ARTICLE 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 102. DEFINITIONS. In this [Act]:

(1) “Child” means an individual, whether over or under the age of majority, who is or is alleged to be owed a duty of support by the individual’s parent or who is or is alleged to be the beneficiary of a support order directed to the parent.

(2) “Child-support order” means a support order for a child, including a child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the issuing State.

(2-A) “Comity” means the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.

Reporter’s note. Appendix B (data supplied by Barry Brooks, an observer from Texas) makes clear that some, if not all, IV-D agencies grant recognition of international maintenance orders through what might be denominated as implicit comity. It seems appropriate to provide a well-recognized definition of the process, see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 163-64 (1895).

(2-B) “Competent authority” means a tribunal, court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to determine parentage in a foreign reciprocating jurisdiction.

(3-A) “Foreign reciprocating jurisdiction” means a country or political subdivision that:

(i) has been declared to be a foreign reciprocating country or political subdivision under a federal [~~law~~] bilateral agreement;

(ii) has established a reciprocal arrangement for child support with this State regarding recognition and enforcement of orders as provided in Section 308;

[(iii) has enacted a law or established procedures for the issuance and enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under this [Act];]

(iv) is entitled to recognition of its support orders on the basis of comity; or

(v) is a signatory to a multilateral international treaty for enforcement of support orders which the United States has ratified.

Reporter’s note. The proposed addition of these stand-alone definitions of two iterations of “foreign jurisdiction” are to be read in conjunction with the deletion in definition 21 of the provision that under certain circumstances a foreign country or political subdivision becomes a “State. ” Defining a foreign country as a “State” may be traced back to 1968, where this approach first appeared in the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA). In retrospect this probably was a step too far. It seems clear that the goal was to enforce an international support order in the same manner as accorded to support orders from a sister state.

At that time, or indeed at any time since, there has not been any suggestion that orders of a foreign country are entitled to application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. To do so would require constitutional analysis where only statutory issues are involved. Moreover, asserting that a foreign order be treated “equally” to a sister state order could well result in a manifestly unfair decision. For example, reading Sections 611 and 615 strictly, modification of a foreign child support should be refused under Section 611 if Section 615 is inapplicable, such as when the obligee-petitioner continues to reside in the issuing foreign country, which does modify its orders. Such application of Section 611 in the State where the obligor resides would frustrate application of local guidelines that recognize a greatly increased obligation and ability to pay.

The amended definition in Subsection (21) is designed to clarify and implement the purpose of the Act, i.e., enforce an international order under state law. If the new convention is ratified by the Senate, the federal preemption of the issue via the treaty clause will be sufficient to accomplish that goal, U. S. Const. Art. VI., cl. 2. But, additional state statutory enforcement should be added to make the terms of the Hague Convention more accessible to bench and bar. Further, UIFSA can supply answers to questions the new convention does not ask.

An almost equally intractable problem is presented by the fact that the term “foreign order” often means an order from whatever source, and more often relates to an order of a sister State. Ultimately it will be best to avoid the term” foreign order,” and refer to” an order of a foreign jurisdiction. ” Although somewhat awkward, that is unambiguous.

(12) “Obligee” means:

(A) an individual to whom a duty of support is or is alleged to be owed or in whose favor a support order has been issued or a judgment determining parentage has been rendered;

(B) a State or political subdivision to which the rights under a duty of support or support order have been assigned or which has independent claims based on financial assistance provided to an individual obligee; [or]

(D) an individual or entity denominated as a “creditor” in international maintenance orders.

(13) “Obligor” means an individual, or the estate of a decedent:

(A) who owes or is alleged to owe a duty of support;

(B) who is alleged but has not been adjudicated to be a parent of a child; [or]

(D) an individual denominated as a “debtor” in international maintenance orders.

* * *

(16) “Register” means to [record; file] a support order or judgment determining parentage in the [appropriate tribunal [~~location~~] for the recording or filing of foreign judgments or support orders generally or foreign support orders specifically].

Reporter’s note. Just as the term “State” has been rendered ambiguous in UIFSA, throughout the Act the terms “foreign order” or “foreign judgment” are used ambiguously. Sometimes the sense is out-of-state, rather than out of country, and sometimes the term may be read to include maintenance orders from a foreign country or political subdivision.

(21) “State” means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The term includes [~~: (A)~~] an Indian tribe.

~~(B) a foreign jurisdiction that:~~

~~(i) has been declared to be a foreign reciprocating country or political subdivision under federal law;~~

~~(ii) has established a reciprocal arrangement for child support with this State as provided in Section 308; or~~

~~(iii) has enacted a law or established procedures for the issuance and enforcement of support orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under this [Act]~~].

Reporter’s note. See note to definitions (3-A) and (3-B), supra.

(23) “Support order” means

(A) a judgment, decree, order, or directive, whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, issued by a tribunal for the benefit of a child, a spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support, health care, arrearages, or reimbursement, and may include related costs and fees, interest, income withholding, attorney’s fees, and other relief; [or]

(B) such a judgment, decree, order, or directive denominated as a “maintenance order” in an international context.

Comment

Many crucial definitions continue to be left to local law. For example, the definitions of "child" and "child-support order" provided by Subsections (1) and (2) refer to "the age of majority" without further elaboration. The exact age at which a child becomes an adult for different purposes is a matter for the law of each State, as is the age at which a parent's duty to furnish child support terminates.

The term "obligee" in Subsection (12) is defined in a broad manner, which is consistent with common usage. In instances of spousal support, the person owed the duty of support and the person receiving the payments are almost always the same. Use of the term is more complicated in the context of child support. The child is the person to whom the duty of support is owed, and therefore can be viewed as the ultimate obligee. However, "obligee" usually refers to the individual receiving the payments. While this is most commonly the custodial parent or other legal custodian, the "obligee" may be a support enforcement agency that has been assigned the right to receive support payments in order to recoup Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 42 U. S. C. Section 601 et seq., formerly known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Even in the absence of such an assignment, a State may have an independent statutory claim for reimbursement for general assistance provided to a spouse, a former spouse, or a child of an obligor. The Act also uses "obligee" to identify an individual who is asserting a claim for support, not just for a person whose right to support is unquestioned, presumed, or has been established in a legal proceeding.

Subsection (13) provides the correlative definition of an "obligor," which includes an individual who is alleged to owe a duty of support as well as a person whose obligation has previously been determined.

The terms “obligor” and “obligee” inherently contain the legal obligation to pay or receive support, and both terms also implicitly refer to the individuals with a duty to support a child. The one-order system of UIFSA can succeed only if the respective obligations of support are adjusted as the physical possession of a child changes between parents or involves a third party caretaker. This must be accomplished in the context of modification, and not by the creation of multiple orders attempting to reflect each changing custody scenario. Obviously this issue is of concern not only to interstate child-support orders, but applies to intrastate orders as well.

Subsection (21) no longer requires reciprocity between the several states, formerly a cornerstone of RURESA and URESA. Public policy favoring enforcement of child support orders is sufficiently strong to warrant waiving any quid pro quo requirement between U. S. jurisdictions. This was true even before the issue was mooted by the enactment of UIFSA by all states by 1998.

The 1996 amendment to Subsection (21) clarified the position that UIFSA, like RURESA before it, does not waive reciprocity in the international context. A major amendment to the text of Subsection (21) was made in 2001 to make clear that a foreign country or political subdivision is defined as a “State” under the Act in three situations. First, a declaration by the U. S. State Department that a foreign jurisdiction is a reciprocating country or political subdivision is controlling for all states. ^{^[1]} Second, in the absence of such a declaration, each of the several states can make an arrangement with a foreign country or political subdivision for reciprocal enforcement of child support. Finally, a finding may be made that a foreign jurisdiction has a law or procedure substantially similar to UIFSA. ^{^[2]} That is, a tribunal may consider whether the foreign jurisdiction also has laws and procedures that allow for a U. S. order to be recognized in that foreign jurisdiction independent of a formal reciprocity agreement. The inclusion of foreign political subdivisions is necessary because in some countries the central government will not or cannot bind the subdivisions. For example, reciprocal arrangements with Canada are made on the province level and not with the Canadian federal government.

