D R A F T
FOR DISCUSSION ONLY
UNIFORM CONSUMER DEBT COUNSELING ACT
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
September
20, 2004
UNIFORM CONSUMER DEBT COUNSELING ACT
WITH PREFATORY NOTE AND PRELIMINARY COMMENTS
Copyright ©2004
By
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
The ideas and conclusions set forth in this draft, including the
proposed statutory language and any comments or reporter’s notes, have not been
passed upon by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
or the Drafting Committee. They do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Conference and its Commissioners and the
Drafting Committee and its Members and Reporter. Proposed statutory language
may not be used to ascertain the intent or meaning of any promulgated final
statutory proposal.
DRAFTING COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM CONSUMER DEBT COUNSELING ACT
The Committee appointed by and representing the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in preparing this Uniform Consumer Debt Counseling Act consists of the following individuals:
WILLIAM C. HILLMAN,
02222, Chair
BORIS AUERBACH,
ROBERT G. BAILEY,
MARION W. BENFIELD,
JR.,
MICHAEL A. FERRY,
200 N. Broadway,
BENNY L. KASS,
MORRIS W. MACEY,
600 Marquis II,
MERRILL MOORES,
NEAL OSSEN,
HIROSHI
STEPHEN C. TAYLOR,
D.C. Department of Insurance, Securities & Banking, 810 1st St. NE,
MICHAEL M.
GREENFIELD,
EX OFFICIO
FRED H. MILLER,
JOANNE B. HUELSMAN,
235 W. Broadway,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ADVISOR
CARLA STONE WITZEL,
Association Advisor
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
WILLIAM H. HENNING,
University of Alabama School of Law, Box 870382, Tuscaloosa, AL
35487-0382, Executive Director
Copies of this Act may be obtained from:
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
312/915-0195
www.nccusl.org
CONSUMER DEBT COUNSELING ACT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Prefatory
Note.............................................................................................................................. 56
SECTION 1.
SHORT TITLE..................................................................................................... 73
SECTION 2.
DEFINITIONS..................................................................................................... 83
SECTION 3.
APPLICATION: RESIDENTS AND NON-RESIDENTS................................ 14
SECTION 4.
EXEMPT PERSONS........................................................................................ 1615
SECTION 5.
REGISTRATION................................................................................................. 18
SECTION 6.
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION: FORM AND CONTENTS............. 19
SECTION 7.
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION: PUBLIC INFORMATION......... 2629
SECTION 8.
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION: ISSUANCE OR DENIAL.............. 2629
SECTION 9.
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION: TIMING......................................... 2832
SECTION 10.
RENEWAL OF REGISTRATION................................................................ 2933
SECTION 11.
REGISTRATION IN ANOTHER STATE................................................... 3236
SECTION 12.
BOND.............................................................................................................. 3237
SECTION 13.
CUSTOMER SERVICE................................................................................ 3843
SECTION 14.
PREREQUISITES FOR PROVIDING DEBT-MANAGEMENT SERVICES 3944
SECTION 15.
COMMUNICATION BY ELECTRONIC MEANS.................................... 4350
SECTION 16.
FORM AND CONTENTS OF AGREEMENT............................................ 4654
SECTION 17.
FOREIGN LANGUAGE................................................................................ 5362
SECTION 18.
VOIDABLE AGREEMENTS........................................................................ 5362
SECTION 19.
TRUST ACCOUNT........................................................................................ 5464
SECTION 20.
FEES: MONETARY LIMITS....................................................................... 5868
SECTION 21.
FEES: OTHER LIMITS................................................................................ 6375
SECTION 22.
PERIODIC REPORTS AND RETENTION OF RECORDS..................... 6579
SECTION 23.
PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES.................................................... 6780
SECTION 24.
ADVERTISING; PUBLIC EDUCATION.................................................... 7593
SECTION 25.
CRIMINAL PENALTY................................................................................. 7696
SECTION 26.
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATOR............................................................... 7898
SECTION 27.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.............................................................. 81101
SECTION 28.
VIOLATION OF UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE PRACTICES STATUTE.. 82103
SECTION 29.
SUSPENSION, REVOCATION, OR NON-RENEWAL OF REGISTRATION 83103
SECTION 30.
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT...................................................................... 84105
SECTION 31.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS................................................................... 88108
[SECTION 32.
SEVERABILITY......................................................................................... 89110
SECTION 33.
RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT......................................................................................................................................... 89110
SECTION 34.
RELATION TO LAW OF OTHER STATES............................................. 89110
SECTION 35.
UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION................. 91112
SECTION 36.
EFFECTIVE DATE...................................................................................... 91112
SECTION 37.
REPEAL........................................................................................................ 91112
SECTION 38.
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS; APPLICATION TO EXISTING TRANSACTIONS................................................................................................................................................. 91112
Prefatory Note 1
SECTION 2.
DEFINITIONS 3
SECTION 3. APPLICATION:
RESIDENTS AND NON-RESIDENTS...................................... 10
SECTION 4.
EXEMPT PERSONS............................................................................................... 11
SECTION 5.
REGISTRATION.................................................................................................... 13
SECTION 6.
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION: FORM AND CONTENTS..................... 14
SECTION 7.
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION: PUBLIC INFORMATION..................... 21
SECTION 8.
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION: ISSUANCE OR DENIAL.......................... 22
SECTION 9.
CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION: TIMING..................................................... 23
SECTION 10.
RENEWAL OF REGISTRATION........................................................................ 24
SECTION 11.
REGISTRATION IN ANOTHER STATE............................................................. 26
SECTION 12.
BOND 27
SECTION 13.
CUSTOMER SERVICE........................................................................................ 32
SECTION 14.
PREREQUISITES FOR PROVIDING DEBT-MANAGEMENT SERVICES....... 32
SECTION 15.
COMMUNICATION BY ELECTRONIC MEANS............................................. 37
SECTION 16.
FORM AND CONTENTS OF AGREEMENT..................................................... 40
SECTION 17.
FOREIGN LANGUAGE....................................................................................... 46
SECTION 18.
VOID AGREEMENTS.......................................................................................... 47
SECTION 19.
TRUST ACCOUNT.............................................................................................. 48
SECTION 20.
FEES: MONETARY LIMITS................................................................................ 51
SECTION 21.
FEES: OTHER LIMITS......................................................................................... 55
SECTION 22.
PERIODIC REPORTS AND RETENTION OF RECORDS................................. 58
SECTION 23.
PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES............................................................. 59
SECTION 24.
ADVERTISING; MANDATORY PUBLIC EDUCATION................................... 68
SECTION 25.
CRIMINAL PENALTY......................................................................................... 71
SECTION 26.
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATOR....................................................................... 71
SECTION 27.
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.......................................................................... 73
SECTION 28.
VIOLATION OF UNFAIR PRACTICES STATUTE........................................... 75
SECTION 29.
SUSPENSION, REVOCATION, OR NON-RENEWAL OF
REGISTRATION 75
SECTION 30.
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT................................................................................ 77
SECTION 31.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS............................................................................. 78
[SECTION 32.
SEVERABILITY]................................................................................................. 80
SECTION 33.
RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT 80
SECTION 34.
RELATION TO LAW OF OTHER ...................................................................... 80
SECTION 35.
UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION............................ 81
SECTION 36.
EFFECTIVE DATE............................................................................................... 81
SECTION 37.
REPEAL 81
SECTION 38.
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS; APPLICATION TO EXISTING TRANSACTIONS 81
UNIFORM
CONSUMER DEBT COUNSELING ACT
The consumer credit counseling
industry arose as a means of assisting individuals to pay their credit card
debt without resorting to bankruptcy and a means of enabling creditors to
collect debt that otherwise would be discharged in bankruptcy. Through the
1980s the industry was financially supported almost entirely by creditors,
which returned to the industry approximately 15% of the money they received
through the efforts of the industry. Over the last decade, however, the
industry has changed significantly. Responding to the dramatic increase in
credit card debt, a new generation of credit counseling agencies arose. Reports
of abuses by counseling agencies and injury to consumers appeared with
increasing frequency in numerous media outlets. A report of two prominent
consumer organizations (Consumer Federation of America and the
$ deception concerning the nature of, the need for, and the cost of debt-management plans to help consumers deal with burgeoning debt;
$ excessive cost to consumers; and
$ self-dealing and other conduct by agencies to evade the ban on private inurement that appears in the Internal Revenue Code requirements for tax-exempt status.
These problems are compounded by a drastic reduction in support for the industry by its traditional benefactors, the issuers of credit cards. This has led counseling agencies to impose on consumers an increasing share of the cost of their operations.
In January 2003 the Executive Committee of the Conference authorized the appointment of a drafting committee to develop a uniform law that would address the problems that have developed and enable the states to take a common approach to regulation of the counseling industry. A uniform approach is particularly important because the great majority of agencies operate in multiple states and would otherwise be subject to multiple and sometimes conflicting requirements.
The Drafting Committee first met in This draft
reflects the deliberations and tentative decisions of the Committee at that
meeting with respect to sections 1-21. At the Annual Meeting of
the Conference in August 2004, the drafting committee received numerous
comments on the draft, and many of them are reflected in this draft. Others are
identified in the Preliminary Comments. In addition, the Committee of the Whole
adopted two sense-of-the-house resolutions: the Act should be drafted so
as to apply to both for-profit and not-for-profit entities; and the
scope of the Act should encompass debt debt-settlement
companies as well as debt management entitiescredit-counseling
agencies; and the Act should be drafted in such a way that
each state may decide whether to permit for-profit entities to provide credit-counseling and
debt-settlement services. This draft reflects those decisions.
Several provisions have been revised
to conform to federal and state law governing electronic communication. Further
revision is contemplated.The Drafting Committee met
again in October 2004, and this draft reflects the decisions and discussions at
that meeting.
UNIFORM CONSUMER DEBT COUNSELING ACT
Legislative
Note: The state must make the basic
policy decision whether to permit for-profit entities to engage in the [debt
adjustment][debt management] business. This decision is implemented by virtue
of the presence or absence of specified provisions in the following sections:
[list to be developed].
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the Uniform Consumer Debt Counseling Act.
Preliminary Comments
In view of the decision to include
debt settlement companies within the scope of the Act, the Act needs a new
title, e.g., Uniform Debt Adjustment Act or Uniform Debt Management Act. and Debt
Settlement Services Act.
Reporter’s
Introductory Note to Section 2 (Definitions): There are
two significant changes in the definitions:
(1) To simplify the language
throughout the draft, the operative terms now are “provider,” “plan,” and
“agreement.” These terms are newly defined in Section 2, and they eliminate the
need to define (and use) the cumbersome terms “debt-management-services
provider,” “debt-management plan,” and “debt-management-services agreement.”
Throughout the draft, the Act now speaks simply of “provider,” “plan,” and
“agreement.”
(2) Because the Act now applies to
both credit counseling and debt settlement, some definitions have been revised
to encompass both entities and their activities. For example, subsection (9)
defines “debt-management services” to encompass the activities of both kinds of
entities. Similarly, subsection (12) defines “plan” to encompass what
credit-counseling agencies now call a debt-management plan (or DMP) and what
debt-settlement companies now call a “program.” As a result of these changes,
“provider” now refers to both types of entities, and the draft does
not define or use the term “debt-settlement-services
provider.” At those points in the draft where it is desirable to have different
rules for the two types of entities, a descriptive phrase differentiates them
(e.g., in section 14: “if a plan contemplates that creditors will settle the
debts for less than the full principal amount of the debt” and “if a plan
contemplates concessions in the form of reduced finance charge or reduced fees
for late payment, default, or delinquency.”)
SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. In this [act], unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) “Administrator” means the ______________.
(2) “Affiliate,” with respect to an individual, means:
(A) the spouse of the individual;
(B) a sibling of the individual or the spouse of the sibling;
(C) a person or the spouse of the person who is a lineal an ancestor
or lineal descendant of the individual or the individual’s spouse;
(D) [any other
individual related to the individual within the third degree of consanguinity
or affinity] [a parent, grandparent, an aunt or uncle,
great-aunt or –-uncle, first- or
second-cousin, sibling, child, niece or nephew,
grand-niece or –-nephew, whether
related by the whole or the half blood, adoption, or step relationship, and
includes the spouse of any of them]; or
(E) any
other person residing with occupying
the residence of the individual.
(3) “Affiliate,” with respect to an entity, means:
(A) a person that directly or indirectly controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with the entity;
(B) an officer of, or a person performing similar functions with respect to, the entity;
(C) a director of, or a person performing similar functions with respect to the entity;
(D) a person that has more than a ten-percent
ownership interest inowns more than 10 percent of, is
employed by, or is a director of a person that receives or received more than
$25,000 in either the current year or the preceding year from the entity;
(E) an officer or director of, or a person performing similar functions with respect to, a person described in paragraph (A);
(F) the spouse of or an individual residing
with occupying the residence of an
individual described in paragraph (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E); or
(G) an individual who is related has the
relationship specified in subsection (2)(D) to an individual or
the spouse of an individual described in paragraph (A), (B), (C), (D) or (E) of this
subsectionwithin the third degree of consanguinity or affinity.
(4) “Agreement” [means] [is
limited to] an agreement between a provider and an
individual for the performance of debt-management services.
(5) “Bank” means
a person engaged in the business of
banking and includes a savings bank, savings and loan association, credit
union, and trust company.
(46) “Certified counselor” means an individual
certified by:
(A) [an
independent, nationally recognized certification organization][a
certification provider that is not affiliated with the employer of the
counselor and that authenticates the competence of individuals counselors providing
education and assistance to other individuals in connection with
debt management services; or]
or by
(B) a training program approved by the administrator.
(57) “Day” means calendar day.
(6) “Debt-management plan” means [a plan
under which money will be paid by or on behalf of an individual {through a
debt-management-services provider} to obtain from one or more creditors of the
individual concessions consisting of reduced interest or delinquency fees][a plan under
which a debt-management-services provider will
provide debt-management services to an individual].
(78) “Debt-management services” means: acting as
an intermediary between an individual and one or more creditors of the individual
for the purpose of obtaining concessions in the form of repayment on terms
other than the terms of the original contracts between the individual and these
creditors.
(A)
receiving money or anything of value from or on behalf of an individual for the
purpose of distributing it to one or more creditors of the individual in full
or partial payment of the individual’s obligations; or
(B)
debt-settlement services, even if the provider of the debt-settlement services
never has possession of the individual’s money.
(8)
“Debt-management-services agreement” means an agreement between a
debt-management-services provider and an
individual for the performance of debt-management services.
(9)
“Debt-management-services provider” means a
person that, in the current calendar year or in the immediately preceding
calendar year, has provided debt-management services to more than three
individuals.
(10) “Debt-settlement
services” means acting or negotiating on behalf of an individual with one or
more creditors of the individual for the purpose of securing the creditor’s
assent to receiving in full satisfaction of the debt owed to it an amount less
than the full principal of the debt [in fewer than four installments].
(119) “Employee,” when used in
connection with “provider,” means an individual who provides furnishes services
related to debt-management services whether or not paid by the debt-management-services
provider that receives the benefit of the individual’s services. This definition
does not apply in Section 4.
(1210) “Entity” means a person other than an
individual.;
(1311) “Person” means an individual, corporation,
business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company,
association, joint venture, or any other legal or commercial entity. The term
does not include a public corporation, government, or governmental subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality.
(12) “Plan” means
a program or strategy in which a
provider furnishes debt-management services to an individual and which includes a
schedule of payments or deposits that are to be made by or on
behalf of the individual and used to pay
all or part of all or some of the debts owed by the
individual.
(13) “Provider”
means a person that, in the current calendar year or in the
immediately preceding calendar year, has provided debt-management services to
more than three individuals.
(14) “Record” means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
(15) “Signed” includes the use of any electronic symbol or process executed or adopted with present intention to identify the person and adopt or accept a record.
(16) “State” means a state of the
(17) “Trust account” means an account held by a debt-management-services
provider or its designee that is:
(A) established in a state- or
federally [chartered,] insured bank;
(B) separate from the debt-management-services
provider’s other accounts of the
provider or its designee;
(C) designated as a “trust account”
or other designation indicating that the money in the account is not the money
of the debt-management-services
provider, its designee, or its the officers,
employees, or agents of either; and
(D) used to hold money of one or more
individuals for disbursement to creditors of the individuals.
Legislative Note: In paragraph (1)
insert the name of the agency or entity that will be charged with enforcement
of this Act. States must decide whether to create a new administrative agency
or charge an existing entity with enforcement of this Act. If the latter,
states must decide which existing entity to select. Logical choices include the
attorney general or other entity charged with consumer protection generally
(under a little-FTC act or similar statute), or the
entity charged with regulation of consumer credit,
or regulation
of financial institutions. It may be necessary or desirable to
amend that entity’s organic statute to refer specifically to this Act.
Preliminary Comments
On rare occasion, the context of the statutory language
may call for a definition not to apply. An example is section 22(a), which uses
the phrase “five business days.” Cf. paragraph (7) (defining
“day”).
Paragraphs (2)-(3)(affiliate): The
term “affiliate” is used at three places in the Act: as a disclosure item in
the application for registration (section 6(d)(2))§ 6(c)(5), (7), (8)) ;
as a tool to ensure the independence of an agency’s board of directors (§ (section 8(b)(6),
(c)) ; and as a limit on an agency’s ability to engage in self-dealing (§ (section 23(c)-(d)(b)-(c))
. The
Act does not impose obligations on affiliates that are not also officers or
directors, nor does any provision impose liability on them.
The definitions of “affiliate”
have not yet been considered by the Drafting Committee. The
definition in paragraph (2) is drawn from § 9-102(a), but it includes more
relatives in the definition. The definition in Article 9 is limited to
relatives who live in the individual’s home. This excludes such close relatives
as nieces and first cousins unless they live in the individual’s home. The
language in subsections (2)(D) and (3)(G) includes those relatives regardless
of where they live. Consanguinity denotes a relationship in which the
persons share a common ancestor. Affinity denotes a relationship in which the
persons are related by marriage. Subsection 2(E) is new, to avoid the need to
define “spouse.” Paragraph (E) is broader than the former definition of spouse,
because it does not require that the person be living with the individual “as if
married.”
At the Annual Meeting a commissioner
objected to the use of “consanguinity” and suggested we look to the Uniform
Adoption Act, which lists the specific relatives. The second bracketed language
takes that approach. At the October 2004 meeting, If
the Committee adopteds this approach, paragraph
(B) (sibling) is redundant.
If the word “consanguinity” remains in the Act, I would
contemplate a Comment along the following lines:
Consanguinity is the relation of persons with a common
ancestor. Affinity is the relation that results from marriage. To determine if
one person is within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity of another,
construct a family tree to the extent necessary to show both persons. Starting
with either person, the other is within the third degree if it takes no more
than three steps, either vertically or horizontally, on the tree to reach that
person. It includes parent, grandparent, great-grandparent, sibling, first
cousin, aunt, uncle, great-aunt, great-uncle, child, grandchild,
great-grandchild, niece, or nephew of an individual, whether related to the
individual by the whole or the half blood or adoption.
Paragraph (2)(E) reverts to
the approach of Article 9 and uses the phrase, “occupying the residence of”
rather than “residing with,” which appeared in the last draft. Is this
acceptable?
Another commissioner at the
Annual Meeting suggested that there ought not be two definitions
of the same word (viz., “affiliate”) and that the Act use “relative” instead. This is feasible
but would mean either that the later sections that use “affiliate” would
instead use “affiliate or relative.” Or the definition of “affiliate” would be
revised to include “relative.” The Committee on Style did not
object to the double definition of “affiliate,” and it at the
October 2004 meeting the Drafting Committee decided to retain it. is a
practice drawn from UCC Article 9. What is the Committee’s pleasure?
The definition in paragraph (3) also
is drawn from the definition of “person related to” in UCC § 9-102(a), but adds
subparagraph
(C). Subparagraph (D)
has been modified to declare that a person that receives more than $25,000 from
a provider is an affiliate of that provider. Paragraph 3 also
stipulates that an owner or director of
the recipient is an affiliate. Since the purpose of defining “affiliate” is to require
independent boards of directors and prevent self-dealing, the level of
ownership necessary to constitute “affiliate” should be
relatively low. Is 10 percent the appropriate level of
ownership necessary to trigger this status? Similarly, is $25,000 the
appropriate level of benefit? The Committee will need to
consider whether ten percent is the appropriate level of ownership to make one
an affiliate and whether the threshold for directors should be stated in terms
of a specific dollar amount (and what that amount should be) or in terms of a
vague standard such as receipt of “non-trivial amounts of payment.” Under
paragraph (3)(CD) a person is
not an affiliate until after the person of
which it is an owner, employee, or director has received $25,001 in the
relevant period.
The definition of “affiliate” does not include employees of the entity. Does it suffice that officers are included in “affiliate,” or does the Committee want to expand the definition further?
Paragraph (4)(agreement): This definition does not incorporate any requirement of “written” or “record.” An oral agreement is within this definition. Requirements of form appear in Sections 14-16.
Paragraph (4): The language
in the second set of brackets is drawn from the recently enacted Virginia
statute (§6.1-363.7(5)).
Paragraph (5) (bank): This definition is from UCC Revised
Article 1 (§ 1-201(b)(4)).
Former Pparagraph
(6)(debt-management plan): has been deleted. At the
October 2004 meeting the Committee decided to define “debt-management
plan” broadly, without reference to the payment mechanism or to the kind of
concessions the provider seeks to obtain for the individual. Thus the
definition includes what are often called debt-settlement programs. The
definition of debt-management plan has been replaced by new paragraph (12),
which defines “plan” to encompass what the previous draft called
“debt-management plan.” In the context of this
definition, “reduced” interest or fees encompasses the complete waiver or
elimination of them. The phrase “through a debt-management-services provider” has been
bracketed to raise the question whether it should be deleted: should the Act
anticipate a debt-management services industry in which the provider negotiates
a plan and the consumer pays the creditors directly? If so, paragraph (7)
should also be modified accordingly. The second bracketed clause is offered as
an alternative to the first. It would pull debt settlement plans into the definition
of “debt management plan.” This might simplify the Act by not having to define
“debt settlement plans” and in subsequent sections not having to refer to both
types of plans.
Paragraph (78)(debt-management
services): At the October 2004 meeting, the Committee decided
to expand the definition to encompass the activity of entities that act as an
intermediary between an individual and the individual’s creditors, for the
purpose of changing the terms of the original contract between the individual and
those creditors. That is, there is no requirement that the individual’s funds
flow through the provider. The definition includes credit-counseling agencies
and debt-settlement companies even if they do not have control over the
individual’s funds, as when they are in an account managed by the individual or
a third party.
The definition includes credit-counseling
agencies even if the concessions offered by creditors are not subject to
negotiation. It does not, however, encompass
a creditor that compromises a claim with its debtor. Although the creditor may
receive money from an individual, it is not for the purpose of “distributing”
that money to a creditor. And the definition does not encompass entities that
provide only educational or counseling services concerning management of
personal finance. At the March 2004 meeting, the
sense of the Drafting Committee was that the definition should encompass those
who provide only rehabilitation or counseling services and perhaps even those
who only provide education about personal finance. This so broadens the
definition that the Act would apply to colleges and even elementary schools
that provide instruction on personal finance. The Drafting Committee still
needs to decide the extent to which it desires the Act to go beyond regulating
those who receive or direct the individual’s money for distribution to
creditors. Pending that decision, the definition does not
encompass those entities that provide only
educational or counseling services concerning management of personal finance.
If the definition of debt-management plan is revised to
delete the phrase “through a debt-management-services provider,” the
definition of debt-management services needs to be revised, too. For example:
“Debt-management services” means acting as an
intermediary between an individual and one or more creditors of the individual
for the purpose of obtaining concessions, such as reduction of interest or
principal, in the terms of payment. [The term includes debt-settlement
services.]”
This definition encompasses
debt-settlement agencies, which are separately defined
in paragraph 10, whether they receive periodic payments from the
individual or instead have the individual establish an account for the
accumulation of money to be paid to creditors at the agency’s direction. The
definition does not encompass a creditor that compromises a claim with its
debtor. Although the creditor may receive money from an individual, it is not
for the purpose of “distributing” that money to a creditor.
Paragraph (8)(debt-management-services
agreement): This definition does not incorporate any
requirement of “written” or “record.” An oral agreement is within this
definition. Requirements of form appear in Sections 14-16.
