2005) (arguing that the sole interest test for loyalty should be replaced by the best interest test). The public policy which favors best interest over sole interest as the benchmark for agent loyalty comports with the practical reality that most agents under powers of attorney are family members who have inherent conflicts of interest with the principal arising from joint property ownership or inheritance expectations.
Subsection (e) provides additional protection for a principal who has selected an agent with special skills or expertise by requiring that such skills or expertise be considered when evaluating the agent’s conduct. If a principal chooses to appoint a family member or close friend to serve as an agent, but does not intend that agent to serve under a higher standard because of special skills or expertise, the principal should consider including an exoneration provision within the power of attorney (see comment to Section 115).
Subsections (f) and (g) state protections for an agent that are similar in scope to those applicable to a trustee. Subsection (f) holds an agent harmless for decline in the value of the principal’s property absent a breach of fiduciary duty (cf. Unif. Trust Code § 1003(b) (2003)). Subsection (g) holds an agent harmless for the conduct of a person to whom the agent has delegated authority, or who has been engaged by the agent on the principal’s behalf, provided the agent has exercised care, competence, and diligence in selecting and monitoring the person (cf. Unif. Trust Code § 807(c) (2003).
Subsection (h) codifies the agent’s common law duty to account to a principal (see Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.12 (2006); Restatement (First) of Agency § 382 (1933)). Rather than create an affirmative duty of periodic accounting, subsection (h) states that the agent is not required to disclose receipts, disbursements or transactions unless ordered by a court or requested by the principal, a fiduciary acting for the principal, or a governmental agency with authority to protect the welfare of the principal. If the principal is deceased, the principal’s personal representative or successor in interest may request an agent to account. While there is no affirmative duty to account unless ordered by the court or requested by one of the foregoing persons, subsection (b)(4) does create a default duty to keep records.
The narrow categories of persons that may request an agent to account are consistent with the premise that a principal with capacity should control to whom the details of financial transactions are disclosed. If a principal bec