Reporter’s note. The comment regarding Definition (21) will be revised in accordance with the decisions of the drafting committee.

SECTION 103. TRIBUNAL OF STATE.

SECTION 104. REMEDIES CUMULATIVE.

(a) Remedies provided by this [Act] are cumulative and do not affect the availability of remedies under other law, including the recognition of a support order of a foreign jurisdiction [~~country or political subdivision~~] on the basis of comity.

Comment

The existence of procedures for interstate establishment, enforcement, or modification of support or a determination of parentage in UIFSA does not preclude the application of the general law of the forum. Even if the parents live in different states, for example, a petitioner may decide to file an original proceeding for child support (and most likely for other relief as well) directly in the State of residence of the respondent and proceed under that forum’s generally applicable support law. In so doing, the petitioner thereby submits to the personal jurisdiction of the forum and foregoes reliance on UIFSA. Once a child support order has been issued, this option is no longer available to interstate parties. Under UIFSA, a State may not permit a party to proceed to obtain a second support order; rather, in further litigation the tribunal must apply the Act’s provisions for enforcement of an existing order and limit modification to the strict standards of UIFSA.

The 2001 addition to Subsection (a) specifically recognizes the doctrine of comity as a legitimate function of state law that on a proper showing provides for the recognition of a foreign support order, see Mississippi Dept. Human Svcs. v. Shelnut, 772 So. 2d 1041 (Miss. 2000). Although the determination by the U. S. State Department that a foreign nation is a reciprocating country is binding on all states, recognition of foreign support orders through comity is dependent on the law of each UIFSA State. The reference to “remedies under other law” is intended to recognize the principle of comity as developed in the forum State by statutory or common law, rather than to create a substantive right independent of that law.

ARTICLE 2

JURISDICTION

SECTION 201. BASES FOR JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENT.

(a) In a proceeding to establish or enforce a support order or to determine parentage, a tribunal of this State may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual [or the individual’s guardian or conservator] if:

(1) the individual is personally served with [citation, summons, notice] within this State;

(2) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this State by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction;

(3) the individual resided with the child in this State;

(4) the individual resided in this State and provided prenatal expenses or support for the child;

(5) the child resides in this State as a result of the acts or directives of the individual;

(6) the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this State and the child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse;

(7) [the individual asserted parentage in the [putative father registry] maintained in this State by the [appropriate agency]; or

(8)] there is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this State and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

(b) The bases of personal jurisdiction set forth in subsection (a) or in any other law of this State may not be used to acquire personal jurisdiction for a tribunal of the State to modify a child support order of another State unless the requirements of Section 611 [~~or 615~~] are met.

* * *

On rare occasion, however, the required personal jurisdiction over the respondent may be available only by virtue of the long-arm provisions of this section, which explains why Sections 201, 205, 207, and 611 [~~and 615~~ ] must read in conjunction with one another. An example of such a situation is as follows: the controlling child-support order was issued by a tribunal in State A, which of course had personal jurisdiction over the parties when it issued its order; the obligee and child presently reside in State B (a State the obligor has never even visited); the obligor presently is employed and resides in Nation X, although the obligor’s “home base” in the United States can be identified as State C where the headquarters of the obligor’s employer is located; and, finally, other than Nation X, the only states that can claim a nexus with the obligor sufficient to assert personal jurisdiction over him are State C and perhaps State A. Under this fact situation, it is necessary to invoke one of the long-arm bases of Section 201 to assert the personal jurisdiction over the obligor necessary to modify the order. Note that the long-arm statute may not be asserted in State B where the movant resides due to the restriction provided in Section 611, even if a basis exists for assertion of long-arm jurisdiction in that State. The employment connection in State C is likely to permit a tribunal in that State to assert jurisdiction to modify the support order based on the catch-all provision, Subsection (a)(8). Further, a tribunal in State A might also find that it has retained jurisdiction to modify the order under Subsection (a)(8) (remember both parties are nonresidents) given the absence or paucity of other U. S. jurisdictions with a nexus to the obligor, see Phillips v. Phillips, 826 S. W. 2d 746 (Tex. App. 1992). Note, however, that such an action by the original issuing State must be exercised with extreme restraint or the restriction on modification in Section 611 will become a nullity. Concern that long-arm jurisdiction will be asserted in less compelling circumstances than presented in this hypothetical situation is not substantiated by experience with Section 201 in establishment cases filed since the enactment of UIFSA. In fact, overreaching assertions of long-arm jurisdiction have been dealt with satisfactorily on a case-by-case basis using due process constitutional or forum non conveniens grounds. Rains v. Dept. of Social & Health Serv., 989 P. 2d 558 (Wash. App. 1998); Phillips v. Fallen, 6 S. W. 3d 862 (Mo. 1999), reversing 1999 WL 50159 (Mo. App. W. D.,1999); Abu-Dalbouh v. Abu-Dalbouh, 547 N. W. 2d 700 (Minn. App. 1996).

Reporter’s note. The remaining sections in Article 2 solidify the concepts of personal jurisdiction and its progeny, continuing jurisdiction and controlling orders. If the tribunal has personal jurisdiction over an individual residing in a foreign jurisdiction, application of the provisions of local law should not be affected by that fact. Whether the foreign jurisdiction will recognize and enforce an order based on this fact is beyond the power of the tribunal or UIFSA to control. Interestingly, only Section 210 mentions that an order affected may be from a foreign jurisdiction. To the extent statutory authorization for the actions described in Article 2 are required internationally, the provisions should be located in new Article 7.

SECTION 202. DURATION OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION.

SECTION 203. INITIATING AND RESPONDING TRIBUNAL OF STATE.

SECTION 204. SIMULTANEOUS PROCEEDINGS.

SECTION 205. CONTINUING, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO MODIFY CHILD-SUPPORT ORDER.

SECTION 206. CONTINUING JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE CHILD-SUPPORT ORDER.

SECTION 207. DETERMINATION OF CONTROLLING CHILD-SUPPORT ORDER.

SECTION 208. CHILD-SUPPORT ORDERS FOR TWO OR MORE OBLIGEES.

SECTION 209. CREDIT FOR PAYMENTS.

SECTION 210. APPLICATION OF [ACT] TO NONRESIDENT SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION. A tribunal of this State exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident in a proceeding under this [Act], or under other law of this State relating to a support order [~~, or recognizing a support order of a foreign on the basis of comity~~] may receive evidence from another State pursuant to Section 316, communicate with a tribunal of another State pursuant to Section 317, and obtain discovery through a tribunal of another State pursuant to Section 318. In all other respects, Articles 3 through 7 do not apply and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive law of this State.

Comment

Finally, the 2001 amendment recognizes and extends the operation of these evidentiary and discovery provisions to a case involving a foreign support order recognized on the basis of comity.

Reporter’s note. Gathering all the provisions applicable to international cases in Article 7 should eliminate the necessity to pick and choose throughout the Act. Although the three sections listed here, Sections 201, 202, and 206(b) are important for international orders, the interested judge or attorney ought not to be required to search the Act for relevant provisions.

SECTION 211. CONTINUING, EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO MODIFY SPOUSAL-SUPPORT ORDER.

(a) A tribunal of this State issuing a spousal-support order consistent with the law of this State has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify the spousal-support order throughout the existence of the support obligation.

(b) A tribunal of this State may not modify a spousal-support order issued by a tribunal of another State having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order under the law of that State.

(1) an initiating tribunal to request a tribunal of another State to enforce the spousal-support order issued in this State; or

(2) a responding tribunal to enforce or modify its own spousal-support order.

Comment

This is not new language; a 2001 amendment moved former Section 205(f) to this stand-alone section. Complimentary provisions with regard to other aspects of CEJ over a spousal support order are also moved. An order for spousal support is treated differently than an order for child support. The issuing tribunal retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over an order of spousal support throughout the entire existence of the support obligation. Sections 205(f) and 206(c) state that the procedures of UIFSA are not available to a responding tribunal to modify the existing spousal support order of the issuing State. This marks a radical departure from RURESA, which treated spousal and child support orders identically. Under UIFSA, “interstate” modification of spousal support is limited to a procedure whereby a proceeding may be initiated outside of the issuing State, but only the tribunal in the original issuing State may modify the order under its law. This approach was expected to have minimal effect on actual practice, a prediction that appears to have been accurate. Interstate modification of pure spousal support was relatively rare under RURESA, and plays almost no part in the activities of support enforcement agencies.