Former Pparagraph
(9)(debt-management-services provider) has been deleted. The
relevant definition now appears in paragraph (13)(provider).: The purpose
of limiting the definition to persons that provide or offer to provide
debt-management services to more than three individuals is to exclude from the
scope of this Act persons who informally assist their friends or relatives by,
for example, accessing the individual’s checking account to pay the
individual’s bills. A person is not subject to the constraints placed on
debt-management-service providers until it has provided or offered to provide
debt-management services to the fourth individual. Thereafter, the person must
comply with this Act. The definition no longer includes an entity
that merely offers to provide debt-management services; the entity must provide
those services to more than three individuals. Once an entity is within the
definition, however, its advertising and other sales practices are subject to
the rules of the Act.
The definition encompasses both a nonresident agency that
serves individuals in this state and a resident agency that serves individuals
in other states. Under Section 3, however, the Act does not apply to
nonresident agencies that serve only nonresident individuals, even if their
method of solicitation (e.g., via the Internet) reaches individuals in this
state.
Former Pparagraph
(10)(debt-settlement services) has been deleted. The definition of
“debt-management services” encompasses the former definition of “debt-settlement
services.” : Some concern was expressed at the November 2003
meeting that the definition might encompass traditional counseling agencies,
which deal with credit card debt in which accrued and unpaid finance charge
becomes part of the debt. For the most part, the concessions offered by card
issuers are prospective, so that the items as to which the issuers make
concessions never become part of the principal of the debt. If a creditor’s
concessions consist of a waiver of accrued finance charge or delinquency
charges, that should not be viewed as waiver of any part of the principal of
the debt for purposes of the definitions in the Act.
As a further precaution, the definition also uses the
number of payments to the creditor as a criterion. The current practice of
debt-settlement agencies is to make one payment to the creditor in full
satisfaction of the debt. The number in the definition, however, whould be set
at a level to prevent agencies from making a slight change in their model in
order to avoid being categorized as debt-settlement-services provider. Is four
the optimal number? One possibility is to delete the bracketed phrase
altogether. This has the advantage of accommodating a change in the model
adopted by debt-settlement-service providers. It has the disadvantage, however,
of allowing a debt-management-services provider that is not also a
debt-settlement-services provider to bring itself within the definition of
debt-settlement-services provider merely by negotiating the reduction of
principal with one creditor.
Paragraph (119)(employee):
The purpose of this definition is to prevent evasion of the Act by resort to
outsourcing the services necessary for running a debt-management-services
business. The phrase “related to debt-management services” is critical, because
it has the effect of excluding from the definition, e.g., an individual who
makes emergency repairs to the agency’s plumbing system. “Services related to
debt-management services” would include such things as marketing, customer
service, education, counseling, interaction with creditors, processing of
payments by individuals, and any other services provided by the agency to the
individual.
The definition encompasses paragraph
has been revised to state a definition (“means” rather than “includes”) and
broadened to encompass all persons who provide the specified
services, regardless of who signs the paycheck and regardless of whether the
employee works on-site at the provider’s place of business or elsewhere (e.g.,
the individual’s home or the site of an entity to which the provider has
outsourced the services). The definition does not apply
in Section 4, which excludes from the scope of the Act specified persons and
their employees.
Paragraph (1311)(person):
This definition conforms to the Conference’s standard definition. The
definition encompasses for-profit, not-for-profit, and tax-exempt entities.
Paragraph (12)(plan): At
the October 2004 meeting, observers representing debt-settlement
companies informed the Committee that they do not form plans. Instead, they
provide programs. The new definition of “plan” is designed to encompass both
what now are typically called “debt-management
plans” and the “programs” established
by debt-settlement companies. This
enables the operative provisions of the Act to use the term “plan” to apply to
both types of providers. To be a plan, the program or strategy
need not encompass all the debts of the individual. E.g., debt-management
plans by traditional credit-counseling
agencies have not typically included secured debt or debts owed utilities. No provision of this Act
requires that a provider deal with all the creditors
of an individual to whom it provides debt-management services.
Paragraph (13)(provider): This
definition replaces former paragraph (9)(debt-management-services provider),
thereby enabling reference throughout the Act to “provider,”
rather than its more cumbersome predecessor. The purpose of limiting the
definition to persons that provide or offer to provide debt-management services
to more than three individuals is to exclude from the scope of this Act persons
who informally assist their friends or relatives by, for example, accessing the
individual’s checking account to pay the individual’s bills. A person is not
subject to the constraints placed on providers until it has provided or offered
to provide debt-management services to the fourth individual. Thereafter, the
person must comply with this Act. The definition does not include an entity
that merely offers to provide debt-management services; the entity must provide
those services to more than three individuals. Once an entity is within the
definition, however, its advertising and other sales practices are subject to
the rules of the Act.
The definition encompasses both a
non-resident entity that
serves individuals in this state and a resident entity that
serves individuals in other states. Under Section 3, however, the Act does not
apply to non-resident entities that
serve only non-resident individuals, even if
their method of solicitation (e.g., via the Internet) reaches individuals in
this state.
Paragraph (14)(record): This definition appears in UCC Revised Article 1 (§1-201(b)(31)).
Paragraph (15)(signed): This
paragraph formerly defined “spouse.” It now definesThe
definition of “signed” “signed,”
the definition of which is drawn from UCC Revised §§
1-201(b)(37) and 9-102(a)(7), and UETA § 2(8).
SECTION 3. APPLICATION: RESIDENTS AND NON-RESIDENTS. This [act] applies to a person if:
(1) it, its employees, or its agents are located in
this state [when it provides debt-management services]its
principal business office is located in this state or if it is formed under the
laws of this state;
(2) by any means, including electronic
communication, it solicits individuals located in this state to purchase obtain debt-management
services; or
(3) it enters into an debt-management-services
agreement with an individual whom it should reasonably know to be
located in or a resident of in this state.
Preliminary Comments
At the October 2004 meeting, the
Committee questioned whether subsection (1) was too broad, to the extent it
referred to “agents.” The purpose of this subsection is to enable the state to
regulate businesses that are located or operating within its borders,
regardless of the location of their customers. A state should be able to
regulate those entities that are physically present within its borders, as well
as those that are incorporated there but not otherwise present. Subsection (1)
has been revised accordingly and no longer refers to
employees and agents. Subsection (2) focuses on the location of the
provider’s customers, regardless of the location of the entity, e.g, an
independent call center, that does the soliciting. Subsection (3) also focuses on
the customer’s location, but the location as it is
known or should be known by the provider.
Under this provision section the
Act does not apply to: (1) a debt-management-services provider that
is not located in this state and that does not solicit or contract with
individuals in this state; (2) a provider whose web site is accessible by
residents of this state if the provider declines to do business with residents
of this state, in which event the provider is not soliciting individuals
located in this state; (3) an individual who, while living in another
state, forms an agreement with a non-resident provider debt-management-services
provider in another state and later
moves to this state; or (4) a resident of this state who forms an agreement
with a debt-management-services
provider located in another state while the individual temporarily
is in that other state, if the debt-management-services provider has
no notice
reason to know that the individual
resides in this state.
Section 16(a)(3) requires the agreement between a provider
and an individual to
state the individual’s address. If the individual supplies an address outside
this state, the provider may have no reason to know that the individual is a
resident of this state. The Act applies, however, if the individual is
physically present in this state when the agreement is formed, if the provider
has reason to know that fact.
At the Annual Meeting a commissioner suggested that
paragraph (1) needs to specify a time. Does the Committee agree?
This Act uses the term “individual” rather than “consumer.” The purpose of this usage is to enlarge the usual meaning of that term (viz., one who acquires goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes) to encompass individuals who have incurred debt for business purposes, including farming.
Subject to the limitations stated in
this section, the intention is for the Act to have as expansive a reach as is
constitutionally permissible. Common criteria for determining whether there is
a sufficient jurisdictional nexus for an Internet-based business include the
business’ targeting a specific jurisdiction and the presence of a customer of a
business in the jurisdiction. Some observers have objected that the Act ought
not apply to providers located in other states and that it is unconstitutional
for a statute to provide otherwise. A cursory review of legislation reveals
that statutes regulating debt-management
services often apply to non-resident
providers that do business with residents of the
state. E.g.,
The Act applies to “persons,” not just “providers.” But persons other than providers need not register. Almost all of the prohibitions and other constraints apply to “providers.” But see section 18 (“agreements” by persons that are not registered under this Act are voidable) and section 27 (liability of persons who cause or aid violations of the Act).
SECTION 4. EXEMPT PERSONS. This [act] does not apply to the following persons, or their employees, when the person or its employee is engaged in the regular course of its business or profession:
(1) a judicial officer, a person acting under a court order, or an assignee for the benefit of creditors;
(2) a state- or federally chartered bank;
(3) a title
insurer, escrow services company, or other person that provides bill-paying
services and does not negotiate with a payee concerning the
terms of paymentif the provision of debt-management services is
incidental to the bill-paying services;
[or]
(3) a state- or federally
chartered, insured bank;
(4) a person licensed under Section ____ as a (money
transmitter)];
(54) an attorney at law who is licensed
by this state if the provision of debt -management
services is incidental to the attorney’s practice; [or]
(65) an accountant licensed by this state if the
provision
of debt-management services is incidental to the accountant’s practice[; or
(6) a person licensed under Section ____ as a (money transmitter)].
Legislative Note: In paragraph (6)
insert the citation to any statute requiring money transmitters to be licensed,
conform the parenthetical to the terminology of that statute, and delete the
parentheses. If there is no such statute, paragraph (6) the
bracketed language should be omitted.
Preliminary Comments
In the March 2004 draft, the
exemption in this section applied to the enumerated persons only when providing
debt-management services is incidental to the regular course of the business or
profession of the person and its employees. In this draft, except for bill-paying
services, attorneys, and accountants, the exemption
applies even if debt debt-management
services constitute a majority of the entity’s business. Most of the exempt
entities are extensively regulated by the state or federal government
(paragraphs (1), (32), (4), (5),
(6)). Paragraph
(2) (bill payers) contains the built-in protection of not negotiating the terms
of payment.
The exemption for banks in subsection (2) extends to
subsidiaries of banks.
A debate arose at the Annual Meeting
concerning whether attorneys should be exempt. Attorneys are governed
by a code of conduct and elaborate disciplinary structure. On the other hand,
this structure is not always effective to protect clients. A law firm operating
as a debt-management-services
provider in The
Committee must decide whether to exempt attorneys (and others). Note that the
definition of debt-settlement services (securing creditor’s assent to accepting
partial payment in full satisfaction) encompasses common conduct of attorneys. A
correspondent, whose letter to the Committee is posted on the Committee’s web
site (www.nccusl.org/Update/CommitteeSearchResults.aspx?Committee=222) questions
the soundness of the reasoning underlying this decision. The correspondent
makes a good point, and the Committee may wish to
reconsider.
A second issue concerning this
exemption which needs further attention is whether the exemption should be
limited to attorneys who are licensed in this state. In connection with
creating an exemption for attorneys, the Conference does not ask
each enacting state to make a judgment whether that state’s system of self-regulation
by attorneys is effective.
Rather, the Conference indulges in a presumption that it is. This suggests that the
Conference should not ask a state to make that judgment about another state’s
system. It probably is desirable for the exemption to
encompass attorneys who are licensed in any jurisdiction. If the Committee
agrees, paragraph (4) could read, “ a person who
is licensed by a jurisdiction in the
An earlier version of this section
exempted a creditor that negotiates or receives settlement of a debt an
individual owes it. The definition of “debt-management services” speaks of
“acting as an intermediary between an individual and one or more creditors.”
With this language in place, it is not has been
revised to incorporate the requirement that the provider receive money for the
purpose of “distributing” it to one or more creditors. A creditor that receives
payment from an individual does not “distribute” that payment to itself. Hence,
it is no longer necessary for an exemption for creditors to appear
in this section, since a creditor acting on its own behalf is not
acting as an intermediary.
Paragraph (23)
exempts entities
that provide bill-paying services if negotiation of the terms of
payment is incidental to the services generally provided by the entity.provided by
an entity that does not negotiate the terms of payment. Additional eExamples
of
exempt entities include mortgage loan servicers, some athletes’
agents, or
artists’ agents, and financial planners, executors
of estates, and personal
representatives of decedents. These entities are exempt so long as
they
do not negotiatenegotiation of payment amounts with the individual
creditors is incidental to their overall services.
Some states exempt title insurers, mortgage loan
servicers, or business liquidators. Others, e.g., Maine, exempt only attorneys
and supervised financial institutions.
Executors and personal representatives of decedents
should not be subject to the Act. Is a specific exemption necessary, e.g., “an
executor or other person administering the estate of a decedent”? Current
legislation is silent.
Preliminary Comments
There are at least three models for a registration
requirement: (a) registration based on bare-bones information; (b) registration
based on detailed information, with or without the power of the state to deny
registration; (c) licensing based upon an examination of the applicant. Each of
these models may be found in existing legislation governing
debt-management-services providers. The Athlete’s Agents Act, suggested as a
model at the November 2003 meeting, follows the second approach. At the March
2004 meeting, the Drafting Committee concurred.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a person may not provide debt-management services to more than three individuals per year unless the person is registered under this [act]. Registration is valid for one year.
(b) A debt-management-services provider must
renew its registration every year.
(c) If a person is registered under this [act],
the registration requirement of subsection (a) does not apply to the officers, employees, and or agents
of the person.
(d) The administrator shall maintain and make
public the names of all persons registered as debt-management-services providers
under this [act].
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a) requires persons
providing debt-management services to be registered under this Act. Under
Section
3 this requirement extends to debt-management-services
providers located in other states, if they serve individuals who
reside in this state.
Subsection (b): Section 2(13) defines “provider”
as “a person that . . . has provided debt-management services to more than
three individuals” in a year.
Subsection (d): The objective of
this subsection is to enable individuals and creditors to ascertain whether a
given debt-management-services
provider is registered. Posting on the Internet web site of the
administrator (or other appropriate official site) is the preferred method,
because the information is instantaneously and continuously available. To
“maintain” the list, the administrator must regularly update
it
regularly.
SECTION 6. APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION: FORM AND CONTENTS.
(a) An application for registration must be in a form prescribed by the administrator.
(b) An application for registration must be accompanied by:
(1) the fee established by the administrator;
(2) the bond or other assurance required by
Section 12 ;
(3) identification of all trust accounts required
by Section 19 ; and
(4) evidence of insurance against the risks of
dishonesty, fraud, theft, or other malfeasance or misconduct on the part of an
employee or agent of the applicant in the amount of [$250,000]; [and]
(5) proof of compliance with Section _______[; and
(6) evidence of tax-exempt status under Section
501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, 42 U.S.C. §501(c), as amended].a record
consenting to the jurisdiction of this state containing:
(A) the name, address, and other contact
information of its registered agent in this state for purposes of service of
process; or
(B) the appointment of the [administrator] as
agent of the debt-management-services provider for
purposes of service of process.
(c) An application for registration must be signed under oath and include[, as applicable]:
(1) the applicant’s name, principal business
address and telephone number, and all other business addresses in this
state, electronic mail addresses, and Internet web site addresses;
(2) all names under which the applicant conducts business;
(3) the address of each location in this state at which the applicant will provide debt-management services, unless the applicant will have no such location, in which event it shall disclose that fact;
(4) the name and home address of each officer or
director of the applicant and each person that owns more than 10 percent has an
ownership interest greater than ten percent of the applicant;
(5) identification of every jurisdiction in which the
applicant or any of its officers or directors has been licensed or registered
or has accepted individuals for debt-management services
during the five years immediately preceding the application; with respect
to each of the three calendar years immediately preceding the year of the
application:
(A)
the number of individuals who entered a debt-management plan or a
debt-settlement plan and made at least one payment in that year; and
(B)
the number of those individuals who either completed the plan or who are still
making payments pursuant to the plan;
(C)
the ratio of the number in subparagraph (B) to the number in subparagraph (A);
(6) a statement describing, to the extent it is known or
after reasonable investigation should be known, any material civil
or criminal judgment, tax lien, or litigation, and a
statement describing, to the extent it is known or after reasonable
investigation should be known, any material administrative
or enforcement action by a government agency in any state [jurisdiction]
against the applicant or against any of its officers, directors, or owners or , [or]
employees[, or affiliates] any person with authority to
access the trust account required by Section 19;
[(7) the applicant’s federal employer
identification number and every state identification number for each state in
which the applicant has a state identification number;]
(87)
the applicant’s audited financial statements for each of the two years
immediately preceding the application or for each year of its existence if it has
not been in operation for the two years preceding the application, unless the
applicant does not have audited financial statements, in which event, unaudited
financial statements;
(9) evidence of any accreditation by a nationally
recognized accrediting organization approved by the administrator;
(108) evidence that, within 12 months after their
initial employment, each of the applicant’s counselors is a certified
counselor;
(119) a description of the three most commonly used
educational programs that the applicant provides or intends to provide to
individuals and copies of any materials used or to be used in those programs;
(1210) a description of the applicant’s financial
analysis and initial budget plan, including any form or electronic model, used
to evaluate the financial condition of individuals;
(1311) a copy of each current form of debt-management-services
agreement that the applicant will use with residents of this state;
(1412) the applicant’s current schedule
or schedules of fees and charges that the applicant will use with individuals
who
are residents of this statewill incur;
(1513) at the applicant’s expense, the results of a
criminal records check, including fingerprints, conducted within the
immediately preceding 12 months, on every officer and on every
employee or agent of the applicant who is authorized to have access to the
trust account required by Section 19 or, if an applicant has submitted this
information to another state, a copy of the report from the background check
conducted for that state; and
(16) an irrevocable consent signed by the
applicant and the bank at which the trust account required by Section 19
is to be maintained, providing that if the administrator in connection
with enforcement of this [act] pursuant to Section 26 so demands, the bank will turn over to the
administrator all money, books, records, accounts, and other property of the
applicant in its control; and
(1714) any other information that the administrator
reasonably requires.
(d) The application also must
include, [Iif
the applicant is organized as a non-profit entity under Section _____ or has
obtained tax-exempt status under Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code,
42 U.S.C. § 501(c), as amended,] the application also must include:
(1) the employers of each director during the ten years immediately preceding the application;
(2) a description of any ownership interest equal to or greater
than ten
10 percent of an officer, director,
owner, or employee of the applicant in any affiliate of the applicant or in any
other entity that provides products or services to the applicant or any
individual relating to the applicant’s debt-management services;
(3) the compensation of the applicant’s five most highly compensated employees for each of the three years immediately preceding the application; and
(4) if the applicant is organized
as a non-profit entity under Section _____ or has obtained tax-exempt status
under Section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, 42 U.S.C. § 501(c), as
amended:
(A)
evidence of tax-exempt status under Section 501(c) of the Internal
Revenue Code; and ]
(B)
the identity of each director who is an affiliate, as defined
in the paragraphs of Section 2 other than paragraph (3)(C), of the
applicant.
(5) a detailed description of the applicant’s
legal structure.
(e) The applicant or registered debt-management-services
provider shall notify the administrator within 10 days after a
change in its name, principal business address, principal telephone number, or
the information specified in subsections (b)(4) or (5) or (c)(1), (3), or (6), (11), or (12), or
(d)(4) .
Legislative Notes: In
subsection (b)(5), insert the
citation to the statute specifying the prerequisites for an entity to do
business in this state. If the state has no such statute, it may substitute the
following for subsection (b)(5):
(5) a record consenting to the
jurisdiction of this state containing:
(A)
the name, address, and other contact information of its registered agent in
this state for purposes of service of process; or
(B)
the appointment of the [administrator or other state official] as agent
of the provider for purposes of service of process.
the state
may wish to name its secretary of state or other official as the agent for
service of process.
If
the state wishes to permit for-profit entities to provide debt-management
services, the bracketed language containing subsection (b)(6) should
be deleted. If the state wishes to limit debt-management services to non-profit
entities, the brackets should be deleted.
In
subsection (d)(introduction), insert the citation to the statute that
authorizes the formation of not-for-profit corporations. If the
state does not permit for-profit entities to provide debt-management services,
the bracketed language should be deleted.
In
states in which the constitution does not permit the phrase “as amended”
when federal statutes are incorporated into state law, the phrase should be
deleted in subsections (b)(6), (d)(introduction), and (d)(4).
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a): The “Form”
encompasses format, and the administrator by rule may require
or permit all or part of the application to be submitted electronically.
Subsections (b)(2) and (3) refer to items “required by” other sections. If those other sections do not require the item as to a particular applicant, then the application need not contain proof of the item.
Subsection (b)(4) requires insurance in
the amount of $250,000 against the risk of employee misconduct, including theft of
funds from the trust account. It is not common under existing state law to
require both this kind of insurance and also a bond of the type required by
section 12. The two requirements, however, protect
against different risks. The insurance required by this section protects
against the risk of employee dishonesty. The proceeds of the
insurance policy would be payable to the provider and would enable
it to continue operating. The bond required
by section 12 protects against the risk of violation of any provision of this
Act. The proceeds would be paid to or for the benefit of the administrator and
the customers of the provider.
The purpose of subsection (b)(5) is
to facilitate subjecting a non-resident
business to the jurisdiction of this state. If the applicant is a resident, so
that the statute referenced in this
subsection does not apply to it, the applicant complies with this subsection by
indicating that fact. If existing statutes leave doubt about the
mechanism for serving process on the provider and the state has chosen not
to enact the language suggested in the Legislative Note, the
administrator can promulgate a rule requiring the applicant to appoint a state
official as the provider’s agent for purposes of service
of process.
Subsection (c): Paragraph (1) requires
disclosure of all business addresses At the October 2004 meeting,
the Committee decided that paragraph (1) should require disclosure only of business
addresses in this state. Other than the principal
business address, it is not necessary for the applicant to list business
addresses outside this state. As now drafted, it requires
this information of agencies located in other states, as well as agencies
located in the state of enactment. For agencies headquartered in this state, it
may (or may not) make sense to require disclosure of all business addresses in
other states. It makes less sense to require an agency headquartered elsewhere
to disclose all its business addresses in all states in which it operates. What
is the Drafting Committee’s pleasure?
Paragraph (3) contemplates
disclosure of the address of places all facilities like
call centers and back-office operations, that are part of the
provider’s operations. It does not, however, require disclosure of
but
not the addresses of employees who work from home. If the
applicant has no physical presence in this state, that must be disclosed.
Former pParagraphs
(56)-(7)
(identification of states in which the applicant has done business during the preceding
five years and states in which the applicant has ever been or has been registered
or licensed to provide debt-management services) has been restored, to enable
the administrator to investigate the applicant and to coordinate enforcement
efforts with administrators in other states. have been
deleted in an effort to reduce the length of the application. Does the Drafting
Committee concur?
Former paragraph (8) (disclosure of states that have
taken enforcement action against the applicant) has been incorporated into new
paragraph (7).
Paragraph (5) (formerly paragraph (9)): This draft
reverts to require disclosure of the success/failure rate during the scheduled
life of a plan or during a portion of the plan. Industry participants explained
that after a certain point in the life of a typical plan, it is common for
individuals to self-administer their plans. The purpose of a disclosure
requirement concerning the success/failure rate of a counseling agency is to
provide some indication of the extent to which an agency is channeling into
DMP’s individuals for whom there is no realistic hope of success. A second
purpose is to provide a basis for comparing one provider with another. The
prior draft required the applicant to disclose the extent to which an agency’s
debt-management plans actually are enabling individuals to reduce their debt,
as follows:
with respect
to each of the second through fifth calendar years immediately preceding the
year of the application:
(A) for all individuals who entered
debt-management plans and made at least one payment to the applicant that year,
the aggregate debt in those plans;
(B) the aggregate distribution to
creditors of those individuals from the aggregate payments made by those
individuals since the inception of their plans; and
(C) the ratio of the number in
subparagraph (B) to the number in subparagraph (A);
Some agencies enroll individuals in
plans only when the agency receives the individual’s first payment. Others
establish the plan in advance of the first payment. To provide similar
treatment to the agencies without regard to which of these models they follow,
the calculations required by this alternative focus on plans in which the
individual makes a payment. But the phrase “at least one payment” in subparagraph
(A) includes a set-up or other fee, as well as a payment of money that is to be
distributed to creditors.
Some individuals may enter a plan in
December of one year and make their first payment in January of the following
year. In making the calculation required by this alternative, the agency may treat the plan
and the payment as occurring in the same year and may select either of the two
years (but not both) for that purpose. If the individual enrolls in a plan but
never makes any payment to the agency, the agency should exclude that
individual’s debt from its calculations.
The Committee must decide whether to
require disclosure of these statistics, disclosure of the success/failure rate,
or neither.
Paragraph (7) (former paragraph
(11)) has been bracked for possible deletion: of what use is this information
to the administrator?