The prohibition of modification of spousal support by a nonissuing state tribunal under UIFSA is consistent with the principle that a tribunal should apply local law to such cases to insure efficient handling and to minimize choice of law problems. Avoiding conflict of law problems is almost impossible if spousal support orders are subject to modification in a second State. For example, States take widely varying views of the effect on a spousal support order of the obligee's remarriage or nonmarital cohabitation. Making a distinction between spousal and child support is further justified because the standards for modification of child support and spousal support are very different. In most jurisdictions a dramatic improvement in the obligor's economic circumstances will have little or no relevance in a proceeding seeking an upward modification of spousal support, while a similar change in an obligor's situation typically is the primary basis for an increase in child support. This disparity is founded on a policy choice that post-divorce success of an obligor-parent should benefit the obligor's child, but not the obligor’s ex-spouse.

Finally, UIFSA does not provide for shifting the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal-support order by mutual agreement. That procedure is limited to child support under Section 205(b)(1). Note that the Act is silent rather than preclusive on the subject. If the parties wish to enter into such an agreement, it is up to the individual States to decide whether to recognize it. A waiver of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and subsequent modification of spousal support by a tribunal of another State simply is not authorized by UIFSA, rather than prohibited.

Reporter’s note. This is a “what to do?” point. Within the United States there is a live-and-let-live philosophy about spousal maintenance because the states are in conflict over the correct approach to modification of alimony. Arguably this attitude should also apply to international spousal maintenance orders; some may disagree.

ARTICLE 3

CIVIL PROVISIONS OF GENERAL APPLICATION

SECTION 301. PROCEEDINGS UNDER [ACT].

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this [Act], this article applies to all proceedings under this [Act].

(b) An individual [petitioner] or a support enforcement agency may initiate a proceeding authorized under this [Act] by filing a [petition] in an initiating tribunal for forwarding to a responding tribunal or by filing a [petition] or a comparable pleading directly in a tribunal of another State which has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over the [respondent].

Comment

Subsection (a) mandates application of the general provisions of this article to all UIFSA proceedings.

Relettered Subsection (b) continues in a new form the basic two-state procedure long-employed by the former reciprocal acts to establish a support order in the interstate context. Direct filing of a petition in the responding State by an individual or a support enforcement agency without reference to an initiating tribunal State was introduced by UIFSA 1992. Although filing of a petition in an initiating tribunal to be forwarded to a responding tribunal is still recognized as a possible procedure, the direct filing procedure has proven to be one of the most significant improvements in efficient interstate case management. The promulgation and use of the federally mandated forms, Section 311(b), further serves to eliminate any role for the initiating tribunal.

Reporter’s note. In the international context, it seems highly likely that a foreign tribunal will be thoroughly confused to receive a petition directly from a U. S. tribunal. Consideration should be given to eliminating the concept of an initiating tribunal forwarding documents to another tribunal, foreign or domestic. The promulgation and use of the federally mandated forms, Section 311(b), further served to eliminate that role for the initiating tribunal.

As a general rule, application of all of the provisions in Article 3 to international cases should be presumed. But, there are some provisions in the article that raise questions in that context. For example, in 2007 filing a lawsuit in a local tribunal, which is to forward the paperwork to the appropriate tribunal in another forum, either is now, or soon will be, a total anachronism. Consideration should be given to eliminating Sections 301(b) This is the way business was conducted under URESA and RURESA, and so initially continued under UIFSA. Today, IV-D agencies send their requests directly to the agency in another State or foreign jurisdiction. Private individuals no doubt employ attorneys who operate in basically the same manner, except the contact in the foreign jurisdiction probably will be a local attorney. Stating in Article 7 that Article 3 provisions apply except as otherwise noted may suffice.

SECTION 302. PROCEEDING BY MINOR PARENT.

SECTION 303. APPLICATION OF LAW OF STATE.

SECTION 304. DUTIES OF INITIATING TRIBUNAL.

* * *

(b) If requested by the responding tribunal, a tribunal of this State shall issue a certificate or other document and make findings required by the law of the responding State. If the responding tribunal [~~State~~] is a foreign reciprocating jurisdiction [~~country or political subdivision~~], upon request the tribunal shall specify the amount of support sought, convert that amount into the equivalent amount in the foreign currency under applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported, and provide any other documents necessary to satisfy the requirements of the responding State.

Comment

Subsection (b) was designed primarily to facilitate interstate enforcement between UIFSA States and URESA and RURESA States, with some applicability to cases involving foreign jurisdictions. After the nationwide enactment of UIFSA by 1998, see Prefatory Note, supra, the subsection retains its utility only with regard to support orders of foreign jurisdictions ~~[nations]~~. Supplying documentation required by a foreign jurisdiction which is not otherwise required by UIFSA procedure will continue to be appropriate in the international context for the foreseeable future. An initiating tribunal is authorized to cooperate and provide whatever information or documentation is required or requested by a foreign jurisdiction. For example, a statement of the amount of support being requested is required by Canadian provinces before a tribunal will establish a support order. The 2001 amendment adds a duty for the initiating tribunal to state the amount of foreign currency equivalent to that request; there is a corresponding duty of a responding tribunal to convert the foreign currency into dollars if the foreign initiating tribunal does not, Section 305(f).

The reference to “the applicable official or market exchange rate” takes into account the present practices of international money markets. A few countries continue to maintain an official exchange rate for their currency. The vast majority of countries recognize the fact that the value of their currency is subject to daily market fluctuations that are reported on the financial pages of many daily newspapers. Thus, in the example described above, a request for a specific amount of support in U. S. dollars, which is to be translated into Canadian dollars on a specific date, will inevitably have a variable value as the foreign currency rises or falls against the U. S. dollar.

Reporter’s note. The directives regarding foreign currency issues in Sections 304, 305, and 307, are specifically directed to a tribunal “of this State,” and do not affect the order going to, or coming from the foreign jurisdiction. Whether the introduction of the debit card should be statutorily recognized is a question for the observers. Another consideration is raised in the Reporter’s note to Section 308.

SECTION 305. DUTIES AND POWERS OF RESPONDING TRIBUNAL.

* * *

(f) If requested to enforce a support order, arrears, or judgment or modify a support order stated in a foreign currency, a responding tribunal of this State shall convert the amount stated in the foreign currency to the equivalent amount in dollars under the applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported.

SECTION 306. INAPPROPRIATE TRIBUNAL.

SECTION 307. DUTIES OF SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT AGENCY.

* * *

(d) A support enforcement agency of this State that requests registration and enforcement of a support order, arrears, or judgment stated in a foreign currency shall convert the amounts stated in the foreign currency into the equivalent amounts in dollars under the applicable official or market exchange rate as publicly reported.

SECTION 308. DUTY OF [ STATE OFFICIAL OR AGENCY].

* * *

(b) The [appropriate state official or agency] may determine that a foreign reciprocating jurisdiction [~~country or political subdivision~~] has established a reciprocal arrangement for child support with this State and take appropriate action for notification of the determination.

Comment

The 2001 addition of Subsection (b) makes clear that a State has a variety of options in determining the scope of its support enforcement program. In the absence of controlling federal action declaring a foreign jurisdiction to be a reciprocating country or political subdivision, see Section 102(21)(B)(i), supra, each State may designate an official with authority to make a statewide, binding determination recognizing a foreign country or political subdivision as having a reciprocal arrangement with the that State.

Reporter’s note. There is a practical problem in deleting entirely the reference to “foreign country or political subdivision” in Sections 308 and 317, to wit stating a general proposition in Article 7 may be technically correct, but deleting existing language always has more visceral effect. Yes, the comment can clarify, but most judges and lawyers do not have ready access to comments.

SECTION 309. PRIVATE COUNSEL.

SECTION 310. DUTIES OF [STATE INFORMATION AGENCY].

SECTION 311. PLEADINGS AND ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS.

SECTION 312. NONDISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION IN EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

SECTION 313. COSTS AND FEES.

SECTION 314. LIMITED IMMUNITY OF [PETITIONER].

SECTION 315. NONPARENTAGE AS DEFENSE.

SECTION 316. SPECIAL RULES OF EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE.

SECTION 317. COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN TRIBUNALS. A tribunal of this State may communicate with a tribunal of another State or foreign reciprocating jurisdiction [~~country or political subdivision~~] in a record, or by telephone or other means, to obtain information concerning the laws, the legal effect of a judgment, decree, or order of that tribunal, and the status of a proceeding in the other State or foreign reciprocating jurisdiction [~~country or political subdivision~~]. A tribunal of this State may furnish similar information by similar means to a tribunal of another State or foreign reciprocating jurisdiction [~~country or political subdivision~~].

Comment

This section authorizes communications between tribunals in order to facilitate decisions. The 2001 amendments extend the coverage of the section to tribunals of foreign jurisdictions ~~[nations]~~. Broad cooperation between tribunals is permitted to expedite establishment and enforcement of a support order.

SECTION 318. ASSISTANCE WITH DISCOVERY.

SECTION 319. RECEIPT AND DISBURSEMENT OF PAYMENTS.

ARTICLE 4

ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPPORT ORDER

SECTION 401. [PETITION] TO ESTABLISH SUPPORT ORDER.

Reporter’s note. this probably is a good place to move Section 701 if there is reason to retain it.

SECTION 402 [701]. PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE PARENTAGE.

A tribunal [~~court~~] of this State authorized to determine parentage of a child may serve as a responding tribunal in a proceeding to determine parentage brought under this [Act] or a law or procedure substantially similar to this [Act].

Comment

This article authorizes a "pure" parentage action in the interstate context, i.e., an action not joined with a claim for support. Either the mother or a man alleging himself to be the father of a child may bring such an action. Typically, an action to determine parentage across state lines will also seek to establish a support order under the Act, see Section 401. An action to establish parentage under UIFSA is to be treated identically to such an action brought in the responding State. Note that in a departure from the rest of this Act, the term “tribunal” is replaced by “court.” Although in the several States there are various combinations of judicial and administrative entities that are authorized to establish, enforce, and modify child-support orders, the UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT (2000) restricts parentage determinations to “a court,” see UPA (2000) Section 104. The view that only a judicial officer should determine parentage is based on what the Conference believes is sound public policy.

ARTICLE 5

ENFORCEMENT OF ORDER OF ANOTHER STATE WITHOUT REGISTRATION

ARTICLE 6

REGISTRATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT ORDER

PART 1 REGISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ORDER.

Reporter’s note: With selective editing, the registration and enforcement provisions in Article 6, Part 1, should conform beautifully to the provisions of the proposed maintenance convention. Directives in Sections 601, 609, and Article 7 may suffice to restrict international orders to the proper channels. .

SECTION 601. REGISTRATION OF ORDER FOR ENFORCEMENT. A support order or income-withholding order issued by a tribunal of another State or foreign reciprocating jurisdiction [~~country or political subdivision~~] may be registered in this State for enforcement.

SECTION 602. PROCEDURE TO REGISTER ORDER FOR ENFORCEMENT.

(a) A support order or income-withholding order of another State may be registered in this State by sending the following records and information to the [appropriate tribunal] in this State:

(1) a letter of transmittal to the tribunal requesting registration and enforcement;

(2) two copies, including one certified copy, of the order to be registered, including any modification of the order;

(3) a sworn statement by the person requesting registration or a certified statement by the custodian of the records showing the amount of any arrearage;

(4) the name of the obligor and, if known:

(A) the obligor’s address and social security number;

(B) the name and address of the obligor’s employer and any other source of income of the obligor; and

(5) except as otherwise provided in Section 312, the name and address of the obligee and, if applicable, the person to whom support payments are to be remitted.

(b) On receipt of a request for registration, the registering tribunal shall cause the order to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one copy of the documents and information, regardless of their form.

(c) A [petition] or comparable pleading seeking a remedy that must be affirmatively sought under other law of this State may be filed at the same time as the request for registration or later. The pleading must specify the grounds for the remedy sought.

(d) If two or more orders are in effect, the person requesting registration shall:

(1) furnish to the tribunal a copy of every support order asserted to be in effect in addition to the documents specified in this section;

(2) specify the order alleged to be the controlling order, if any; and

(3) specify the amount of consolidated arrears, if any.

(e) A request for a determination of which is the controlling order may be filed separately or with a request for registration and enforcement or for registration and modification. The person requesting registration shall give notice of the request to each party whose rights may be affected by the determination.

Reporter’s note: Section 602 may provide far too much statutory detail in the context of international orders. Not only are the federal forms available, see Section 311(b), but similar approved forms apparently will be available for international use, Draft Convention, Prel. Doc. 29, Annex 1. Indeed, section 602 may also unduly restrict full utilization of modern technology. Expert opinion is needed on whether, and how, this section may be amended to serve the needs of the child support community, both for the U. S. and foreign jurisdictions. Luckily, that expert opinion is available from the advisors and observers.

SECTION 603. EFFECT OF REGISTRATION FOR ENFORCEMENT.

(a) A support order or income-withholding order issued in another State is registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this State.

(b) A registered order issued in another State is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal of this State.

(c) Except as otherwise provided in this article, a tribunal of this State shall recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.

SECTION 604. CHOICE OF LAW.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), the law of the issuing State governs:

(1) the nature, extent, amount, and duration of current payments under a registered support order;

(2) the computation and payment of arrearages and accrual of interest on the arrearages under the support order; and

(3) the existence and satisfaction of other obligations under the support order.

(b) In a proceeding for arrears under a registered support order, the statute of limitation of this State or of the issuing State, whichever is longer, applies.

(c) A responding tribunal of this State shall apply the procedures and remedies of this State to enforce current support and collect arrears and interest due on a support order [~~of another State~~] registered in this State.

(d) If there is only one order, [A]after a tribunal of this or another State determines which is the controlling order and issues an order consolidating arrears, if any, a tribunal of this State shall prospectively apply the law of the State issuing the controlling order, including its law on interest on arrears, on current and future support, and on consolidated arrears.

Reporter’s note. Section 604 is virtually a mirror image of UIFSA with regard to choice of law, see Draft Convention, Prel. Doc. 29, art. 28.

PART 2 CONTEST OF VALIDITY OR ENFORCEMENT.

Reporter’s note: Article 6, Part 2, seems overwritten in retrospect; the advisors and observers are best situated to give guidance on appropriate amendments, if any.

SECTION 605. NOTICE OF REGISTRATION OF ORDER.

(a) When a support order or income-withholding order issued in another State is registered, the registering tribunal shall notify the nonregistering party. The notice must be accompanied by a copy of the registered order and the documents and relevant information accompanying the order.

(b) A notice must inform the nonregistering party:

(1) that a registered order is enforceable as of the date of registration in the same manner as an order issued by a tribunal of this State;

(2) that a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order must be requested within [20] days after notice;

(3) that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner will result in confirmation of the order and enforcement of the order and the alleged arrearages; and

(4) of the amount of any alleged arrearages.

(1) identify the two or more orders and the order alleged by the registering person to be the controlling order and the consolidated arrears, if any;

(2) notify the nonregistering party of the right to a determination of which is the controlling order;

(3) state that the procedures provided in subsection (b) apply to the determination of which is the controlling order; and

(4) state that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the order alleged to be the controlling order in a timely manner may result in confirmation that the order is the controlling order.

(d) Upon registration of an income-withholding order for enforcement, the registering tribunal shall notify the obligor’s employer pursuant to [the income-withholding law of this State].

SECTION 606. PROCEDURE TO CONTEST VALIDITY OR ENFORCEMENT OF REGISTERED ORDER.

(a) A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or enforcement of a registered order in this State shall request a hearing within [20] days after notice of the registration. The nonregistering party may seek to vacate the registration, to assert any defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the registered order, or to contest the remedies being sought or the amount of any alleged arrearages pursuant to Section 607.

(b) If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner, the order is confirmed by operation of law.

(c) If a nonregistering party requests a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order, the registering tribunal shall schedule the matter for hearing and give notice to the parties of the date, time, and place of the hearing.