Paragraph (6) requires disclosure of
material judicial and administrative proceedings in any jurisdiction against
the officers, directors, owners, and persons
authorized to access the trust account containing
customers’ funds. The administrator by rule can elaborate on what proceedings
are material. This paragraph does not impose any disclosure
requirement with respect to proceedings of which the applicant is reasonably unaware.
Paragraph (87)
(former
paragraph 13) (requires audited financial statements only if the
applicant has them. If the applicant is not in the practice of
obtaining audited statements, this
paragraph does not require them. This is contrary to many existing statutes,
which require an
applicant to supply audited financial statements.): There are
two problems with the former version of this requirement. First, an applicant
may not have been in business for two years. Second, the applicant may not be in
the practice of obtaining audits of its financial statements. Does the draft
address these situations appropriately?
Paragraph (9) (former paragraph
(15)): At the March 2004 meeting the Drafting Committee tentatively decided to
abandon any requirement that a debt-management-services
provider be accredited. Hence this paragraph merely
requires the agency to inform the administrator whether it is accredited. This
information may assist the administrator in determining whether further
investigation is warranted. If this decision is reversed, and it should be,
paragraphs (9) and (10) can be combined.
Paragraph (108) (former
paragraph (16)): To obtain registration, a debt-management-services provider
must employ counselors who are certified within 12 months of their initial
employment. This requirement applies only to employees who act as counselors
and educators. It does not apply to such other employees as customer service
representatives. Section 14 prohibits a debt-management or
debt-settlement plan unless a certified counselor has done
specified things. The reason for requiring an applicant to produce
evidence that its counselors are certified is In one sense paragraph (10) may not be
necessary. But it may be desirable to require the applicant to
assure the administrator that it the provider will
be able to comply with section 14, i.e. that its employees are
qualified.
Paragraph (119) (former
paragraph (19)): As used in this paragraph, “programs” encompasses
both a course of instruction, which may be entirely oral, and computer
software.
Paragraph (1311) former
paragraph (21)): An agency, whether located in this
state or located elsewhere, need supply
only the documents that it will use with residents of this state. Section 26(c)(1)
empowers the administrator to investigate the activities in another
jurisdiction of a provider that is located in or doing
business in this state. Under that section the administrator may obtain
documents used in other jurisdictions. An agency located in this
state, however, may use different forms for individuals who reside in other
states. This subsection requires the agency to file a copy of each with its
application. If a form used in another state violates a provision of this Act,
Section 34 determines whether the violation is
actionable.
Paragraph (12)14) (former
paragraph (22)): As with paragraph (1311),
an agency located
an
applicant, whether located in this state or elsewhere,
need supply only the schedules of fees and charges for residents of this state.
For
purposes of this paragraph, “fees and charges” includes all costs, however
denominated (e.g., “voluntary contribution”), to be paid by customers of the
applicant. An agency located in this state must supply the
schedules used for residents of other states, too. This
information will enable the administrator to monitor the industry’s practices
in the state. It should assist the administrator in determining whether an
individual agency is gouging individuals, as well as whether to encourage the
legislature to raise the fee cap when the passage of time or changed
circumstances make it too low.
Paragraphs (11) and (12) require
information that is current as of the time
of the application. An applicant is free to modify the forms or the fees
without prior approval, unless the administrator adopts a rule to
the contrary. Subsection (e) of this section requires the provider to notify
the administrator within 10 days of any changes in specified information
required by this section, including the information
required by paragraphs (11) and (12).
Paragraph (1513) (former
paragraph (23)): In some jurisdictions the mechanics and
procedures for obtaining fingerprints are quite burdensome. This paragraph
attempts to reduce the burden by permitting an applicant that has gone through
this process in one state to use the results of the process for a period of 12 months in
other states, too. in this state, too.The 12-month limitation
applies to the criminal-records check, not the time
of submission to the other state. The criminal-records
check must include a check of fingerprints, but the
fingerprints need not have been obtained during the 12-month period.
Former paragraph (16), which required an applicant to provide an irrevocable consent giving the administrator access to the trust account, has been deleted. In its place is new subsection 26(c)(4), empowering the administrator to obtain the funds, as well as all books and records, from the bank holding the trust account.
Paragraph (16) (former paragraph
(24)): In the draft for the March 2004 meeting, this paragraph had two parts,
one addressing accounts at a bank located in this state and one addressing
accounts at a bank located in another state. If an administrator from any state
seizes even a portion of the money and records, that seizure would effectively
freeze the entire operation of the debt-management-services
provider. Consequently, the Drafting Committee decided to
collapse the two parts into one. In response to the requirements of this
paragraph, it is likely that a bank would provide its irrevocable consent only
if the account contains the money of individuals from a single state. This
would mean that a debt-management-services provider would have
to establish a separate trust account for each state whose residents it serves.
The Drafting Committee may wish to consider this further.
Paragraph (1714) (former
paragraph (25)): The administrator may require additional
information either by rulemaking procedure applicable to all applicants or
by specific request in response to an a specific application.
Subsection (d) is new. It
reflects the decision to authorize for-profit entities. Some of the required
disclosures for non-profits in the prior draft may not be appropriate
disclosures for for-profit entities. Subsection (d) collects several
paragraphs from the prior draft to specify in one
place additional disclosures for non-profit entities. An observer
at the October 2004 meeting suggested that these disclosures be required of all
entities, so as not to make the requirements for non-profits more onerous than for
for-profits. The reporter’s notes from that meeting
fail to reflect any decision by the Committee with respect to this suggestion.
Pending review by the Committee, this draft incorporates the suggestion. (If the
Committee’s decision is to require these disclosure only of non-profits, the
brackets will come off in the introductory clause, and the reference to non-profits in
paragraph (4) will be deleted.)
Subsection (e): The cross-referenced
sections require evidence of insurance against employee misconduct
and disclosure of the name of the applicant’s registered agent, the name
of the applicant, the addresses at which it operates, enforcement action
against the applicant in another state, the applicant’s fee schedule
and standard forms, and tax-exempt status. Subsection (de)
requires immediate notification of any change in this information, and since it
applies to the “applicant or registered provider,” even though
the subsection speaks of an “application,” this requirement of
notification applies both before and after the administrator has issued a
certificate of registration. Notification of change in other required
information is governed by Section 10 (Renewal of Registration),
which requires notification at the time of renewal of registration.
At the Annual Meeting a commissioner
suggested that subsection (e) should include references to other subsections,
specifically former subsection (c)(18), referring to evidence of
insurance against employee misconduct. This requirement has been
moved to Section 5. Should this or any other paragraph in Section 6(c) be
referenced in subsection (e)?
SECTION 7. APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION: PUBLIC INFORMATION.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the administrator shall make available to the public the information in an application for registration.
(b) The administrator shall preserve the
confidentiality of the information required by Section 6(c)(7) and (13) and the
addresses required by Section 6(c)(4). (4), (8), and (15), except
that the information required by Section 6(c)(15)
is subject to legal process in connection with public or private
enforcement of this [act].
Preliminary Comments
This preserves the confidentiality
of home addresses, financial statements, and, except in litigation,
the report on the criminal records check. This section prohibits the
administrator from disclosing the specified information. It has no effect on the use of
judicial process in connection with civil or criminal litigation. Public
disclosure of some information, e.g., financial statements, may undermine the
competitiveness of the applicant. Is there other information that should be
shielded from public disclosure, e.g., the information required by paragraphs
(12)-(14)?
SECTION 8. CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION: ISSUANCE OR DENIAL.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(b), the administrator shall issue a certificate of registration to a person
that complies with Section 6 .
(b) The administrator [may][shall] may deny
registration if:
(1) the application is not accompanied by the fee established by the administrator;
(2) the application contains information that is materially erroneous or incomplete;
(3) an officer, director, owner, or employee of the applicant has ever been convicted of a crime or suffered a civil judgment involving violation of state or federal securities laws, moral turpitude, or dishonesty;
(4) the applicant or any of its officers, directors, owners, or employees has ever defaulted in the payment of money collected for others;
(5) the administrator finds that the financial responsibility, experience, character, or general fitness of the applicant or its officers, directors, owners, employees, or agents is not such as to warrant the belief that the business will be operated in compliance with this [act]; or
(c) (6) with [With respect to
non-profit or tax-exempt applicants,] the administrator shall deny
registration if the board of directors is not independent of the
applicant’s officers, employees, and agents.
(cd) A board of directors is not independent under for purposes
of subsection (c) (b)(6) if more
than [one-fourth][one-third]
of its members:
(1) are affiliates of the applicant as defined in the paragraphs of Section 2 other than paragraph (3)(C); or
(2) within [10]
years after first becoming a director of the applicant, were employed by or
directors of a person that receives or received from the applicant more than [$25,000]
in either the current year or the preceding year.
Legislative Note: If the state limits registration
to non-profit entities, the bracketed language in subsection (c) should be
deleted. If the state permits for-profit entities, the
brackets should be deleted.
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (b): Some
conduct justifies a lifetime ban from the debt-management-services industry.
Examples appear include some of the conduct
described in paragraphs (3) and (4). Other conduct can be readily
corrected, e.g., paragraphs (1)-() and (2).
and
perhaps (6). Paragraph (5)The introductory language of the subsection
(administrator “may” deny) gives the administrator discretion to
consider the importance of various items of adverse information about an
applicant, such as the precise nature and timing of past criminal conduct.
Paragraph (5) gives the administrator
discretion to consider other relevant information, such as the fact
of and reasons for any suspension or revocation of the applicant’s right to
provide debt-management services in another state.
Subsection (c) replaces former Paragraphsubsection
(b)(6). It
requires that the board of directors of a non-profit provider be
independent of the management of the agency and independent of the creditors
for whom the agency is, in a sense, acting as collection agent. If the board
of directors is not independent, the administrator must deny registration. Under
former subsection (b)(6), denial of registration was discretionary.
Subsection (d): Since
the definition of “affiliate” includes directors, the board of directors
could not possibly be independent. Hence paragraph (1) excludes directors from
the definition of affiliates for purposes of determining the independence of
the board. subsection (c)(1) excludes
that portion of the definition. If the applicant has no board
of directors, subsection (6) is inoperative. The Committee should consider
whether it wants to impose the independent-board requirement on for-profit
entities. If it does, then we must consider what requirements are appropriate
for other forms of business organizations, e.g., LLC and LP.
At the Annual Meeting a commissioner
disagreed with the first two sentences of this comment. He suggested that
denial of registration be discretionary with the administrator, who should be
able to consider mitigating circumstances in deciding whether to issue a
registration certificate to an applicant that, e.g., employs a person convicted
of fraud in the distant past. The Committee must decide whether the proper verb
in subsection (b) is “may” or “shall.”
SECTION 9. CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION: TIMING.
(a) The administrator shall approve or deny an
initial registration within [60] days after an
application [satisfying the requirements of Section 6 ]
is filed. In connection with a
request pursuant to section 6(c)(14) for additional information, theThe
administrator may extend the [60]-day period [for
up to {60}
days].
[If the administrator does not act on the application before the expiration of
the period, the application is approveddenied.], and the
administrator shall issue a certificate of registration.] Within
seven days after denying an application, the administrator, in a record, shall
inform the applicant of the reasons for the denial.
(b) If the administrator denies an applicant’s
application for registration [or fails to act on an application within the time
specified in subsection (a)], the applicant, before the expiration of within [30]
days after receiving notice of the denial, may appeal and request a
hearing pursuant to Section ____.
Legislative Note: In subsection (b) insert the citation to the appropriate section of the Administrative Procedure Act or other statute governing administrative procedure, and conform the number in brackets to the period specified in that Act.
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a) requires the
administrator to act on an application in an expeditious manner. If the
administrator needs additional information, the administrator may extend the
period, but only for a limited time. Four approaches are possible for dealing
with the administrator’s failure to act on an application within the
specified time. The first approach is to treat the failure to act promptly as
an approval of the application. This remedy operates to the detriment of the
public, and the Committee rejected it at the October 2004 meeting.
The second approach is the
converse of deeming the application approved: the
application is deemed to be denied, and the applicant may exercise its right of
appeal under subsection (b). To implement this alternative, one would add the
bracketed sentence in subsection (a).
This is the cleanest of the alternatives.
In the third approach,
the bracketed sentence in subsection (a) is omitted and the bracketed clause in
subsection (b) is added. Subsection (b) then would authorize a judicial appeal
if the application is denied
or if the administrator fails to act in a timely manner.
The fourth approach is to delete the
bracketed material in both subsections and implicitly leave the entire matter
to be handled by judicial procedure, such as mandamus.
The Committee discussed these
alternatives at the October 2004 meeting, but did not decide which one to
adopt. Which approach does the Committee prefer?
At the Annual Meeting a commissioner
suggested that the administrator’s power to extend the consideration period
should not be unbounded. Does the Committee agree?
Another commissioner commented on
subsection (a) as follows: “Subsection (a) requires action by the administrator
only if an application ‘satisfies the requirements of Section 6.’ This suggests
that no action is required if some of the information required by Section 6 is
not included or is incomplete. The bracketed material then provides for a
default approval. Questions will necessarily arise as to whether an application
not acted upon is approved, depending upon the sufficiency of the information.
Perhaps the phrase ‘satisfying the requirements of Section 6’ should be
deleted. I don’t think an automatic default approval should be allowed.” In
other words, the automatic approval language is a mechanism for enforcing the
administrator’s duty to act on an application, but it enforces that duty at the
expense of the public if the application does not meet the standards for
registration. Should the bracketed sentence be deleted?
SECTION 10. RENEWAL OF REGISTRATION.
(a) An application for renewal of registration must be in a form prescribed by the administrator. It must:
(1) be filed no more than 60 and no fewer than 30 days before the registration expires;
(2) be accompanied by the fee established by the
administrator and the bond or other assurance required by Section 12 ;
(3) be signed under oath;
(4) contain the matter required for initial
registration by Section 6(c)(8)(5) , (9), and
(10) and a financial statement of the kind required by Section
6(c)(87)
for the applicant’s fiscal year immediately preceding the application;
(5) disclose any changes in the information contained in the applicant’s application for registration or its immediately previous application for renewal, as applicable;
(6) supply evidence of insurance against risks of
dishonesty, fraud, theft, or other malfeasance or misconduct on the part of an
employee or agent of the provider, in an amount equal to the highest daily
balance in the trust account required by Section 19 during the six-month period immediately
preceding the application;
(7) disclose the total amount of money received by it or its designee during the preceding 12 months from or on behalf of individuals who reside in this state and the total amount of money distributed to creditors of those individuals during that period; and
(8) disclose the total amount of money
accumulated during the preceding 12 months pursuant to plans by or on
behalf of individuals who reside in this state and with whom
it has agreements; and
(89) provide any other information that the
administrator [by rule]reasonably
requires.
(b) Except for the information specified in
Section 7(b) , the
administrator shall make available to the public the information in an
application for renewal of registration.
(c) The administrator shall approve or deny an
application for renewal of registration within [30]
days after receiving it. The administrator may extend the [30]-day
period, but the registration remains effective until the administrator, by
record, notifies the applicant of a denial and states in the record the reasons
for the denial.
(d) If the administrator denies an applicant’s application
for renewal of registration, the applicant, within 30 days after receiving
notice of the denial, may appeal and request a hearing pursuant to Section
____. Until
the appeal process is final, the applicant may continue to provide debt-management
services. Thereafter, subject to the administrator’s order and Ssubject
to Section 29(c), the applicant may [must] continue serving its existing
customers until, with the approval of the administrator, it transfers them to
another registered debt-management-services provider.
Legislative Note: In subsection (d) insert the citation to the appropriate section of the Administrative Procedure Act or other statute governing administrative procedure.
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a): The cross-referenced
provisions in paragraph (4) requires
disclosure
of the ratio of individual payments to individual debt, proof of agency
accreditation, and proof of counselor certification. The
financial statement required by section 6(c)(7) is not necessarily an audited
statement. Does the Committee want to impose a requirement that,
once registered, providers must obtain audited financial statements? In paragraph
(8) the brackets have been added, to suggest deletion of the phrase. Section
6(c)(17) permits the administrator to require an applicant to supply additional
information. This paragraph should be parallel.
Paragraphs (7) and (8) require
disclosure of amounts paid or accumulated by individuals with whom the
applicant has agreements. These amounts determine the size of the bonds
required by section 12. Paragraph (7)
refers to providers and their agents that receive and distribute
the individual’s money. Paragraph (8) is new; it
applies to providers that do not take possession of those
funds.
Subsection (b): The home
addresses, financial statements, and criminal-records
check, as disclosed
in an application for registration or in an application for renewal, remain
exempt from public disclosure. : The
information required by Section 6(c)(4) and (15) (home
addresses and criminal records check) as disclosed in the
application for registration or in an application for renewal remains exempt
from public disclosure.
Subsection (c): The grounds for
denial of an application to renew registration appear in Section 29. The administrator has 30 days
to act on the application. The number “30” is bracketed
pending the Drafting Committee’s decision concerning the appropriate number. In
this draft the The 30-day period starts running upon
receipt of an application, not receipt of a proper application. The latter date
might never occur, in which event the registration would remain effective
forever. Does the Committee concur with this change?
Subsection (d): When a provider’s registration
ends, section 5(a) prohibits it from
providing debt-management services. An abrupt end to the provider’s activity,
however, may adversely affect its customers who are in the middle of a plan.
Consequently, this subsection authorizes the administrator to permit or compel
the entity to continue providing services to existing customers. The Drafting
Committee has identified but not yet considered the issue presented by the
second sentence of this subsection, dealing with the aftermath of a denial of
renewal of registration.
SECTION
11. REGISTRATION IN ANOTHER STATE. A person that has submitted an application
for, and holds a certificate of, either registration or renewal of
registration as a debt-management-services provider in
another state may submit a copy of that application and certificate in lieu of
an application in the form prescribed by Section 6(a) and (c) or Section
10(a). The administrator shall accept the application and the
certificate from the other state as an application for registration or for
renewal of registration, as appropriate, in this state if the application to the other
state:
(1) the application to the other state contains information substantially similar to or more comprehensive than that required in an application submitted in this state; and
(2) was submitted to the other state within the six
months immediately preceding the submission of the application to this state
and the applicant, under oath:
(A) certifies that the information contained in the application is current; or
(B) provides current information.
Preliminary Comments
This section is drawn from the Athlete’s
Agent Act. Paraphrasing a comment to that Act, the subsection provides
for reciprocal use of applications in states that have adopted this Act. It simplifies
registration in states that have substantially similar laws, The need for
a debt-management-services provider to
comply with substantially different application procedures in multiple
jurisdictions is eliminated. This is intended to ease thereby
easing the burden placed on debt-management-services providers
that operate in multiple states. Paragraph (1) makes that This benefit is
available to the debt-management-services
provider, however, only if the law of the other state is substantially
similar to this Act. As a practical matter, a debt-management-services provider
can comfortably rely on this section only if the other state has also adopted
this Act. Under paragraph (2) the application must have been
submitted to the other state within the last six months. Since subparagraphs
(A) and (B) require the information to be accurate when the application is
submitted to this state, however, the rationale for the six-month requirement
is not clear. The Committee may wish to consider abandoning it.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(h), every debt-management-services provider
shall file a surety bond with the administrator.
(b) The surety bond must run concurrently with the period of registration and for two years thereafter if the provider ceases providing debt-management services to individuals in this state.
(c) If the principal place of business of a debt-management-services
provider is:
(1) located in this state, a surety bond must run
to the
customers of individuals who obtain
debt-management services from the provider and to the state for
the benefit of the state and those individuals, the customers of the provider,
wherever located; or
(2) not located in this state, a surety bond must
run to the individuals who obtain debt-management services
from customers of the provider and who
reside in this state and to the state for the benefit of the state and those
individualsthe customers of the provider who reside in this
state.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (f), a surety bond must:
(1) be in an amount equal to the larger of [$100,000]
orand [the sum of
amounts deposited in the trust account required by Section 19
on each of the 180 days immediately preceding the date of application
for registration or renewal of registration, divided by six] [three [two]
times the average daily balance in the trust account required by
Section 19 during the six months immediately
preceding the date of the application for registration or renewal of
registration];, whichever is larger, or in
such other amount that the administrator determines is warranted by the
financial condition and business experience of the provider, the history of the
provider in providing debt-management services, the potential loss to individuals, and any
other factor the administrator considers appropriate;
(2) be issued by a bonding, surety, or insurance company that is authorized to do business in this state; and
(3) have payment conditioned upon the
noncompliance of the debt-management-services provider [or
its agents] with this [act].
(e) If a debt-management-services provider
whose principal place of business is located in this state provides a surety
bond to comply with the law of another state with respect to individuals who
reside in that state, the amount of the bond required under this section is
reduced by the amount of that bond, and the bond filed pursuant to this section
must not run for the benefit of persons in that state, provided, however, that
the amount of the bond shall not be reduced to less than the larger of $100,000 or two
times the average daily balancean amount equal to the sum
of the amounts received from residents of this state and deposited in the trust
account required by Section 19 during the
six monthson each of the 180 days immediately
preceding the date of the application for registration or renewal of
registration, or such other amount as determined by the
administratordivided by six.
(f) For an initial
registration of a debt-management-services provider that
has not provided debt-management services in this state within the immediately preceding five
years, the amount of the surety bond is the larger of $100,000 or
an amount must be determined by the
administrator, based on the administrator’s consideration of the financial
condition and business experience of the debt-management-services provider,
the history of the debt-management-services provider in
providing debt-management services, the potential loss to individuals, any
other factor the administrator considers appropriate, and, for providers that
are required by Section 19 to
maintain a trust account, an estimate of the average daily balance amounts to
be deposited in the trust account during the twelfth month after
registration.
(g) If the principal amount of a surety bond is
reduced by payment of a claim or a judgment, the debt-management-services provider shall
immediately notify the administrator of that fact and, within [30]
days after notice by the administrator, shall file a new or additional surety
bond in an amount set by the administrator, which amount must be at least the
amount of the bond immediately before payment of the claim or judgment. If for any
reason a surety terminates a bond, the provider must immediately file a new
surety bond in the same amount as the amount of the terminated bond.
(h) In lieu of the surety bond required by this
section, the debt-management-services a provider
may:
(1) file a certificate of insurance in the amount
required by subsections (d) through (f), issued by an insurance company rated
at least [A] by a nationally
recognized rating organization, with a deductible of no more than $10,000 10 percent
of the face amount of the policy coverage and, as provided in
subsection (i), loss payable to the state and to customers of the provider as
their interests may appear, as provided in subsection (c), if the provider does
not comply with this [act];
(2) provide an irrevocable letter of credit, issued or confirmed by a financial institution approved by the administrator, in the amount and form determined by the administrator pursuant to subsections (d) through (f) and payable upon presentation of a certificate by the administrator and, as provided in subsection (i), payable to the state and to customers of the provider as their interests may appear, as provided in subsection (c), if the provider does not comply with this [act]; or
(3) subject to the approval of the administrator, deposit and maintain with a financial institution approved by the administrator for this purpose bonds or other obligations of the United States or guaranteed by the United States or bonds or other obligations of this state or a political subdivision of this state, in the amount determined by the administrator pursuant to subsections (d) through (f), designated as available, as provided in subsection (i), to the state and to customers of the provider as their interests may appear, as provided in subsection (c), if the provider does not comply with this [act].
(i) The administrator that recovers issues a
final order under Section 27(a)(2) or (5) recovers a
final judgment under Section 27(a)(5) or
any
individual and any person who recovers a final
judgment pursuant to Section 30(a), (b), or (c)(1)
or (3) or (b) may obtain satisfaction of the order or judgment
out of the surety bond, insurance, letter of credit, or other security required
pursuant to this section. If claims against the security exceed the amount
of the security, the surety or other stakeholder may petition the administrator
to determine the order and amount in which the claims are paid.
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a): The requirement of a
bond apples to all debt-management-services providers,
including those that are not required to establish trust accounts. provide
debt-settlement services.
Subsection (b): The bond is a source of payment of
injuries caused by a provider’s failure to comply with this Act. It
is conceivable that the administrator or an individual would not
commence litigation until after a provider ceases providing services in this
state. This subsection preserves
the availability of the bond for two years after the year in which the
provider’s registration ends. Legislation in some
states contains comparable provisions. E.g., 2004
Subsection (c): The bond runs in
favor of the state for the benefit of the state and the provider’s customers.