Comment

Subsection (a) directs the “nonregistering party” to contest the registration of a foreign order within a short period of time or forfeit the opportunity to contest. UIFSA provides that either the obligor, the obligee, or a state enforcement agency, may seek to register a foreign support order. In fact, even a stranger to the litigation, for example a grandparent or an employer of an alleged obligor, may register a support order. Thereafter, the nonregistering party is put on notice of the registration and is required to assert any existing defense to the alleged order or forfeit the opportunity. Note that either the obligor or the obligee may have objections to the registered order, although in the vast majority of cases doubtless the obligor will be the nonregistering party. For example, there is a possibility that in multiple order situations either party may register the order most favorable to that party rather than the likely controlling order, thus triggering a contest. However, such chicanery is contrary to Subsection 605(c) and is specifically forbidden for a support enforcement agency, Subsection 307(c).

On the other hand, a nonregistering obligor may assert defenses such as "payment" or "the obligation has terminated" in response to allegations of noncompliance with the registered order. Similarly, a constitutionally-based attack may be asserted, i.e., an alleged lack of personal jurisdiction by the issuing tribunal over a party. There is no defense, however, to registration of a valid foreign support order.

Reporter’s note: The repeated use in the Comments to Article 6 of the terms “foreign judgment” or “foreign support order” is clearly used to mean a “sister state judgment or order. ”

SECTION 607. CONTEST OF REGISTRATION OR ENFORCEMENT.

(a) A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order or seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of the following defenses:

(1) the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party;

(2) the order was obtained by fraud;

(3) the order has been vacated, suspended, or modified by a later order;

(4) the issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal;

(5) there is a defense under the law of this State to the remedy sought;

(6) the alleged consolidated arrears amount is incorrect [~~full or partial payment has been made~~];

(7) the statute of limitation under Section 604 precludes enforcement of some or all of the alleged arrearages; or

(8) the alleged controlling order is not the controlling order.

(b) If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial defense under subsection (a), a tribunal may stay enforcement of the registered order, continue the proceeding to permit production of additional relevant evidence, and issue other appropriate orders. An uncontested portion of the registered order may be enforced by all remedies available under the law of this State.

(c) If the contesting party does not establish a defense under subsection (a) to the validity or enforcement of the order, the registering tribunal shall issue an order confirming the order.

Comment

Subsection (a) places the burden on the nonregistering party to assert narrowly defined defenses to registration of a support order. The 2001 amendment added an obvious defense that was inadvertently omitted from the original list of defenses. In a multiple order situation, if the nonregistering party contests the allegation regarding the controlling order, either because it allegedly has not been registered or because another order has been misidentified as such, the nonregistering party may defend against enforcement of another order by asserting the existence of a controlling order. Presumably the defense must be substantiated by registration of the other alleged controlling order to be effective.

If the obligor is liable for current support, in the absence of a valid defense under Subsection (b) the registering tribunal must enter an order to enforce that obligation. State Dept. of Revenue ex rel. Rochell v. Morris, 736 So. 2d 41 (Fla. App. 1999); Welsher v. Rager, 491 S. E. 2d 661 (N. C. App. 1997); Cowan v. Moreno, 903 S. W. 2d 119 (Tex. App. —Austin 1995). Proof of arrearages must result in enforcement; under the Bradley Amendment, 42 U. S. C. Section 666(a)(10), all States are required to treat child support payments as final judgments as they come due (or lose federal funding). Therefore, such arrearages are not subject to retroactive modification.

Subsection (c) provides that failure to successfully contest a registered order requires the tribunal to confirm the validity of the registered order. Although the statute is silent on the subject, it seems likely that res judicata requires that both the registering and nonregistering party who fail to register the ”true” controlling order will be estopped from subsequently collaterally attacking the confirmed order on the basis that the unmentioned “true order should have been confirmed instead. ”

SECTION 608. CONFIRMED ORDER. Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.

Comment

If the nonregistering party fails to contest, the registered support order is confirmed by operation of law and no tribunal action is necessary. If contested, a registered support order must be confirmed by the forum tribunal if the defense authorized in Section 607 is rejected after a hearing. Either result precludes the nonregistering party from raising any issue that could have been asserted in a hearing. Confirmation of a foreign support order validates both the terms of the order and the asserted arrearages.

PART 3 REGISTRATION AND MODIFICATION OF CHILD-SUPPORT ORDER.

Reporter’s note: Here the rubber meets the road. The Draft Convention mentions repeatedly the terms “modify” (4) and modification (12). Nonetheless, some important questions are left unanswered on this subject, especially for the United States because of our adherence to the requirement of personal jurisdiction to bind the parties to a support order. One thing is certain; the current UIFSA system for modification is applicable only to interstate cases, not international cases.

SECTION 609. PROCEDURE TO REGISTER CHILD-SUPPORT ORDER OF ANOTHER STATE FOR MODIFICATION.

(a) A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and enforce, a child-support order issued in another State shall register that order in this State in the same manner provided in Part 1 if the order has not been registered. A [petition] for modification may be filed at the same time as a request for registration, or later. The pleading must specify the grounds for modification.

(b) A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and enforce, a child-support order issued in a foreign reciprocating jurisdiction shall register that order in this State in the same manner provided in Part 1 if the order has not been registered. Thereafter, the modification procedure is not subject to Sections 609 through 614, but is governed by Article 7.

Comment

Sections 609 through 614 [~~615~~] deal with situations in which it is permissible for a registering State to modify the existing child-support order of another State. A petitioner wishing to register a support order of another State for purposes of modification must conform to the general requirements for pleadings in Section 311 (Pleadings and Accompanying Documents), and follow the procedure for registration set forth in Section 602 (Procedure To Register Order for Enforcement). If the tribunal has the requisite personal jurisdiction over the parties as established in Sections 611 or [,] 613, [~~or 615,~~] modification may be sought in conjunction with registration and enforcement, or at a later date after the order has been registered, confirmed, and enforced.

SECTION 610. EFFECT OF REGISTRATION FOR MODIFICATION.

SECTION 611. MODIFICATION OF CHILD-SUPPORT ORDER OF ANOTHER STATE.

(a) If Section 613 does not apply, [~~except as otherwise provided in Section 615~~], upon [petition] a tribunal of this State may modify a child-support order issued in another State which is registered in this State if, after notice and hearing, the tribunal finds that:

(1) the following requirements are met:

(A) neither the child, nor the obligee who is an individual, nor the obligor resides in the issuing State;

(B) a [petitioner] who is a nonresident of this State seeks modification; and

(2) this State is the State of residence of the child, or a party who is an individual is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this State, and all of the parties who are individuals have filed consents in a record in the issuing tribunal for a tribunal of this State to modify the support order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

(b) Modification of a registered child-support order is subject to the same requirements, procedures, and defenses that apply to the modification of an order issued by a tribunal of this State and the order may be enforced and satisfied in the same manner.

(c) [~~Except as otherwise provided in Section 615, a~~] A tribunal of this State may not modify any aspect of a child-support order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing State, including the duration of the obligation of support. If two or more tribunals have issued child-support orders for the same obligor and same child, the order that controls and must be so recognized under Section 207 establishes the aspects of the support order which are nonmodifiable.

(d) In a proceeding to modify a child-support order, the law of the State that is determined to have issued the initial controlling order governs the duration of the obligation of support. The obligor’s fulfillment of the duty of support established by that order precludes imposition of a further obligation of support by a tribunal of this State.

(e) On the issuance of an order by a tribunal of this State modifying a child-support order issued in another State, the tribunal of this State becomes the tribunal having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

SECTION 612. RECOGNITION OF ORDER MODIFIED IN ANOTHER STATE.

SECTION 613. JURISDICTION TO MODIFY CHILD-SUPPORT ORDER OF ANOTHER STATE WHEN INDIVIDUAL PARTIES RESIDE IN THIS STATE.

SECTION 614. NOTICE TO ISSUING TRIBUNAL OF MODIFICATION.

~~DETERMINATION OF PARENTAGE~~

~~SECTION 701. PROCEEDING TO DETERMINE PARENTAGE.~~

A court of this State authorized to determine parentage of a child may serve as a responding tribunal in a proceeding to determine parentage brought under this [Act] or a law or procedure substantially similar to this [Act].

Reporter’s note. As originally presented to the Uniform Law Conference in UIFSA 1992, Article 7 contained a wide variety of substantive and procedural sections regarding parentage actions. All provisions but the single section above, as amended in 2001) below were deleted in floor debate, based on the argument that the Uniform Parentage Act (1973) provided the authoritative word on the Conference’s position on the subject. The attempt to amend part of the UPA (1973) failed; a decade later NCCUSL promulgated a completely revised act, the Uniform Parentage Act (2002). Section 701 can either be deleted entirely, or moved to Article 4. In either event, this frees Article 7 for statutes regulating international support orders in once place.

PROPOSED ARTICLE 7

ESTABLISHMENT, RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT, AND MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT ORDERS INVOLVING PARTY OR CHILD RESIDING IN FOREIGN JURISDICTION

Reporter’s note. In considering what to include in a new iteration of UIFSA that would assist bench and bar, there is one crucial fact to bear in mind. If the new maintenance convention is ratified, its language becomes substantive law for all of the States. Arguably a listing of those provisions to which the United States has taken a reservation probably would be very useful to the practice. Otherwise, the language of the convention is what it is, and is not subject to domestic amendment by the ULC—interpretation perhaps, but not amendment.

This is not to say the UIFSA should remain silent with regard to a support order issued in a foreign jurisdiction that is entitled to recognition and enforcement by the terms of the proposed convention. As previously mentioned, the terms “modify” and “modification” are much employed in the text of the draft convention, but many questions go unanswered. I believe that UIFSA may legitimately fill these gaps.

SECTION 701. ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPPORT ORDER INVOLVING PARTY OR CHILD RESIDING IN FOREIGN COUNTRY. In a proceeding under this [Act], a tribunal of this State shall apply the provisions of this [Act] to establish a support order binding on a nonresident obligor or obligee subject to the jurisdiction of the tribunal irrespective of whether the nonresident party or the child reside:

(1) in a foreign country that will not recognize and enforce the order; or

(2) in a foreign jurisdiction that is committed to recognize and enforce such an order by agreement, treaty, or otherwise.

SECTION 702 [615]. [RECOGNITION OF] ESTABLISHMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT ORDER INVOLVING FOREIGN RECIPROCATING JURISDICTION WHEN MODIFICATION NOT AVAILABLE.

(a) If a foreign reciprocating jurisdiction [~~country or political subdivision that is a State~~] will not or may not modify its order pursuant to its laws, a tribunal of this State may assume jurisdiction to establish a [~~modify the~~] child-support order and bind all individuals subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal. [~~whether or not the c~~] Consent to modification of a child-support order otherwise required of the individual pursuant to Section 611 is not required. [~~been given or whethe~~~~r t~~] The individual seeking modification may be [is] a resident of this State or of the foreign reciprocating jurisdiction [~~country or political subdivision~~].

(b) An order issued pursuant to this section is the controlling order.

Comment

The amendments of 2001 added these provisions (then Section 615), which expanded upon language moved from Section 611 (a)(2) in the 1996 Act. A tribunal of one of the several States may modify a support order of a foreign country or political subdivision when a tribunal of the foreign entity would have jurisdiction to modify its order under the standards of UIFSA, but under the law or procedure of that foreign entity the tribunal will not or may not exercise that jurisdiction to modify its order. The standard example cited for the necessity of this special rule involves the conundrum posed to a tribunal of a foreign country or political subdivision that has a requirement that the parties be physically present in order to sustain a modification of child support, and lacking the authority to compel a party residing outside of the borders of the country to appear. In such an instance, a tribunal of the forum State may modify the order if it has personal jurisdiction over both parties, including jurisdiction over the absent party who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the forum by making a request for modification of the support order.

Reporter’s note. This revision of UIFSA § 615 is consistent with Article 15 2. c), which limits proceedings initiated by the debtor when the creditor remains in the issuing state. The contemplation here is that the creditor will seek modification, but will be unable to obtain it because the debtor will not appear to defend or the creditor must appear in a distant forum.

SECTION 703. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF MODIFICATION OF FOREIGN SUPPORT ORDER INVOLVING PARTY OR CHILD RESIDING IN FOREIGN JURISDICTION.

(a) Except as provided in Sections 501 through 506 and 609 through 614, a tribunal of this State shall apply the provisions of this Act to register and enforce a modification of a support order of a foreign jurisdiction if:

(1) the modification was rendered by the judicial or administrative authority that rendered the original decision; and

(2) the support order has previously been recognized and enforced by a tribunal of this State or another state;

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a), a tribunal of this State shall apply the provisions of this Act to register and enforce a modification of a support order of a foreign jurisdiction rendered by a judicial or administrative authority other than that which rendered the original decision if:

(1) the modification is recognized to be enforceable by the original issuing judicial or administrative authority, which does not claim continuing jurisdiction over the original order; and

(2) the judicial or administrative authority that modified the support order did so under similar factual circumstances that conferred, or would have conferred jurisdiction on a tribunal of this State to make such a decision.

(c) If the tribunal of this State cannot register and enforce the modification decision because the factual circumstances would not provide personal jurisdiction over an individual part, the tribunal of this State shall take all appropriate measures to establish a decision if it may assert personal jurisdiction over the individual parties.

Reporter’s note. Because in the rest of the world the residence of the obligee (creditor) and child is determinative of jurisdiction to establish and modify a support order, the issue of personal jurisdiction over the obligor (creditor) is basically moot. This distinction forms the basis of Article 17 Bases for Recognition and Enforcement, infra. The ability of the United States to take a reservation regarding creditor-based jurisdiction is agreed in Article 17 2. This provision takes that agreement an identical step forward with regard to a modification of the original support order.

SECTION 704. MODIFICATION OF DOMESTIC CHILD SUPPORT ORDER INVOLVING FOREIGN RECIPROCATING JURISDICTION.

(a) A tribunal of this State may register and modify a child support order of another State as provided by Sections 609 to 610 and 612 to 614, without regard to the restrictions on modification of a support order stated in Sections 201 (b) and 611 if:

(1) the child support order involves an obligor, obligee, or child residing in a foreign jurisdiction;

(2) the issuing State lacks continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify its order under Section 205; and

(3) the tribunal of this State may assert personal jurisdiction over the parties in accordance with the long-arm jurisdictional nexuses listed in Section 201 (a)(1)-(8).

Reporter’s note. In drafting UIFSA 1992 critical choices were made regarding modification of an existing child support order when all parties and the child had left the issuing State. First, the original order was to remain in force as the controlling order until modified. Second, the issue was what to do when the parties resided in different States. The deciding factor centered on the undesirable effect of ambush jurisdiction. The drafting committee objected to the possibility that the parties would vie to strike first to obtain a home town advantage. Arguably this could discourage continued contact with the children by the obligor for fear of a lawsuit in a distant forum. Thus, modification in a forum with long-arm personal jurisdiction over both parties was to be avoided. Indeed, repeated modification suits were to be avoided. Ultimately, an alternative was produced, which has come to be known as “the movant must play an away game,” as exemplified in Section 611.

The requirements of Section 611, and the prohibition against assertion of long-arm jurisdiction in the international context makes much less sense. Only because the United States is wedded to personal jurisdiction does this issue arise; foreign jurisdictions regard the support order to be one of the country or political subdivision, and jurisdiction is based on the creditor’s residence. Consideration was given to labeling a support order of a State as an order of the United States. Conforming modification to the general principles of state-control of the subject matter through UIFSA, with an exception for appropriate assertion of long-arm jurisdiction, seems the more conservative approach. Of course, the movant may also choose to seek modification in the other party’s place of residence.

APPENDIX A

JURISDICTIONAL PROVISIONS

DRAFT MAINTENANCE CONVENTION

Reporter’s note. It has taken five years to come to the brink of a final draft of the Convention of the International Recovery of Child Support and other Forms of Family Maintenance. It would be both duplicative and counter-productive to repeat in UIFSA the recognition and enforcement provision of the draft convention. That is, if the treaty is signed and ratified by the United States, it becomes the effective substantive law on the subject for all of the States. A deviation in UIFSA of any aspect covered in the convention would be a nullity. The provisions limiting modification proceedings and dealing with recognition and enforcement are set forth below.