Thus, it is available to compensate the administrator for its enforcement
costs. The bond also runs directly in favor of customers who are injured by a
provider’s noncompliance with the Act. As now drafted the bond runs
in favor ofThis includes individuals who reside
in other states if the debt-management-services provider is
based in this state. If the debt-management-services provider has
no presence in this state other than its agreements with individuals who live
in this state, then the benefits of the bond are limited to the administrator
and residents of this state. This subjects the domestic agency to the bond
requirements of this state and also the other states in which its customers
reside. But see subsection (e).
Subsection (d): For those providers, including
debt-settlement-services providers, that do not receive payments
for distribution to creditors, and therefore are not required by Section 19 to
establish a trust account, the minimum bond requirement is [$100,000].
For others, the bond requirement is the greater of $100,000 or two times subsection
presents the Committee with a choice.
In the first, the amount of the bond
approximates the average monthly amount of money that is deposited into the
trust account. This may be an impossible hurdle for most providers. For
example, a provider that processes payments of $120 million per year would have
to post a bond of $10 million. This alternative in effect sets the bond at
16.6% of the sum of the amounts deposited during a 180-day period. A variation
would be to set the bond at a lower percentage (e.g., 3%) of the amounts
deposited during that period.
The second alternative sets the bond
at three times (or other multiple of) the
average daily balance in the trust account. The amount of the bond would depend
on the amount received from individuals and the frequency of the provider’s
payment to the creditors. A provider that receives payments of $120 130 million
per year, or $2.5 million per week, and pays creditors twice a week, would have
an average daily balance of approximately $900,000750,000.
Its bond requirement would be $1.82.25 million.
This alternative gives the provider an incentive to make payments to creditors
on a daily basis. The administrator is free to set the bond
requirement for a particular provider at a different amount.
The bond requirement under
existing legislation varies widely. Many of the statutes were enacted decades
ago and have not been amended in this respect. These statutes often require
bonds of modest amounts, $10-25,000. The more
recently enacted or revised legislation sets the bond at much higher amounts,
often to be set by the administrator in light of specified factors. E.g., Connecticut ($40,000 or
2 times the highest monthly amount paid by Connecticut residents); Illinois ($25,000 or
the amount of disbursements during the preceding year); Kansas
($25,000-1,000,000); Maine ($50,000); Maryland
($10,000-350,000); Michigan ($35,000-100,000); New York (minimum of
$250,000); Vermont (minimum of $50,000);
Virginia ($25,000-350,000). This draft
sets the amount of the bond at $100,000 but authorizes the
administrator to adjust it in either direction. This flexibility may be
especially important with respect to true non-profit
credit-counseling agencies.
Paragraph (3) requires that the bond be
conditioned upon noncompliance with the Act. Nothing is payable until the
administrator or an individual obtains a judicial determination that the
provider has failed to comply. In a typical case the surety would be joined as
a party defendant.
In subparagraph (3), is the phrase
“or its agents” necessary?
Subsection (e): A provider located in this
state must provide a bond in an amount based on the size of its
trust account, which may contain funds of individuals who reside in other states.
The laws of those other states may require the provider to furnish a bond to
protect the residents of those states. This subsection provides reciprocity,
to give the debt-management-services provider some
relief from having to provide duplicative bonds. In no event, however, does the
bond amount fall below the amount it would be if the provider were not located
in this state. average monthly deposits by residents of this
state.
Subsection (f): Special provision is
made for a newly registered provider that does not have the trust account
experience contemplated by subsection (d) for fixing the amount of the bond. This special
provision does not apply to debt-settlement-services providers as to whom the
bond is not determined by the size of any trust account.
Subsection (h): As an alternative to
posting a bond, subsection (h) authorizes the debt-management-services provider
to procure insurance or, subject to the administrator’s approval, a letter of
credit or debt instruments. The requirement of approval by the administrator
extends to both the securities deposited and the terms of the account into
which they are deposited, to ensure that they are available to pay claims of
injured individuals. The administrator by rule can develop the mechanics for liquidating
the securities and paying the proceeds to injured individuals.
Prior drafts authorized insurance
with a deductible no greater than 10 percent of the face
amount of the policy. If the bond requirement for a particular provider were $1
million, this would permit a deductible of $100,000. The burden of a deductible
should not fall on the injured individual, and this draft lowers the
permissible deductible to $10,000. Does the Committee concur?
Subsection (i): Section 27 empowers
the administrator to seek restitution for injured individuals. Under subsection
(i) the bond or other security required by this section is a source for payment
of this restitution. Section 30 authorizes
private rights of action. The bond or other security is a source of payment of
actual damages, damages for overcharges, the [$1,000]
minimum damages, and costs and attorney’s fees. It is not available to satisfy
criminal penalties under Section 24 ,
civil penalties under Section 27 ,
or punitive damages under Section 30 . Does the Drafting Committee concur?
The last sentence has been added, to
permit the administrator to determine the order in which the security should be
applied to satisfy claims. This seeks to make payment of claims equitable. But
it may deprive individuals who uncovered wrongdoing and acted first from
recovering full compensation for their injuries. At
the expense of the diligent consumer, the provision enhances the position of
the individual who files a copycat action. Should this last sentence be
dropped? Should the administrator be directed to determine
priority on the basis of first-in-time?
SECTION
13. CUSTOMER SERVICE. A debt-management-services provider must
maintain a telephone system, staffed at a level that reasonably permits an
individual to speak to a counselor or customer service representative, as
appropriate, during ordinary business hours.
Preliminary Comments
Some inquiries require counseling
services
or assistance in dealing with creditors; others concern
administrative matters such as confirmation of receipt of a payment,
communication that a payment for a particular month will be late or in a
different amount than scheduled, etc. The debt-management-services provider
must provide sufficient staffing to meet the reasonably expectable demand for
both kinds of requests. Even if a debt-management-services provider
desires to operate exclusively by electronic interaction with individuals, it
must comply with this subsection. See Section 15(c) and accompanying Comment. Reporter’s
Note.
This subsection contemplates
responses to telephonic requests by existing customers. The staffing required
by this subsection therefore is in addition to whatever staffing the debt-management-services
provider might have for soliciting or responding to potential
customers.
The standard “level that reasonably
permits an individual to speak to a counselor …” is vague. Is this
satisfactory?
Section 15 permits a provider to comply with Sections 14, 16, and 22 by means of electronic communication. Section 13 makes no exception for this provider. Even if a provider desires to operate exclusively via electronic communication, it must comply with this section.
SECTION 14. PREREQUISITES FOR PROVIDING DEBT-MANAGEMENT SERVICES.
(a) Before providing debt-management services to
an individual, a person shall provider shall give
the individual a list, in a record the individual may keep whether or not the
individual assents to an agreement, of services and the charges
for each, describing:
(1) those goods and services the person provider offers:
(A)
free of additional
charge, if the individual enters into an debt-management-services
agreement;
(B)
for a charge, if the individual enters into an agreement; a
debt-management plan; and
(C)
for a charge, if the individual does not enter into an debt-management-services
agreement; and
(2) those goods or services the person provider offers
for a charge that are not offered as a part of debt-management services.
(b) A person provider
may not furnish
offer or provide a debt-management services
plan
or a debt-settlement plan to an individual unless the person provider,
through the services of a certified counselor:
(1) provides the individual with reasonable education
concerning
personal finance or counseling about the management of personal
finance;
(2) has prepared a financial analysis and a plan for payment
of the individual’s debts;
(3) has made a good faith, reasonable
determination, based on its analysis of the
information provided by the individual and otherwise available to it, that
the plan is suitable necessary for the
individual and to avoid serious financial
hardship or the need to file for relief under the United States Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.; and
(4) has made a good faith, reasonable
determination based on its analysis of the information provided
by the individual and otherwise available to it that:
(A)
the individual will be able to make the payments that the plan
calls for the individual to make; and
(4) (B)in good
faith believes that each creditor of the individual listed as a
participating creditor in the plan will accept payment of the individual’s
debts as provided in the plan.
(c) Before an individual assents to an agreement [assents to a
proposal][signs an agreement] to engage in a debt-management
plan or a debt-settlement plan, a debt-management-services
provider shall provide the individual with:
(1) a copy of the analysis and plan required by
subsection (b)(2) in a form record the
individual may keep whether or not the individual [assents to the agreement proposal][signs the
agreement]; and
(2) with respect to all creditors identified by
the individual or otherwise known by the provider to be creditors of the
individual, a list of all creditors that the provider in good faith reasonably
expects to participate accept the payment proposed in
the plan and a list of all creditors that the person provider reasonablyin good
faith expects not to grant concessions or as to which the provider
has no reason to know.
(d) Before an individual assents to an agreement [assents to a
proposal][signs an agreement] to
engage in a debt-management plan, a debt-management-services
provider shall disclose the following information,
in a record that contains nothing else and which the individual may
keep whether or not the individual assents to the agreement: , the
following:
(1) plans are not suitable for all
individuals and the individual may ask the provider about other ways, including
bankruptcy, to deal with indebtedness;
(2) establishment of a plan may
adversely affect the individual’s credit
rating or credit scores;
(3) nonpayment of debt may lead
creditors to undertake collection activity, including litigation;
(4) unless it is not true, the
provider may receive compensation from the
creditors of the individual; and
(5) unless the individual is insolvent,
if a creditor settles for less than the full amount
of the debt, the plan will result in the creation of taxable income to the
individual even though the individual does not receive any money.
(e) If a plan contemplates concessions by creditors in the form of reduced finance charge or reduced fees for late payment, default, or delinquency, a provider may comply with subsection (d) by providing the following disclosure:
IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR YOU TO CONSIDER
(1)
Debt-management plans are not suitable for all individuals,
and you may ask us to provide information about bankruptcy and other ways to
deal with indebtedness. ;
(2)
Establishment of a debt-management plan may adversely affect hurt
your credit rating or credit scores.;
(3) •
In [the third calendar year preceding the current year], [number] individuals
entered a debt management plan with us. Of those individuals, [number], or
[percent], have completed the plan or are still making payments under it.
• In [the second
calendar year preceding the current year], [number] individuals entered a
debt-management plan with us. Of those individual, [number], or [percent], have
completed the plan or are still making payments under it.
• In [calendar year
immediately preceding the current year], [number] or [percent], have completed
the plan or are still making payments under it; and
(43) [unless it is
not true,] We may receive compensation for our services from some or all of
your creditors.
(ef) If a plan contemplates that creditors will settle
the debts for less than the full principal amount of debt owed, a
provider may comply with subsection (d) by providing the following disclosure:Before an
individual [assents to a proposal][signs an agreement] to engage in a
debt-settlement plan, a debt-management-services provider shall disclose, in a
record that contains nothing else, the following:
IMPORTANT
INFORMATION FOR YOU TO CONSIDER
(1)
Debt-settlement plans are Our program
is not suitable for all individuals, and you may ask
us to provide information about bankruptcy and other ways to deal with
indebtedness. ;
(2) •
In [the third calendar year preceding the current year], [number] individuals
entered a debt settlement plan with us. Of those individuals, [number], or
[percent], have completed the plan or are still making payments under it.
• In [the second calendar year
preceding the current year], [number] individuals entered a debt-settlement
plan with us. Of those individuals, [number], or [percent], have completed the
plan or are still making payments under it.
• In [calendar year immediately
preceding the current year], [number] individuals entered a debt-settlement
plan with us. Of those individuals, [number], or [percent], have completed the
plan or are still making payments under it;
(32) Nonpayment of your debt pursuant to the planour program
is likely to hurt have an adverse effect on your
credit report and may lead creditors to undertake activity, including
litigation, to collect their debts. ; and
(43)
Unless you are insolvent, a debt settlement plan our program will
result in the creation of taxable income to you even though you will not
receive any money.
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a): The
disclosure of charges must contain the dollar amounts or the method of
determining the dollar amounts, e.g., “$5 per month for each creditor that
participates in the plan” or “five percent of the amount
of debt that a
creditor writes off.”
Subsection (b): Many debt-settlement companies do not
currently see education as part of their mission. At the October 2004 meeting,
the Committee decided to mandate education for all providers. Paragraph (1)
implements this decision. Paragraph (1) requires
education or counseling by debt-settlement-services
providers as well as by debt-management-services providers. Debt
settlement-services providers do not currently see education as part of their
mission. Does the Committee wish to mandate education for
them?
The education or counseling may
consist of an individual session with a counselor (which may also include the
analysis required by paragraph (2)), a group class, or an electronic
educational program. The education and counseling must be substantially
more than an explanation of the benefits of a debt-management plan or a
debt-settlement plan. It must begin but need
not be completed before commencement of a plan, since a course of education or
counseling may take months to complete. Education for financial
literacy is receiving increased attention, and several entities are attempting
to define standards for effectiveness. As these attempts come to fruition, the
administrator may exercise power under Section 26(e) Under
Section 26(e) the administrator has the power to
establish minimum standards for the education and counseling.
Paragraph (3) of the prior
version of this subsection required a provider to make a reasonable determination
that the plan is necessary to avoid financial hardship or bankruptcy. At the
direction of the Drafting Committee at
the October 2004 meeting, this draft drops any reference to financial hardship
or bankruptcy, instead requiring only that the provider reasonably believe that
the plan is suitable for the individual. For providers that assist the individual to repay in
full, this requires a determination that
the individual has sufficient income to permit payment to creditors after
payment of living expenses, but not so much income that concessions from
creditors are not necessary. For providers that assist the individual to
settle debts for less than full payment, the suitability requirement
means at a minimum that the individual does not have the ability to satisfy
creditors out of current income within a
reasonable time.
Paragraph (4) of the prior version required a
provider to make a good faith, reasonable determination that the individual can
make the required payments and that creditors will participate in the plan.
This requirement is feasible for credit-counseling
agencies but perhaps not for debt-settlement
companies. Therefore, the paragraph no longer requires that the
provider reasonably believe that each creditor will participate. It
suffices that the provider honestly
believes that the creditor will participate. If a provider
knows that a particular creditor will not
participate, the provider cannot in good faith believe that the creditor will
participate, and therefore cannot satisfy this paragraph if that
creditor is included in the plan. Former paragraphs 3-4 have
been slightly reorganized to implement these changes. Paragraphs (3)-(4)
require the provider to make good faith, reasonable determinations. The
standards “good faith” and “reasonable” are vague. The administrator may promulgate
rules to articulate factors relevant to determining whether these vague standards
are met. , and this creates a risk that a disgruntled
consumer, with the benefit of hindsight, might allege that the provider failed
to meet these standards. Does the Committee wish to address this matter, either
by reconsidering the standards (e.g., deleting “reasonable”) or by making
violation of these paragraphs actionable only by the administrator?
The requirement in Pparagraph
(4) requires
that the provider to believe make a
reasonable determination that the creditors will accept the plan . This does
not mandate communication with the creditors before an debt-management-services
agreement is formed. The; the provider’s
past experiences with the creditors may be a sufficient basis for the provider’s
good faith reasonable belief.
Subsection (c): Since secured creditors are creditors, paragraph (2) requires the provider to include secured creditors in the two lists, as appropriate. The language in the last draft (“accept the payment proposed in the plan”) is appropriate for plans of credit-counseling agencies, but not for programs of debt-settlement companies. This draft changes the phrase to “participate in the plan.” To conform to the change in subsection (b)(4), the standard in this paragraph is changed from reasonableness to good faith. Taken together, the two lists must include all the creditors whose existence the provider knows or has reason to know. It might be preferable to revert to the approach of the previous draft, requiring reasonableness rather than good faith and creating separate subsections with different standards for credit-counseling agencies and debt-settlement agencies.
Subsections (d)-(ef): These s Subsections
(d) requires providers of debt-management
plans to give a warning to individuals
before they commit to a debt-management plan or a debt-settlement plan.
Subsections
(e) and (f) provide safe-harbor language for the provider to use. Use of the
exact language in these subsections constitutes compliance with
subsection (d). If the provider uses other
language, the disclosure is subject to review to determine if it adequately
discloses the required information. The format has been changed to
specify the exact language that the provider must use.
SECTION 15. COMMUNICATION BY ELECTRONIC MEANS.
(a) A debt-management-services provider may
comply with Section 14, or 16, or 22 via the Internet or other electronic means if
the provider obtains the individual’s consent in the manner provided by Section
101(c)(1) of the Electronic Signatures
in Global and National Commerce Act, (15 U.S.C.
Section 7001(c)(1)), as amended, and:
(1) with respect to the requirements of Section
14(b) ,
a certified counselor has reviewed and approved the education required by
subsection 14(b)(1) and the computer program or application used to create the
financial analysis and the debt-management plan required by
subsection 14(b)(2);
(2) the individual is advised of the availability
of counseling
assistance by telephone or in person
and is afforded the opportunity for counseling and for discussion of the
financial analysis and the initial plan with a certified counselor;
(3) the disclosures and materials
required
by Sections 14, 16, and 22 are presented in such a way that the
individual can may retain them
electronically and print them;
(4)(A) the provider informs the
individual that upon electronic, telephonic, or written request within the next 30 days,
the provider will send the individual a written copy of the materials required
by Section 14(c) at no charge; and
(B) if requested to send a written copy of the materials, the provider sends it at no charge within three days of the request;
(5) with respect to disclosure via an Internet
web site of the information required by Section 14(d) and (e) :
(A) the disclosure appears on one or more screens that:
(i) contain no other information; and
(ii) the individual must see before proceeding to assent to formation of a plan; and
(B) the provider
informs the individual that, upon electronic, telephonic, or written request within the
next 30 days, it will send the individual a written version of the
disclosures at no charge; and
(C) if requested to send a written version of the disclosures, the provider sends it at no charge within three days of the request; and
(6) [within {3} days, the provider sends the
individual, at no charge, a signed, written copy of the agreement required by
Sections 16 and 23
] [(A) the provider informs the
individual that upon electronic, telephonic, or written request within 90
days after the individual assents to an agreement,
it will send the individual a written copy of the agreement required by
Sections
16 and 23 ]; and
(B) if requested to
send a written copy of the agreement required by Sections 16 and 23, the
provider sends it at no charge within three days of the request.;
(7)(A) At the time of
providing an electronic version of a report required by Section 22, the
provider informs the individual that upon
electronic, telephonic, or written request within the next 30 days, it will
send the individual a written copy of the report; and
(B) if requested to send a written copy of the report, the provider sends it at no charge within three days of the request.
(b) A debt-management-services provider that
pursuant to this section complies with Section 14 by means of electronic communication via its
Internet web site shall disclose on the home page of that web site or on a
page that is clearly and conspicuously linked to the home page:
(1) its name and all names under which it does business;
(2) its principal business address and telephone number; and
(3) the names of its principal officers.
(c) A debt-management-services provider that
forms debt-management
plans or debt-settlement plans with
individuals on its Internet web site shall respond to electronically
communicated requests for counseling or customer serviceassistance
within a reasonable time during ordinary business hours.
Legislative Note: In states in which the
constitution does not permit the phrase “as amended,”
in
subsection (a) is not permitted by the constitution, the phrase
should be deleted in subsection (a).
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a) permits electronic
delivery of the information required by Section 14, and it permits electronic
formation of debt-management-services agreements.
Under paragraph (2), if counseling in person is not readily available in
reasonable proximity to the individual’s residence, the debt-management-services provider
must offer counseling or other assistance by telephone. An
alternative approach would permit agencies to operate entirely by electronic
communication, in which event paragraph (2) would be revised to require the
agency to disclose that it operates entirely by electronic communication, that
some other agencies provide personal contact, and that if the individual wants
personal contact he or she should seek out one of those other agencies. (Section 13
(Customer Service) would also need revision.) Does the Committee wish to
adopt this alternative?
Paragraph (3) does not require a provider to verify that the individual has an operable printer; it merely requires that the material be presented in a printable format.
To meet the objectives of the physical
delivery
contemplated by section 14, electronic delivery must satisfy
certain requirements of form, such as appearing on a screen that contains no
other information. Paragraph (5)(B) prohibits the provider from
limiting the medium the individual may use to request a written copy.
Even if a debt-management plan
is formed over the Internet, the individual should have a hard copy of the
agreement with the debt-management-services provider.
Paragraph (3) requires that the agreement must be presented in a printable
format. Paragraph (6) poses two versions of an additional requirement:
automatic mailing of a written copy or mailing a copy if the individual
requests. These requirements still must be checked against E-Sign and UETA.requires the
provider to send a written copy if the individual requests it. The
provider may not limit the medium by which the individual requests a copy. This
is true also of the requests for written copies under paragraphs (4) and (5).
Section 22 requires periodic reports. Section 15 has been drafted to permit the provider to make these reports electronically. Does the Committee concur?
Subsection (b): An agency might do
business under numerous names. Should the statute Subsection (b) requires
disclosure of all those names, along with the provider’s principal location and
officers, but it permits the provider to disclose permit the agency to provide
this information via a link to another page of the website.? The same
question exists with respect to the names of its principal officers.
Subsection (c): The debt-management-services
A provider that operates exclusively
via its web site must comply with Section 13 (maintain an adequate telephone system).
Having invited electronic communication, however, it also must respond within a
reasonable time to requests that are transmitted electronically. The choice of
media is left to the individual.
At the Annual Meeting several
commissioners complained of the complexity and repetitiveness of this and other
sections. Does the Committee wish to streamline it, perhaps cutting back on the
statutory requirements and leaving it to the administrator to flesh out? A
simpler statute might be more enactable. As a result of differeing
responses by administrators in different states, however, it might be less
uniform, making it harder for providers to comply with the requirements of
multiple jurisdictions.
SECTION 16. FORM AND CONTENTS OF AGREEMENT.
(a) Every debt-management-services agreement
must:
(1) be in a record;
(2) be dated and signed by the debt-management-services
provider and the individual;
(3) include the name and address of the
individual and the name, address, and telephone number of the debt-management-services
provider;
(4) disclose:
(A) the services to be provided;
(B) the amount or method of determining the amount of all fees, individually itemized, to be paid by the individual;
[(C) that the
debt-management-services provider may not require
a voluntary contribution from the individual for any service provided to the
individual;]
(DC)
the schedule of payments or deposits to be made by or on behalf of
the individual, including the amount of each payment, the date on which each
payment is due, and an estimate in good faith of the date of the last payment;
(ED)
each creditor of the individual to which payment will be made, the amount owed
to each creditor, and any the concessions
the debt-management-services
provider reasonably believes expects each
creditor to will offer;
(E) if a plan
provides for regular periodic payments to creditors, and the
schedule of payments to each creditor, including the amount and date on which
each payment will be made;
(F) if the plan provides for other than regular periodic payments to creditors, the amounts of and dates on which the provider reasonably believes payments to creditors will be made;
(FG)
each creditor that the provider in good
faith believes will not participate in the is not participating
in the debt-management plan and to
which the debt-management-services provider will
not be directing money payment;
[(G) unless it is not
true, that the debt-management-services provider may receive
compensation from the individual’s creditors for the benefits it provides to
the creditors;]
[(H) that
establishment of a debt-management plan may adversely affect the individual’s
credit rating and credit scores;]
(IH)
that the debt-management-services provider, if
consistent with good faith, may terminate the agreement for good cause and upon
return of unexpended money of the individual;
(JI)
that the individual may contact the administrator with any questions or
complaints regarding the debt-management-services provider; and
(KJ)
the address, telephone number, and Internet address or web site of the
administrator; and
(5) be delivered to the individual immediately upon formation of the agreement. Delivery of an electronic record to an individual who has consented to electronic communication occurs when it is made available in a format in which the individual may retrieve, save, and print it.
(b) If the administrator supplies the debt-management-services
provider with any of the information required under subsection (a)(4)(J)(3)(K),
the provider complies with that subsection only by disclosing the information
supplied by the administrator.
(c) Every debt-management-services agreement
must provide that:
(1) the individual has a right to terminate the
agreement at any time, without penalty or obligation, by giving the debt-management-services
provider written or electronic notice, in which event the provider
will refund all unexpended money that the provider has received
from or on behalf of the individual has paid the
provider for the reduction or satisfaction of the individual’s
debt;
(2) the individual authorizes any bank in which
the debt-management-services
provider has established a trust account to disclose to the
administrator any financial records relating to the trust account;
(3) the debt-management-services provider
will notify the individual within five days after learning of a creditor’s
decision to reject or withdraw from a debt-management plan
and that this notice will include:
(A) the identity of the creditor; and
(B) the right of the
individual to [modify or ]terminate the debt-management-services
agreement; and
(4) immediately before settling a debt with a creditor, the provider will obtain the individual’s consent to the settlement.
(d) An debt-management-services agreement
may not:
(1) provide for payments by the individual for
longer than 60 months or other period established by rule of the administrator;
(21) provide for application of the law of any
jurisdiction other than the United States and this state or
the state in which the individual resides at the time of the agreement;
(32) except as permitted by Section 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2, as amended, contain a provision
that modifies or limits otherwise available forums or procedural rights, including
the right to trial by jury, that are generally available to the
individual under law other than this [act];
(43) contain a provision that restricts the
individual’s remedies under this [act] or law other than this [act]; or
(54) contain a provision that:
(A) limits or
releases the liability of any person for failing to perform the debt-management-services
agreement or violating this [act]; or
(B) indemnifies any
person for liability arising under this [act] or out of performance of the debt-management-services
agreement.
(e) The rights and obligations specified in
subsection (c) exist even if a the debt-management-services provider
has not complied with the requirements of that subsection. A provision in an
debt-management-services
agreement that violates subsection (d) is void.
(f) An individual may rescind an
debt-management-services
agreement until midnight of the third business day after the
individual assents to it, unless the agreement fails to comply
receives a copy of an agreement that complies with
this Ssection
and or Section 23 , in which event the
individual may rescind the agreement until the expiration of 30 days
after the individual assents to it. To exercise the right to
rescind, the individual must give written or electronic notice to the debt-management-services
provider. Notice by mail is given when mailed.
(g) Every debt-management-services agreement
must be accompanied by a form that has the heading “Notice of Cancellation” and
contains in bold face type:
You may cancel this agreement,
without any penalty or obligation, at any time before midnight of the third day
that begins the day after you receive a copy of it. agree to it
by electronic communication or by signing it.
To cancel this agreement during this
period, send an e-mail to (e-mail address of the provider) or send or
deliver a signed, dated copy of this notice, or any other written notice to (name
of debt-management-services
provider) at (address) before midnight on (date).
If you cancel this agreement within the 3-day period, we will refund all money
you already have paid us.
You also may terminate this agreement at any later time, but we may not refund fees you have paid us.
I hereby cancel this contract,
( date
) ,
( individual’s signature ) .
(h) An individual may waive the right to cancel rescind in
the event of a personal emergency. To waive the right, the individual must send
or deliver a signed, dated statement in his or her own
words describing the circumstances that necessitate a waiver. The waiver must
explicitly waive the right to cancelrescind. A waiver
by means of a written or electronic standard-form document is void.
Legislative Note: In subsection (d)(2), if the
constitution does not permit use of the phrase, “as amended,” when
federal statutes are incorporated into state law, the phrase should be deleted.
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a):
At the October 2004 meeting,
the Committee decided to drop several paragraphs of this subsection: former paragraph (4)(C) required
disclosure that the provider may not
require voluntary contributions. In a modest attempt to reduce
the length and complexity of both the statute and the debt-management-services
agreement, paragraphs (C), (G), and (H) are bracketed for suggested deletion. The
substantive prohibition of required contributions in Sections 20-21 remains in
the draft. lessens the need for paragraph (C). The
disclosure requirements in section 14 render the disclosures in former paragraphs
(G) and (H) redundant, so they have been dropped as required disclosures
here. Does the Committee concur? Should the disclosures
be truncated further?
Paragraph (4)(DC):
The date of the last payment depends on the creditors’ concessions and the
amount of the monthly payment by the individual, each of which may change
during the course of the plan. It also depends on the timeliness of payment by
the individual. None of this can be known in advance. Therefore, paragraph (4)(DC)
requires a good faith estimate of the date of the final payment.
Paragraph (4)(D): At the October
2004 meeting an observer suggested
changing the standard from reasonable to good faith. This change was made in
Section 14, dealing with information provided before the individual
assents to a plan. Under this section, however, before
securing the individual’s assent to a plan the provider must have a reasonable
basis for believing that each creditor will make the concessions listed in the
record. Former paragraph (E) has been broken into two paragraphs. One or the
other, but not both, will apply to each provider. The first, here paragraph (E), will
apply to credit-counseling agencies, and it
contains the latter part of former paragraph (E). New paragraph (F) will apply
to debt-settlement companies and
requires disclosure of the amounts of and dates on which
the provider expects
payments to be made to creditors. It may not be feasible for
debt-settlement companies to comply with paragraphs (D) and (F).
Paragraph (4)(FG):
As with Section 14(c)(2) (pre-agreement disclosures), identification of
nonparticipating creditors includes secured creditors but refers only to
creditors that the individual has disclosed to the debt-management-services provider
or that the provider otherwise actually knows to be a creditor of the
individual. Subparagraph (FG) does not
require the provider to make any disclosures with respect to creditors of which
it is unaware. The language
has been modified to be more
appropriate for debt-settlement companies.
Paragraph (4)(IH):
The good cause for termination by a provider pursuant to this paragraph does
not encompass a desire to escape the fee structure to which the provider may
have committed. Rather, it contemplates such things as the individual’s failure
to make monthly payments or to cooperate with the provider. The standard of
good cause may vary depending on whether the provider is a
credit-counseling agency or a debt-settlement
company, is higher with respect to a debt-settlement plan
than for a debt-management plan because the adverse consequences
to the individual in the event of termination may be different.are higher.
Paragraph (4)(KJ):
Compliance with this subparagraph (K) will
mean that a provider that serves individuals in 50 states may have to have a
different form for each state. Computerization of the standard document may
minimize the difficulty of complying with this disclosure requirement.
A provision in paragraph (4)
requiring disclosure of the name and address of the bank holding the trust
account was deleted in an earlier draft.
Paragraph (5) requires immediate delivery of the record to the individual. If the record is electronic, delivery occurs when the provider makes it available in retrievable and printable form.
Subsection (c): Current practice by
many counseling agencies is to permit termination at any time; they do not even
purport to bind the individual to a contract. The draft mandates this right of
termination for all agencies providers. If
the individual has an unlimited right of termination, it is questionable
whether there is a contract at all. The requirement of notice may supply
sufficient obligation to support a contract, but even if it does not, there is
no reason why the industry, and regulation of the industry, cannot operate on
the basis of agreements that are not enforceable under the common law of
contracts. This Act can provides the
authorization for the industry, as well as the regulation of it.
For a termination to be
effection under subsection (1), the individual must give written or electronic
notice. Is this wise, or should oral notification suffice? With respect
to any requirement of notice of termination, what should be the consequence of
the individual’s failure to give notice? Unless it gives the
debt-management-services provider some right
it would otherwise not have, the imposition of a notice requirement may be
unwise: it may mislead the individual into continuing with a debt-management
plan even after he or she no longer wants it. On the other hand, perhaps the
requirement is desirable simply as a matter of bringing closure to the
transaction.
The prior draft gave the individual
the right to modify an agreement under certain circumstances. This provision
has been dropped because the right to terminate altogether may include the less
drastic option of modifying the agreement. If the Drafting Committee believes
that unilateral modification by the individual should be permitted, subsection
(c)(1) will be modified to read, “right to terminate or modify the agreement at
any time.”
Subsection (4) is new. It requires
debt-settlement companies to secure
the individual’s consent at the time of settling each debt. This affords the
individual an opportunity to review the terms of the settlement before it
becomes final.
Subsection (d): This subsection
seeks to preserve the individual’s common law and statutory rights against the
unilateral decision of a debt-management-services provider to
remove or restrict them. Thus an agency may not evade this Act by adopting the
law of another jurisdiction. Nor may an agency contract for a distant forum or
the surrender of rights or remedies under other law, including the right to
proceed by way of a class action when appropriate. A statute designed to
protect individuals should not permit the deprivation of important procedural
and jurisdictional rights by means of a unilateral decision by the other party.
Subsection (f): Section 16 specifies the form of the agreement, and Section 23 lists prohibited terms. Subsections
(f) through (h) derive from section 125 of the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1635. Subsection
(f) confers a right of rescission for three days after an agreement that
complies with sections 16 and 23. Section 16
specifies the form and contents of the agreement, and Section 23 lists
prohibited conduct. Some of the prohibited conduct might be manifest in an
agreement, in which event the agreement would not comply with section 23. The October 2004 Meeting Draft
provided that if the provider failed to comply with Section 16 or Section 23, the
right of rescission never expired. This draft provides that if the agreement
fails to comply with either of those sections, the individual has 30 days in
which to rescind. Though the language of
subsections (f) through (h) varies from the language of the federal statute,
courts should interpret these subsections in a manner consistent with the
interpretations of section 125, including Regulation Z and the Official Staff
Commentary. If the agreement fails in any respect to comply with
Sections 16 or 23, the three-day period never starts running. The remedy,
under subsection (g), if If the individual rescinds, subsection (g)
calls for forfeiture of all amounts paid, even
those amounts already paid over to creditors. The purpose
of this remedy is to provide an additional
incentive for providers to comply with Sections 16 and 23. If the
agreement complies with sections 16 and 23 but the provider fails to honor the
individual’s attempt to rescind, section 30(f) provides a
similar remedy (recovery of all amounts paid or deposited by the individual). If the right
to rescind has expired, the individual still has the right
to terminate under subsection (c). If the Committee thinks this
is too draconian, perhaps there should be a limit on the right to rescind,
e.g., 30 or 60 days. The individual still would have the right
to terminate under subsection (c).
SECTION
17. FOREIGN LANGUAGE. If a debt-management-services provider
communicates with an individual primarily in a language other than English, all the disclosures
and documents required by this [act] must be in the other language.
Preliminary Comments
At the Annual Meeting several commissioners objected that the mandatory nature of this provision is too onerous. Salespersons, they said, often use a combination of English and any one of hundreds of foreign languages to accommodate their customers. It is not reasonable to require the employer to have documents in every language that its employees and customers speak. An alternate version of this section might provide:
If a debt-management-services provider
communicates with an individual [primarily] in a language other than English,
the provider must comply with one of the following:
(a) all disclosures and documents required by this [act] must be in that other language; or
(b) the provider must explain in that other language the meaning of every provision in every disclosure and document required by this [act].
At the October 2004 meeting, the
Committee decided to leave the section in its present form. If the provider
communicates in a foreign language, it must provide documents and disclosures
in that language. If the provider is not willing to do this, then it must
communicate in English. This places the burden on the individual to bring a
translator along or assume the risk of not understanding any disclosures or
documents that are beyond the individual’s English-language skills.
SECTION 18. VOIDABLE AGREEMENTS.
(a) An debt-management-services agreement
between an individual and a person that is not registered under this [act] when
the agreement is formed is voidable.
(b) If a debt-management-services agreement is
void under subsection (a), an individual may recover from the debt-management-services
provider all money paid by or on behalf of the
individual pursuant to the agreement, together with costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees.
(cb) A person that violates Section 5(a) or (b)
does not have a claim against an individual for breach of contract and does not
have a claim in restitution with respect to an agreement that is void under
this section.
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a): The Consumer Federation/NCLC
report recommends that the contract be void if it violates any requirement of
the proposed statute. This section (like the CFA/NCLC’s Model Consumer Debt
Management Services Act) does not go that far. It limits voidness to aAgreements
by a debt-management-services
provider that is not properly registered under Section 5 are voidable.
On the
other hand,
Former subsection (b) contained the
remedy for subsection (a)(the provider must return to the individual all
money paid or deposited by the individual [which it has not
already distributed to creditors]). This
provision now appears as section 30(a). if a provider
is not properly registered, it must return to
the individual all money paid by the individual, even amounts
passed on to creditors. This is a windfall to the
individual and a penalty to the provider. It is included for its deterrent
effect.
Subsection (b) as been
rewritten to (1) use the active voice; and (2) add the phrase “void under
subsection (a)” because subsection 21(e) also voids
certain agreements, viz. those in which the individual is overcharged. If the
Committee decides that the consequences under § 21(e) are the
same as specified in this subsection, the phrase can be deleted.
Current Ssubsection
(cb)
clarifies that the provider has no claim whatsoever against the individual. The
individual’s right to terminate the agreement would foreclose a claim for
future loss, and this section is intended to make it clear that the provider
has no claims with respect to any benefits conferred on the individual in the
past.
(a) All money paid to a provider or other
person by or on behalf of an individual pursuant to
a plan is held in trust. Within two business
days after receipt, a debt-management-services the provider or other
person shall deposit that money in a trust account
established for the benefit of individuals all money paid by or on
behalf of an individual for disbursement to the individual’s creditors.
(b) Money in a trust account is not property of a
debt-management-services
provider or other person that establishes the account.
A trust account established pursuant to this section is not available to [judgment] creditors
of the debt-management-services
provider or other person, other than an
individual from whom or on whose behalf the debt-management-services provider or other
person has received money, to the extent that the money has not
been distributed
disbursed to creditors of the
individual.
(c) A debt-management-services provider
shall:
(1) maintain separate records of account for each
individual to whom the provider is providing furnishing debt-management
services;
(2) disburse money paid by or on behalf of an the individual
to creditors of the individual as disclosed in the debt-management-services agreement as required
by Section 16(a)(4)(E), except that:
(A) the disbursement must comply with the due dates established by each creditor; and
(B) subject to rule of the administrator, the provider may delay payment to the extent that a payment by the individual is not final; and
(3) promptly correct any payments that are not
made or that are misdirected as a result of an error by the debt-management-services provider
or
other person in control of the trust account and reimburse the
individual for any costs or fees imposed by a creditor as a result of the
failure to pay or misdirection.
(d) A person may not commingle the money in a trust account established for the benefit of individuals with money of a person other than those individuals.
(e) A debt-management-services provider
shall reconcile the trust account at least once a month. The reconciliation
must ascertain the cash balance in the account and compare it to the sum of the
escrow
balances in each individual’s account. If the debt-management-services provider
has more than one trust account, each trust account must be individually scheduled
and reconciled.
(f) Each trust account of a debt-management-services
provider must at all times have a cash
balance equal to or greater than the sum of the escrow balances
of each individual’s account.
(g) If its a trust
account does not contain sufficient money to cover the aggregate individual
balances, the debt-management-services provider,
immediately upon discovery, shall notify the administrator by telephone,
facsimile, electronic mail, or other method approved by the administrator.
Within [three] days of discovery, unless the
administrator by rule provides otherwise, the debt-management-services provider
shall also provide give notice
describing the remedial action taken or to be taken.
(h) If an individual terminates an
agreement or if it becomes reasonably apparent to a provider that a
plan has failed, If [all][a majority] of the unpaid creditors to
whom a debt-settlement-services provider has submitted proposals refuse to
assent to those proposals, the provider shall promptly refund to
the individual all money paid by or on behalf of the individual which has not
been paid to the creditors.
(i) Before changing the financial institution at
which its trust account is located, a debt-management-services provider
shall deliver
to inform the administrator the consent
required by Section 6(c)(16)of the name,
address, and telephone number of the new financial institution. As soon as
practicable, the provider shall inform the administrator of the account number
of the trust account at that institution.
Preliminary Comments
This section requires that persons that
receive money for disbursement to creditors establish trust accounts. Some
providers receive the money directly. Others use third parties for the purpose
of receiving the funds and managing the accounts. Under
either model, the recipient is a fiduciary and must establish a trust account. If the
provider does not receive money for that purpose, but instead leaves the
individual in control of that money, this section does not require a trust
account. The Committee must decide how to deal with money in accounts that are
owned by an individual
but accessible to a provider by means of the power to initiate a debit
transfer. As a first step toward dealing with this, a new
provision has been added, section 23(b).
Subsection (a): For debt-management-services
providers at brick and mortar locations, it would be feasible to
require the trust account to be located in this state. For providers that
operate (via the Internet or telephone) nationally out of an office not located
in this state, it may be unduly burdensome to require a trust account in each
state in which the provider operates. Some existing state statutes, however, do
just that. This section permits the agency to deposit money of residents of
this state into a trust account located in another state and containing the
money of individuals who reside in other states. But Section 6(c)(24) requires the depository bank to provide
irrevocable consent to a turnover order by the administrator. A bank may be
unwilling to do this if the account contains the money of individuals who
reside in other states. As a practical matter, then, an agency may have to
establish a separate account for each state whose residents it serves.
Subsection (b): As a person with a
claim against a debt-management-services provider, the
individual is a “creditor.” Nevertheless, the individual should have access to
the trust account, but only to the extent the debt-management-services provider
has received money from or on behalf of the individual and has not distributed them it to
creditors. Without this limitation, the individual’s compensation out of the
trust account would come at the expense of other individuals whose money
comprises the trust account. Compensation of the individual for other loss or
damage will have to come from assets of the debt-management-services provider
or the bond or other assurance required by Section 12 . Because the money does not belong
to the provider, the trust account may not bear interest for the benefit of the
provider.
The language of the subsection (b) finesses the
question of has been modified, to finesse the
need to specify the process by which the individual may access the
trust account. This Act leaves that question to other law, but as a creditor of
the provider, the individual has whatever rights creditors generally have. In
addition, the individual may be the beneficiary of action by the administrator
under §§
sections 26-27.
Subsection (c) imposes obligations on the
provider. If the provider uses a third party to administer
the trust account, the provider may delegate these obligations
to the third party. The provider, however, is
responsible for performance of the obligations and is liable if they are not
performed.
The subsection contemplates
that the debt-management-services agreement may
establish a date by which the individual must remit to the provider and a date
by which the provider must remit to the creditors. In Pparagraph
(2) the
cross reference to section 16 has the effect of limiting paragraph (2) to credit-counseling
agencies. Subparagraph (A) applies to
credit-counseling agencies and requires
that the agreement—and the provider’s
performance—must conform to the due dates established by the creditors. It is
expected that, if necessary or desirable, the provider will secure the
creditors’ assent to modify the original due dates to maximize the feasibility
of the plan. Subparagraph (B) reflects the use of payment
systems other than checks. Reflecting a suggestion made at the October 2004
meeting, it also contemplates that the administrator may establish standards of
finality for those other systems, e.g., ACH transfers, money orders, et al.
Does it not suffice to reference the administrator’s power in the Comment? If so, then
the phrase at the beginning of subparagraph (B) (“subject to ...”) may be
deleted. Do we need anything comparable to paragraph (2)
for debt-settlement companies? requires that any such
agreement—and the provider’s performance—must conform to the due dates
established by the creditors. It is expected that, if
necessary or desirable, the provider will secure the creditors’ assent to
modify the original due dates to maximize the feasibility of the plan. Subparagraph
(B) has been revised to reflect the use of payment
systems other than checks.
With respect to
debt-settlement-services providers, the provider’s business model may not
entail a trust account. If, however, it does, does paragraph (2) deal with it
appropriately?
Subsection (f): Section 29(b) provides that failure to maintain the
amount is cause for summary suspension of registration.
At the October 2004 meeting, a member of the Committee suggested creating an exception to subsections (f) and (g) to allow a deficit in the account if the bank debits the account because of a bounced check or other reversal of a deposit. The draft does not incorporate this suggestion because if the bank reverses a credit, the provider would also debit the individual’s account in the trust account. Hence, the trust account would not show a deficit. If the Committee still thinks a problem exists, the following clause could be appended to the end of subsection (f): “unless the reason for the deficit is that the bank has reversed a credit to the account.”
Subsection (h): This provision has been rewritten,
to remove the numerical test of failure. In its place is the vague standard, “reasonably
apparent.” Once it becomes clear that a debt-settlement plan will
not work, the provider must refund the individual’s money. The subsection could be
omitted, since the individual may terminate the agreement at any time, in which
event the provider must return all unspent money. But if the individual is not
aware of the need to give record notice of the desire to terminate, the
provider might simply retain the individual’s money. Should the
trigger be rejection by all the creditors or something less than that?
Presumably these funds are in the
trust account, but the obligation under this subsection exists even if they are
not.
The subsection has been further amended to require prompt refund of payments when an individual terminates the account.
Subsection (i): Section 6(c)(24) requires the agency and the bank to give
irrevocable consent to permit the administrator to access the account in
connection with enforcement of the Act.
SECTION 20. FEES: MONETARY LIMITS.
Reporter’s
Note: At the October 2004 meeting, the Committee began
considering the desirability of fee caps. Committee members and
observers alike expressed wildly
disparate views, from the need for specific and low fee caps (because one of the
biggest problems in credit counseling and debt settlement is exorbitant costs
to consumers) to the view
that there should be no fee caps at all (because the costs
of doing business vary from state to state and because the
operation of the market will produce appropriate fees). The
Committee directed the reporter to
generate several alternative versions of a section that addresses limitations
on fees.
To place these alternatives in
context, a brief explanation of the current state of regulation of fees may be
helpful. In many states the
statutes enacted in the 1950s and 1960s banning the business of debt-adjusting or
debt-prorating are still in effect.
In some of these states there is no fee
cap, and no need for a fee cap, because anyone engaged in the business is committing in a
crime. In some of these states, there is an exemption for non-profits, and
there may no fee limit because the legislature had in mind true non-profit
institutions that would serve the public interest. Some of the 1950s-era
statutes have fee limits. Of the more recently enacted or
revised statutes, fee caps are very common. Most of them apply to debt
settlement as well as credit counseling.
In the states with fee caps, there
is provision for one or more of the following kinds of fees: set-up, monthly
service, and settlement. The cap on set-up fees ranges from $25 to
$75, with $50 being the most common cap. The monthly fee ranges from $3 per creditor
to 15% of the total debt in a plan/program. The 15% figure dates from the
1950s-era legislation and is the most commonly used figure. In states that
permit debt settlement, the 15% figure often applies.
Some states, however, have a lower limit, sometimes stated as a percentage of
the payment to the creditor (3%, 6-7%, 10%) or as a
dollar amount ($20-25). One state, which does not permit for-profits,
sets fees by regulation; several (including some that permit
for-profits) limit the fee to an amount that does not exceed the provider’s bona fide
expenses; and one (NY) specifies that fees must be fair and reasonable. The
prevailing regulatory scheme is either a prohibition of the
business of credit counseling or debt settlement or a cap on the fees that those
in the business may charge.
This draft contains three
alternatives. Alternative A directs the administrator to set fee caps.
Alternative B places fee caps in the statute. Alternative C contains a soft fee
cap (“fair and reasonable”) and relies on disclosure. Each
alternative has multiple variations, which are
not fully presented here. After the
Committee has selected one of the alternatives, the variations will be ripe for
consideration. In each
alternative, subsections (a) and (b) are unchanged in substance
from the last draft.
(a) A person may not impose a fee or other charge
on an individual or receive money from or on behalf of an individual for
debt-management services except as permitted under by this
section.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c)
and Section 15(a)(6) , a A
person providing debt-management services to an individual may not impose
charges or receive payment for the services until the person and the individual
have executed an debt-management-services agreement
that complies with Sections 16 and 23 .
ALTERNATIVE
(A):
(c) Except as otherwise provided in Section
21(c):
(1) a provider may charge for its educational and
counseling services a fee that is fair and reasonable, as provided by rule of the administrator;
(2) if an individual assents to
an agreement, the provider may charge:
(A)
a reasonable fee, as provided by rule of the
administrator, for consultation, obtaining a credit report, setting up an
account, and the like; and
(B)
a monthly service fee not in excess of
the amount determined by rule of the
administrator to be reasonable in relation to the services provided; and
(3) a provider that assists an individual in
settling one or more of the individual’s debts for
less than the principal amount of the debt may not charge a settlement fee:
(A) in excess
of the amount determined by rule of the
administrator to be reasonable in relation to the services provided; or
(B)
before settlement of the individual’s debt.
ALTERNATIVE B:
(c) Except as otherwise provided in Section
21(c):
(1) a provider may charge for its educational and
counseling services a fee that is fair and reasonable, as provided by rule of the
administrator; and
(2) if an individual assents to
an agreement, the provider may charge a fee not exceeding $50
for consultation, obtaining a credit report, setting up an account, and the
like.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in Section
21(c), [if a plan contemplates concessions by creditors in
the form of reduced finance charge or reduced fees for
late payment, default, or delinquency,] a provider
may charge a monthly service fee not exceeding the
lesser of 10 percent of the
monthly payment by or on behalf of the individual or $10 for each
creditor that is listed in the agreement between the provider and the
individual, except that the total monthly service fee may
not exceed $50.
(e) Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(c) [and (d)] and in Section
21(c), if a plan contemplates that creditors will settle an
individual’s debts for less than the full principal amount of those debts:
(1) a provider
may not charge or receive compensation with respect to a debt until the
settlement of the debt;
(2) compensation for services in
connection with settling a debt may not exceed, with respect to each debt, [the lesser
of $600 or] 15 percent of the
amount of the forgiven portion of the debt; and
(3) a
provider may not receive any compensation with respect to a debt that the
individual settles directly with the creditor to which that debt is owed.