In the draft convention there is only one set of substantive answers regarding modification of an order of a foreign jurisdiction to be identified and discussed, to wit, Article 15.

CHAPTER IV – RESTRICTIONS ON BRINGING PROCEEDINGS

Article 15 Limit on proceedings

1. Where a decision is made in a Contracting State where the creditor is habitually resident, proceedings to modify the decision or to make a new decision cannot be brought by the debtor in any other Contracting State as long as the creditor remains habitually resident in the State where the decision was made.

Reporter’s note. This provision facially models UIFSA § 205, Continuing Exclusive Jurisdiction to Modify Child Support Order [CEJ], albeit with more specific exceptions. The most noticeable (glaring?) of these is the fact that CEJ applies only to the continuing residence in the issuing forum of the creditor (obligee). In addition, the continuing residence of the child in the issuing forum does not have a preclusive effect as it does in § 205. To at least some degree, these distinction undercut the equal treatment requirements of UIFSA. Moreover, this provision most certainly does not freeze absolutely the continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify spousal support in the issuing forum, as does UIFSA § 211.

While it is tempting to suggest the debtor (obligor) merely be added to this provision, given the exception providing a variety of alternative choices to the creditor, this does not seem possible under the convention.

2. The previous paragraph shall not apply –

a) where, except in disputes relating to maintenance obligations in respect of children, there is agreement in writing between the parties to the jurisdiction of that other Contracting State;4

Reporter’s note. Professors Spector and Sampson have had an ongoing, although inconclusive, debate over whether at present under UIFSA the obligor and obligee can agree to submit a child support issue to a forum that has no nexus with either party or the child. It does appear that in the absence of a dispute the parties may do so under this provision.

b) where the creditor submits to the jurisdiction of that other Contracting State either expressly or by defending on the merits of the case without objecting to the jurisdiction at the first available opportunity;

Reporter’s note. This provision also appears to amend UIFSA 2001. If either party or the child continue to live in the issuing forum, the nonresident obligor may successfully plead CEJ and object to a modification being sought in the forum in which he or she resides. The motivation for this action may appear counter-intuitive at first glance, but examination of the significant difference in child support guidelines in various States quickly provides a reason for the obligor to prefer the existing order and that forum for modification.

c) where the competent authority in the State of origin cannot, or refuses to, exercise jurisdiction to modify the decision or make a new decision; or,

Reporter’s note. This provision basically tracks current UIFSA 615, which has been retained in Article 7 as Section 703, above. Although having two substantive provisions, one effective for the creditor (obligee), and another for the debtor (obligor), is theoretically possible, enacting provisions that allow the debtor to constrict the creditor’s choices almost certainly will result in UIFSA conflicting with the new convention.

d) where the decision made in the State of origin cannot be recognised or declared enforceable in the Contracting State where proceedings to modify the decision or make a new decision are contemplated.

Reporter’s note. The conflicts that may be triggered between this provision and amendments to UIFSA follow the patterns described above.

CHAPTER V – RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT

Article 16 Scope of the Chapter

1. This Chapter applies to a decision rendered by a judicial or administrative authority in respect of a maintenance obligation. Such decision includes a settlement or agreement concluded before or approved by such an authority. A decision may include automatic adjustment by indexation and a requirement to pay arrears, retroactive maintenance or interest and a determination of costs or expenses.

2. If a decision does not relate solely to a maintenance obligation, the effect of this Chapter is limited to the parts of the decision which concern maintenance obligations.

3. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “administrative authority” means a public body whose decisions, under the law of the State where it is established –

a) may be made subject of an appeal to or review by a judicial authority; and

b) have the same force and effect as a decision of a judicial authority on the same matter.

[4. This Chapter also applies to authentic instruments and private agreements relating to a maintenance obligation in accordance with Article 26. ]

5. The provisions of this Chapter apply to an application for recognition and enforcement made directly to a competent authority of the State addressed in accordance with Article 34.

Article 17 Bases for recognition and enforcement

1. A decision made in one Contracting State (“the State of origin”) shall be recognised and enforced in other Contracting States if –

a) the respondent was habitually resident in the State of origin at the time proceedings were instituted;

b) the respondent has submitted to the jurisdiction either expressly or by defending on the merits of the case without objecting to the jurisdiction at the first available opportunity;

c) the creditor was habitually resident in the State of origin at the time proceedings were instituted;

d) the child for whom maintenance was ordered was habitually resident in the State of origin at the time proceedings were instituted, provided that the respondent has lived with the child in that State or has resided in that State and provided support for the child there;

e) except in disputes relating to maintenance obligations in respect of children, there has been agreement to the jurisdiction in writing by the parties; or

f) the decision was made by an authority exercising jurisdiction on a matter of personal status or parental responsibility, unless that jurisdiction was based solely on the nationality of one of the parties.

2. A Contracting State may make a reservation, in accordance with Article 57, in respect of paragraph 1 c), e) or f). 5

3. A Contracting State making a reservation under paragraph 2 shall recognise and enforce a decision if its law would in similar factual circumstances confer or would have conferred jurisdiction on its authorities to make such a decision.

4. A Contracting State shall, if recognition of a decision is not possible as a result of a reservation under paragraph 2, and if the debtor is habitually resident in that State, take all appropriate measures to establish a decision. The preceding sentence does not apply to direct applications for recognition and enforcement under Article 16(5) unless a new application is made under Article 10(1) d).

5. A decision in favour of a child under the age of 18 which cannot be recognised by virtue only of a reservation under Article 17(1) c), e) or f) shall be accepted as establishing the eligibility of that child for maintenance in the requested State.

6. A decision shall be recognised only if it has effect in the State of origin, and shall be enforced only if it is enforceable in the State of origin.

Article 18 Severability and partial recognition and enforcement

1. If the State addressed is unable to recognise or enforce the whole of the decision it shall recognise or enforce any severable part of the decision which can be so recognised or enforced.

2. Partial recognition or enforcement of a decision can always be applied for.

Article 19 Grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement

Recognition and enforcement of a decision may be refused –

a) if recognition and enforcement of the decision is manifestly incompatible with the public policy (“ordre public”) of the State addressed;

b) if the decision was obtained by fraud in connection with a matter of procedure;

c) if proceedings between the same parties and having the same purpose are pending before an authority of the State addressed and those proceedings were the first to be instituted;

d) if the decision is incompatible with a decision rendered between the same parties and having the same purpose, either in the State addressed or in another State, provided that this latter decision fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition and enforcement in the State addressed;

e) if the respondent had neither –

i) proper notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, nor

ii) proper notice of the decision and the opportunity to challenge it on fact and law; or

f) if the decision was made in violation of Article 15.

Article 20 Procedure on an application for recognition and enforcement

1. Subject to the provisions of this Convention, the procedures for recognition and enforcement shall be governed by the law of the State addressed.

2. Where an application for recognition and enforcement of a decision has been made through Central Authorities in accordance with Chapter III, the requested Central Authority shall promptly either –

a) refer the application to the competent authority which shall without delay declare the decision enforceable or register the decision for enforcement; or

b) if it is the competent authority take such steps itself.

3. In the case of a direct application to a competent authority in the requested State in accordance with Article 16(5), that authority shall without delay declare the decision enforceable or register the decision for enforcement.

4. A declaration or registration may be refused only for the reasons specified in [Articles 17 and 19] [Article 19 a)]. 7 At this stage neither the applicant nor the respondent is entitled to make any submissions.

5. The applicant and the respondent shall be promptly notified of the declaration or registration, or the refusal thereof, made under paragraphs 2 and 3 and may bring a challenge or appeal on fact and on a point of law.

6. A challenge or an appeal is to be lodged within 30 days of notification under paragraph 6. If the contesting party is not resident in the Contracting State in which the declaration or registration was made or refused, the challenge or appeal shall be lodged within 60 days of notification.

7. A challenge or appeal may be founded only on the following –

a) the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement set out in Article 19;

b) the bases for recognition and enforcement under Article 17;

c) the authenticity, veracity or integrity of any document transmitted in accordance with Article 21(1) a), b) or d).