ALTERNATIVE
C:
(c) Except as otherwise provided in Section
21(c):
(1) a provider may charge for its
education and counseling services a fee that is fair and reasonable; and
(2) in connection
with a plan, a provider may not receive compensation of any kind except for
a set-up fee, a monthly service fee, and, if the plan contemplates that creditors
will settle an individual’s debts for less
the the full principal amount of those debts, a settlement fee.
(d) If a plan
contemplates that creditors will settle an individual’s debts for less than the full
principal amount of those debts, a provider may not
charge or receive a settlement fee with respect to a debt until the
settlement of the debt.
END OF ALTERNATIVES.
Under each alternative, the section would continue:
(c) Except as otherwise provided in Section 21(c) :
(1) a debt-management-services provider may
charge for its educational and counseling services a fee that is fair and
reasonable, as permitted by the administrator; and
(2) if an individual enters a debt-management
plan or a debt-settlement plan, the provider may charge a fee not exceeding
$[50] for consultation, obtaining a credit report, setting up an account, and
the like.
(d) The fees permitted by subsection (c) must be
deducted from:
(1) the first six payments of any monthly
maintenance fee in connection with a debt-management plan permitted by
subsection (b); and
(2) the compensation permitted a
debt-settlement-services provider by subsections (f) and (g).
(e) Except as otherwise provided in Section 21(c) , a debt-management-services
provider other than a debt-settlement-services provider may
charge a monthly maintenance fee not exceeding the lesser of [6%] of the
monthly payment by or on behalf of the individual or $[8] for each creditor
that is listed in the debt-management-services agreement between the debt-management-services
provider and the individual, except that the total monthly
maintenance fee may not exceed $[40].
(f) Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(c), a person providing debt-settlement services may not charge or receive
compensation until the settlement of an individual’s debt with a creditor.
(g) The amount of compensation of a debt-settlement-services
provider may not exceed the lesser of [$600] or [15%] of the amount of debt
that each creditor forgives.
(hx) Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(c), a person providing debt-management services to an individual may not charge
a fee to:
(1) prepare a financial analysis or an initial
budget plan for
the individual;
(2) provide education or counseling about the management of personal finance; or
(3) terminate an debt-management-services agreement.
(iy) If a payment by an individual under this
section is dishonored, a debt-management-services provider may
impose a reasonable charge on the individual, not to exceed [$25][the amount
allowable for dishonored checks or other instruments by Section ___].
(j) The administrator [shall] [may] adjust the
dollar amounts specified in this section to reflect inflation, as measured by
the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers, or other index adopted by rule by the administrator.
Legislative Note: In subsection (iy)
insert the citation of the statute specifying the maximum charge a payee may
impose for a dishonored check.
Preliminary Comments
[If the
Committee adopts Alternative C, the disclosure provision in Section 14(a) should
be revised, perhaps as follows:
(a) Before
providing debt-management services to an individual, a person shall provide the
individual an itemized list, in a record, of services and the charges for each,
describing those goods and services the person offers:
(1)
free of charge, if the individual enters into an agreement;
(2)
for a charge, if the individual enters into an agreement, using the
following terminology, as applicable, and format:
Set-up fee [ $ amount of fee ]
Monthly service fee [
amount of fee or method of determining amount ]
Settlement fee [ amount of fee or method of determining
amount ]
Goods/services in addition to
those provided in connection with a plan:
[ item ] [ $ amount or method ]
[ item ] [ $ amount or method ]
Perhaps
something like this standardized disclosure should be incorporated into section 14
regardless of which alternative is selected in this section.
Subsection (b): In addition to
specifying some of the contents of an debt-management-services agreement,
Ssection
16 requires immediate delivery of the record containing the agreement. If the
record is a writing, this subsection prohibits a debt-management-services provider
from collecting any money before the individual receives a copy of it. If the
record is electronic, the provider may impose a fee as soon as it delivers the
record, which occurs when it makes the record available in retrievable and
printable form. Section 15(a)(6) permits delayed delivery of the written
agreement by a provider that communicates by electronic means. The
phrase “payment for the services,” viz., debt-management services, means that
the prohibition in this subsection does not apply to fees for education or
counseling. If the debt-management-services provider
creates a debt-management plan for the individual, the next subsection requires
that the educational or counseling fees be credited against the fees for the
DMP.
Subsection (c): Section 21(c) requires a tax-exempt provider to
reduce or waive its fee in appropriate cases.
The Oregon statute permits a charge
for “education classes” if (1) the classes and the fees are approved by the
administrator or (2) the classes are required by federal or state law, the
provider is certified under that law as an approved provider of the classes,
and the administrator approves the fee. If the bankruptcy bill is enacted, any
federal law authorizing specific charges for the education required by the bill
would be likely to preempt any provision in this Act that caps fees for the
services required by that bill. If the federal law authorizes charges by resort
to a standard such as “reasonable,” a limit in state law might be viewed as
defining “reasonable” and not preempted.
At the Annual Meeting some
commissioners questioned whether the a fee limit
should appear in the statute. They suggesged suggested that
the power to set fees should be vested in the administrator and that the
statute should articulate standards for the administrator to use. Does the
Committee wish to change its approach?Alternative A implements this
suggestion.
In the previous draft,
subsection (d) required a provider to credit any set-up fee or education fee
against the accruing monthly service fees. This provision has been deleted. Subsection
(d): Subsection (c) permits a debt-management-services provider to
charge a set-up fee and a fee for educational services. Subsection (e) permits
a monthly service fee, and this fee is comprehensive, so if there is a set-up
fee or a charge for education or counseling before the individual enters a DMP,
the provider must refund them, in the form of a credit against the accruing
monthly charges. The Committee must decide whether to confirm this approach or
adopt the current industry practice of cumulative set-up and maintenance fees.
Subsection (e): Using the numbers in
brackets, the $40 limit would apply if either the number if creditors
exceeds five or the monthly payment exceeds $666.
Some states cap the fees at a
percentage of the monthly payment by the individual without regard to the
number of creditors. (15% is common in statutes regulating debt pro-raters, the
forbears of debt-settlement service providers.) Others, e.g., California, use a
combination of a percentage and a fixed cap. Washington prohibits imposition of
a fee with respect to payments to utility companies or landlords. In Michigan,
Nebraska, and Washington, the limit on the set-up fee is $25. The trade
associations limit their member agencies to $75. See the Reporter’s Note to
subsection (g). The ISO standard for accreditation caps the set-up fee at $75
and the monthly fee at $50.
Providers of debt-settlement
services typically charge a percentage of the forgiven debt, as much as 25% or
more, in addition to large front-end fees and perhaps monthly charges. The cap
imposed by this section is much lower, but does not apply to those entities.
Subsection (g) establishes the cap for debt-settlement-services providers.
Subsections (f)-(g): Subsection (c)
permits the debt-settlement-services provider to receive the set-up fee.
Subsection (d) does not authorize a debt-settlement-services provider to charge
a monthly fee, so the ban of subsection (a) applies. So under subsections
(a)-(d), a debt-settlement-services provider may charge the set-up fee but not
any monthly fee. Subsection (f) makes this ban on monthly fees clear.
Subsection (g) permits compensation of up to [$600] (or [15% of $4000] of debt
forgiveness) at the time the individual’s debt to a creditor is settled, and
subsection (d) requires that the amount of any set-up fee and any fee for
education or counseling be credited against this compensation. The 15%/$600 cap
applies to each debt that is settled. The Drafting Committee has not yet
considered whether this approach and these limits are appropriate and has not
yet considered whether debt-settlement-services providers should be subject to
the same caps as other debt-management-services providers.
Subsection (iy):
The Drafting Committee may wish to consider whether it is appropriate to borrow
the state’s general provision on fees for bounced checks. In the context of
debt-management-services agreements, it
may be appropriate to set the sanction for writing a bad check at a level that
just permits the provider to recover the costs a bad check causes it to incur. The issue
is of diminishing importance because the prevailing practice for both
credit-counseling agencies and debt-settlement companies is to use direct
debits to the individual’s bank account. The use of checks is disappearing.
Former subsection
(j) addressed the adjustment of dollar amounts. At the direction of the
Committee, this provision has been moved to section 26 (Powers of
Administrator), and the annual adjustment is mandatory. Subsection (j): The
Drafting Committee must decide whether there should be adjustment
of dollar amounts and, if so, whether
adjustments should be mandatory or optional. The Committee also must decide
whether to specify the inflation index or leave it to the administrator. As
drafted, the subsection establishes a default setting, thereby relieving the
administrator of the burden when first assuming responsibility for this area.
SECTION 21. FEES: OTHER LIMITS.
(a) A [non-profit or tax-exempt] debt-management-services
provider may not require solicit a
voluntary contribution from an individual or any other person for any service
provided to the individual. A [non-profit or tax-exempt] debt-management-services
provider may accept voluntary contributions from an individual
but, until 30 days after completion or termination of a plan, debt-management
plan [or debt settlement plan], the
aggregate amount of money received from or on behalf of the individual may not
exceed the total amount the debt-management-services provider is
authorized to charge the individual under Section 20 .
(b) A debt-management-services provider, as
a condition of entering into a debt-management plan or a
debt-settlement plan Except as otherwise provided
in Section 14(b), a provider may not require an
individual, as a condition of entering
into a plan, to purchase a counseling
session, an educational program, or materials and supplies. Except as otherwise
provided in subsection (c), however, the provider may charge the individual a fair and
reasonable amount , to the extent permitted by Section 20 , for counseling sessions,
educational programs, or supplies if the individual does not enter into a plan assent to
an agreement.
(c) A [non-profit or tax-exempt] debt-management-services
provider may not deny services to an individual whom it determines cannot pay
the provider’s usual fee. The provider shall reduce its fee to the extent
necessary to enable the individual to acquire its services.
(d) If, for a period of 60 days, an
individual who has entered into an debt-management-services agreement
does not make payments required by the agreement, for a period
of 60 days, the debt-management-services
the provider may terminate the
agreement. The provider shall immediately return to the individual any money of
the individual remaining in its possession or in the trust account.
(e) If a debt-management-services provider
imposes a fee or other charge or receives money or other payments not
authorized by subsection (a) or Section 20 , except as a result of an
unintentional and bona fide error made in good faith
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably designed to prevent
the error, the individual may void the agreement. debt-management-services
agreement. If the individual voids the agreement, the
debt-management-services provider [shall immediately pay the individual three
times the amount of the unauthorized fees, charges, money, or payments] [shall
return to the individual all amounts received from or on behalf of the
individual].
(f) If, as a result of an unintentional error
made in good faith notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably
designed to prevent the error, a debt-management-services provider
receives money not authorized by subsection (a) or Section 20 , the provider shall return that
money to the individual no later than two days after learning of the error.
Legislative Note: If the state does
not permit for-profit debt-management-services providers,
the bracketed language that appears twice in subsection (a) and once
in subsection (c) should be deleted. If the state permits for-profit providers,
the brackets should be deleted from the phrases.
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a): A common abuse by allegedly
non-profit credit-counseling agencies has been coercing consumers into making
allegedly voluntary contributions to the agency. Subsection (a) seeks to end
this practice. The provision
has been revised to (a) prohibit solicitation of contributions as well as
requiring contributions, and (b) apply to for-profit entities in those states
that choose to permit them. Section 20(a) precludes a debt-management-services provider
from requiring
or receiving a “voluntary” payment in addition to or in excess of
the amounts stipulated in Ssection 20 . The separate prohibition in this
section is included in order to leave no doubt that the current practice of
many debt-management-services
providers is unlawful. The point presumably could be made in a comment to
Section 20(a) instead of being included in the text of the
statute. The limitation on voluntary contributions is designed to prevent
evasions of the basic prohibition. It could survive even if the basic prohibition
is removed from the text of the subsection. What is the Committee’s pleasure?
Neither section 20 nor this section prohibits the solicitation or receipt of charitable contributions for services other than debt management by entities that provide those other services. Section 20 puts the prohibition in terms of “receiv[ing] money ... for debt management services,” and this section puts the prohibition in terms of “solicit[ing] a voluntary contribution ... for any service provided to the individual.” The administrator and the courts have the power to prevent evasion of this subsection.
Subsection (b): This subsection authorizes a counseling agency to impose charges for education or counseling services. Any charge must be fair and reasonable.
Subsection (c): This is the current
practice of most counseling agencies, and is a
requirement for qualification as a § section 501(c)(3)
entity, and appears
in some state statutes that regulate credit-counseling agencies.
An industry Observer at the November 2003 meeting pointed to the risk of
adverse selection since virtually all individuals seeking debt-management
services are financially stressed. The ISO standards for accreditation,
however, require that there “be objective evidence of conformance to demonstrate
... the individual credit counseling agency stands ready to serve all clients
who seek service regardless of ... a client’s ability to pay ....” Does the
Committee wish to impose this obligation on for-profit entities, too?
Subsection (d): In the context of a
debt-management plancredit-counseling
agencies, if the debt-management-services provider is
acting in conformity with the Act, there will be no money in the trust account.
This provision addresses the provider that has not distributed the money to
creditors as required by Section 19(c)(2) . Perhaps more
importantly, it requires the provider of a debt-settlement
company in
possession of an services to return the
individual’s money to return it.
Subsection
(e): If a provider overcharges, the individual has the
option of voiding the agreement. The portion of subsection (e) that, in the
previous draft, dealt with the
consequences of a provider’s imposition or receipt of excess charges, has been
relocated to Section 30(a)-(b) (Private Enforcement).
Subsection (e) has been modified to
eliminate automatic voidness if the provider overcharges and instead makes it
optional with the individual. If the Committee concurs, the remaining issue is
whether the sanction should be treble damages or the more deterrence-oriented
remedy of returning all money received from the individual, including the money
that was paid over to the creditors. For an overcharge, forfeiture of all
amounts received may be too draconian. A similar question is presented under
Section 18(b) (void agreements), where the remedy, although draconian,
may nevertheless be appropriate.
The standard “unintentional error made in good faith notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably designed to prevent the error” derives from the federal Truth-in-Lending Act § 130(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1640(c). To promote consistency in the law of consumer protection, courts should interpret the phrase in this Act in a manner consistent with the federal interpretations of the federal statute.
SECTION 22. PERIODIC REPORTS AND RETENTION OF RECORDS.
(a) A debt-management-services provider
shall provide the accounting required by subsection (b):
(1) at least once each calendar quarter month;
(2) upon rescission or termination of an
debt-management-services
agreement; and
(3) within five business days after a request by an individual.
(b) A debt-management-services provider
shall provide each individual for whom it has established a debt-management plan or a
debt-settlement plan a written accounting of the following information, as
applicable:
(1) the amount of money received from the individual since the last report;
(2) the amounts and dates of disbursement made on
the individual’s behalf, or by the individual upon the direction of the debt-management-services
provider, to each creditor listed in the plan since the last
report;
(3) any the amounts
deducted from amounts received from the individual; [and]
(4) [any the amount held
in reserve; and
(5)] the total amount and the terms on which a creditor has agreed to accept as payment in full on a debt owed by the individual.
(c) A debt-management-services provider
shall maintain records for each individual for whom it provides debt-management
services for six years after the last payment made by the individual and produce
them to the individual within a reasonable time after a request for them.
The debt-management-services
provider may use electronic or other means of storage of the
records.
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a): An individual is entitled to regular
communication of the status of his or her account. This
subsection has been revised to require providers to give accountings on a
monthly basis. This adopts for all the current practice of many
providers to give a monthly accounting. Some debt-management-services
providers provide accountings
on a monthly basis. Nothing in this section is intended to discourage this
practice.
Subsection (b): Paragraph (2) has been revised
to pick up those agencies, typically providers of
debt-settlement services, that have
the individual establish a savings account rather than sending payment to the
provider for placement in an escrow account. The If any of “the amounts” is zero, the provider
need not include any disclosure with respect to that paragraph. If a provider
requires the individual to establish an account with a bank
or other third party from which money is to be disbursed to creditors,
the provider complies by stating the dates on which it directed
the individual to make payment.
Paragraph (4) is bracketed because § section 20
places strict limits on what the a provider may
charge and does not explicitly permit the a provider
to retain any amounts in reserve. Unless one can point to an appropriate
instance of holding any of the an individual’s
payment in reserve, the language should be omitted. Otherwise, it creates an
implication that such a reserve is permissible.
Paragraph (5) applies primarily to
debt-settlement agenciescompanies. If no
creditor has agreed to settlement terms during a reporting period, the
subsection does not require the agency to make any disclosure. Hence, the
subsection ordinarily would not apply to plans operated by credit-counseling
agencies, because operating a debt-management plan, in which
creditors receive the full principal amount of the debt owed them and do not
“agree” to accept any particular amount as payment in full.
Subsection (c): The period of retention should
be tied to the statute of limitations in section 31, perhaps one year longer
than the statute, so as to afford a reasonable time for the discovery process
to unfold. Implicit in the permission to maintain records
electronically is a requirement that the records may be produced promptly upon
proper request.
SECTION 23. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES.
Preliminary Comments
Most states that regulate credit
counseling agencies have a list of prohibited practices. The prohibited
practices have several discrete purposes:
(1) to implement the policy that a debt-management-services
provider should assist the individual in dealing with his
or her creditors but not become a creditor itself or have an adversary
relationship with the individual;
(2) to implement the objective of
improving, not worsening, the individual’s economic situation;
(3) to prevent deception;
(4) to promote the debt-management-services
provider’s duty of loyalty to the individual; and
(5) to prevent unfairness or abuse.
The section
has been reorganized somewhat. At the Annual Meeting a commissioner noted that
the prohibitions in subsection (a) would foreclose the specified activities
even as to individuals with whom the debt-management-services provider is not
providing debt-management services. If a provider is engaging in multiple lines
of business, it could not make loans, purchase debts, etc., independently of
its debt-management-services business. Therefore, subsection (a) has been
rewritten to separate out and relocate to a new subsection those prohibitions
from the prohibitions that should apply across the board.
At the November 2003 meeting there
was some discussion of whether the Act should state that counseling agencies
are fiduciaries. An agency undoubtedly is a fiduciary with respect to
management and disbursement of the trust account, even without any express
statement to that effect in the Act. The Drafting Committee postponed
consideration of whether there should be a broader statement regarding an
agency’s fiduciary status and, if so, exactly what that status entails. If the
Committee decides to include a fiduciary obligation, this section might be an
appropriate place to locate it.
(a) A debt-management-services provider may
not:
(1) misappropriate or misapply money in a trust
account;
(2) initiate a transfer from an
individual’s account at a bank or with another person unless the
transfer is a return of money to the
individual or:
(A) for the
purpose of paying a monthly service fee, a
settlement fee, or a settlement; and
(B) properly authorized by the agreement and this [act];
(3) offer a gift, bonus, premium, reward, or
other compensation to an individual for executing an agreement;
(4) offer, pay, or give a gift, bonus, premium,
reward, or other compensation to a person for referring a prospective customer;
(5) receive a bonus, commission, or other benefit for
referring an individual to a person for any reason;
(26) structure a debt-management plan
in a manner that would result in a negative amortization of any of the an individual’s
debts, unless a creditor that is owed a negatively amortizing debt agrees to
refund or waive the finance charge upon payment of the principal amount of the
debt;
(7) compensate its employees on the basis of a
formula that incorporates the number of individuals the employee induces to
enter into agreements;
(8) take a confession of judgment or power of
attorney to confess judgment against an individual or appear on the
individual’s behalf in a judicial proceeding.
(9) lead an individual to believe that a payment
to a creditor is in settlement of a debt to the creditor unless the the
provider receives from the creditor a certification that the payment is in full
settlement of the debt;
(10) misrepresent that it is authorized or
competent to furnish legal advice or perform legal services;
(11) represent that it is a not-for-profit or
tax-exempt entity unless it meets the standards for that status under the
Internal Revenue Code and has received certification of that status from the
Internal Revenue Service; or
(312) employ an unfair, unconscionable, or
deceptive act or practice, including the knowing omission of any material
information; .
(4) offer a gift, bonus, premium, reward, or
other compensation to an individual for executing a debt-management-services
agreement;
(5) misrepresent that it is authorized or
competent to furnish legal advice or perform legal services;
(6) offer, pay, or give a gift, bonus, premium,
reward, or other compensation to a person for referring a prospective customer,
except to the extent the payment is reasonable and represents only compensation
for the service of determining whether the services of the
debt-management-services provider are suitable for the individual;
(7) receive a bonus, commission, or other
consideration for referring an individual to a person for any reason;
(8) compensate its employees on the basis of a
formula that incorporates the number of individuals the employee induces to
enter into debt-management-services agreements; or
(9) take a confession of judgment or power of
attorney to confess judgment against an individual or appear on the
individual’s behalf in a judicial proceeding.
(b) With respect to an individual to whom a debt-management-services
provider furnishes provides debt-management
services, the provider may not, directly or indirectly:
(1) purchase a debt or obligation of an the individual;
(2) receive from or on behalf of an the individual
a promissory note or other negotiable instrument other than a check or a demand
draft;
(3) lend money or provide credit to an the individual;
(4) obtain a mortgage or other security interest
in property owned by an the individual;
(5) make a representation that:
(A)
the debt-management-services
provider will provide furnish money to
pay bills or prevent attachments;
(B) payment of a certain amount will permit satisfaction of a certain amount or range of indebtedness; or
(C)
participation in a debt-management plan will or may
prevent litigation, garnishment, attachment, repossession, foreclosure,
eviction, or loss of employment;
(6) disclose the identity or identifying information of the individual or the identity of the individual’s creditors, except to:
(A) the administrator, upon proper demand; or
(B)
a creditor of the individual, to the extent necessary to secure the cooperation
of the creditor in the debt-management a
plan;
(7) except as otherwise provided for
debt-settlement-services providers in Section 20(gy) , provide the individual less than the
full benefit of a compromise of a debt arranged by the provider;
(8) charge for or provide credit insurance, other
insurance of any kind, coupons for any kinds of
goods or services, membership in a club of any kind,
access to computers or the Internet, or any other matter not directly related
to debt-management services or education concerning personal finance; or
(9) furnish legal advice or perform legal
services, including the preparation of or advice concerning a release of
attachment or garnishment, stipulation, affidavit for exemption, compromise document agreement,
or other legal document other than an debt-management-services agreement for
debt-management services, unless the
person furnishing that advice or
those services is licensed to practice law. This [act] does not authorize any
person to engage in the practice of law.
(c) A person that provides debt-management
services may not, directly or indirectly, receive compensation, directly or indirectly,
for advising, arranging, or assisting an individual in connection with
obtaining an extension of credit or other service from a lender or service provider
if:
(1) the person providing debt-management
services, or an officer, director, owner, employee,
or affiliate of that person, owns more than 10 percent of has an
ownership interest greater than [ten] percent in the
lender or service provider; or
(2) an officer, director, owner, employee,
or affiliate of the person providing debt-management services is an officer,
director, owner, employee, or affiliate of
the lender or service provider.
(d) A debt-management-services provider may
not purchase goods, services, or facilities from a person if an officer,
director, owner, employee, or affiliate of
the debt-management-services
provider owns more than 10 percent of has an
ownership interest greater than [ten] percent in the person, or an
officer,
director, owner,employee or affiliate of the debt-management-services
provider is an officer, director, owner, employee,
or affiliate of the provider of the goods, services, or facilities. This
subsection does not prohibit a debt-management-services provider from
purchasing legal, accounting, or banking services from a member of its board of
directors, if the supplier of those services both:
(1) supplies those services generally; and
(2) supplies
them to the debt-management-services provider at a
cost [no greater than][less than] the cost generally charged by the supplier of
those services to other persons.
(e) A debt-management-services provider, in In
connection with collecting debts owed it or another person, a provider may
not use a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means; engage in
conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse a
person; or use unfair or unconscionable means.
(f) In applying this subsection (d),
the administrator and the courts shall give due consideration to judicial and
administrative interpretations given to Sections 806 through 808 of the Federal
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, (15 U.S.C. §§
1692d-1692f), as amended.
(gf) This [act] does not prohibit an assignment of
wages by an individual to a debt-management-services provider to
the extent permitted by law other than this [act].
Legislative Notes: In
lieu of subsection (a)(7), the state may wish to amend its general deceptive
practices statute to clarify that that statute applies to providers of
debt-management services as defined in this Act.
In
states in which the constitution does not permit use of the phrase
“as amended” in subsection (a) is not permitted by the constitution,
the phrase should be deleted.
Preliminary Comments
At the November 2003 meeting there
was some discussion of whether the Act should state that counseling agencies
are fiduciaries. An agency undoubtedly is a fiduciary with respect to
management and disbursement of the trust account, even without any express
statement to that effect in the Act. The Drafting Committee postponed
consideration of whether there should be a broader statement regarding an
agency’s fiduciary status and, if so, exactly what that status entails.
General principles of the law
of fiduciaries include such statements as “One who
stands in a fiduciary relationship to another has a duty not to profit at the
expense of the other” and “A fiduciary has a duty to act
for the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the
relationship.” Several
provisions in the Act serve to promote these principles.
(1) Section 20
limits the extent to which a provider may profit at the expense of a customer.
(2) Section 23
prohibits
·
misappropriation of trust
funds
·
unauthorized debiting of a
customer’s bank account
·
revealing
confidential information about a customer
·
deception of the customer
·
referral fees
·
self-dealing via affiliates.
It would not
seem wise to abandon these specific provisions in favor of
a vague statement that a provider owes a fiduciary
duty to its customers. Conversely, the addition of that vague statement to the
existing list in this section is likely to be either aspirational (and
therefore ineffectual) or productive of litigation about marginal
conduct.
Subsection (a):
The paragraphs of this subsection have been placed in a new order, and three new paragraphs (2, 9, and 10) have been added.
At the Annual Meeting a commissioner
suggested deleting subsection (a) and empowering the administrator of the UDAP statute
to promulgate rules to deal with these various forms of unfair or deceptive
practices. Does the Committee concur?
The November 2003 draft contained a
prohibition against operating as a collection agency, as defined in federal and
state law. Those definitions, however, contain an exception for nonprofit
credit counseling agencies. E.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act §
803(6)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(E). Hence, the prohibition is deleted. In its
place new subsection (d) has been added to prohibit the offensive behavior that
the debt collection statutes prohibit.
Paragraph (2): Credit-counseling
agencies typically have access to their
customers’ checking accounts, for the purpose of withdrawing money to pay the
customers’ creditors
and to pay the agency its monthly fee. Similarly, debt-settlement
companies may have their
customers establish accounts with banks or other persons for the
purpose of accumulating money until it
is paid to creditors, and the company typically
initiates transfers out of these
accounts to pay monthly service fees and/or settlement
fees, as well as to pay creditors. This paragraph
prohibits providers from initiating transfers that are not properly authorized
by the agreement. Section 20 limits the amount of the fees and the
timing of withdrawals that the agreement may authorize.
Paragraph (2): At the
November 2003 meeting an Observer noted that at least one creditor engages in a
practice that might, depending on the annual percentage rate and the amount of
the monthly payment, result in negative amortization. This creditor, however,
forgives or refunds the accrued finance charge if the individual completes the
debt-management plan. Apparently, this is true even if the individual ends his
or her relationship with the counseling agency and self-administers the plan.
If the individual does not self-administer it to completion, the negative
amortization remains. Given the high rate of non-completion of plans, the
Drafting Committee may wish to consider whether it is appropriate to encourage
this creditor’s practices by allowing plans to include debts that involve
negative amortization. The Virginia statute deals with this general problem by
prohibiting a plan that, at the conclusion of the plan, would result in
negative amortization. This approach would not prohibit the practice of the
creditor in question.
Paragraph (3): This
paragraph prohibits false or misleading representations whether or not the
provider knows of the deception. In accord with existing UDAP statutes, the risk
of falsity or deception is on the person that makes an express statement. On
the other hand, the paragraph prohibits omissions only if the omitted facts are
material and are known to the provider.
Alternate articulations found in
some statutes include: “employ any scheme, device, or artifice to defraud” and
“engage in any act, practice, or course of business that would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person.”
In lieu of the suggestion in the
Legislative Note above, the Act could omit paragraph 3 altogether and provide
specifically for amendment of the UDAP statute.
Paragraph (5) has been
revised because some providers, viz., attorneys, perform legal services.
Ultimately, this paragraph needs to be coordinated with the decision under § 4
concerning the scope of the exemption for licensed attorneys.
Paragraph (64):
The November 2003 draft prohibited referral fees altogether. The Annual
Meeting and September 2004 drafts prohibited The current
draft prohibits them unless the referring party provides screening
services to determine if the prospective customer is a good candidate for the
educational or other services of the debt-management-services provider.
The
phrase “to the extent that” is intended to permitThose drafts
permitted compensation only for the screening services and not for
the bare referral. The fact remains, however, that whether the screening
function is done by a creditor in-house or is outsourced, it is a subset of the
creditor’s collection costs. The creditors’ direct support of the counseling
industry has declined over the last decade. The Drafting Committee may
consider whether to prohibit the creditor from passing this indirect cost on to
the debt-management-services provider.At the
October 2004 meeting, the Committee voted to prohibit the provider from
permitting the creditor to pass this indirect cost on to it.
The Committee may wish to
consider whether there should be any prohibition on a provider’s payment of
referral fees. The rationale for the prohibition is to minimize the provider’s
costs of doing business, which ultimately are passed on to its customers. On
the other side is an argument that p ayment of
referral fees is an efficient way to attract business and achieve economies of
scale.
Payment of referral fees may be an
efficient way to attract business and achieve economies of scale. But it has
the potential of driving up the provider’s costs of doing business, which are
reflected in the prices charged to individuals. In addition, there is a risk
of deception. If a creditor, for example, refers an
individual to a particular provider,
the individual is likely to perceive this as an
endorsement by the creditor, which is seeking to help the
individual. In fact, the referral may be driven by identification
of which provider is willing to pay the highest price
for the referrals.
The prohibition against paying referral fees does not preclude payment for sales leads or lists of prospective customers, if the provider does not reveal the sources of the list. The vice here is misleading the individual into believing that an entity with which the individual has a relationship (viz., one of the individual’s creditors) is disinterestedly recommending that the individual seek the services of the provider. Hence, the provider may not reveal to the individual that a creditor of the individual is in any way connected to the reason the provider is communicating with the individual. If the source of the list is identified to the individual by either the provider or the source, the sales lead becomes a referral, and the provider may not pay for it.
Paragraph (75):
This provision is the converse of paragraph (124).
The
November 2003 draft prohibited the agency from receiving “any cash, fee, gift,
bonus, premium, reward, or other compensation from a person other than the
individual or person on the individual’s behalf in connection with the
debt-management-services provider’s business
of providing debt-management services.” The former version went too far, in
that it would bar a counseling agency from receiving “fair-share” money from
creditors. Additionally, it would not achieve its objective because it applies
“in connection with the … business of providing debt-management services,” but
“debt-management services” is defined to mean receiving money from the
individual and distributing it to creditors. Thus the prior version might
permit the agency to receive referral fees with respect to individuals who do
not sign up for a debt-management plan. The current version avoids these problems.
The purpose of paragraph (7) Its purpose is to
reduce or eliminate the economic incentive for an agency to refer individuals
to persons who provide loans or other products. The Committee may wish to consider
whether the protection of financially stressed, vulnerable
consumers justifies discouraging a provider from recommending products provided
by others. At the October 2004 meeting, it was suggested that
this paragraph not prohibit a provider from including
on its web site a link
to the web site of an entity providing
other services or products and receiving payment based on the number of times
individuals hit that link. The assertion was that this is a form of
advertising. No change to permit this has been made in the
text or the comment of this draft, because the practice is indistinguishable
from payment for referrals. Placing a link on the provider’s web site
necessarily amounts to an endorsement of or referral to the owner
of the linked web site. It should not matter
whether the referral is by electronic link or verbal recommendation. The
provider is free, of course, to place the link on its web site, so
long as it does not receive compensation from the owner/sponsor of the other
web site. This distinguishes
disinterested advice from referrals motivated by the
provider’s self-interest.
Paragraph (6): At the
November 2003 meeting an Observer noted that at least one creditor engages in a
practice that might, depending on the annual percentage rate and the amount of
the monthly payment, result in negative amortization. This creditor, however,
forgives or refunds the accrued finance charge if the individual completes the
plan. Apparently, this is true even if the individual ends his or her
relationship with the counseling agency and self-administers the plan. If the
individual does not self-administer it to completion, the negative amortization
remains. Given the high rate of non-completion of plans, the Drafting Committee
may wish to consider whether it is appropriate to encourage this creditor’s
practices by allowing plans to include debts that involve negative
amortization. The Virginia statute deals with this general problem by
prohibiting a plan that, at the conclusion of the plan, would result in
negative amortization. This approach would not prohibit the practice of the
creditor in question. The Committee has yet to consider whether negative
amortization should be permitted. Now is the time.
Paragraph (9): If a plan
contemplates settlement of a debt for less than the full principal amount of
the debt, the provider should not pay the creditor
unless it receives formal acknowledgment from the creditor that the
debt is satisfied. This paragraph seeks to accomplish that by barring a
misrepresentation. To violate the paragraph, the misrepresentation does not
have to be express. If the settlement contemplates that the creditor will be accepting installment
payments, the provider must make it clear to the individual that the initial
installment(s) do not settle the debt.
Paragraph (11): This
paragraph prohibits false or misleading representations whether or not the
provider knows of the deception. In accord with existing statutes prohibiting
unfair or deceptive acts or practices, the risk of falsity or
deception is on the person that makes an express statement. On the other hand,
the paragraph prohibits omissions only if the omitted facts are material and
are known to the provider.
Subsection (b):
Paragraph (2): At the November 2003
meeting an Observer suggested narrowing “draft” to “demand draft,” Under UCC
§3-104 a draft is an unconditional order directing a third party to pay money
to the person presenting the draft (or to the order of that person). Narrowing
the exception has the effect of permitting a debt-management-services provider
to receive a draft payable on demand, but not a draft directing payment on a
future date. The rationale for banning promissory notes would seem to apply to
drafts that are to be paid in the future. This draft therefore incorporates the
suggestion and permits the use only of demand drafts.
Paragraphs (3)-(4): should there be
an exception to these bans to permit the extension of secured or unsecured
credit with respect to the provider’s fees?
Paragraph (5):
Subparagraphs (B)-() and (C)
prohibit certain representations that sometimes are used to entice individuals
to sign up for debt-management and debt-settlement plans.
They are prohibited here even when they are true because they too often are
untrue. Does
the Committee concur with this ban on truthful speech?
Paragraph (6): So long as the debt-management-services
provider strips out the individual’s identifying information, it is would be free
to disclose information for purposes of academic research or construction of a
scoring system. If the identifying information is present, however,
this paragraph prohibits disclosure of any of the information, except as permitted
by the two specified exceptions.On the other
hand, t The only permissible purpose for a
disclosure to a creditor of the individual is to secure its cooperation.
Paragraph (7): The cross-referenced
section permits debt-settlement companies-services providers to
receive [15%]a portion
of the forgiven debt. Other agencies would not be entities are
not permitted to receive any portion of any forgiven debt. The drafting
may need further attention: by arranging for the compromise of “one or more
debts,” an agency could bring itself within the definition of
debt-settlement-services provider and thus be authorized by § 20(g) to receive up to [15%] of the forgiven debt.
Of course, the agency would then be subject to all other sections applicable to
debt-settlement-services providers. Furthermore, since the fee cap for
debt-settlement-services providers is a percentage of the forgiven debt, this
would provide incentives to a credit counseling agency only if it could
negotiate a large reduction in the debt. If the agency provides both
debt-management plans and debt-settlement plans, it must comply with provisions
of the Act that apply to each.
Paragraph (8): This paragraph is
intended to prohibit the sale to individuals of insurance and other products
that in other contexts have been the cause of large expense for largely
worthless products as a means of evading statutory regulation. The Drafting
Committee may wish to consider whether there are other evasions that should
specifically be mentioned, or whether t The catch-all at
the end of the paragraph sufficesis intended to thwart the
exercise of ingenuity in generating new ideas to evade the limits imposed by
the Act..
Paragraph (9): Paragraph (10)Subsection
(a)(8) prohibits misrepresentations that an agency is
authorized or competent to provide legal services. This subsection prohibits
performing those services, unless the person is a licensed attorney.
The unauthorized practice of law is prohibited by other law., and t This
paragraph makes it a violation of this Act, too, and makes it clear that nothing in this Act
authorizes a person to practice law. A provider
does not violate this subsection if the person providing legal
services is licensed in a state, even if not this state. It may,
however, violate that other law. The Drafting Committee will needs
to resolve a dilemma: this paragraph prohibits some activity of debt-settlement-services
providers companies, viz., preparation of or
advice concerning a settlement. compromise agreement. In addition,
depending on the resolution of the exemption issue, this paragraph may need an
exception for providers that are licensed attorneys.
Subsection (c): This paragraph prohibits a
provider from receiving compensation for performing specified services for a
third party if there is a certain connection between the third party (or
persons related to the third party) and the provider (or persons related to the
provider). In the previous draft the persons related to
the third party or the provider included “officer,
director, owner, employee, or affiliate.” The definition of “affiliate,”
however, includes officers, directors, and
controlling persons. Hence this draft deletes officers, directors, and owners
from the list of related persons, which now consists of employees and
affiliates. This is a drafting change but not a substantive change
(except, perhaps to the extent that “owner” is different from “a person
that controls”).
This paragraph supplements subsection (a)(7) (prohibiting referral fees). It is narrower than subsection (a)(7) in that it only applies if there is a particular relationship between the agency and the other person.
The prohibition is drawn from the Maryland
statute, but the Maryland statute only bans the practice if the debt-management-services
provider fails to disclose the relationship. If
self-dealing is offensive, disclosure is not a sufficient response.
Subsection (d): The purpose of this subsection is to prohibit the use of a counseling agency to channel money to related entities. Subsection (2) recognizes that members of an agency’s board of directors may provide services for free or on a reduced-fee basis. To the extent this practice benefits the agency more than obtaining the services elsewhere would benefit it, the practice seems unobjectionable. Limiting the nature of the services to those specified is designed to prevent attempted evasions of the limit. At the Annual Meeting a commissioner suggested changing “at a cost less than” to “at a cost no greater than.” A restraint on insider dealing is more effective if the exception is limited to below-market prices, but the Committee may wish to consider the suggestion.
The Drafting Committee may wish to consider expanding the kinds of services covered by this subsection and the kinds of insiders from whom the agency may purchase services. To the extent the agency purchases at below-market prices, the transaction is unobjectionable. The risk, of course, is re-opening the door to self-dealing.
The Committee should consider whether the prohibitions of subsection (c) and (d) are appropriate if the provider is a for-profit entity. With respect to subsection (d), is it a sufficient protection that the provider’s fees are capped? The prohibition in subsection (d) reinforces the fee cap and may provide a second line of defense if an enacting state loosens or abandons fee caps.
At the October 2004 meeting, it was
suggested that a provider be able to
purchase goods, services, or
facilities from any insider, not just directors, if the conditions of the
second sentence are met. The reporter’s notes fail to indicate the
Committee’s response to this suggestion. If the Committee wishes to pursue this
approach, the paragraph might read as follows:
A provider
may not purchase goods, services, or facilities from a person if an employee or
affiliate of the provider owns more than 10 percent of the person,
or an employee or affiliate of the provider
is an employee or affiliate of the provider of the goods, services,
or facilities, except that this subsection does not prohibit a provider from
purchasing legal, accounting, or banking services from any supplier of those
services that both
(1) supplies those
services generally; and
(2) supplies them to the provider at
a cost [no greater than][less than] the cost generally charged by the supplier
of those services to other persons.
Subsections (e)-(f):
The language of subsection (e) is drawn almost verbatim from the federal
statute. To eliminate some of the vagueness of the terms in these provisions, it subsection
(f) directs the courts to look to the interpretations given the
federal statute. This follows the approach of statutes in more than 20 states,
which direct their courts, in applying the state’s
unfair-or-deceptive-acts-or-practices statutes, to be guided by the federal
courts’ interpretation of section 5 of the FTC Act.
SECTION
24. ADVERTISING; MANDATORY PUBLIC
EDUCATION.
[(a)] All advertising for debt-management services other than
debt-settlement services, regardless of medium, must disclose in a
readily comprehensible manner the information specified in Section 14(d)(2)-(3) .
All
advertising for debt-settlement services, regardless of medium, must disclose
the information specified in Section
14(e) .
[(b) The administrator may provide public education
concerning personal finance and may assess a fee on [registered providers]
[each registered provider that in the preceding
calendar year spent more money on advertising than on public education.] The
administrator shall set the fee in such a way as to offset the
cost of this public education. In every calendar year, every debt-management-services
provider shall spend on public education concerning
personal finance an amount of money equal to the amount it spends on
advertising via the print media, the broadcast media, and the electronic
media, including e-mail. This public
education may not contain any self-promotion, but for purposes of this
subsection, self-promotion does not include mentioning the name of the debt-management-services
provider as the provider of the education at the beginning
or the end, or both, of the educational program. If the debt-management-services
provider is identified, the educational program must
clearly and conspicuously disclose the information specified in Section 14(d)
or (e) , as applicable.]
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a): This subsection
seeks to counteract the deception and pressure often exercised by debt-management-services
providers that engage in extensive advertising. In the
October 2004 meeting draft, theThe cross
references are was to the
provisions requiring disclosure of the success rate of the agency’s plans; the
likely impact on the individual’s credit report; that plans are not suitable
for all individuals; and that other alternatives for dealing with indebtedness
are available. To ease the disclosure burden,
in this draft the cross reference is to the
provisions requiring disclosure of the likely impact on credit rating and the
likelihood of collection efforts. To prevent the disclosures from becoming
The
time and conspicuousness of the disclosures needs further attention, lest they become
as incomprehensible as the Truth-in-Lending Act disclosures on TV
and radio, this draft requires that the information be
disclosed “in a readily comprehensible manner.” The Official
Comment could clarify that this refers to type size in print and TV ads and to speed of
delivery in TV and radio ads. At the Annual Meeting a commissioner
suggested as an alternative that the administrator’s web site contain
appropriate disclosures.
Subsection (b): This subsection
seeks to expand the amount of public education concerning management of
personal finance. The Drafting Committee has not yet decided whether
to include this section. As originally drafted, it
imposed an obligation to provide public
education on any provider that spent more money on advertising than on public
education. It is would have been a
lightening rod for objections, may have raised constitutional
issues, and might have required defining
“public education” in such a way as to preclude self-serving infomercials that
promote debt-management plans and underemphasize education. In addition, at the
Annual Meeting a commissioner observed that a provider could evade the spirit
of this
the requirement by placing the
required advertising in a medium or at a time that would reach a different
audience than its primary advertising reaches. It could, for example, direct
its public education to a population an audience that
it knows does not need the education or that the provider does not seek to
serve. Does
the Committee wish to pursue this subsection further? As an alternative, the
Act could direct the administrator to provide public education, funded by fees
imposed on licensed providers. For example: “A provider that spends more money
on advertising than on public education shall pay a fee in an amount determined
by the administrator. The administrator shall use the fee to provide public
education concerning personal finance and shall set the fee to offset the cost
of this education.” Or section 26 (Powers of Administrator) could be revised to
mandate or permit the administrator to provide public education (and to set the
fees to offset the cost). Would the Committee like to pursue this further? The current
draft makes public education a function of the administrator, leaves it to the
discretion of the administrator, and authorizes the administrator to shift the
costs of the effort to registered providers. The administrator may determine the fee
structure in any reasonable manner, including fees based on the provider’s
revenues or on the provider’s advertising expenditures. If the Committee adopts
this approach, the provision could appear here or in section 26
(Powers of Administrator).
Duties of Creditors: The
credit counseling industry is largely a creation of the credit card industry.
The expansion of credit card debt in the last two decades is at least partially
a result of the promotional activities of those credit card issuers. Arguably,
at the least, creditors have responsibility for dealing with the problems in
the counseling industry that led to the creation of this reform effort.
Creditors are assuming some responsibility on their own, as they revise the
manner in which they compensate the agencies for the benefits the agencies
provide them. But the Drafting Committee may wish to consider whether it is
appropriate to impose some obligations on the creditors, too.
Caveat: Credit card issuers that are
regulated by the federal banking authorities may not be subject to these
restrictions by virtue of the preemption of state law. Nevertheless, it may
still be appropriate for the state to assert its view of the proper public
policy with respect to these matters. It might even influence the rules adopted
by the federal regulators.
To stimulate discussion of the
propriety of imposing obligations on credit card issuers, the following
suggestion illustrates several obligations for the Drafting Committee to
consider:
SECTION
__. DUTIES OF CREDITORS.
(a)(1) For purposes of this section only,
“individual” means an individual who resides in this state;
(2) For purposes of
this section only, “creditor” means a creditor that extends credit to
individuals pursuant to an “open end credit plan,” as defined in the Federal
Truth-in-Lending Act §103(a)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 1602(a)(i); and
(3) For purposes of subsections (c), (d), (e),
and (f) only, “debt-management-services provider” means a
debt-management-services provider that is registered in this state.
(b) A creditor may not accept a proposed
debt-management plan from a debt-management-services provider unless the
debt-management-services provider is registered under Section 5 .
(c) A creditor that receives a proposal for a
debt-management services plan on behalf of an individual from a
debt-management-services provider shall respond to that proposal within 30 days
of receiving it.
(d) A creditor that receives payment on an
individual’s behalf from a debt-management-services provider shall permit the
[individual/provider] to alter the date of the month on which payment is due.
(e) A creditor may not increase the cost of
credit or make other changes in terms adverse to the individual, in whole or in
part because the individual has entered a debt-management plan with a
debt-management-services provider.
(f) A creditor that receives money on behalf of
individuals from debt-management-services providers other than
debt-settlement-services providers shall compensate those
debt-management-services providers. The creditor may allocate the payments
among those providers in whatever way it elects, so long as the aggregate
payments to all those providers is at least [ten] percent of the aggregate
amounts received from them.
(g) A creditor may not, directly or indirectly,
impose a fee, commission, or other charge on a debt-management-services provider
for referring individuals to the provider.
(h) A creditor that receives more than [one
million] dollars in a calendar year from debt-management-services providers
shall, pursuant to a rule promulgated by the administrator, pay the
administrator [$10,000] to support the administration of this [act].
Reporter’s Note: The
reference in subsection (a)(2) is to “open end credit plan” because the
Truth-in-Lending Act uses that term. The FRB’s implementing regulation, known
as Regulation Z, defines and uses the term “open-end credit.” In interpreting
the definition in this section, the intent is that the courts will interpret
“open-end credit plan” in accordance with the interpretation given the term by
Regulation Z, the Board’s Official Commentary, and judicial decisions.
The Reporter’s Note to § 23(a)(12) raises the issue whether
agencies should be permitted to pay for screening services.
Subsection (g) presumes that the answer is “no,” and complements
that section by barring the creditor from charging for screening services.
SECTION
25. CRIMINAL PENALTY. Upon conviction, aA person that
knowingly and willfully violates this [act] or a rule or order issued
under this [act] shall be fined not more than [$1,000] for the first violation
and shall be fined not more than [$5,000] or imprisoned not more than [five]
years, or both, for each subsequent violation. is guilty of a
[felony/misdemeanor] and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding
[$1,000] for the first violation and to a fine not exceeding [$5,000] or
imprisonment not exceeding [five] years, or both, for each subsequent
violation.
Preliminary Comments
At the Annual Meeting a commissioner
suggested that if this section remains, it ought to specify the level of the
crime (or leave that to each state) and not specify the sanction, since the
general criminal law specifies the sanctions. Another commissioner suggested
that not all violations of the Act merit criminal sanctions and this section
should be narrowed accordingly. A third commissioner suggested eliminating the
section altogether and relying on the general criminal statutes. A fourth
commissioner sent a message pointing out a problem that may arise in a
prosecutor’s ability to charge a person with a crime under this section as it
existed in the 2004 Annual Meeting Draft. He
passed on the comments of a deputy attorney general in his state:
Here are the
general virtues I believe will improve statutes that include criminal
sanctions:
(1) A
statute that creates a crime should include a title that clearly and concisely
describes the proscribed behavior (murder in the first degree, kidnapping,
robbery, etc., not “penalties”);
(2) A clear
and logical recitation of as few elements as are necessary to clearly define
the proscribed behavior (not 127 pages of a complex chapter followed by “any
person who violates this chapter shall be guilty of a misdemeanor”);
(3) A
penalty section that simply states the category of crime without giving details
as to the sentence (for example, “kidnapping is a class A felony,” not “any
person who violates this section shall be punished as follows”-- sentencing
details should be addressed in other sections or chapters that deal exclusively
with sentencing and that set forth penalties to be applied to all crimes of a
given category); and
(4) Each
crime should be set forth in a single statutory section that defines a single
crime and categorizes the crime in a single category such as “misdemeanor” or
“class B felony,” etc....
A treatise could be written on
this subject, but following the above principles and following the general
principles of good legislative drafting will promote the creation of criminal
prohibitions that are simple to understand and stated in such a way that the
prosecution and defense of these crimes will focus more on a determination of
the facts and less on the semantics of the statutory section alleged to have
been violated. Complexity is the enemy of justice when society seeks to define
criminal behavior.