8. A challenge or an appeal by a respondent may also be founded on the fulfilment of the debt if the recognition and enforcement was only applied for in respect of payments that fell due in the past.

9. The applicant and the respondent shall be promptly notified of the decision following the challenge or the appeal.

10. Further appeal is possible only if permitted by the law of the State addressed.

11. Nothing in this Article shall prevent the use of simpler or more expeditious procedures.

Article 21 Documents

1. An application for recognition and enforcement under Article 20 shall be accompanied by the following –

a) a complete text of the decision;

b) a document stating that the decision is enforceable in the State of origin and, in the case of a decision by an administrative authority, a document stating that the requirements of Article 16(3) are met;

c) if the respondent did not appear in the proceedings in the State of origin, a document establishing that the conditions of Article 19 e) were met;

d) where necessary, a document showing the amount of any arrears and the date such amount was calculated;

e) where necessary, in the case of a decision providing for automatic adjustment by indexation, a document providing the information necessary to make the appropriate calculations;

f) where necessary, documentation showing the extent to which the applicant received free legal assistance in the State of origin.

2. A Contracting State may by declaration under Article 58 specify circumstances in which it will accept an abstract or extract of the decision drawn up by the competent authority of the State of origin in lieu of a complete text of the decision; [in such a case a Contracting State may use the form set out in Annex . . ].

3. Upon a challenge or appeal under Article 20(7) c) or upon request by the competent authority in the requested State, a complete copy of the document concerned, certified by the competent authority in the State of origin, shall be provided promptly –

a) by the Central Authority of the requesting State, where the application has been made in accordance with Chapter III;

b) by the applicant, where the application has been made directly to a competent authority of the State addressed.

Article 22 Procedure on an application for recognition

This Chapter shall apply mutatis mutandis to an application for recognition of a decision, save that the requirement of enforceability is replaced by the requirement that the decision has effect in the State of origin.

Article 23 Findings of fact

Any competent authority of the State addressed shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the authority of the State of origin based its jurisdiction.

Article 24 No review of the merits

There shall be no review by any competent authority of the State addressed of the merits of a decision.

Article 25 Physical presence of the child or applicant

[The physical presence of the child or applicant shall not be required in any proceedings in the requested State under this Chapter.]

[Article 26 Authentic instruments and private agreements

1. An authentic instrument or a private agreement made in a Contracting State shall be entitled to recognition and enforcement as a decision under this Chapter provided that it is enforceable as a decision in the State of origin.

2. An application for recognition and enforcement of an authentic instrument or a private agreement shall be accompanied by the following –

a) a complete text of the authentic instrument or of the private agreement;

b) a document stating that the particular authentic instrument or private agreement is enforceable as a decision in the State of origin.

3. Recognition and enforcement of an authentic instrument or a private agreement may be refused if –

a) the recognition and enforcement is manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the requested State;

b) the authentic instrument or the private agreement was obtained by fraud or falsification;

c) the authentic instrument or the private agreement is incompatible with a decision rendered between the same parties and having the same purpose, either in the State addressed or in another State, provided that this latter decision fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition and enforcement in the State addressed.

4. The provisions of this Chapter, with the exception of Articles 17, 19, 20(7) and 21(1) and (2), shall apply mutatis mutandis to the recognition and enforcement of a private agreement or authentic instrument save that –

a) a declaration or registration in accordance with Article 20(4) may be refused only for the reasons specified in [paragraph 3] [paragraph 3 a)]; and

b) a challenge or appeal as referred to in Article 20(6) may be founded only on the following –

i) the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement set out in Article 26(3);

ii) the authenticity, veracity or integrity of any document transmitted in accordance with Article 26(2).

5. Proceedings for recognition and enforcement of an authentic instrument or a private agreement shall be suspended if proceedings concerning its validity are pending before a competent authority.

6. A State may declare that applications for recognition and enforcement of authentic instruments and private agreements shall not be made directly to a competent authority. ]

[Article 27 Reciprocal arrangements involving the use of provisional and confirmation orders

Where a decision is produced by the combined effect of a provisional order made in one State and an order by an authority in another State (“the confirming State”) confirming the provisional order –

a) each of those States shall be deemed for the purposes of this Chapter to be a State of origin;

b) the requirements of Article 19 e) shall be met if the respondent had proper notice of the proceedings in the confirming State and an opportunity to oppose the confirmation of the provisional order; and

c) the requirement of Article 17(6) that a decision be enforceable in the State of origin shall be met if the decision is enforceable in the confirming State.]

CHAPTER VI – ENFORCEMENT BY THE REQUESTED STATE

Article 28 Enforcement under national law

1. Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, enforcement shall take place in accordance with the law of the State addressed.

2. Enforcement shall be prompt.

3. In the case of applications through Central Authorities, where a decision has been declared enforceable or registered for enforcement under Chapter V, enforcement shall proceed without the need for further action by the applicant.

4. Effect shall be given to any rules applicable in the State of origin of the decision relating to the duration of the maintenance obligation.

5. Any limitation on the period for which arrears may be enforced shall be determined either by the law of the State of origin of the decision or by the law of the State addressed, whichever provides for the longer limitation period.

Article 29 Non-discrimination

The requested State shall provide at least the same range of enforcement methods for cases under this Convention as are available in domestic cases.

Article 30 Enforcement measures

1. Contracting States shall make available in domestic law effective measures to enforce decisions under this Convention.

[2. Such measures may include –

a) wage withholding;

b) garnishment from bank accounts and other sources;

c) deductions from social security payments;

d) lien on or forced sale of property;

e) tax refund withholding;

f) withholding or attachment of pension benefits;

g) credit bureau reporting;

h) denial, suspension or revocation of various licenses (for example, driving licenses). ]

Article 31 Transfer of funds

1. Contracting States are encouraged to promote, including by means of international agreements, the use of the most cost-effective and efficient methods available to transfer funds payable as maintenance.

2. A Contracting State, under whose law the transfer of funds is restricted, shall accord the highest priority to the transfer of funds payable under this Convention.

Article 32 Information concerning enforcement rules and procedures

Contracting States, at the time of becoming a Party to this Convention, shall provide the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference with a description of their enforcement rules and procedures, including any debtor protection rules. Such information shall be kept up-to-date by the Contracting States.

CHAPTER VII – PUBLIC BODIES

Article 33 Public bodies as applicants

1. For the purposes of applications for recognition and enforcement under Article 10(1), “creditor” includes a public body acting in place of an individual to whom maintenance is owed or one to which reimbursement is owed for benefits provided in lieu of maintenance.

2. The right of a public body to act in place of an individual to whom maintenance is owed or to seek reimbursement of benefits provided to the creditor in place of maintenance shall be governed by the law to which the body is subject.

3. A public body may seek recognition or claim enforcement of –

a) a decision rendered against a debtor on the application of a public body which claims payment of benefits provided in place of maintenance;

b) a decision rendered between a creditor and debtor to the extent of the benefits provided to the creditor in place of maintenance.

4. The public body seeking recognition or claiming enforcement of a decision shall upon request furnish any document necessary to establish its right under paragraph 2 and that benefits have been provided to the creditor.

[1] As of August 1, 2007, the following foreign jurisdictions have been recognized as reciprocating countries or political subdivisions by the United States in accordance with 42 USCA § 659a (PRWORA, see Appendix A, infra). Note that Canadian provinces are dealt with on a province-by-province basis:

Australia; Canada (provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland/Labrador, Northwest Territories, Nova Scotia, Nunavut, and Ontario; Saskatchewan; and Yukon Territory); Czech Republic; El Salvador, Finland; Hungary, Ireland; Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Slovak Republic; Switzerland;. http://www. acf. dhhs. gov/programs/cse/international

[2] The federal IV-D statute provides that “States may enter into reciprocal arrangements for the establishment and enforcement of support obligations with foreign countries that are not the subject of a declaration [of reciprocity by the federal government] to the extent consistent with Federal law,” 42 U. S. C. A. § 659a(d). The details for a state plan providing for an agreement with a foreign jurisdiction are supplied in 42 U. S. C. A. § 654 ¶ 32(A)….