At the
October 2004 meeting, a member of the Committee suggested the Uniform
Securities Act as a model. The current draft of this section is modeled on
section 508 of that act. It criminalizes all violations of the Act and all
violations of the administrator’s rules and orders. A more
limited approach would be to criminalize the violation of specified sections of
the Act, such as sections
If the level of crime is a felony
(of whatever class), the section might be limited to violations of §
5 (registration requirement), § 12 (bond requirement), § 19
(trust account requirement), § 20(a) (fee limits), and § 23
(prohibited acts and practices). This would be somewhat, though not totally,
responsive to the views quoted above.
As now drafted, there is no requirement that only the administrator may initiate a criminal prosecution. Any law enforcement official with the general authority to initiate criminal prosecutions may initiate a prosecution for violation of this Act. Nor does this section in any way preclude prosecution under any other law of this state.
The Committee must decide: (1)
whether the Act should contain criminal sanctions; (2) if so, whether it should
be a felony or misdemeanor; and (32)
the sections for which violation should carry criminal sanctions.
SECTION 26. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATOR.
(a) The administrator shall determine whether to
approve an application for registration or renewal of registration of a debt-management-services
provider.
(b) The administrator may act on its own initiative or
in response to complaints and may receive complaints, take action to obtain
voluntary compliance with this [act], refer cases to the [attorney general] for
prosecution, and seek or provide remedies pursuant to Section 27.
(c) The administrator has the
power tomay:
(1) investigate and examine, in this state or elsewhere, by subpoena or otherwise, the activities, books, accounts, and records of a person that provides or offers to provide debt-management services to determine compliance with this [act];
(2) charge to the person the reasonable expenses
necessarily incurred to conduct the examination; and
(3) require or permit a person to file a
statement under oath as to all the facts and circumstances of a matter to be
investigated; and
(4) recover from the bank at which the trust account required by Section 19 is maintained all money, books, records, accounts, and other property of the provider that is in the control of the bank and, if the provider is neither organized under the laws of this state nor maintains its principal office in this state, relates to individuals who reside in this state.
(c) The administrator may receive and act on
complaints,take action to obtain voluntary compliance with this [act], refer
cases to the [attorney general] for prosecution, and seek or provide remedies
pursuant to Section 27.
(d) The administrator may adopt rules to carry out the requirements and further the purposes of this [act] in accordance with Section .
(e) The administrator may enter into cooperative arrangements with any other federal or state agency having authority over persons providing debt-management services and may exchange with any of those agencies information about a person providing debt-management services, including information obtained during an examination of the person.
(f) The administrator, by rule,
shall [may]
establish reasonable fees for processing an application for
registration or renewal of a registration in the amount
reasonably necessary for administering this [act].
(g) The administrator shall adjust the dollar
amounts specified in Sections 2(3), 6(b), 8(c), 12(d), (e), (f), and
(h), 20(c), (e), and (g), 25, 27(a) and (b), and 30(c) and (d) of this [act]
to reflect inflation, as measured by the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, or other index adopted
by rule by the administrator.
Legislative Notes:
Subsection (db):
If the administrator is the attorney general, the last penultimate clause
(“refer
cases to the [attorney general]”) should be
deleted. If the state wishes the prosecution to be handled by some other
official,
the name of that
official should be substituted for “attorney general.”
Subsection
(ed):
Insert the citation to the appropriate section of the Administrative Procedure
Act or other statute governing administrative procedure.
Preliminary Comments
Subsections (b) and (c) from
the October 2004 Meeting Draft have
been inverted and modified to clarify that the administrator may
act on its own initiative.
Subsection (bc):
At the Annual Meeting a commissioner suggested establishing a limit on the
amount of expenses that could be charged to the provider, specifically, limiting
liability for investigative charges to those instances in which the
administrator concludes that the provider has violated the Act. At the
October 2004 meeting the Committee was disinclined to impose
this limitation, and this draft remains unchanged in that respect.
The prior draft of subsection (cb)
provided that failure to comply with what is now subsection
(c)(3)(b)(2)
was grounds for a cease and desist order, but it was not clear what the person
is to cease and desist from. In this draft the failure to comply is grounds for
suspension of registration, and the provision has been moved to § section 29(a)(4).
Subsection (d): The administrator
has broad powers to adopt rules to implement and further the purposes of this Act.
In exercising this power, however, the administrator should be mindful of section 35,
which exhorts those enforcing the Act to promote uniformity among the
enacting states.
In sSubsection
(f):,
The criterion
for setting “reasonable” fees is the amount necessary to defray the costs of
administering the Act, not just the costs of the registration process. This could
be a very large figure. Does the Committee wish to reconsider this? does the
Drafting Committee wish to specify criteria for setting “reasonable” fees, e.g.,
“establish reasonable fees to cover the cost of processing an application”? Or
should the fees perhaps be set at a level to cover all the costs of
administering the Act?
Subsection (f) might also provide,
“The administrator may retain for the use of the administrator the aggregate of
fees, reimbursement of examination expenses, and any other payment made to the
administrator pursuant to this [act] and may carry forward any balance of money
from a fiscal year to be expended for the administration and enforcement of the
[act] in the following fiscal year.” The Maryland statute contains a more
elaborate version. The Oregon statute provides that fees of the type referred
to here stay with the administrator, but that all civil penalties of the type
received by the administrator pursuant to Ssection 27 shall be credited to the general money of the
state treasury.) Does the Drafting Committee wish to include anything along
these lines?
Subsection (g): The administrator
must adjust annually all dollar amounts that appear
in the Act. Those amounts are found in the following
sections:
Section 2(3)(D): threshold for
becoming an affiliate ($25,000)
Section 6(b)(4): employee theft
insurance ($250,000)
Section 8(c)(2): independence of
board of directors ($25,000)
Section 12(d), (e), (f): bond
($100,000)
Section 12(h): insurance deductible
($10,000)
Section 20(c)(2), (e)(2): fee caps
(Alt. B)
Section 20(g): NSF fee ($25)
Section 25: criminal penalty ($1000/$5000)
Section 27(a), (b): civil penalty
($10,000)
Section 30(c): minimum damages ($5,000)
Section 30(d): punitive damages ($10,000)
SECTION 27. ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
(a) [After notice and an opportunity for a
hearing,
t] The administrator may enforce this
[act] and rules adopted under this [act] by:
(1) ordering a violator or an officer, director, or employee of a violator to cease and desist from the violation and any similar violations;
(2) ordering a violator or a person who has caused a violation to take affirmative action to correct the violation, including the restitution of money or property to a person aggrieved by a violation;
(3) imposing a civil penalty not exceeding
[$5,000] for each violation; and
(4) revoking, suspending, or denying renewal of a
debt-management-services
provider’s registration in accordance with Section 29 .;
(b) The administrator may enforce this [act] and
rules adopted under this [act] by:
(15) commencing a civil action to obtain
restitution, an injunction or other equitable relief, or both; and
(26) intervening in an action brought pursuant to
Section 30.
(cb) If a person violates or knowingly authorizes,
directs, or aids in the violation of a final order issued under subsection
(a)(1) or (2), the administrator may impose a civil penalty not exceeding
[$10,000] for each violation.
(dc) The administrator may file a
petition institute in any
[county] an action to enforce seeking enforcement of
an order issued under this section.
(ed) In determining the amount of a civil penalty
to be imposed under subsection (a) or (c), the administrator shall consider the
seriousness of the violation, the good faith of the violator, the violator’s
history of previous violations, the deleterious effect of the violation on the
public, the assets net worth of the
violator, and any other factor the administrator considers relevant to the
determination of the civil penalty.
Preliminary Comments
The administrator should be able to
issue an order to an agent or employee of a debt-management-services provider,
whether or not the administrator issues an order to the provider. Is this
implicit in subsection (a), or should the section contain an explicit statement
to that effect?
Subsection (a): At the October 2004 meeting the Committee decided to permit the administrator to proceed without specifying the need for notice and an opportunity for a hearing. This permits the incorporation of former subsection (b) into subsection (a). The administrator’s power and procedure is governed by the state’s administrative procedure act.
Subsection (a) has been
revised also to permit the administrator to proceed against those officers,
directors, or employees who are
responsible for a provider’s violation of the Act.
Subsection (a)(5) authorizes the
administrator to commence civil actions. Section 26(db) authorizes the administrator to refer cases to
the attorney general for prosecution. The drafting Drafting Committee
needs to decide whether to place all enforcement in the hands of the
administrator, split it between the administrator and the attorney general, or
let the states choose which model to use.
The Oregon statute provides that an
individual may initiate proceedings before the administrator, who is empowered
to award damages, which may be recovered by resort to the debt-management-services
provider’s bond. The Drafting Committee may wish to
consider the desirability of establishing this adjudicatory function for the
administrator in this Act.
SECTION
28. VIOLATION OF UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE
PRACTICES STATUTE. If an act or practice of a provider violates both
this [act] and Section ______, an individual may not recover under both for the
same act or practice. A violation of this [act] constitutes [an unfair or
deceptive act or practice] in violation of Section .
Legislative Note: Insert the citation
to the state’s little-FTC or deceptive practices act., and in the
brackets insert the appropriate descriptive phrase, e.g., “deceptive trade
practice.” In some states it may be necessary to amend that act to add this Act
to the statutes whose violation constitutes a violation of that act.
Alternatively, this entire Act could be appended to and be a part of that act.
Depending on the provisions of that other act, this might permit deletion of
Section 25 (criminal penalty), Section 26(b)-(e) (investigatory power, referral to
the attorney general, rule-making power), and much of Section 27 (administrative
remedies).
Preliminary Comments
The
prior version of this section stated that a violation of this Act constitutes a
violation of the deceptive practices statute. The current version
acknowledges that conduct that violates this Act also
may violate that other statute. The section
prohibits recovery under multiple statutes for the same conduct. The aggrieved individual may seek relief
under either statute.
SECTION 29. SUSPENSION, REVOCATION, OR NON-RENEWAL OF REGISTRATION.
(a) [After notice and an opportunity to be
heard,
t]The administrator may suspend,
revoke, or deny renewal of a debt-management-services provider’s
registration if the administrator finds concludes that:
(1) a fact or condition exists that, if it had existed when the registrant applied for registration, would have been ground for denying registration;
(2) the debt-management-services provider
has violated a material provision of this [act] or a rule or order of the
administrator under this [act];
(3) the debt-management-services provider
is insolvent;
(4) the debt-management-services provider
or an employee or affiliate of the provider has refused to permit the
administrator to make an examination authorized by this [act], has failed to
comply with Section 26(bc)(3) within 15 days after request, or has made a
material misrepresentation or omission in complying with Section 26(bc)(3) ;
or
(5) the debt-management-services provider
has not responded within a reasonable time and in an appropriate manner to
communications from the administrator.
(b) If a debt-management-services provider
does not comply with Section 19(f) or if the administrator otherwise finds
that the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action, the
administrator may order a summary suspension effective on the date specified in
the order. [The administrator shall hold a
hearing promptly thereafter to determine whether to revoke the registration.]
(c) If the administrator suspends, revokes, or
denies renewal of the registration of a debt-management-services provider,
the administrator may seize any records and assets of the provider which are located
in this state. This power is in addition to the powers of the
administrator under the consent required by Section 6(c)(24) .
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (a): The Committee did
not discuss this section at the October 2004 meeting. Presumably, however, if
the Act does not specify the need for notice and
hearing in section 27, it need not specify
it here either. Hence, the
change in this subsection. Should the words “the administrator concludes that” be deleted
as well?
Subsection (b): Section 19(f) deals with failure to maintain a trust account
in an amount at least equal to the sum of the
balances in each individual’s escrow account. If the section does not
specify the need for prior notice and opportunity for a hearing, the
bracketed sentence should be deleted.
Subsection (c): Section 6(c)(24)
requires the agency to provide an irrevocable consent by the bank
holding the trust account to enable the administrator to access to the account.
At the Annual meeting a commissioner
suggested that this section be restructured. As now drafted, the
administrator may take the specified actions. it places an adjudicatory
function on the administrator. The suggestion is that the administrator
not have the power to suspend or revoke a registration and that this section
merely
specify the grounds on which the administrator could ask a court
to take
that action. suspend or revoke a registration. Does the
Committee wish to pursue this suggestion? (If so, If this
suggestion is pursued, it will be necessary to deal separately
with non-renewal of registration.)
SECTION 30. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT.
(a) If an individual voids an
agreement pursuant to Section 18(a), the individual may recover in a civil
action all money paid or deposited by or on behalf of the individual pursuant
to the agreement [except for amounts paid to creditors], together
with recovery under subsection (d)(2) and (3).
(b) If an individual
voids an agreement pursuant to
Section 21(e), the individual may recover in
a civil action [three times
the amount of the unauthorized fees, charges, money, or payments] [the total of all amounts
paid or deposited by or on behalf
of the individual pursuant to the agreement], together
with recovery under subsection (d)(2) and (3).
(c) If a provider
fails to comply with Section
21(f), an individual
may recover in a civil action two times
the unauthorized money, together with recovery under subsection (d)(2) and
(3).
(ad) An individual who is injured by a violation
of this [act] other than Section 6 or 10 or by a
violation of a rule promulgated adopted by the
administrator under this [act] other than a rule adopted to
implement Section 6 or 10 may recover in a civil
action:
(1) subject to subsection (be)(1),
compensatory damages, including damages for non-economic injury,
or, for violation of Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, [19], 20, 21, 22, or 23, the
greater of compensatory damages, including damages for non-economic injury,
or $[15,000];
(2) subject to subsections (be)(2)
and (cf),
punitive damages; and
(3) the costs of the action, including reasonable attorney’s fees based on the amount of time involved.
(be) In a class action:
(1) except for violation of Section 23(a)(2), the
minimum damages provision in subsection (ad)(1)
does not apply; and
(2) punitive damages may not exceed [$10,000] per class member.
(cf) In determining the amount of punitive damages
under subsection (ad)(2) or (be)(2),
the court shall consider the seriousness of the violation, the good faith of
the violator, the violator’s history of previous violations, the deleterious
effect of the violation on the public, the assets net worth of
the violator, and any other factor the court considers relevant to the
determination of the damages.
(g) In addition to the remedy available under subsection (d), if a provider fails to give effect to an individual’s rights under Section 16(f), the individual may recover in a civil action all money paid or deposited by or on behalf of the individual pursuant to the agreement.
(dh)
An individual’s action, except a class action, takes precedence over a prior or
subsequent action by the administrator with respect to the claim of that
individual. An individual’s class action takes precedence over a subsequent
action by the administrator with respect to claims common to both actions, but
the administrator may intervene. An administrator’s action on behalf of a class
of consumers takes precedence over a consumer’s subsequent class action with
respect to claims common to both actions. Whenever an action takes precedence
over another action under this subsection, the latter action may be stayed to
the extent appropriate while the precedent action is pending and may be
dismissed if the precedent action is dismissed with prejudice or results in a
final judgment granting or denying the claim asserted in the precedent action.
Preliminary Comments
This section specifies the private
remedies for an individual who has been injured by a violation of this Act.
More than one subsection may apply to a particular violatioin, and the
individual may recover under any of them, so long as there is not double
recovery for the violation.
Subsections (a), (b), and (c) have
been relocated from sections 18 (Void Agreements) and 21 (Fees: Other Limits),
pursuant to the Committee’s decision to locate all
remedies provisions in one section.
Subsection (a) : Section
18(a) makes an agreement voidable if the provider is not properly registered
under this Act. Under this subsection the individual may recover all money paid
by the individual[, except for amounts passed on
to creditors]. This sanction is to disgorge
all money that the provider otherwise would have earned for its services.
Subsection (b): Section
21(e) permits an individual to void an agreement if a provider exceeds the fee
caps. The Committee must decide whether, when an individual elects to void the
agreement, the individual should be able to recover three times the overcharge or the more
deterrence-oriented remedy of returning all money received from the individual,
including the money that was paid over to the creditors. For an overcharge,
forfeiture of all amounts received may be too draconian. A similar question is
presented under subsection (a), where the
remedy, although draconian, may nevertheless be appropriate.
Subsection (c): Section 21(f)
requires a provider that has unintentionally exceeded the fee caps to return
the excess charges within two days after learning of the
overcharge. If the provider fails to do so, subsection (c) provides for recovery
of twice the overcharge.
Subsection (ad):
“Compensatory damage” in paragraph (1), which includes
recovery for non-economic injury, encompasses such as emotional
distress, humiliation, aggravation, etc. Is “compensatory” the best
word to capture this idea?
The minimum damages provision applies only to the specified violations (prerequisites for a plan, electronic communication, form and contents of an agreement, failure to use foreign language documents, trust account, fee caps, other limitations on fees, periodic reports, and prohibited acts and practices). For violation of other sections, including failure to register and failure to provide customer service, the aggrieved individual may recover actual and punitive damages. The administrator also may enforce these other sections. Does the Committee concur with this dichotomy?
“Costs of the action” in paragraph (3) encompasses filing fees, jury fees, expert witness fees, and everything else that properly may be taxed as costs against the losing party.
Subsection (be):
An aggrieved individual may proceed by class action if the prerequisites for
class actions under the rules of civil procedure are satisfied.
Subsection (g) is new. It
implements the remedy implicit in section 16(f)
when an individual exercises the right to
rescind: section
16(a)(5) requires a provider to deliver to the individual, immediately upon
formation, a copy of an agreement that complies with
Sections 16 and 23. If the provider complies with this
obligation, the individual has only three days to rescind. Upon
rescission, the provider must refund all money paid by the individual. The
provider can protect itself against any out-of-pocket loss
by keeping any such money until the three-day
period has expired, in which event this subsection imposes no loss on the
provider. If, however, the provider fails to
deliver a proper copy of the agreement, the
rescission period is 30 days, in which event rescission
may very well occur after the provider
has disbursed funds to creditors. In this scenario, the remedy in this subsection results in
an out-of-pocket loss to the provider. It thus provides an additional incentive
for the provider to conform to the
requirements of sections 16 and 23.
At the Annual Meeting a commissioner
suggested adding a provision to resolve possible conflicts between public and
private enforcement actions. Subsection (dh)
is drawn almost verbatim from UCCC § 6.113.
SECTION 31. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
(a) An action brought pursuant to Section 27 must
be commenced within [four] years of after the
act of which the administrator complains.
(b) An action brought pursuant to Section 30 must
be commenced within [four] two years from after the
latest of:
(1) the individual’s last transmission of money
to a debt-management-services
provider;
(2) an individual’s last transmission of money to
a creditor at the direction of a debt-management-services provider;
(3) a debt-management-services provider’s last
disbursement to creditors;
(4) a debt-management-services provider’s
last accounting to the individual pursuant to Section 22(a)(1) and (2) ; or
(5) the date on which the individual discovered
or reasonably should have discovered the facts giving rise to the individual’s
claim; and
(6) termination of proceedings by the administrator with respect to a violation of the [act].
(c) The period prescribed in subsection (b)(5) is tolled during any period during which the defendant has materially and willfully misrepresented information required by this [act] to be disclosed to the individual if the information so misrepresented is material to the establishment of the liability of the defendant under this [act].
Preliminary Comments
Subsection (b): Paragraph (3) is
new. It has been added to reflect that the scope of the Act encompasses debt
settlement.
The Drafting Committee must decide
upon the appropriate triggers to start the statute of limitations. Presumably
the trigger should not be simply the date of the violation, because if the
violation appears in the documents, the statute may have run before the
individual completes the debt-management plan. Under the
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act (§ 11), triggers are violation of the Act,
last payment by the individual, or termination of proceedings by the
administrator.
At the October 2004 meeting, the
Committee seemed to concur with the triggers in the draft. This draft adds a
new trigger, drawn from the UCSPA (termination of proceedings by the
administrator). There was some sentiment at the October meeting that four years
was appropriate for actions by the administrator, but too long for private actions. In
this draft the limitations period for private enforcement is two years.
Subsection (c): The language of this
subsection is from H.R. 3331, a bill to regulate debt-management-services providers. The Style
Committee has observed that it is ambiguous and will always require judicial
action to implement.
[SECTION 32. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this [act] or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions of applications of this [act] that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this [act] are severable.]
SECTION 33. RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT. This [act] modifies, limits, and supersedes the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (15 U.S.C. Section 7001 et seq.) but does not modify, limit, or supersede Section 101(c) of that act (15 U.S.C. Section 7001(c)) or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices described in Section 103(b) of that act (15 U.S.C. Section 7003(b)).
SECTION
34. RELATION TO LAW OF OTHER STATES STATES.
(a) If compliance with a provision of this [act]
by a debt-management-services
provider located in this state would constitute a violation in
another state of a statute that regulates persons providing or offering to
provide debt-management services, the debt-management-services provider
need not comply with the that provision of this
[act] with respect to its operations in that state.
(b) Failure to comply with a provision of this [act] pursuant to subsection (a) is not a violation of this [act] or ground for denial, suspension, or revocation of a license under this [act].
Preliminary Comments
This section addresses the situation
of an agency that is subject to inconsistent requirements in two states. It
accommodates only agencies that are physically located in this state. A
domestic agency must comply with this Act with respect to individuals in this
state. It must comply with this Act also with respect to individuals in other
states, except to the extent that compliance with the law of those other states
would put it in violation of this Act, to which extent it may ignore this Act.
This section makes no allowance for agencies located in other states. Those
entities must comply with the requirements of this Act even if that puts them
in violation of the law of the state in which they are located. The section
thus in all cases gives priority to the state in which the affected individuals
reside.
The ABA Advisor to the
Committee has observed that this provision does not adequately
address the burden imposed on providers by section 3. That section extends this
Act to a provider that is located in
this state (or organized under the laws of this
state) even though it does not provide services to any
individual in this state. Section 34 offers relief to this provider only to the
extent that compliance with the Act would place the provider in
violation of the law of another state. If compliance with both is
possible, the provider would have to comply with both. The result of this is
that, with respect to each requirement that the two
states impose, the provider will have to comply with the more
onerous one. To illustrate, assume this
state has a fee cap of $50 and a bond
requirement of $100,000, and the state in which its
customer resides has a fee cap of $75 and a bond
requirement of $250,000. Under the operation of section 34, the provider
would not get the benefit of the higher fee cap in the
other state, since compliance with this Act
would not put it in violation of the law of the other
state; but it would have to post a bond of $250,000 even though
this state only requires $100,000. The provider is in the
position of determining whether the law of the two states on any given matter
is different and then always having to comply with the
more burdensome one. To respond to this predicament,
subsection (a) could be revised to read:
If a
provider located in this state provides debt-management services to an
individual residing in another state and the other state permits and regulates
persons providing debt-management services to its residents, the provider need
not comply with provisions of this [act] with respect to those individuals.
This would
not relieve the provider of the need to register, and the state would retain
its authority (and responsibility) to regulate entities that are located in the state or organized
under the laws of the state. The Act would be fully
applicable to the extent a provider is serving individuals in a state that bans the business
of debt management or a state in which the statutes
are silent. But if the other state has a statutory scheme for
regulating providers, this language would relieve the provider of
having to comply with any part of this Act with respect to the residents of the
other state.
A less extreme response
would be to exempt a provider from having to
comply with the provisions of this Act that are different from the
corresponding provisions of the law of the other state. So, for example,
if the other state did not address the subject of
dealing with affiliates, the provider would still have to comply with the ban
in this Act. (The last clause might read, “the
provider need not comply with provisions of this [act] that are different from
the specific provisions of the law in the other state.”)
SECTION
35. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND
CONSTRUCTION. In applying and construing this Uniform Act,
consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with
respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
SECTION 36. EFFECTIVE DATE. This [act] takes effect on [ ].
SECTION 37. REPEAL. The following sections are repealed:
Legislative Note: Insert the citation
to any existing legislation regulating consumer credit counseling,
debt settlement, debt adjustment, debt prorating, or the like.debt-management
services.
SECTION 38. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS; APPLICATION TO EXISTING TRANSACTIONS. Transactions validly entered into before this [act] takes effect and the rights, duties, and interests resulting from them may be completed, terminated, or enforced as required or permitted by a law amended, repealed, or modified by this [act] as though the amendment, repeal, or modification had not occurred.
Preliminary Comments
“Law” includes statutes,
administrative rules, and judicial decisions. It may be burdensome for a debt-management-services
provider to comply with prior law for some of its customers and
with this Act for others of its customers. The language of this section, “may
be,” permits a provider to comply with this Act even with respect to
transactions entered before this Act takes effect.